Decades before Israel’s strategic cooperation with the United States in Operations Rising Lion and Roaring Lion, Israel launched a joint operation with France and Britain. Its enemy at the time was Egypt, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser. The circumstances have changed beyond recognition since then, but the strategic questions remain familiar.
In late October 1956, Israel launched Operation Kadesh as part of a secret agreement with France and Britain, in coordination with Operation Musketeer, the British-French military operation against Egypt during the 1956 Suez Crisis, which had been secretly coordinated with Israel. In just eight days, the IDF achieved an impressive military victory: its forces advanced rapidly across the Sinai Peninsula, struck Egyptian forces and infrastructure, and captured extensive territory. The political outcome, however, was more complicated. Heavy international pressure, led by the United States, forced Israel to withdraw from all the territories it had captured within a few months.
The Sinai Campaign therefore raises questions that extend beyond the realm of historical debate: When are the conditions right for going to war? How is a strategic decision made under conditions of uncertainty? How do relations between the political and military leadership affect decision-making? And what role should a cautious political position play when most decision-makers favor military action?
The Background: Infiltrations, Fedayeen and the Arms Race
In the mid-1950s, Israel faced a difficult security reality and the threat of another war with the Arab states, particularly Egypt and Jordan. Egypt was regarded as the strongest and most dangerous of Israel’s adversaries, while the threat along the Jordanian border persisted. On both fronts, Israel faced infiltrations, terrorist attacks and border incidents.
Infiltrations began after the War of Independence, initially involving attempts by refugees to return to the homes and villages they had left behind. Later, armed infiltrators and gangs also carried out acts of sabotage. From mid-1955, this was compounded by the fedayeen force established by Egypt, numbering approximately 600 men. Its members infiltrated from the Gaza Strip and Jordanian territory and carried out attacks throughout Israel. During the years of infiltration and terrorism, more than 500 Israelis were killed and approximately 800 wounded. The persistent attacks undermined the sense of security, particularly in communities along the borders, and intensified pressure for a response.
One of the most horrific incidents was the Ma’ale Akrabim massacre in March 1954, in which 11 passengers on an Israeli bus were murdered. Such events highlighted the difficulties faced by the young state in defending its borders and citizens.
Israel responded with reprisal operations. The most prominent of these, Operation Black Arrow in Gaza in February 1955, demonstrated the IDF’s operational capabilities, but the deaths of dozens of Egyptian soldiers further intensified the confrontation. The reprisal operations also deepened divisions within Israel’s leadership. David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett disagreed over whether the operations deterred the enemy or instead encouraged escalation and narrowed Israel’s room for diplomatic maneuver.
In September 1955, Nasser announced the Czech-Egyptian arms deal. Forged against the backdrop of the escalating confrontation with Israel, the deal included hundreds of aircraft, tanks and artillery pieces, along with extensive quantities of weapons and ammunition. In Israel, concerns grew that Egypt would initiate a war once it had completed the integration of the new weapons and trained its forces to operate them. These concerns were compounded by Egypt’s closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and its prevention of Israeli vessels from passing through the Suez Canal.
The situation along the Jordanian border also deteriorated during the second half of 1956. Infiltrations, terrorist attacks, gunfire and mine-laying led to reprisal operations, including Operation Shomron in Qalqilya on the night of October 11. The fear that the border confrontation could develop into a full-scale war was real.
The fedayeen attacks were therefore an important factor in the decision to launch the Sinai Campaign, but not the only one. The decision stemmed from a combination of immediate security needs, changes in the balance of power, restrictions on freedom of navigation and the desire to strengthen deterrence, alongside a diplomatic opportunity that had emerged in the international arena.
The Diplomatic Opportunity: The Secret Alliance at Sèvres
Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956 intensified his confrontation with Britain and France. Both countries sought to weaken him, ensure freedom of navigation through the canal and restore their influence in the region. This created a convergence of interests with Israel.
Following a series of secret contacts, a summit was held on October 22-24 at Sèvres, near Paris. The Israeli delegation included Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ben-Gurion, Director-General of the Ministry of Defense Shimon Peres, and IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan. They met with senior representatives of France and Britain.
The agreement signed on October 24 stipulated that Israel would launch an operation in Sinai and create a threat to the Suez Canal area. Britain and France would intervene under the pretext of separating the two sides and protecting the canal. In practice, their aim was to undermine Nasser’s standing and regain control of the canal zone.
The agreement opened a window of opportunity for Israel, but also created a dependency: the outcome of the campaign would be determined not only by the IDF’s ability to win, but also by the actions of its allies and the responses of the United States and the Soviet Union. This lies at the heart of one of the central questions raised by the Sinai Campaign: Did the alliance that made the military operation possible also guarantee that its achievements would be preserved after the fighting ended?
Four Figures, Four Perspectives on Decision-MMaking
The Sinai Campaign was shaped to a large extent by four individuals, each representing a different aspect of decision-making: political determination, the use of force, force buildup, and diplomatic caution.
David Ben-Gurion: Political and Strategic Decision-Making
Ben-Gurion had to weigh the Egyptian threat, the changing balance of power, and the issue of the Straits of Tiran against the opportunity to cooperate with France and Britain. He saw the importance of striking at the Egyptian army and the fedayeen infrastructure, strengthening deterrence, and improving Israel’s regional standing.
His decision to keep the preparations and coordination secret from most members of the government, following Sharett’s removal as foreign minister, also raises questions about the limits of secrecy in decision-making. Secrecy helped preserve the element of surprise, but narrowed the circle of participants and limited the range of views considered in discussions about an operation with far-reaching implications.
Moshe Dayan: Campaign Strategy and the Use of Force
Dayan, who had served as IDF Chief of Staff since late 1953, was one of the strongest advocates of military action against Egypt. As early as late 1955, he proposed capturing Sharm el-Sheikh to lift the blockade on shipping through the Straits of Tiran. The proposal was rejected, but this objective was later incorporated into the campaign’s operational plans.
Together with the head of the Operations Directorate, Major General Meir Amit, Dayan was involved in planning and preparing the IDF for a large-scale military operation. The army was required to maneuver along several axes, confront a substantial Egyptian force, and achieve its objectives quickly. Its success demonstrated its capabilities, but also raised a question that went beyond operational execution: To what extent did the military plan serve the political objective, and what was needed to preserve the achievements after the fighting ended?
Shimon Peres: Force Buildup and Relations with France
Peres played a central role in deepening security ties with France and securing aircraft, tanks, and additional weapons systems. These ties helped Israel address Egypt’s military buildup and had already become a strategic asset before the campaign.
His contribution went beyond his participation in the secret negotiations at Sèvres. He was involved in a prolonged process of building up Israel’s military capabilities and preparing the army for a possible war. At the same time, his activities through security channels, bypassing the Foreign Ministry, also highlighted tensions between different centers of decision-making. The advantages of the alliance with France required an assessment of its limitations and the diplomatic price it entailed.
Moshe Sharett: The Diplomatic Voice and the Fear of Escalation
Sharett, who served as foreign minister until June 1956, represented a more cautious approach. He feared that reprisal operations would intensify the confrontation, damage Israel’s international standing, and reduce the prospects for diplomatic solutions.
The dispute between him and Ben-Gurion intensified after the latter returned to the post of defense minister in February 1955, and even more so after he resumed the premiership later that year. It concerned the relationship between military power and diplomacy, the role of the United Nations, and how to deal with Egypt and international pressure.
Sharett’s forced resignation in June 1956 was the result of a prolonged personal, political, and ideological rift. It should not be attributed to a specific disagreement over Operation Kadesh, which began approximately four months later and whose preparatory negotiations Sharett did not take part in. Nevertheless, his departure from the government removed a prominent voice that had emphasized the diplomatic costs of using military force.
This does not prove that Sharett was right in all his positions or that avoiding war would necessarily have been preferable. The significance of his approach lies in the insistence on examining whether military action improves Israel’s position and what risks it entails, particularly the danger of drawing the country into an escalating cycle that may be difficult to control.
The four individuals illustrate that strategic decision-making requires a combination of determination and critical examination: Ben-Gurion made the decision, Dayan planned and directed the use of force, Peres advanced military buildup and security ties, while Sharett emphasized the diplomatic risks. The quality of a decision also depends on the ability to listen to views that contradict those of the decision-makers.
The Military Achievement and the Human Cost
Operation Kadesh began on October 29, 1956, and ended on November 5. Within just a few days, the IDF achieved most of its military objectives, took control of extensive areas of Sinai and the Gaza Strip, and dealt a severe blow to the Egyptian army. It was the largest-scale campaign the IDF had conducted up to that point, and the first in which forces operating at divisional level were deployed.
The success rested on operational preparations, reserve mobilization, planning, and deception. The mobilization of forces was presented to the public as a response to fears of surprise attacks along the borders, thereby preserving ambiguity about Israel’s intentions. Only a handful of senior officials knew the full details of the coordination with France and Britain. The government was asked to approve the operational plan on October 28, the eve of its launch.
The element of surprise contributed to the rapid advance, but it was accompanied by force preparation, command and control capabilities, the selection of operational routes, and the exploitation of weaknesses in the Egyptian defensive deployment. The experience accumulated since the War of Independence enabled commanders to act on their own initiative and seize opportunities on the battlefield.
Following preliminary air force operations, the campaign opened on the afternoon of October 29 with the parachute drop of Battalion 890, commanded by Rafael Eitan, east of the Mitla Pass. The first operational parachute drop in IDF history was intended to create a threat near the Suez Canal and provide Britain and France with the agreed pretext for intervention.
The fighting subsequently expanded along several axes. The IDF confronted tanks, artillery, fortified positions, and infantry forces, bringing about the collapse of Egyptian defenses across extensive parts of Sinai. The Israeli Air Force played an important role in the success. From October 31, British and French forces also struck targets in Egypt as part of Operation Musketeer, subsequently landing in the canal zone and Port Said.
Alongside the achievements, mistakes and shortcomings emerged at the tactical, operational, and senior command levels. The battle at the Mitla Pass, which remains controversial, served as a painful reminder of the cost of operational decisions: 38 soldiers were killed there. It demonstrated the importance of knowing the terrain, assessing risks, and reassessing plans as a battle unfolds.
According to the records of the IDF and Defense Establishment Archives, 182 IDF soldiers were killed and approximately 800 wounded during the campaign. Behind the accounts of rapid maneuvers and the defeat of the enemy, therefore, lie fierce battles and families who paid a heavy price.
The Withdrawal and the Diplomatic Test
The campaign’s achievements were tangible: the Egyptian army suffered a severe blow, the fedayeen infrastructure was damaged, and the capture of Sharm el-Sheikh helped create the conditions for opening the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. However, Israel was not free to determine on its own the future of the territories it had captured.
The United States and the Soviet Union exerted pressure to end the fighting and withdraw. Britain and France were also forced to halt their operations and evacuate their forces from Egypt. Ben-Gurion eventually ordered a withdrawal from the entire Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. In March 1957, the evacuation of the Sharm el-Sheikh area was also completed.
Israel therefore did not retain its territorial gains, but the withdrawal did not erase the security achievements. The Straits of Tiran were opened to Israeli shipping, the United Nations Emergency Force was deployed in Sinai and the Gaza Strip, and a period of relative calm began along the Egyptian border. Approximately 11 years, not without tensions and confrontations, passed before the next war.
This highlights the need to distinguish between three levels of achievement: tactical success in battle, the defeat of the Egyptian military deployment in Sinai, and a lasting improvement in the security and political reality. The speed of the advance and the extent of the territory captured are part of the picture; a strategic assessment must also examine the objectives, the costs, and the achievements that remained in place after the withdrawal.
Ben-Gurion’s Warning: What Not to Learn from Sinai
Ben-Gurion himself warned against drawing the wrong lessons from the success. On December 27, 1956, he addressed the IDF’s senior command staff in a speech titled “What Not to Learn from the Sinai Campaign.” He emphasized the campaign’s unique circumstances, describing it as a “deluxe war,” and warned against assuming that the next war would unfold under the same conditions and end in the same way.
The warning remains relevant: success can obscure weaknesses and encourage excessive confidence in the ability to replicate achievements. To learn from it, one must examine what made it possible, which conditions were unique, what depended on external partners, and what might change in the next confrontation.
Seven Lessons for Decision-Making
- Military success does not guarantee lasting political achievements. It is possible to defeat the enemy and still be required to relinquish the territory captured. The desired postwar reality and the means of preserving it must be defined in advance.
- The relationship between different objectives must be examined. Deterrence, degrading the enemy’s capabilities, opening shipping routes, and changing the regional reality are distinct objectives. It is necessary to determine whether they are compatible and what price each entails.
- Alliances create opportunities, but also dependencies. It is necessary to examine what an ally is capable of and willing to deliver, how it will respond to external pressure, and what may happen if its interests change.
- Strategic debate requires listening to opposing views. The disagreement between Ben-Gurion and Sharett illustrates the importance of genuinely examining alternatives and the diplomatic costs associated with the use of force.
- Threat assessment and the choice of response are separate decisions. A real threat requires a response, but does not by itself determine whether to go to war, when to do so, on what scale, or under what conditions the war should end.
- Success requires critical examination and learning. The mistakes and weaknesses exposed during a successful campaign must also be examined, while avoiding the transformation of a one-time experience into an entire strategic doctrine.
- Campaign planning must include the day after. Alongside the military plan, there must be an assessment of security arrangements, political conditions, the positions of allies, and the possibility that some of the achievements will not be preserved.
From the Sinai Campaign to Today’s Challenges
Threats, technology, the regional system, and international relations have changed profoundly since 1956. It is therefore important to avoid directly transplanting lessons from the past. Nevertheless, the Sinai Campaign compels us to reconsider how to identify shifts in the balance of power, challenge basic assumptions, and ensure that the use of force serves a clear political purpose.
These questions have particular significance following the events of October 7, 2023, and the war that followed. There is no need to draw direct comparisons between the events to recognize the importance of examining entrenched perceptions, overconfidence, and preparedness for alternative scenarios.
Even in an interim assessment of a multi-front war, achievements, limitations, disagreements, and costs must all be taken into account. Such an examination allows the military and society to learn from the past and ask difficult questions about the decisions that were made and the alternatives that were not chosen.
The Sinai Campaign demonstrated the IDF’s strength and the importance of force buildup, initiative, and diplomatic opportunity. At the same time, it exposed the limitations of Israel’s freedom of action and its dependence on the interests of great powers and allies.
Seventy years later, the central lesson is one of strategic responsibility: define objectives, examine alternatives, listen to criticism, and plan for the end of the campaign. The real test is the ability to turn military achievement into a better and more stable security and political reality.
