More than a year after the agreement between Israel and Hamas was signed on October 9, 2025, the Gaza Strip remains an unstable arena. The agreement, signed in Sharm el-Sheikh under the mediation of the United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, brought an end to the Iron Swords War and secured the return of the remaining Israeli hostages held in captivity. Nevertheless, the confrontation between the sides continues, albeit on a more limited scale and at a lower intensity.
IDF forces are operating along the lines of contact to prevent attacks and protect the troops. At the same time, targeted operations against senior Hamas figures and operatives continue, particularly those involved in the October 7, 2023, terrorist attack. These operations are carried out in operational and intelligence cooperation with the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet).
Following the Knesset elections held on October 27, 2026, the formation of a new government will require a decision between two main courses of action. The first is to advance U.S. President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan. The second, should efforts to reach an arrangement fail, is to resume military operations against Hamas. The objective would be to complete Israel’s stated war goals: dismantling the organization’s military capabilities and civilian rule, and preventing any future security threat originating from the Gaza Strip.
Against this backdrop, one central question remains: Who within Hamas has the authority to make the decisions required for an arrangement, and who has the ability to implement them?
Trump’s Plan: Mechanisms Established, Implementation Delayed
President Trump’s “Board of Peace,” headed by Executive Director Nikolay Mladenov, is leading a diplomatic and economic effort to implement a multi-stage plan for the rehabilitation of the Strip. The Board has presented an initial budget of $2.45 billion to fund 66 urgent projects. These include debris removal, the construction of temporary housing, the rehabilitation of hospitals, and measures to support economic recovery. The total long-term damage to the Strip is estimated at more than $35 billion.
As part of the plan, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) was established, headed by Ali Shaath, a civil engineer who previously held several positions in the Palestinian Authority. The committee is intended to replace Hamas in governing the Strip. Mladenov has confirmed that the Palestinian Authority will be involved in the activities of the new governing mechanism.
The Board of Peace was established as an international legal entity under UN Security Council Resolution 2803. It enjoys the support of dozens of countries, including Arab and Muslim states. An armed International Stabilization Force (ISF) is expected to deploy on the ground to secure areas undergoing rehabilitation. Morocco and Kosovo are among the countries expected to participate in its initial phase.
In the summer of 2026, the Board published a 15-point plan detailing the implementation of the second phase of Trump’s broader initiative. The plan includes several key components:
- Settlement of Hamas’s debts, up to a total of $400 million.
- The disarmament of the organization, alongside financial incentives for those who surrender their weapons and refrain from terrorist activity.
- The transfer of authority to a local technocratic administration under the supervision of the Board of Peace.
- The deployment of an international stabilization force and a new Palestinian police force, alongside the withdrawal of IDF forces.
- The establishment of an International Verification Commission (IVC) to monitor violations and approve the transition between the various stages of the agreement.
The plan also includes a roadmap for disarming Hamas in cooperation with countries in the region, including Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar. However, implementation is proceeding slowly, partly due to Israeli opposition to some of its components.
In August 2026, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that Israel rejected the 15-point plan. He stressed that the IDF would not withdraw in any way that compromised its freedom of security operations. Israel seeks to prevent the imposition of an arrangement and the deployment of a multinational force under terms it considers unacceptable. To this end, it is delaying the reopening of border crossings and restricting the entry of heavy equipment and trucks. In recent weeks, talks on advancing the plan have slowed, and some have even been suspended, amid escalating tensions between the United States and Iran. As a result, a gap remains between the plans and budgets being advanced by the international mechanism and its ability to implement them on the ground.
Hamas Decision-Making: Disagreements Without a Split
The author’s long-standing monitoring of Hamas shows that the organization’s internal leadership in Gaza and its external leadership have not always seen eye to eye. Over the years, substantial disagreements have emerged between them, both strategic and tactical, over how to achieve the organization’s objectives. Nevertheless, these tensions have never developed into an irreparable rift, and Hamas continues to present a united front to the outside world.
Relations between the two leaderships are based on a division of responsibilities, mutual dependence, and a shifting balance of power. The external leadership, currently operating out of Qatar and Turkey, is responsible for political strategy, fundraising, and managing foreign relations. It maintains ties with Iran, Qatar, and other countries, and conducts diplomatic contacts. The internal leadership in the Strip is responsible for maintaining control on the ground, managing the civilian administration, and monitoring other centers of power and organizations. It also directs military operations through the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. Its control over operational forces gives it greater weight in decisions concerning implementation on the ground.
From Sinwar to Joint Leadership
Until 2017, the external leadership was considered the dominant force in directing Hamas, primarily due to its control over the organization’s budget and foreign relations. The election of Yahya Sinwar as the organization’s leader in Gaza that year greatly strengthened the internal leadership. The center of gravity shifted to the Strip, particularly with regard to the confrontation with Israel. Sinwar’s position enabled him to pursue an independent course and make decisive operational decisions. This created a gap between the official leadership based outside the Strip and the leadership determining the organization’s actions on the ground.
The decision to launch the October 7, 2023, terrorist attack was made largely within Hamas’s local leadership circle in Gaza. Senior figures abroad were informed and involved in coordination only to a limited extent. During the war, the external leadership made clear to the mediators that any agreement with Israel required the approval of “those fighting on the ground.” This division of responsibilities sharpened tensions between the two leaderships. Figures abroad conducted negotiations with the mediators, but the leadership in the Strip retained the authority to make decisions on military operations and the issue of the hostages held in Gaza.
The assassination of Deputy Head of the Political Bureau Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut in January 2024, followed by the assassination of Political Bureau Chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July of that year, changed the balance of power. In August, Sinwar was chosen to succeed Haniyeh. Around him operated a local leadership that included senior figures from Gaza who had most likely been involved in planning and carrying out the October 2023 attack. Sinwar’s assassination on October 16, 2024, brought about another shift. In early 2025, the influence of the external leadership grew, particularly in managing ceasefire negotiations. Khalil al-Hayya and other senior figures led the negotiations, coordinating with those who remained in the Strip. The continued targeting of the command structure in Gaza and abroad encouraged a transition to joint leadership. Prominent figures in the collective leadership included al-Hayya, Khaled Mashal, and Zaher Jabarin, who oversees the organization’s financial affairs and its West Bank portfolio. They were joined by senior figures from the internal leadership and members of the Shura Council.
Despite the strengthening of the external leadership, the leadership on the ground has not lost its influence. In my assessment, it still retains a kind of veto power over major decisions. The external leadership can conduct negotiations, but struggles to impose a ceasefire, disarmament, or relinquishment of control on the commanders in Gaza without their consent. Conversely, the internal leadership depends on the political, financial, and logistical support provided by its counterparts abroad.
Al-Hayya’s Election and the Standing of the Gaza Faction
The power struggles found expression in the process of selecting Sinwar’s successor as head of the Political Bureau in 2026. The two leading candidates were Khaled Mashal and Khalil al-Hayya. Mashal favored closer ties with Sunni Arab regimes, while al-Hayya supported maintaining close relations with Iran. However, the differences between them should not be overstated when it comes to the continuation of the confrontation with Israel.
On July 20, 2026, Hamas announced al-Hayya’s election as head of the Political Bureau. Days later, reports indicated that he had won by a single vote, with 35 votes against Mashal’s 34. According to the reports, the support of Gaza’s representatives proved decisive. Al-Hayya’s election, given his identification with the Iranian axis and Sinwar’s legacy, demonstrated the strength of the Gaza faction even within the leadership operating outside the Strip. It shows that the geographical location of senior figures does not necessarily reflect their affiliations or strategic outlook. However, the leadership decision did not resolve the organization’s dilemmas. Hamas is under pressure to disarm and agree to an alternative to its rule in Gaza. Negotiations over its future are proceeding slowly, and the deep divisions between the parties have yet to be bridged.
Winter as a Tool for Increasing Pressure on Israel
According to recent media reports, senior Hamas figures in Gaza have devised a plan to exploit the population’s winter hardships in order to increase international pressure on Israel. The reports indicate that the information was brought to the attention of senior political and security officials. According to the sources who reported on the plan, its purpose is to hold Israel responsible for the deteriorating humanitarian situation. In doing so, Hamas seeks to undermine the legitimacy of renewed military operations and buy time to strengthen its economic and military capabilities. Images of flooded tents and weather-damaged shelters are intended to serve as a central element of this propaganda campaign.
According to estimates by the United Nations and international organizations, approximately 1.3 million residents of the Strip are living in tents. By contrast, according to figures from the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), more than 85,000 tents have been brought into the Strip in recent months, in addition to those delivered during the war. It was also reported that more than 8,000 trucks carrying tarpaulins, blankets, winter clothing, and other supplies have entered Gaza.
An Israeli security official who recently briefed the media claimed that Hamas is seeking to recreate what it considers the propaganda success of the “starvation campaign” of July 2025. According to this assessment, the organization identified a decline in Israel’s international legitimacy at the time and is now seeking a similar outcome by documenting the hardships of winter. The objective is to restrict Israel’s freedom of action while Hamas continues to refuse to disarm and relinquish control. The official stressed that preparations for winter have improved compared with previous years. In his words, “With regard to food, shelter, and winter supplies, the situation in the Strip is significantly better than in previous winters since the beginning of the war.” He added: “This will not prevent Hamas from trying to turn every image of a flooded tent into a campaign against Israel.”
The briefing also made clear that Israel links the rehabilitation of the Strip to Hamas’s disarmament. The official said Israel would not allow the entry of equipment that the organization could exploit to rebuild tunnels and manufacture weapons. “As long as Hamas remains armed, Gaza will not be rebuilt and its residents will continue living in tents,” he said. According to him, this position also applies to the entry of mobile homes and other equipment requested by international actors.
Mutual Dependence That Hinders an Agreement
Three years after the October 7 attack, there are no clear signs of a structural split between Hamas’s internal and external leaderships. The organization continues to operate within a joint framework, despite internal tensions and power struggles. Four main constituencies participate in its strategic decision-making: Gaza, Judea and Samaria, the prisons, and the external leadership. The balance of power has shifted over the years. Sinwar strengthened Gaza’s dominance, while his assassination and the targeting of other senior figures once again increased the influence of the external leadership. Al-Hayya’s election demonstrated that, even after this shift, the Gaza faction retains decisive influence.
Mutual dependence continues to shape the organization’s decision-making: the external leadership controls the political and financial channels, while the internal leadership controls the armed forces and the ability to implement decisions on the ground. Consequently, any agreement reached through negotiations also requires the consent of the commanders in the Strip. Conversely, the internal leadership cannot maintain its control over time without the resources and connections provided by its counterparts abroad.
In this situation, the identity of the person heading the Political Bureau is only one aspect of the leadership question. Equally important is that person’s ability to forge consensus among the various centers of power and translate it into action. For now, Hamas remains committed to its refusal to disarm, its commitment to armed struggle against Israel, and its ties with Iran. This position, alongside the gaps between Israel and the international mechanism, continues to hinder efforts to establish a new order in the Strip.
