Summary
The strategic reality in which Israel operates will not wait for the political crisis to be resolved, and the challenges facing the country are only growing more acute. At the heart of this analysis is the argument that, in the absence of the ability to address all fronts simultaneously and with equal intensity, the new government must identify the “strategic shaper”: the central vector influencing Israel’s room for maneuver across all other arenas.
The relationship with the United States is identified and defined as this strategic shaper. The erosion of bipartisan support in Washington, the growing estrangement of the American Jewish community, and concerns over a potentially unsympathetic administration taking office in January 2029 require Israel to fundamentally change its approach. To secure American backing, and in particular to enlist President Trump in a significant military campaign against Iran that would lay the groundwork for the overthrow of the regime, Israel must initiate creative moves on various fronts to demonstrate its commitment to changing and improving the current reality.
The article proposes a conceptual framework for a “strategic compass,” combining the military defeat of Hamas in Gaza with the gradual implementation of the “Twenty-Point Plan” and the integration of a reformed Palestinian Authority; determined action to curb Jewish terrorism in Judea and Samaria, alongside the enforcement of law and order, including with regard to the illegal construction of farms and outposts not authorized by government decisions; and the establishment of multinational security mechanisms along the borders with Lebanon and Syria. A judicious combination of military power geared toward decisive outcomes and creative diplomatic flexibility would enable Israel to stem the erosion of its international legitimacy, strengthen its strategic alliance with Washington, and safeguard its national security.
Between Political Crisis and Strategic Imperative
The process of forming a government in Israel officially got underway with the president’s decision to grant the mandate to form a government to Gadi Eisenkot, chairman of the Yashar! party. Nevertheless, Israel’s political system continues to operate amid a dense fog of uncertainty. There is considerable doubt as to whether Eisenkot will be able to overcome the political hurdles and form a coalition. Even if he succeeds, the stability and longevity of such a government remain open and troubling questions. The alternatives, meanwhile, appear no less obstructed: the likelihood of Benjamin Netanyahu succeeding in forming a government is low, and worse still, the prospects for establishing a broad national unity government, which would seemingly be both an urgent imperative and an indispensable necessity at this time, are not particularly promising.
The strategic reality in the Middle East and on the global stage, however, is entirely indifferent to coalition maneuvering. Regardless of the identity of the government that emerges or the person who leads it, Israel’s fundamental problems and security and diplomatic challenges remain unchanged. Moreover, given the results of the US elections, the troubling deterioration of Israel’s standing in Washington and around the world, the growing security challenges along its borders, and domestic social cohesion, which remains under constant threat and is already showing signs of fracture, these challenges appear far from static. Their complexity and urgency are only increasing.
In such a chaotic reality, any government that takes office will first and foremost need a “strategic compass.” It must develop the analytical and operational capacity to identify the true centers of gravity of the campaign, concentrate a focused national effort on them, and use them as the basis for reshaping Israel’s national priorities. The abundance of threats and crises imposes an inherent constraint: the country’s attention, economic resources, and military capabilities are limited, making it impossible to address all challenges simultaneously and with the same level of effort. The art of statecraft and strategy therefore requires a clear distinction between long-term strategic challenges and immediate ones, as well as the formulation of an optimal response to this complex mix. Above all, it demands the precise identification of the “strategic shaper”: the overarching challenge whose influence has a decisive domino effect across all other arenas, and addressing which correctly would make it possible to respond effectively to most of the remaining challenges.
The Challenge Map and the Interconnections Between Its Components
Israel’s strategic environment consists of a complex network of interconnected arenas, in which failure or stagnation on one front directly affects its freedom of action on the others. A thorough examination of the challenge map reveals nine major centers of crisis, all closely interrelated.
At the top of the geopolitical pyramid stands the relationship with the United States, which is undergoing profound structural upheaval. Israel is no longer dealing merely with isolated criticism, but with a dangerous process in which it is losing parts of the Republican Party while becoming almost entirely disconnected from the Democratic Party, where the progressive wing, increasingly critical of Israel, is gaining strength. The political hourglass is running out: a president friendly to Israel is expected to leave office in approximately two years, while already facing a hostile and challenging Congress in both chambers. This political reality could severely restrict the president’s room for maneuver, particularly his ability to act against Iran in a way that would eliminate the threat as Israel perceives it. More seriously, Israel must prepare for the possibility that, following the presidential election in November 2028, a far more critical and unsympathetic US administration will take up residence in the White House. Already, military assistance to Israel and the country’s standing have become subjects of open criticism and even a driving force behind the delegitimization of Israel in American discourse. Although this criticism focuses primarily on the policies of the Israeli government, the IDF’s conduct in the Gaza Strip, military assistance to Israel, and calls for a change in the relationship with Israel, it is also spilling over into public and political debate about Israel’s very right to exist as the nation-state of the Jewish people.
The erosion of Israel’s standing in Washington is directly linked to the deterioration of its international standing. The country faces a tangible and growing risk of a wave of international boycotts and sanctions. These measures are not a theoretical threat, but a direct danger that could severely damage the Israeli economy, isolate academia, lead to boycotts of cultural figures and athletes, and even restrict the freedom of movement of individual Israeli citizens abroad.
Against the backdrop of this diplomatic erosion, the Iranian threat continues to loom as an unequivocal existential threat to the State of Israel. The strategic dilemma is compounded by a fundamental perceptual gap between Jerusalem and Washington: while Israel regards the overthrow of the regime in Tehran as the paramount and indispensable objective, without which the existential threat cannot be eliminated, President Trump is focused exclusively on the nuclear issue and has more limited objectives. At a time when it is entirely unclear whether the US president will order a military strike, and what its objectives would be, the likelihood of a dangerous worst-case scenario is growing: Israel could find itself completely alone in confronting an escalating Iranian threat.
On the immediate border fronts, Israel is facing stagnation and renewed threats. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas has yet to be decisively defeated and dismantled as an organized governing and military entity. It continues to control the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian population in approximately 40% of the Strip’s territory, systematically and energetically working to restore its governing capabilities and rebuild its military strength. The “Twenty-Point Plan” is nowhere near being implemented on the ground, while pressure from President Trump to demonstrate progress in its implementation is expected to intensify. Israel finds itself in a predicament: in order to create the conditions for the plan’s implementation to begin and ensure the demilitarization of the Strip, it must lay the groundwork for the complete dismantling of Hamas as a governing and military entity. This objective would require a major military operation to take control of the entire Gaza Strip.
At the same time, the Judea and Samaria (West Bank) arena resembles a landscape of “smoldering embers,” fanned by fierce easterly winds, but with no firefighters to contain the blaze. The situation on the ground is extremely volatile: on the one hand, Jewish violence and terrorism are escalating; on the other, deep despair and frustration are spreading among the Palestinian population. This frustration is fueled by a lethal combination of deteriorating personal and communal security, severe economic hardship, and the Palestinian Authority’s impotence. In the eyes of its own public, the PA is perceived as corrupt, ineffective, and incapable of protecting the population from violent Jewish extremists. The situation in Judea and Samaria does not remain confined to the boundaries of the arena. It dramatically compounds Israel’s diplomatic predicament vis-à-vis the international community and the United States, while increasing the risk of a violent collapse of the entire system, an eruption that could spread to other arenas and even into Israeli territory.
On the northern front, too, security arrangements are proving to be a broken reed. In Lebanon, the pilot initiative undertaken with the Lebanese Armed Forces has failed miserably. The Lebanese army is demonstrating an inability, and perhaps even a fundamental lack of willingness, to fulfill its responsibility for clearing the territory under its control of Hezbollah’s terrorist infrastructure and preventing the organization’s operatives from returning to the area. For its part, the Lebanese government, despite its public declarations of commitment to the arrangements, is too weak to impose any change on the ground. Across the border in Syria, talks with the regime on security arrangements have reached a stalemate. This deadlock is accompanied by an expanding hostile Turkish foothold in Syria, adding fuel to the tensions between Turkey and Israel, which are spilling over into other arenas. At the same time, the Syrian regime’s international standing is improving, with growing legitimacy for its demands that Israel withdraw from its sovereign territory and that the IDF redeploy along the lines that existed before the war.
The cumulative result of these crises is regional stagnation. Efforts to expand the Abraham Accords and advance the historic normalization process with Saudi Arabia have come to a complete standstill. Above all these challenges looms the danger of further erosion in Israel’s domestic resilience: the weakening of social cohesion, driven by widening social and political divisions amid successive election campaigns and their inconclusive outcomes, projects weakness externally and undermines the country’s national resilience.
Diagram: The Challenge Map and Their Interconnections
The diagram below illustrates the systemic dynamics through which domestic erosion and the stalemate on the various battlefronts fuel the loss of international and American legitimacy, which in turn undermines Israel’s ability to confront the Iranian threat and generate regional breakthroughs.

The Strategic Shaper: Washington as Israel’s National Center of Gravity
An in-depth analysis of the challenge map and the interconnections between its various components leads to one unequivocal strategic conclusion: the relationship with the United States is the “strategic shaper” for the State of Israel. It is the most significant and consequential challenge, directly and inevitably affecting Israel’s ability to successfully address all the other challenges it faces.
Without a solid American strategic backing, Israel will struggle to stem a potential tsunami of international sanctions and boycotts, lose the leverage required to reach security arrangements in Lebanon and Syria, and be unable to revive the normalization process with Saudi Arabia. However, the paramount importance of the American strategic shaper becomes even more evident in the face of the existential threat from Iran. All these developments would severely restrict the room for maneuver and freedom of action available to any Israeli government, potentially resulting in a form of functional paralysis that would, in turn, undermine social cohesion and national resilience, further weakening Israel’s national security. Israel needs an extraordinary national effort to restore its standing with both political parties in the United States and, no less importantly, among the diverse American Jewish community, which is increasingly distancing itself from Israel and from actively supporting it.
This restoration is not merely a declarative objective, but an essential means of achieving a paramount security goal: securing President Trump’s commitment, or at the very least increasing the likelihood of his commitment, to leading a military campaign against Iran. Even if the objectives of such an American campaign were limited by the president to destroying Iran’s nuclear infrastructure alone, the very act of launching a major military operation could establish the structural conditions that would help the Iranian people themselves overthrow the regime in Tehran. The underlying assumption is that a significant military strike would inevitably further weaken the Iranian regime and remove the Iranian threat, at least for several years. Weakening the Iranian regime would inevitably undermine the Iran-led Axis of Resistance, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, and lay a more solid foundation for shaping a new regional architecture. All of this would give Israel greater flexibility and room for maneuver, along with new opportunities to address the remaining arenas and challenges. To maintain the White House’s attention and commitment to such a historic undertaking during the limited time remaining in the president’s term, and in the face of a hostile Congress, Israel must remove unnecessary points of friction with the administration from the agenda and demonstrate its strategic value, while making a determined effort to build strategic partnerships across the other arenas of the Middle East.
The Strategic Compass: From Tactical Initiative to Diplomatic and Security Momentum
How, then, can the understanding that the relationship with the United States is the strategic shaper be translated into practical policy? The strategic compass points to the need for Israel to restore its standing in Washington and around the world by demonstrating seriousness, responsibility, and a willingness to make progress in the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Syria, and Judea and Samaria. The new government must abandon its policy of waiting and reacting, and instead present creative ideas that could break the deadlock on the three border fronts while rigorously safeguarding Israel’s security interests, alongside a dramatic change of direction on the Palestinian front.
1. The Gaza Strip: Combining Military Decisiveness with Gradual Implementation
The Gaza Strip requires a two-pronged strategy combining an iron-fisted military approach with implementation flexibility. On the one hand, Israel cannot accept the continued Hamas rule over approximately 40% of the Strip or its renewed military buildup. It must lay the groundwork for the organization’s complete dismantling as an organized governing and military entity, even if this requires a military operation to take control of the entire Strip in order to ensure its demilitarization. On the other hand, in order to address the anticipated pressure from President Trump and demonstrate diplomatic seriousness, Israel can propose a practical, gradual, and controlled framework: beginning implementation of the “Twenty-Point Plan” in the southern Gaza Strip, while continuing to exert intense military pressure on Hamas in the north. Such a move would enable progress on the civilian and diplomatic fronts without relinquishing the objectives of demilitarization and decisive military defeat.
2. Judea and Samaria and the Palestinian System: Law Enforcement and a Conditional Political Horizon
The Judea and Samaria arena requires immediate action to extinguish the “smoldering embers” threatening to ignite a major conflagration in Israel’s relations with the United States and the rest of the world. Any government that takes office must act resolutely and without compromise against Jewish lawbreakers and terrorists. What is needed is a change in both tone and action: an explicit and unequivocal government condemnation of the phenomenon, coupled with active measures to eradicate it, including rigorous enforcement of law and order and the dismantling of all illegal outposts and farms.
At the same time, Israel must adopt a constructive but demanding approach toward the Palestinian Authority. The government must demonstrate its commitment to the very existence of the PA and its proper functioning, and pledge to help it advance the necessary reform processes. Such cooperation must be conditional on an explicit Israeli demand that the PA immediately cease its pursuit of Israel through international tribunals and commit to ending incitement.
In the broader context, the strategic compass calls on Israel to adhere to the “Twenty-Point Plan,” particularly Article 19. Israel must focus on creating the necessary conditions for a reformed Palestinian Authority to return to effective control of the Gaza Strip. An explicit Israeli declaration linking the reconstruction of the Strip and the PA’s return to control there, subject to demonstrable progress on reforms, with a statement that this constitutes the path toward advancing a diplomatic process that ultimately offers a political horizon addressing some of the Palestinian people’s national aspirations, would partially undermine the position of Israel’s critics around the world and help restore the firm and essential backing of the United States.
3. The Northern Front (Lebanon and Syria): International and Regional Security Mechanisms
In light of the failure of the pilot initiative with the Lebanese army and the weakness of the government in Beirut, Israel can no longer rely on empty Lebanese declarations. The creative solution Israel should promote in Lebanon is the establishment of an inter-Arab force, preferably led by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, with active US involvement. This force would deploy alongside the Lebanese army across a significantly larger area of southern Lebanon, enabling the IDF to carry out a gradual and controlled withdrawal without leaving a governing vacuum for Hezbollah to fill once again.
On the Syrian front, Israel must demonstrate flexibility in its thinking in order to break the deadlock in security arrangement talks and counter the growing international legitimacy of Syria’s unilateral demands for an Israeli withdrawal. Israel should express its willingness to redeploy IDF forces, but make this conditional on a series of stringent security requirements: the complete demilitarization of the territory from which Israeli forces withdraw, and the deployment of an American task force to serve as a buffer and monitoring force, modeled on the successful Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission deployed in the Sinai Peninsula following the peace treaty with Egypt.
The Bottom Line
The new government formed in Israel, whatever its composition, will not enjoy a hundred days of grace. It will take office in the midst of a perfect storm combining existential external threats, a dangerous erosion of the country’s international standing, and deep divisions tearing Israeli society apart from within. Under these circumstances, attempting to put out fires through conventional means or allowing a narrow political agenda to dictate priorities is a recipe for strategic disaster. The fire that has broken out is comparable to an oil well blaze, one that can and must be extinguished through an explosion.
Adopting the “strategic compass” proposed in this article is an urgent imperative. Recognizing that the relationship with the United States is the paramount strategic shaper requires Israel to take proactive initiatives to restore bipartisan trust in Washington and enlist the Trump administration in eliminating the Iranian threat. The road to Washington runs through creative initiatives in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria; determined action to curb Jewish terrorism in Judea and Samaria; and the judicious use of the “Twenty-Point Plan” to create a conditional political horizon. Only a government capable of navigating by this compass will be able to extricate Israel from its strategic deadlock, restore its domestic cohesion, and secure its future and national security in a changing Middle East.








