On February 19, 2026, the first meeting of the “Peace Council” convened in Washington, chaired by the President of the United States, Donald Trump. This comes ahead of the beginning of the implementation of the second phase of the American president’s plan for stabilizing and rehabilitating the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the war. In his speech to the participants at the gathering, the American president announced, among other things, the mobilization of more than $7 billion designated for this purpose. During the conference, an ambitious plan was also presented by high-tech entrepreneur Liran Tankman, one of Jared Kushner’s advisers, regarding the economic and digital integration of Gaza into the world and the establishment of its economy on AI technology. Participants were also shown a video prepared by the “Peace Council,” presenting a grand, ambitious, and breathtaking AI vision featuring the “Abraham Gate,” which is intended to connect Gaza within three years to its neighbors and other countries in the region, including Israel, and within ten years to transform it into an independently managed entity fully integrated into the region. This is without addressing the question of whether it will by then be part of a Palestinian state, or what its status will be.
The High Representative of the “Peace Council,” Nikolay Mladenov, who also spoke at the conference, noted that the council had begun recruiting Palestinian police officers who would be trained in Egypt for a force to operate in the Gaza Strip, which, he claimed, would enable the disarmament of Hamas. He added that “there is no alternative but complete demilitarization and the removal of all weapons in Gaza for the reconstruction of the Strip to begin.” Ali Shaath, head of the Palestinian technocratic committee tasked with managing day-to-day life in the Strip across various civilian domains, stated on his part that the Palestinian police force would number 5,000 personnel and begin operating on the ground within two months.
The American general, Jasper Jeffers, commander of the international stabilization force set to be deployed in the Gaza Strip as part of the U.S. administration’s plan to end the war, stated that the necessary infrastructure for deploying the force had been prepared in recent months. He confirmed that Egypt and Jordan would train the forces. “The force will be responsible for stabilizing the security situation in Gaza and will prepare the ground for the activities of the civil administration” of the technocratic committee, Jeffers elaborated. According to him, the international force, composed of soldiers from Indonesia, Morocco, Albania, Kosovo, and Kazakhstan, will initially be deployed in the Rafah area, with its operations gradually expanding to other areas across the Strip. He further noted that the goal is for the force to grow in manpower, eventually reaching 20,000 soldiers. This is in addition to the Palestinian police, which will include 12,000 officers. It should be noted that Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that his country is ready to send troops to the Gaza Strip, despite Israel declaring that it is unwilling to accept this. Moroccan Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch stated that he is prepared to send representatives to the policing force.
A Strategy of “Buying Time”
However, President Trump’s ambitious vision, as presented at the inaugural “Peace Council” conference in Washington, which includes the recruitment of a new Palestinian police force, the disarmament of Hamas and the demilitarization of the Strip, a reconstruction plan for Gaza, and its integration into the regional space through the “Abraham Gate” project, does not, to say the least, align with the realities currently characterizing the situation on the ground, nearly two years after the end of the war. In practice, it is not difficult to discern a wide and visible gap between the ambitious, grandiose plan, bordering on the imaginary, and the grim reality prevailing in the Gaza Strip, where nearly two million Palestinians are engaged in a daily struggle for existence and survival under harsh conditions of scarcity, blockade, and uncertainty.
One of the central issues in implementing Trump’s plan concerns Israel’s demand for the disarmament of Hamas and the demilitarization of the Strip within a defined timeframe of two months. This is undoubtedly the key question on which everything will stand or fall from Israel’s perspective. As of the time of writing this article, the clear impression is that Hamas has no intention of complying with the demands placed before it and implementing them in practice as a condition for the continuation of the stabilization and reconstruction process in the Strip. It is highly likely, and clear indications of this can already be observed, that Hamas will employ tactics of delay, postponement, deception, and procrastination in an attempt to “buy time” and avoid, as much as possible, the execution of such a plan.
Based on personal and direct acquaintance with senior Hamas figures, members of the generation that stood behind the organization’s founding in the days following the outbreak of the First Intifada on December 9, 1987, and foremost among them the founding father, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, I can make a well-founded assessment that Hamas will not meet such demands. I can say this after years of monitoring the organization’s activities, positions, and ideological vision – it will not agree to self-disarmament nor to the demilitarization of the Strip. On the contrary, it is highly likely that the Hamas leadership, both within Gaza and outside it, will adopt an antagonistic approach, adhering rigidly and uncompromisingly to positions that ensure its jihadist identity and the continuation of its activity as a fighting organization going forward.
This assessment is based on an understanding of the essence of Hamas, which in its very establishment reflected, from the perspective of its founding fathers, a shift in the center of gravity of activity away from da‘wa, religious Islamic civilian activity, placing at the forefront and as the primary objective jihad, the uncompromising armed struggle against Israel. This was in the spirit of the slogan prevalent at the time in the Gaza Strip, even prior to the establishment of Hamas: “Zawal Isra’il – Hatmiyya Qur’aniyya” – the demise of Israel is inevitable according to the Qur’an.
A clear expression of Hamas’s position has been evident in recent weeks in a series of media interviews by senior organization officials. Without exception, they conveyed a clear and unequivocal message that Hamas has no intention of disarming or voluntarily relinquishing its military capabilities. They argued that the weapons are intended for self defense and constitute an “internal Palestinian matter.” In response to the 60 day deadline defined as the time allotted to Hamas to fulfill the demand to disarm, the organization’s senior official abroad, Mahmoud Mardawi, stated on February 16, 2026, in a transparent attempt at evasion, that his organization had not received any official message from any party regarding this decision and that it refuses to respond to it. He rejected Netanyahu’s statement that “Hamas must be disarmed and Gaza must be demilitarized. This will be done the easy way, or the hard way.” At the same time, Cabinet Secretary Yossi Fuchs said at a conference of the newspaper Besheva: “Within 60 days Hamas must disarm from all its weapons. Everything. If this does not happen, IDF fighters will have to ensure that it does.”
Mardawi dismissed these statements outright. He added that “Netanyahu and the media are merely spreading threats that have no basis in the negotiations being conducted.” Regarding Israel’s threat to use force if, after the deadline it set, Hamas refuses to disarm, Mardawi claimed that “any threat will have dangerous consequences for the region, and the Palestinians will not raise a white flag.” Another senior Hamas official, Mousa Abu Marzook, also emphasized in a statement on the Al Jazeera channel on January 27, 2026, that “Hamas has never agreed to hand over its weapons, and the weapons of resistance have never been subject to discussion.”
In addition to the issue of Hamas’s disarmament, other questions remain on the agenda, for which there are currently no clear answers. The first concerns the identity of the body that will be entrusted with civilian administration in the Gaza Strip in the day after. Will the technocrats’ committee be assigned this task, even though a timetable for its entry into the Strip to fulfill its role has not yet been defined, nor have the authorities that will actually be granted to it been clarified. It is also unclear what the mandate of the international stabilization force (ISF) will be, what its chain of command will look like, and what enforcement capabilities it will possess.
Will Israel Be Able to Agree to the Arrangement?
And of course, a fundamental question also arises on Israel’s side: will the Netanyahu government be willing to approve Trump’s plan, which in practice grants Gaza a certain degree of political backing? This comes at a time when Netanyahu has made clear that there will be no reconstruction in Gaza without demilitarization, and has not committed to a withdrawal from the Strip or to supporting a broader political framework thereafter.
In light of Hamas’s response to the unequivocal demand of the American administration that it disarm, it can be assessed that the defense establishment has already completed operational preparations for the possibility that this will not materialize. Within this framework, operational plans have likely been prepared, the level of alert has been raised, and preparatory steps have been taken for the possibility of military action. Such a move would be intended to realize Israel’s war objectives in the Gaza Strip: the collapse of Hamas both as a military force and as a governing authority.
It is important to note that at the present juncture, and even before the prospects for implementing Trump’s plan have been clarified, there appears to be a tangible effort by Hamas to advance measures aimed at the organization’s recovery, the rebuilding of its military strength, and the consolidation of its civilian control on the ground. This is reflected in its activity directed at expanding its operational fighting order of battle, including through the recruitment of new young members into its ranks; maintaining routine and operational readiness on the ground through patrols, searches, observations, surveillance, and more; strengthening and improving military infrastructure such as underground tunnels, fortifications, bunkers, and the like; manufacturing locally produced weapons such as explosive devices, UAVs, rifles, ammunition, and similar means; and maintaining a regular training routine and conducting exercises to ensure a high level of operational readiness and preparedness. Current assessments regarding the scope of Hamas’s present order of battle stand at approximately 20,000 armed operatives.
Reports recently published in the media reflect a sense of cautious optimism among the members of the “Peace Council” regarding the prospects for the practical implementation of the second phase of Trump’s plan, despite the difficulties and obstacles along the way. According to this assessment, tangible progress in the process of demilitarization and the disarmament of Hamas will ensure the continued implementation of the plan, with emphasis on the deployment of the stabilization force (ISF) and the commencement of its operations on the ground.
It appears that the continuation of the implementation of Trump’s plan depends to a large extent on the position adopted by the American administration. As of today, President Trump is taking a firm stance articulated in unequivocal terms. In his statements, he calls on Hamas to meet its commitment and disarm, as well as to agree to the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip according to a defined timetable beginning in March 2026. On the Israeli side, there is a degree of skepticism regarding the implementation of the central components of President Trump’s plan: the disarmament of Hamas, the demilitarization of the Strip, and the deployment of the international stabilization force. This is despite the optimistic assessments voiced by senior officials within the “Peace Council.”
In a speech delivered before the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations on February 16, 2026, Prime Minister Netanyahu clarified his position regarding the disarmament of Hamas. He defined the Kalashnikov rifles, which Hamas regards as “weapons for self defense,” as “heavy weapons” that must be removed from the Strip. This, alongside RPG missiles and the dismantling of the tunnel network, which, according to him, for the most part, 350 out of 500 kilometers, remains intact.
It is important to note that despite Israeli proposals, as expressed by Prime Minister Netanyahu, that he would not allow the Palestinian Authority to be part of Gaza’s future, Nikolay Mladenov, Secretary General of the “Peace Council,” officially confirmed that the Palestinian Authority would be involved in administering the Strip. In an official statement, Mladenov welcomed the establishment of a liaison office between the Palestinian Authority and the “Peace Council.” Despite Israel’s position, the Authority’s involvement appears to be a fait accompli on the ground, and according to media reports, representatives identified with it are already effectively integrated into the operational mechanisms of the Rafah crossing.
The Bottom Line
As of today, there is a clear absence of any willingness on the part of Hamas to disarm, particularly regarding light weapons, estimated at approximately 60,000 items. Even if the organization ultimately agrees to meet this demand, it cannot be ruled out that such willingness would be conditional upon the fulfillment of a series of its own demands, especially the disarmament of clans operating alongside Israel in the Gaza Strip in order to reduce the danger posed to its operatives after they relinquish their weapons; an Israeli withdrawal from areas of the Strip that remain under its direct control; and possibly also a demand to realize certain political achievements. Should such a scenario materialize, it is highly likely that such demands by Hamas would encounter unequivocal opposition from Israel.
If it ultimately becomes clear that Hamas is using the time window granted to it for disarmament to conduct deception tactics, delay, and “buy time,” and refrains from fulfilling the ultimate demand placed before it, there will be no alternative but to assign the mission of disarming the organization to IDF forces.
However, as noted, my many years of familiarity with the organization since its establishment lead me to conclude that Hamas will not accede to demands to disarm and demilitarize the Strip, and in any case such a move is not expected to be free of problems and difficulties. It is more likely that the organization will pursue deception and delay tactics while concealing the weapons in its possession. Therefore, under the current circumstances and before Israel’s demands are fulfilled, IDF forces must continue to maintain their deployment in areas of the Strip along the “Yellow Line.” From Israel’s perspective, this constitutes a necessary line of deployment, intended to serve a paramount security interest and to prevent the renewed entrenchment of Hamas along the “Green Line.”
