Introduction
The Israel Defense Forces constitute a unique phenomenon in global military history. Built from scratch, in the midst of war, from a collection of irregular underground organizations alongside veterans of the British Army and soldiers of other Allied forces from the Second World War, the IDF was not founded upon a long military tradition or an established institutional structure of a sovereign state’s army. Since its establishment in 1948, it has confronted continual existential threats, including conventional wars against Arab armies, reprisal operations, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns, and, more recently, multi-front warfare against the “ring of fire” Iran has built around Israel.
This article examines, in detail, the evolution of the IDF’s combat doctrine—the system of principles, methods, and operational concepts that guides military action from the War of Independence (1948–1949) to the War of Restoration (2023–2025). In parallel, we analyze the development of the officer-training system, the backbone of IDF command, from its early blend of underground organizational influences (such as emphasis on individual initiative and mission commitment) and foreign military traditions (primarily British, German, and American) to advanced academic tracks integrating digital technology, artificial intelligence (AI), cyber, and intelligence, adapted to hybrid, subterranean, and multi-domain warfare in the modern era.
We divide the analysis into two main stages: the formative stage (1948–1967), during which organizational frameworks, doctrines, concepts, and basic principles were built while facing inexperience, limited resources, immediate threats, and the need for mass mobilization; and the stage of rupture, recovery, adaptation, and innovation, encompassing the “euphoria of victory” after the Six Day War, dramatic failures in the Yom Kippur War (1973) and the Lebanon War (1982), deep transformations following the First (1987–1993) and Second (2000–2005) Intifadas, operations in the Gaza Strip such as Cast Lead (2008–2009), Pillar of Defense (2012), Protective Edge (2014), Guardian of the Walls (2021), and onward, culminating in the adaptations required in the War of Restoration against Hamas, Hezbollah, Yemen, and Iran. These adaptations included, among other things, subterranean warfare, the use of AI for intelligence and planning, and integration of land, sea, and air forces both at the tactical level and across multiple theaters.
This article seeks to understand the causes of the doctrinal breakdown, how these processes affected command-training systems, and how the IDF adapted itself to the challenges of combat in dense urban and subterranean environments, while leveraging Israel’s unique human capital and the principle of a “people’s army,” which mobilizes the entire nation when necessary, enhancing its technological edge and relying on the belief in the justice of its cause.
In its early years, the IDF’s doctrine was based on a blend of underground guerrilla warfare and foreign military influences, mainly British and German. It evolved into an offensive doctrine rooted in rapid maneuver, air superiority, and combined arms. Yet, it also faced crises stemming from overreliance on personal experience, underestimation of the enemy, and neglect of structured military theory. Officer training shifted from short, improvised, underground-style courses to professional, academic, and technologically integrated programs emphasizing leadership and adaptability for joint warfare. In this respect, the War of Restoration marked a turning point: a shift to prolonged, multi-theater warfare that underscored the need to adapt both the IDF’s doctrine and its command and training systems to confront a wide range of threats.
To understand this evolution, it must be examined within a broad historical context. The IDF was officially founded on May 26, 1948, shortly after the declaration of independence, following David Ben-Gurion’s directive to merge the Haganah, Palmach, and Etzel into a unified force. The initial doctrine drew heavily on underground experience but lacked regular-army components such as staff command, logistics, systematic training, and operational planning. This situation led to internal disputes between Palmach veterans (who favored guerrilla-style warfare and personal initiative, oriented toward combating the Arab irregular bands active before independence) and former British Army officers (who favored organized structure, staff work, and inter-branch coordination). Ben-Gurion, identifying the threat posed by neighboring Arab states with organized, well-equipped armies, understood the need to prepare for conventional warfare within a structured military framework while preserving the fighting spirit and initiative characteristic of the underground movements. This insight led to the integration of British-trained officers, mainly in training roles, alongside veterans of the Haganah and Palmach.
Officer training began as improvised courses focused on squad and platoon levels, without long-term programs or unified standards. Thus, in the War of Independence, the IDF fought without a coherent doctrine but succeeded through initiative, dedication to the mission, and extraordinary sacrifice—foundations for subsequent reorganization, as articulated in Chief of Staff Yaakov Dori’s 1949 directive, “Changes in the Structure of the IDF.” The directive divided the workforce into three groups: the regular army (conscripts and career soldiers), the reserve forces (mobilized in emergencies), and the Guard Corps (defending the frontier and rear-area settlements). It also emphasized the need for uniformity and standardization in IDF operations.
The evolution of IDF doctrine is a story of constant adaptation. At first, doctrine was rooted in underground principles such as small-night raids, mission commitment, and personal initiative, as practiced by the Palmach and Haganah. Over time, it absorbed influences from Western militaries, such as the British brigade structure, and evolved into an offensive concept emphasizing rapid maneuver and air superiority.
The major rupture occurred after the Six-Day War, with excessive reliance on personal experience and informal knowledge, leading to failures in the Yom Kippur War, when the Bar Lev Line collapsed, and armored units suffered heavy losses from mobile infantry-carried anti-tank weapons. The subsequent recovery included strengthening combined arms, creating the Field Forces Command (1984), and shifting toward integrated warfare. During the First and Second Intifadas, Operation Defensive Shield, and the Gaza operations, a concept for counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and urban combat gradually emerged. The War of Restoration brought all these elements to their extremes, demonstrated integrated combat capability, and showcased the resilience of the regular and reserve ground forces. This military overcame poor initial conditions and endured a brutal, prolonged campaign across multiple theaters and threats.
1. The development of doctrine and training up to the Six-Day War
1.1 The IDF in its early years – from underground organization to regular army (1948–1956)
The IDF was born out of chaos, from fragmented underground organizations, in the midst of war. It was established without an institutional military infrastructure, advanced equipment, or experience in regular warfare, and thus found itself in the War of Independence (1948–1949) without an organized doctrine of combat, relying instead on the experience of underground fighters from the British Mandate period and a small number of veterans from regular armies who had fought in World War II. The existing doctrine was largely partisan, focused on small-unit warfare – raids, ambushes, sabotage, and the use of small arms and explosives – carried out by small units (team to platoon size), mainly at night, without large formations such as battalions.
Its logistical and administrative rear depended on the Jewish Yishuv, which served as a staging area between operations and as a departure point, with the objective being the execution of a specific mission in a raid-and-return format, rather than seizing territory, achieving decisive victory, or holding strategic objectives (Ze’evah Ostfeld, A Army Is Born: Major Stages in Building the Army under David Ben-Gurion, Ministry of Defense, 1994).
David Ben-Gurion, who assumed responsibility for defense in 1947, conducted a “seminar” – an extensive review of the Yishuv’s readiness for war – which exposed critical weaknesses: a lack of heavy weapons, communications systems, artillery, and armor, and the absence of logistics and an organized staff. Contrary to most Haganah leaders, who anticipated facing only Arab irregulars, he assessed that Arab regular armies would enter the war, which required a prepared regular army (Yoav Gelber, A Core for a Regular Hebrew Army, Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 1986).
The memorandum by Haim Laskov and Fritz Asht (Shalom Asht), both British Army veterans, proposed establishing units modeled on the reinforced British brigade structure, based on veterans of His Majesty’s forces with World War II experience, with emphasis on organized training and a two-year training cycle. But the massive mobilization beginning in November 1947 and the outbreak of fighting shortly after the UN Partition Plan disrupted these plans, leading to improvised adaptations during combat, including the rapid recruitment of foreign army veterans and overseas volunteers (Machal).
British Army veterans, including graduates of the Jewish Brigade and discharged soldiers returning to the country, demanded a shift to regular training based on British methods and lessons from World War II. This led to sharp disputes with Palmach and underground veterans, who favored guerrilla-style combat emphasizing personal initiative and simplicity. Ben-Gurion, who valued the regular, professional experience of British Army veterans, forcefully imposed the British system, and Laskov was appointed Deputy Head of the Training Section, which became the Training Directorate after the establishment of the General Staff organization (IDF General Staff, Organization of the Ground Forces, Aug. 26, 1949).
Command training began as introductory courses at the squad and platoon level, based on translated materials from foreign armies (Britain and Germany), with emphasis on individual, team, and squad training. Yet it lacked long-term planning and uniform standards, which led to command-and-control problems in the field, reflected in poor coordination among units, logistical difficulties, and the absence of joint training across branches. Training focused on basic skills such as platoon command, tactics, and the use of light weapons, and was relatively short due to the urgent need for commanders on the battlefield. British and American influences were evident in the curricula, as many early commanders had been trained in foreign armies during World War II. By the end of the 1940s, many junior officers had been trained, but the system still suffered from inconsistency and limited resources. Senior officer training at this stage was minimal, with most training based on field experience.
A major conceptual shift occurred during Operation Nachshon, the effort to open the road to Jerusalem (April 1948), when senior commanders such as Yigal Allon, Yitzhak Sadeh, and Israel Galili recognized the need to transition from small-unit guerrilla tactics to organized warfare that included seizing and holding territory, rather than relying solely on raids that ended with quick withdrawal. This was the first step toward shaping an offensive doctrine based on maneuver and coordination.
At the end of the war, the IDF found itself with a non-uniform structure, about one hundred thousand mobilized soldiers, no formal doctrine, but initial experience in regular combat against Arab armies, including those of Syria and Egypt, and the Jordanian Legion (Emanuel Wald, The Broken Tools, Shoken, 1987).
1.2 Initial organization: the reserve structure and the beginnings of doctrine (1949–1952)
At the end of the War of Independence in July 1949, the IDF faced a dual, decisive challenge: rapidly demobilizing roughly one hundred thousand soldiers due to the economic, social, and labor needs of the young state, while maintaining high readiness for a “second round,” perceived as a real threat from states such as Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. After extensive discussions within the General Staff and with Ben-Gurion (who also served as Defense Minister), the decision was made to build a large reserve army with a small regular core, defensive in structure but offensive in execution, to cope with limited strategic depth, scarce resources, and threats from every border.
The basic formation was designated as an enlarged brigade, modeled on the British brigade, integrating branches – infantry, armor, artillery, engineering, signals, medical, and logistics – to allow independent, flexible, and rapid action (Gelber 1986).
The brigades were reorganized as regional brigades subordinated to commands established based on wartime fronts: Northern Command (Brigades 1, 3, 20, 90), Central Command (5, 6, 160, 170), Southern Command (7, 40, 100, 110), and a national reserve (Brigade 12, armor). Only three brigades remained in the regular army: 1 (Golani) in the north, 5 (Givati) in the center, and 7 (armor) in the south. The process included thirty days of restructuring, transferring forces between units, establishing professional corps (armor, artillery, engineering), and four months of concentrated training to prepare fighters, commanders, and leadership cadres for the reserve brigades. During this time, units were relieved of routine border security duties, which were transferred to the Border Police, allowing them to focus on training (IDF General Staff, Organization of the Ground Forces, Aug. 26, 1949).
Chief of Staff Dori’s directive established the process, emphasizing the uniformity, standardization, and professionalism that had been lacking during the war. The Training Team, headed by Laskov (Head of the Training Directorate), became the main instrument for shaping doctrine. The guiding idea, developed by Laskov in consultation with Ben-Gurion, was to create a professional team of instructors and mentors to train regular brigades and reserve cadres. The team was given broad authority, exceeding that of regional commanders. It consisted of four sections: a command section (simulating a supervisory echelon), a brigade staff training section, a professional section (sub-units), and a base headquarters (administrative) (Ostfeld 1994).
The process was divided into four stages:
Stage A – organization under the new structure and self-training (one month, under instruction)
Stage B – integrated training (four months, with courses and professional qualifications)
Stage C – staff separation (ten days)
Stage D – training recruits or reserves (three months)
The team (150 personnel: 37 officers, 113 NCOs and soldiers, and veterans of the British Army and Palmach) shaped brigade doctrine, including 31 instructional booklets, training programs, exercises, and templates for various types of battle (attack, defense, pursuit). It began operations in September 1949, after the initial reorganization of the brigades under the new structure, and first trained internally to prepare instructors and to learn brigade doctrine and staff work.
The team operated from November 1949 to February 1950 in the Golani (1), Givati (50), and Seventh (armor) Brigades. Training was not completed in all brigades due to the need to return mobilized soldiers to the civilian economy. Even so, it institutionalized norms: standing orders, daily reports, and a unified professional language. The high friction between Palmach veterans and British-style officers led to shared learning, and daily and monthly reports documented progress. At the same time, a “dual staff” structure (a shadow brigade staff) was created to train reserve brigades.
Training and education incorporated branch coordination, staff exercises, and professional seminars. Lessons learned also led to structural innovations: establishing corps chiefs as professional authorities (not brigade-level unit commanders), eliminating the British-style administrative officer, creating independent logistics and personnel officers, separating intelligence from operations in the Operations Directorate, and more. Initial skepticism in the field toward the Training Team gradually shifted to a positive reception as training advanced and the program proved its value.
During this period, training processes also began to be institutionalized. In 1950, Bahad 1, the Officer Training School, was moved to the Tzrifin base, and the training program was extended to roughly six months, emphasizing leadership, military ethics, and professional military skills. In the 1950s, dedicated courses were established for different branches, such as the Air Force and the Armored Corps, and the first academic elements were introduced into training programs.
1.3 The large maneuvers: testing readiness, mobilization, and operational plans (1950–1952)
After consolidating an initial structure, the need arose to assess the army’s actual readiness, with emphasis on the reserve force, including mobilization, logistics, coordination, and operational concepts. For this purpose, a series of maneuvers was conducted over three years, known as the “large maneuvers” (due to their scale), which formed part of the process of shaping military doctrine.
The first maneuver examined the reserve mobilization system and the economy’s preparedness for an emergency. 100,000 people and numerous vehicles were mobilized. Its lessons included refining the mobilization method, enabling silent call-up, locating emergency depots near concentrations of soldiers for rapid equipping, and establishing the Supreme Command Post (MATZPA) for wartime management (Yigael Yadin, “More on the Margins of the 1952 Maneuvers,” Maarachot 72, October 1952).
In the subsequent maneuvers, the doctrine for operating regional commands and the Supreme Command Post was examined, along with operational concepts for employing the IDF. These were divided into TEMA (a one-sided command-post exercise), TEMB, and TEMG (two-sided, “blue” versus “green”), followed by a structured process of summaries, debriefings, and lessons learned at all levels. Among the insights was the first proposal to establish an additional echelon (a division) between the brigade and the command, for situations requiring simultaneous management of multiple efforts.
The 1952 maneuvers included training headquarters for prolonged combat, examining operational issues, staff work, and surprise mobilization across commands. Within this framework, full two-sided maneuvers of infantry and armor brigades were conducted to test the plans.
The plans examined included “Northern Scenario” (Syria–Lebanon), “Eastern” (Jordan), “Southern” (Egypt), “North–South” (Egypt–Syria), and the “All-Front Scenario” (all fronts simultaneously). The integrated maneuvers exposed insufficient defensive depth, which prevented effective defense against parallel attacks in several sectors, and led to the concept of a preemptive offensive to shift the fighting into enemy territory and thereby create depth. This concept was later implemented during the Sinai Campaign (1956) and the Six-Day War (1967). Additional lessons included the need to improve logistics, command and control, and inter-unit coordination.
These lessons were incorporated into officer training, with emphasis on operational planning, inter-branch coordination, and combat techniques, and later became the basis for command and staff courses.
The large-scale maneuvers demonstrated the relevance of the reserve structure. Still, they highlighted the need for a unified doctrine, which later materialized with the establishment of the Command and Staff Course (POOM) in 1954. The lessons also influenced doctrine, emphasizing rapid mobilization and shifting the combat into enemy territory, as seen later in the Sinai Campaign.
1.4 The consolidation of combat doctrine (1952–1967)
1.4.1 The Command and Staff College: staff work, command, and control (1952–1954)
The lessons of the War of Independence and the large-scale maneuvers revealed an urgent need to train commanders at the highest tactical level and to develop professional staff officers capable of addressing regular military threats. Following the maneuvers, the General Staff decided to establish a Command and Staff College (POOM). The task was assigned to a team of officers from the Training Department and various branches, headed by Lt. Col. Aharon Yariv. The team included key figures such as Matti Peled, Elad Peled, Ezer Weizman, Dan Hiram, Yuval Ne’eman, Moshe Dori, Yeshayahu Gavish, and Avraham Tamir.
The team was instructed to study foreign armies as well. Meir Zorea and Peled studied in Kimberly (UK), and Yariv studied at the French War College. In September 1952, an initial proposal was submitted for a year-long course integrating branches and services (including Air and Sea), emphasizing the development of staff-work doctrine, command and control, writing doctrinal material, and producing doctrinal literature for the IDF. The first course opened in June 1954, attended by President Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, Prime Minister Moshe Sharett, Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon, and Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan.
At the conclusion of the first course, which was experimental and whose lessons informed adjustments to the second course, Yariv stated:
“We devoted the entire eleven months to developing the cadets’ ability to think, because we believe that the main weapon of the officer, staff officer, and inspector is not the pen or pencil but the mind. No less did we invest in clarity of expression, because we believe that a commander’s or staff officer’s thinking is useless if it is not expressed concisely, clearly, and precisely. We also repeatedly stressed the decisive value of the human factor in war and in the IDF in particular” (Maarachot 93).
The curriculum included entrance exams, doctrinal subjects, staff work, and exercises. The cadets, all lieutenant colonels from all branches and services, were selected carefully for future senior roles (brigade and command commanders). POOM completed key processes, contributed to shaping doctrine that had not previously existed in the army, and embedded it in the IDF. It later influenced lower-level officer courses, such as battalion command courses, and established a knowledge base for regular warfare, with an emphasis on professionalism and inter-branch coordination.
1.4.2 Institutionalizing combat doctrine and training at the tactical level (1953–1956)
The 1950s were turbulent, marked by infiltrations across the borders and reprisal operations. The failure of the Golani operation at Tel Motila in 1951 (see The Battle of Tel Motila, HaMikhlol) led to an internal review of the infantry, then the army’s backbone. A proposal to establish a Chief Infantry Officer Headquarters was rejected due to opposition from the regional commands, which feared it would undermine their authority. Chief of Staff Mordechai Maklef established an Infantry Branch within the Training Directorate (22 February 1953), led by Col. Yehuda Wallach, tasked with improving the state of the infantry. The branch included a tactical-training section headed by Lt. Col. Rehavam Ze’evi, as well as a commanders’ training section headed by Lt. Col. Meir Pa’il (David Kimche, The Recruit of Laskov – The Mechanism of the Training Team in its Evolution into Centralized, Unifying Learning – The Training Directorate 1949–1953, History Department, Yesodot 1, 16 November 2021).
The branch’s first action was a comprehensive survey of all infantry units. Its concluding report revealed many problems, including workforce shortages, integration of new immigrants with language difficulties, and outdated or insufficient equipment. The General Staff therefore decided to take immediate measures, including allocating high-quality personnel and supplying improved equipment. Regarding the operational level, the assessment led to the establishment of Unit 101 (August 1953). Col. Mish’al Shaham founded the unit, then commander of the Jerusalem Brigade, together with Maj. Ariel Sharon, who also commanded it.
Arik, formerly commander of the Golani Reconnaissance Unit and at the time a student at the Hebrew University attached to the Jerusalem Brigade, fostered in the unit a culture of daring and offensive initiative that would later influence the IDF’s ethos. At the same time, its establishment triggered a debate that continues in the IDF today, mainly concerning whether allocating elite personnel and resources to special units harms the quality and capability of the regular standing forces.
During this period, the Training Directorate’s Infantry Branch developed fighter- and commander-training programs. These included the squad-leaders’ course as a prerequisite for officer training, and the development of training and instructional literature, including training doctrine (fieldcraft, individual, squad, platoon), the books Fieldcraft Training, The Riflemen’s Squad, The Riflemen’s Platoon, and Instruction in the Army, as well as translations of materials from foreign armies (Germany, Britain, France).
The improvement in infantry standards was reflected in the Sinai Campaign (1956) and later influenced the quality of selection for IDF officer-training courses.
1.4.3 The Development of the Armored Corps: From Supporting Arm to Decisive Force (1950–1956)
The Armored Corps was established based on the improvised armored vehicles of the War of Independence, such as makeshift half-tracks and civilian vehicles fitted with ad hoc armor. The corps’ school was first established in Netanya at the beginning of 1948, in a camp later named Training Base 11. In April 1948, it was moved to Tel Litwinsky (Tel Hashomer), but its activities were discontinued during the War of Independence. In September 1949, the “Training and Reinforcement Center for the Armored Corps” was established at the Tzrifin camp. It later became Training Base 5 and the Armored Corps School, which in 1954 was moved to the Julis base (Camp Immanuel).
Laskov’s doctrine emphasized the importance of tanks as a decisive force, advocating their concentrated rather than dispersed employment, as a striking arm rather than as fire support for the infantry. In Laskov’s view, the mobility of armor enabled surprise and rapid decision with minimal effort. His significant contribution lay in promoting the concept of employing a maneuvering armored division, in contrast to the prevailing idea of the time, which focused on brigade-level operations.
Laskov fought to advance this concept, exerting his full influence in a struggle against the General Staff, headed by Chief of Staff Dayan and many other commanders who opposed it. Ultimately, however, his doctrine was adopted by the IDF and influenced the character of senior command and the way land forces conducted war.
1.5 Operation Kadesh: A First Test of a Consolidated Doctrine and Initial Lessons (1956)
Operation Kadesh (29 October 1956) was the first real test of the structure and military doctrine developed over years of effort. The campaign employed quiet reserve mobilization, a preemptive strike, air superiority, and armored assaults, combined with inter-branch and inter-arm cooperation. The task-organized division was first used under Southern Command. Lessons from the campaign included the need to expand the Armored Corps (transitioning from a supporting to a decisive arm), to examine establishing a permanent division, to strengthen the Air Force’s capabilities, and to improve the efficiency and readiness of the logistics system.
The war itself marked a turning point. The IDF, still a relatively young army, achieved a swift and impressive victory in crossing the Sinai. Yet, large-scale engagements revealed weaknesses in its organizational structure, inter-branch coordination, and training. The war highlighted the need for significant change, leading to extensive reforms in training that prepared the army for the wars to come. At the same time, cooperation with foreign militaries, especially the French Army, contributed to the development of officer training and became a central tool in building a professional officer corps.
Immediately after Operation Kadesh, the IDF initiated a broad reform and organizational redesign, rebuilding itself as a modern standing army. One of the central changes was a shift from an infantry-based structure to mechanized warfare, emphasizing rapid mobility and inter-branch coordination. Lessons from the war, such as the need for operational flexibility and commander initiative, were incorporated into training and led to the establishment of more advanced training programs. For example, paratroopers were dispersed among other combat units to “train the army” and raise its overall professionalism. These reforms also included improvements in joint training between the branches (ground forces, the Air Force, and the Navy).
In parallel with internal reforms, cooperation with foreign militaries played a central role in officer training. France became Israel’s military ally, its leading arms supplier, and its partner in Operation Kadesh (together with Britain). This cooperation expanded into frequent and extended visits by senior Israeli officers to France, including professional courses, training of Israeli submarine crews, and the participation of IDF officers in programs at French military schools, where they studied advanced techniques of mechanized-force command and operational planning. The cooperation was not one-sided: Israel shared operational knowledge on cross-border raids with the French Army, which was then engaged in counter-terrorism operations in Algeria.
The combination of reforms and international cooperation strengthened the IDF as a learning and adaptive military. Officer training improved, with emphasis on operational planning, inter-branch integration, and joint exercises, leading to updates in doctrinal literature and command courses. These improvements laid the foundations for the modern IDF. In retrospect, it is clear that Operation Kadesh was not only a military victory but also a catalyst for upgrading the army and improving its readiness for future conflicts.
1.6 Doctrinal Publications: The Theoretical Foundation of the IDF (1950–1964)
The Training Directorate, established in 1948 as part of the IDF’s post-World War II consolidation efforts, initially relied on existing British military doctrine, such as the British Army manual used by the Jewish Brigade, which gradually replaced the underground literature that had existed since the 1930s. This effort, led by Laskov as head of the directorate, sought to instill doctrinal uniformity across the army while addressing weaknesses in command and control revealed during the early years. This body of literature, written in a unified military language, served as the basis for the “retraining” process and was incorporated into early training programs alongside lessons from battles such as Operation Nachshon and the Latrun engagements.
Later, the Command and Staff Department published “Staff Work” (1956, updated 1963), a key booklet detailing planning processes, reporting procedures, and the elements of “perfect staff work.” In parallel, the Training Department of the Infantry Corps published “The Rifle Platoon” (1954), a tactical guide to platoon warfare that combined elements of mission command with discipline.
In the early 1960s, as the army expanded, more advanced publications appeared: “The Division Book” (1961), which described the structure of a multi-branch divisional formation adapted to desert warfare; “Battle Doctrine” (1963), which balanced offense and defense, detailed combined-arms battle forms (such as maneuver warfare) and outlined air–ground coordination; and “Armored Warfare” (1964), which, drawing on lessons from Operation Kadesh, established the Armored Corps as a central pillar. These publications — roughly 500 pages in total — were written by General Staff committees and incorporated into command courses, from squad-leader and officer courses to brigade commanders’ courses, with an emphasis on uniformity, ongoing updates, and field experience.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, doctrinal literature underwent a process of writing and updating. Its discontinuation after these decades marked the beginning of a rupture, stemming from an organizational shift of attention away from the development of professional knowledge and military doctrine.
1.7 The Six-Day War: Peak Consolidation and Full Realization of Doctrine (1967)
The Six Day War, which began with the Air Force’s preemptive strike (Operation Focus) on 5 June 1967, marked the culmination of the IDF’s doctrinal implementation. The principles established during Laskov’s “retraining” efforts and the Command and Staff Department’s consolidation in the 1950s reached full expression in the inter-branch synergy and rapid maneuver of the 1967 campaign. Within one hundred hours, the IDF captured Sinai, the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights, destroying significant enemy forces — a sweeping victory demonstrating the doctrinal pillars of surprise, deep maneuver, and shifting the war to enemy territory.
A notable example is the battle of Umm Katef in Sinai, where Sharon’s division operated with coordinated armor, infantry, and air power: some two hundred Egyptian tanks were destroyed in synchronized movement, exploiting the open spaces of the Negev for armored tactics as described in “Armored Warfare.” This demonstrated the IDF’s ability to synchronize branches and arms as practiced in command courses and at the Command and Staff College.
At the same time, the infantry forces implemented the principles of “Battle Doctrine” (1963) in combat in complex terrain: in Jerusalem, paratroopers advanced through built-up neighborhoods with tactical surprise, while in the Golan Heights, they confronted Syrian resistance in fortified positions. Officer training, which integrated doctrinal literature with field experience, proved its worth in the application of “perfect staff work” — precise planning and real-time reporting — but also produced vulnerabilities: overreliance on personal experience and underestimation of the enemy, which contributed to the phenomenon of “victory euphoria” and led to failures in the Yom Kippur War (1973).
2. The rupture in the combat doctrine: from triumphal euphoria to reliance on personal experience (1967–1973)
2.1 The Six Day War: triumphal euphoria, the “humanization of doctrine,” and the oral tradition (1967–1973)
After the victory in the Six Day War, which marked the high point of the IDF’s doctrinal implementation, a major fracture emerged in the process: a sense of triumphal euphoria, an organizational arrogance that led to excessive reliance on the personal experience of senior commanders, the heroes of the war, instead of systematic updating of the written doctrine based on lessons learned and on changes in the security reality, such as the new strategic depth gained in the Golan Heights, Judea and Samaria, and Sinai.
A clear symbol of this trend is Shabtai Tevet’s book The Tanks Are Burning (Schocken, 1968), which describes the military’s addiction to fast-maneuver tactics in Sinai while neglecting preparations for strategic defense. This phenomenon, called “the humanization of doctrine,” that is, the personal adaptation of doctrinal principles to subjective interpretations, was reinforced by an oral tradition that often nullified official documents.
Following the war, a debate emerged over how to defend the new borders without allocating excessive forces. The discussion centered on two approaches: mobile defense, based on agile, shifting troops that rely on reserve units and regular patrols, with an emphasis on rapid response, ambushes, and offensive raids. Its advantages included great flexibility and resource efficiency, though it was less effective in preventing widespread infiltration and required highly accurate intelligence.
The opposing approach was static defense, which relied on fixed strongpoints, obstacles (fences, mines, berms), and large, permanently deployed forces in defensive sectors.
At a May 1968 meeting at the Armored Corps Headquarters, the issue was discussed—the commander of the Armored Corps, Maj. Gen. Moshe “Musa” Peled remarked that “in the books it’s the opposite” (meaning the doctrinal literature supported mobile defense while the IDF was choosing the static model). The commander of Division 84 during the war, Maj. Gen. Israel Tal stated, “We did not invent new methods but relied on experience.” At the same time, Ariel Sharon, commander of Division 38, objected, saying, “We will change if the Chief of Staff accepts it,” reflecting a lack of broad commitment to revising the doctrine.
Ultimately, the IDF chose static defense, leading to the construction of the Bar Lev Line along the Suez Canal. This was a continuous, rigid defense meant to reduce infiltration and ensure territorial control.
The consequences were disastrous: the neglect of doctrinal defense turned “mobile defense,” as defined in the official Combat Doctrine, into a distorted concept interpreted differently by each commander. Maj. Gen. Yitzhak Hofi saw it as a preemptive maneuver; Maj. Gen. David Elazar perceived it as dynamic blocking, and Maj. Gen. Shmuel Gonen, the Southern Command commander during the Yom Kippur War, considered it a static defense—one of the factors that contributed to the war’s failures. The Agranat Commission, the state inquiry into the war’s failures, determined that this conceptual drift stemmed from underestimating the enemy and from a lack of long-term planning, placing responsibility on the senior military command.
In addition, linguistic distortions emerged: official terms like “strongpoint” were replaced by “line,” “defense” by “blocking,” and tactical terms turned into daily slang such as “nibble” (advance gradually), “sweep” (clear an area), “wash” (destroy quickly), and “catch a ride on a bridge,” undermining the uniform military language established since the 1949 “Operations Team.” Command training suffered from these inconsistencies, with an excessive emphasis on personal experience at the expense of systematic doctrinal study, weakening the courses at the Command and Staff College where the written doctrine had been taught.
2.2 The War of Attrition: turning routine security constraints into combat doctrine (1968–1970)
The War of Attrition, fought along the Suez Canal from September 1968 to August 1970, also marked a turning point in the development of the IDF’s combat doctrine, as routine security constraints were converted into an improvised doctrinal framework with long-term implications, emphasizing rigid static defense without territorial concessions.
This process, which began as a tactical response to Egyptian bombardments, evolved into two conflicting concepts: the “Sela” (Courtyards) plan, based on large reserve forces and dispersed fortified positions set back from the canal, versus the “Outpost” model—the Bar Lev Line, championed by Maj. Gen. Avraham “Bren” Adan, who relied on small outposts (20–30 soldiers) on the waterline, with tank support behind them, as described in Training Directorate documents from 1969.
The static approach, heavily influenced by political pressure to hold the waterline, neglected structured doctrinal defense and centered on running a static system of bunkers and strongpoints. Building this defensive system in a non-doctrinal manner and in disregard of military professionalism became one of the significant causes of failure in the Yom Kippur War. Solutions in the field remained tactical rather than doctrinal, reflecting the triumphal euphoria of the post–Six-Day War period and the reliance on personal experience rather than doctrinal updating.
This trend dovetailed with the rise of the Armored Corps at the expense of other branches. Single-branch divisions were created from three tank brigades, neglecting infantry and artillery. In his article “Is the Tank Dead?” (Maarachot, Issue 224, 8 August 1972), Col. Yehuda Wallach criticized the disregard for anti-tank threats and the failure to adapt to technological developments such as radar and guided missiles. This process illustrates how routine constraints can evolve into doctrine, but without systematic revision, they lead to strategic breakdown.
Immediately after the Six-Day War, the IDF expanded its training to adapt to the new reality. Until then, exercises focused on short guerrilla-style fighting inspired by the War of Independence. The victory reinforced faith in armored capabilities and led to increased investment in training the corps, along with brigade-level exercises integrating air, armor, and infantry, including reserve training to ensure readiness for threats across the newly held territories.
The War of Attrition accelerated the implementation of training changes for mobile defense and navigation in the Sinai. That period also exposed conceptual rigidity, as the IDF failed to develop effective responses to new anti-tank missiles and to the Egyptian advancement of surface-to-air missile arrays to the canal in the war’s final stages. In the long term, these developments shifted the IDF away from Ben-Gurion’s doctrine of “transferring the war to enemy territory” toward integrated territorial defense.
2.3 The decline of the Training Directorate and organizational changes (1950–1973)
Under generals like Laskov (1953–1958), Head of the Training Directorate and later Chief of Staff, and Yitzhak Rabin (1964–1968), who served as Deputy Chief of Staff and commander of the Battalion Commanders’ School, the directorate enjoyed senior status within the General Staff. Laskov, a veteran of the Jewish Brigade, initiated the establishment of the “Operations Team” to train brigades after the War of Independence, and Rabin expanded training to battalion commander courses. The directorate held broad authority and a strong standing within the army. But after a decade and a half of rising doctrinal influence, organizational changes began to erode this standing. After the Six-Day War, training authority for armored units was transferred to the Armored Corps Headquarters under Maj-Gen. Israel Tal, who emphasized independent training for armored forces rather than integrated combined-arms combat.
3. The Yom Kippur War – A Major Rupture and Initial Recovery (1973–1982)
3.1 The Failure of the Oral Doctrine and Initial Lessons Learned (1973)
The Yom Kippur War exposed the failures of the IDF’s combat doctrine, particularly the excessive reliance on an “oral doctrine” based on the personal experience of commanders such as Sharon and Tal, at the expense of a systematic update of the written doctrine.
The combined Egyptian and Syrian offensive breached the Bar Lev Line along the Suez Canal and the line of outposts on the Golan Heights, leading to a significant collapse. The neglect of doctrine, including defensive warfare doctrine, and the “single arm” combat approach of armored units that had developed after the Six-Day War, failed when confronted with advanced anti-tank weapons such as Sagger missiles. The disregard for technological developments led to tactical failure, as anti-tank ditches, anti-tank missiles, and mines halted rapid maneuver.
The failure resulted from a combination of “victory euphoria,” underestimation of the enemy, and a distorted concept of “mobile defense” that lacked a written, structured doctrine. The result was the collapse of defensive lines in Sinai and the Golan Heights within hours. The initial lessons learned from the war were integrated into command training: the Command and Staff College and the Officers School expanded their programs, with emphasis on defensive planning, deep-defense exercises, and intra-battlefield simulations. By 1975, integrated training programs had been added, including the “Armor Wave” exercise (1976), which combined infantry and armored forces in combat against an enemy equipped with anti-tank weapons.
As noted, one of the main lessons of the war was the need to update officer training, which was seen as a significant weakness: a lack of structured theoretical education, excessive dependence on personal or practical experience, and insufficient emphasis on critical thinking. Until the war, officer training relied on short courses at the Officers School (Bahad 1), with a focus on field experience, while theoretical education was postponed to later stages. The reforms implemented under Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur transformed the training process from short, practical courses into longer, more professional tracks designed to prepare officers for complex wars better.
Immediately after the war, intensive training was emphasized in all field units, including brigade and division-level exercises. Gur ordered large-scale drills simulating real combat scenarios, including coordination between branches and corps (armor, infantry, air force, and special units), to improve operational readiness and prevent surprises. These changes included renewing professional fundamentals and coordinating the employment of combined forces.
The establishment of the Ground Forces Command in 1984 unified the ground forces under a single command while dividing the corps (armor, infantry, engineering) into more flexible formations. The reform, led by Defense Minister Moshe Arens and Chief of Staff Moshe Levy, integrated the lessons of the Agranat Commission and led to the creation of multi-corps divisions, which were reflected in the First Lebanon War (1982).
4. Operation Peace for Galilee and the Intifadas – Emphasis on Counterterrorism (1982–2005)
4.1 Operation Peace for Galilee: Lessons of Urban and Built-Up Warfare (1982)
The war that began on June 6, 1982, marked a turning point in the IDF’s combat doctrine, particularly in dealing with urban and built-up warfare, an environment in which dense construction, civilian populations, and armed militants create unique tactical challenges. The operation, which began as a focused raid to push terrorist organizations out of rocket range from northern Israel, quickly expanded into the conquest of southern Lebanon and entry into Beirut, where the IDF fought intense urban battles against PLO militants.
The core lessons focused on force integration: the war exposed the limitations of “armor shock” (a remnant of the Six-Day War) in an urban environment, as tanks were trapped in ambushes in Beirut and Sidon. In response, the Ground Forces Command developed a combined-arms doctrine for armor, infantry, engineering, and air support.
Officer training was upgraded accordingly: the Command and Staff College and the Officers School added modules on “leadership in urban settings” – training to handle crossfire, identify ambushes, and interact with civilians, inspired by the battles in Beirut. By 1985, urban warfare simulations had also been added to training bases.
4.2 The First Intifada: Counterterrorism and Doctrinal Changes (1987–1993)
The Intifada, which began in December 1987 in Gaza and the West Bank, marked a dramatic shift in the IDF’s doctrine from conventional warfare to LIC (Low-Intensity Conflict) – asymmetric conflict based on counterterrorism, mass demonstrations, and the civil–military struggle. The events, which included stone-throwing, tire burning, and acts of violence, forced the IDF to confront a new type of threat in the territories, requiring significant doctrinal changes.
The IDF moved from the aggressive “mobile defense” of the Six-Day War era to an adapted defense emphasizing dispersed forces, centralized control of tactical operations, and the integration of tactical intelligence. As described by Stuart A. Cohen in his study (“How Did the Intifada Affect the IDF?”, Conflict Quarterly, 1994), the conflict altered force structure, including extensive use of special units such as the Yamam and undercover units.
Yitzhak Rabin’s “breaking bones” policy (1988), which included physical force for deterrence, generated ethical criticism but reinforced the need for updated training: counterterrorism modules in officer instruction, training in combat ethics (such as “proportional use of force”), and revised rules of engagement adapted to civilian environments. The Training Directorate updated the “combat doctrine” (1989) to emphasize the use of field intelligence, including cooperation with the Shin Bet, thereby reducing civilian casualties and leading to a gradual decline in violence until the Oslo Accords (1993).
The Second Intifada (2000–2005), which escalated from mass protests and stone-throwing to shootings along roads and communities, Qassam rocket fire, and suicide bombings, exposed further limitations and led to changes in force employment: a series of targeted raids across the West Bank and Gaza, culminating in Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002) – a limited maneuver in the West Bank to recapture major cities – generated new tactical techniques such as breaching walls between homes in fighting inside refugee camps.
5. The Second Lebanon War: The Failure of the Ground Forces
The war that erupted in July 2006, following the capture of reservists Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser, found the IDF ground forces in a state of low readiness. They were deeply engaged in counterterrorism operations in the West Bank and Gaza, suffered from significant budget cuts, lacked regular and reserve unit training, faced equipment shortages in storage units, and were generally unprepared for war.
The abandonment of training in both regular and reserve units and the resulting weakening of reserve force readiness were clearly reflected in performance. The IDF struggled to conduct basic maneuver operations, failed to advance in the built-up and rugged terrain of southern Lebanon, and suffered heavy damage from advanced Russian anti-tank missiles (Kornet) launched by Hezbollah during advances along mountainous routes. The Winograd Commission, the governmental inquiry established after the war, together with IDF investigative teams, identified these failures. Implementation of the lessons was carried out by Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, who assumed office in February 2007 following the resignation of Dan Halutz.
The lessons of the war included strengthening the reserve forces with equipment and training, expanding regular army training, and regulating the command training process in the IDF with emphasis on the ground forces. A major-level course was established for all corps; the Command and Staff College became mandatory for promotion to lieutenant colonel; the National Defense College became compulsory for promotion to brigadier general; and new courses were instituted for colonels and brigadier generals in the General Staff. This was accompanied by formalizing all ground forces courses: company commander, battalion commander, brigade commander, and division commander.
6. Gaza Operations (2006–2022)
6.1 Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009)
The operation in December 2008 began after a sustained increase in rocket fire toward the communities surrounding Gaza and the southern cities. In light of the failures revealed in the employment of ground forces during the Second Lebanon War, a process of correction was carried out. Hamas, which had seized control of the Gaza Strip in a military coup in 2007, continued to consolidate its power, using the open Rafah border to build up its capabilities.
The IDF, for its part, prepared for a military operation while conducting a long process of training and readying the forces for combat in the Gaza arena. All forces designated to participate in the ground maneuver in the Strip were organized according to their combat teams (infantry, armor, engineering, artillery, and more), and they conducted integrated training at the Ground Forces Training Center in Tze’elim, including at the newly completed urban warfare training center that simulates a Palestinian city. As part of the training, all threat scenarios were examined, including attempts to abduct soldiers and drills against a force simulating the enemy.
Commanders underwent a series of professional briefings and training sessions, both to study the enemy and its operational patterns and to employ fire and air support. The operation began after a national-level deception effort and a preemptive strike on a Hamas police course and on its heavy weapons depots. The ground maneuver phase started with a command-level deception and the use of a rolling fire curtain to accompany the forces’ entry. The most significant achievement of the operation was restoring the IDF’s confidence in its ground maneuver capability after the Second Lebanon War.
During the training and preparation process, new combat techniques and professional training frameworks were developed for fighting in urban terrain, densely built areas, and combined-arms operations – areas in which significant gaps had been exposed in Lebanon. On the other hand, there was no professional doctrinal engagement with subterranean warfare, an evolving threat that the IDF had already encountered in the years before the disengagement from Gaza and certainly after the abduction of Gilad Shalit in 2006.
6.2 Operation Pillar of Defense – A Surprise Operation (2012)
Since Hamas resumed rocket fire from the Gaza Strip very shortly after the end of Operation Cast Lead, it became clear that a response to the developing threat was required. At both the political and military levels, there was a desire to avoid reoccupying the Gaza Strip and controlling its population, while also needing to address the ongoing harm to the home front. The General Staff and Southern Command conducted a learning process through a series of war games held mainly at the Dado Center, in which the concept of deterrent operations took shape – bounded campaigns intended to achieve periods of quiet by harming the enemy without seizing or holding territory or population.
This was an operational-level conceptual process that examined the problem and possible solutions in depth and continued within Southern Command for several years, both before and after Operation Pillar of Defense. Within this process, it became clear that to achieve a significant operational gain already in the opening strike, surprise was required – a problematic issue given the need to act with both international and domestic legitimacy. In other words, to enable a short campaign, a significant achievement had to be obtained in the opening blow while minimizing the harm to internal and external legitimacy inherent in being the initiating side.
Within this conceptual framework, preparations for Operation Pillar of Defense were made, and after a sustained increase in rocket fire, a decision was made to initiate the operation. The operation opened with the targeted killing of Hamas’s military commander, Ahmed Jabari, and the destruction of all long-range rockets then held by Hamas. During the roughly week-long operation, numerous airstrikes were carried out, though the ground force that was mobilized and deployed around the Strip was not activated. The operation ended quickly with a ceasefire, with Israel crediting itself with operational achievements—most of them accomplished in the opening strike—while Hamas hailed its ability to maintain continuous rocket fire until the last moment, including, for the first time, at the Tel Aviv metropolitan area.
6.3 Operation Protective Edge – The Subterranean Challenge (2014)
Even after Operation Pillar of Defense, rocket fire toward the Gaza periphery and the southern cities resumed, though in what became known as “drizzles.” At the same time, Hamas’s extensive force buildup activities were exposed, particularly the digging of offensive cross-border tunnels into Israeli territory. Southern Command at the time lacked intelligence and any significant tunnel-detection capability; the method used was drilling shafts along the border in the hope of randomly hitting a tunnel route, a primitive and ineffective approach.
After the discovery of several tunnels crossing into Israeli territory, a broader understanding emerged regarding the scope of the threat (over thirty cross-border tunnel routes). Ahead of the operation, tactical tools were developed at the field level, such as the “Purple Fox” technique developed by the Givati Brigade for locating tunnel shafts. Still, there was no systemic response, neither doctrinally nor technologically (Shay Levy, “Genius Improvisation: How Givati Eliminated Dozens of Tunnels,” Mako, 5 August 2014).
At the beginning of the fighting, once the decision was made to act against the cross-border tunnel routes, Southern Command received a technological solution for detecting tunnel routes that existed within the IDF’s special operations community but was not accessible to the broader army. It reached Southern Command only thanks to the personal connections and prior knowledge of the Nahal Brigade commander, Ofer Gordin, who had served in Sayeret Matkal.
Neither before nor after the operation was any doctrinal or technological solution provided to address the subterranean threat. The directions that later received significant expression after the war resulted from research that began with the lessons of the Shalit abduction incident in 2006, and they materialized mainly in the creation of the subterranean barrier that prevents the use of cross-border tunnels. Another lesson drawn by the incoming Southern Command commander, Eyal Zamir, was shifting the operational focus in Gaza toward a plan for the conquest and defeat of Hamas – no longer deterrence-centered operations, but decisive victory, if and when the organization rebuilt its strength. Yet, since it was understood at all levels of the IDF that there was no intention—neither political nor military—to implement a conquest and defeat of Hamas, the attitude toward the plan and its preparations reflected that reality.
6.4 Operation Northern Shield (2018)
After prolonged intelligence monitoring and engineering and logistical preparations, the IDF exposed and destroyed Hezbollah’s cross-border tunnel infrastructure along the northern border. This project, on which the organization had worked for many years, was part of its offensive infrastructure for a future war. In doing so, the IDF employed capabilities developed for locating and destroying Gaza tunnels to neutralize the tunnels on the northern border.
6.5 Operation Guardian of the Walls – Hamas Deterred and Restrained (2021)
After Operation Protective Edge, several parallel processes took place that influenced the IDF’s readiness for a Gaza campaign. First, under Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot, the military shifted resources to improve intelligence coverage in Gaza. Second, the Air Force developed the ability to strike and damage subterranean infrastructure from the air. Third, a new barrier was built along the Gaza border, primarily blocking the underground domain and preventing tunneling without early warning.
Southern Command conducted a strategic process that yielded a new deterrence-oriented plan with significant potential to damage Hamas. The plan relied on high-quality intelligence, the Air Force’s technological and operational capabilities, and a limited ground maneuver. The relatively small force earmarked for the maneuver allowed the concentration of the ground army’s best capabilities in several regular brigade combat teams.
Most of the IDF’s force buildup during this period focused on Northern Command and on preparations for fighting Hezbollah, including training and operational planning. Alongside this, Southern Command also prepared an operational plan and conducted the necessary preparations. The plan was exercised, and readiness for its implementation was high. Still, the intelligence assessment was that Hamas was deterred and seeking an arrangement with Israel—an evaluation that collapsed with the rocket fire toward Jerusalem.
The incoming Southern Command commander, Eliezer Toledano, who had not been directly involved in preparing the plan in the years before the operation, did not fully understand the logic of its implementation and the interdependence between its stages and components. The plan was executed while disregarding the operational constraints built into the concept and without sufficient dialogue between the command echelons—Southern Command and the General Staff—resulting in outcomes far below expectations. Part of the failure was reflected in a reluctance to conduct a ground maneuver, which was integral to the overall plan to draw Hamas militants into the underground network and then strike them. This paralyzing hesitation led to canceling the planned maneuver and instead moving toward the barrier without crossing it. Hamas understood what was happening, avoided entering the tunnels, and thus was not harmed in the strike. In turn, the IDF failed to employ the operational surprise it had planned in the attack on the “Metro.”
7. Iron Sword War (2023–2025)
The most recent war, in fact, consisted of several simultaneous campaigns: in Gaza, in the north against Hezbollah, in Syria, against Iran, against the Houthis, and against terrorism in Judea and Samaria. For most of these arenas (with the possible exception of the Iranian front), the IDF entered the war without a structured operational concept. Officer and command training were likewise severely lacking. Years of neglect in developing military doctrine left senior officers without a solid grasp of the fundamentals of the profession of arms, reflected in several core deficiencies:
The war exposed the weakness of the General Staff’s force-employment planning. Overall force-employment planning, allegedly under the authority of the Operations Directorate (AMANZ), addressed operational planning for campaigns, while the strategic dimension was vested in the Planning Directorate. This division created a lack of a shared professional language and caused friction among the strategic, operational, and tactical planning processes throughout the war. As a result, the Southern Command was forced to formulate its own command-level strategy and work to instill it within the General Staff.
The principles of military planning in the IDF require a methodical and structured situational assessment process that produces an operational plan. Such plans may be prepared in advance for various scenarios as operational directives or drafted as executable operations orders. These fundamentals are rigorously practiced at the IDF’s main operational headquarters, including the regional commands.
The Operations Division, which was meant to serve as the “operations officer” of the entire army—responsible for command, control, synchronization, and real-time management of operations, ensuring that the IDF’s main commands operate in accordance with plans, orders, and strategic objectives—found itself absorbed in operational planning instead. The result was that the IDF ended up weakened on both fronts.
Another doctrinal gap involved the failure of defensive preparations in the south and north. Defensive doctrine rests on several principles, many of which were not implemented before the war. First, the IDF was often positioned behind critical terrain—population centers and communities—making effective defense against enemy attacks impossible. Given that this placement was a political constraint, no alternative solution was adopted. IDF posts were built as routine bases rather than fortified defensive positions, and no battle compounds were prepared for manning in the event of an enemy assault. There were no reserve forces designated to respond to breaches of the contact line or to enemy surprise attacks.
Another example was the construction of Division 91’s headquarters in Biranit, directly on the border, despite the obvious fact that such a headquarters would be unable to function in wartime. The same error was repeated with the Gaza Division headquarters and the two territorial brigade headquarters, all located in a base in the southern sector that lacked proper defensive readiness.
A further mistake was the heavy reliance on a technological barrier without establishing mutual-support capabilities in surveillance and fire. The basic principles of defense appeared to be forgotten once the technological barrier along the border was built. Although defensive forces enjoy advantages of prepared positions and familiarity with the terrain, the foundational assumption remains that “the defensive line will always be breached”—a principle that did not sufficiently permeate the senior command.
Offensive doctrine also revealed significant gaps during the war. For example, the ground assault in Lebanon was executed frontally, contrary to doctrine. The idea of penetrating deep into enemy territory and clearing backward from the depth was not seriously considered. In our assessment, this failure stemmed from inadequate training of ground forces and a lack of confidence in their ability to operate effectively. A similar phenomenon occurred before the ground maneuver in Gaza early in the war, when many senior officers doubted the ground forces’ ability to function effectively there.
It goes without saying that the IDF did not possess a practical operational plan for conquering Gaza and defeating Hamas. The existing plan had not been exercised for years, leading to a lack of trust among commanders.
More broadly, the core principles of ground warfare—seizure, clearing, and control—were not internalized in the IDF. As a result, the army refrained from seizing and holding territory under military governance. Instead, reliance on raid-based tactics drastically reduced operational effectiveness and wasted precious resources. Repeatedly entering and withdrawing from areas that had been struck and cleared allowed Hamas to recover again and again. This approach cost the IDF heavily and required repeated returns to the same terrain. The raid-based approach promoted by the previous Chief of Staff, Herzi Halevi, including proposals to apply similar methods at the end of the war under the “Gideon Chariots B” framework, revealed the extent to which the senior IDF leadership had lost its doctrinal bearings and understanding of the military profession.
Likewise, the mission of separating the population from Hamas operatives made no progress at all—partly due to a lack of commitment and management by the IDF and Southern Command, and partly due to legal obstacles raised by the Military Advocate General and the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories. The political leadership instructed the IDF to establish a “humanitarian city” in an area cleared by our forces in Rafah. In response, as with the military-governance issue, a fear-inducing presentation was leaked, claiming that the task required a massive force, billions of shekels, and many months to complete. A cost and duration analysis conducted within the American Fund initiative, as well as by other civilian bodies using international benchmarks, showed otherwise.
Avoiding control over humanitarian aid and refraining from implementing temporary or partial military governance began during the first return to combat after the initial ceasefire in December 2023. It intensified after the second ceasefire ended in March 2025. It must also be emphasized that the IDF avoided imposing an effective siege on Hamas-held areas, allowing the civilian population to continue receiving aid from outside the combat zone. Solutions for population control—military governance and its alternatives—were presented as detailed above, but met determined opposition from the General Staff and successive Chiefs of Staff. This opposition was not professionally grounded. (Gabi Siboni and Erez Wiener, Gaza Until When, JISS, 6.10.2025)
8. Conclusions and Recommendations
The State of Israel was born in the midst of war. The country’s founders and defense leaders, led by David Ben-Gurion, succeeded in creating an organized fighting force out of underground militias and veterans of regular armies. Alongside the establishment of the military, a remarkable process of doctrinal and training development took place. Operational staff structures, large-scale maneuvers, the creation of the Command and Staff College, and the writing of military doctrine—all emerged in the early years, effectively creating a professional military from nothing.
These foundations produced the operational successes of Operation Kadesh and the Six-Day War. Yet the “victory intoxication” that followed, combined with the personalization of doctrine, led to conceptual stagnation. Despite significant changes in threats and the strategic environment—such as the creation of strategic depth in Sinai, the Golan Heights, and Judea and Samaria—no substantive updates were made to concepts and doctrine. The defensive system in Sinai was built without adherence to defensive doctrine, and the results in the Yom Kippur War reflected that failure.
The peace treaties with Egypt and later Jordan, the rise of Palestinian terrorism, and the Intifada did not receive adequate doctrinal response. The IDF continued training for assaults on fortified positions and the capture of “Syrian pitas,” even as the real threat lay in urban and close-quarter fighting. Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency doctrine did not evolve, resulting instead in various localized practices that lacked coherence with what was taught in courses or training programs.
Later, as the subterranean threat evolved, doctrinal and instructional development lagged again. The IDF focused on ideas and technologies but neglected fundamental doctrine.
A similar lack of professionalism was evident in the training system. Some training programs were effectively outsourced—both instructors and content. Frequent changes to curricula were made, often to emulate trends from the business world. The military profession was not perceived as sufficiently valuable, and commanders preferred academic studies in unrelated fields over the study of military doctrine.
A subcommittee of the Knesset on Defense Concept and Force Build-Up, chaired by MK Amit Halevi, produced severe findings on the state of training and made essential recommendations (Training of Commanders in the Ground Combat Forces, Subcommittee Report, 2025). The committee’s distinction between “training for position” and “training for rank,” intended to justify the IDF’s complex, multilayered training structure, was shown to be artificial.
For example, integrating academic studies into the training track does not equip officers—even those with academic education—with the basic military knowledge required in many armies worldwide. Officers spend considerable time and energy on fields unrelated to the profession of arms—political science, sociology, economics—rather than focusing on intellectual development in their military profession. Unrelated subjects consume much of the limited time allocated to officer training.
The committee also compared IDF officer training duration with that of foreign militaries, revealing significant gaps in the professional preparation of combat officers. The report concluded that the IDF’s training sequence was developed through improvisation and responses to local constraints, with insufficient planning and insufficient attention to training throughout an officer’s career.
Moreover, the report noted that the Command and Staff College (PU’M) is the IDF’s final stage of professional military education. That is, after the rank of lieutenant colonel, a severe conceptual distortion arises, as senior officers incorporate external considerations and unrelated fields into their military decision-making.
In our view, both doctrine and training require top-down review and restructuring—from updating the national security concept, through IDF strategy, multi-branch operational concepts, and down to the doctrinal frameworks of branches and corps. To address this vital issue properly, military studies must be prioritized as part of the command-promotion track, instructional roles must be treated as core assignments, and command tenures should be extended across the board.
There is a need to restore the centrality of training and instruction. The Training Directorate should be re-established and tasked with coherently structuring the entire military education system, from private to Chief of Staff, while reviewing curricula, eliminating redundancy and contradictions, and restoring doctrinal rigor. Military doctrine must once again be central to military practice. Commanders should be evaluated on their mastery of doctrine, their record in instructional roles, and their contributions to military writing.
The IDF must abandon external trends and outsourcing of its command training and bring this work back inside. When it is more desirable for an officer to graduate from the National Defense College than from the Wexner Foundation, we will know progress has been made. IDF training must undergo a significant upgrade in content, instructional leadership, and overall conceptual design from end to end.
As Pirkei Avot teaches: “Without flour, there is no Torah; without Torah, there is no flour.” There must be a reciprocal connection between substance and spirit. Advanced weapons are essential, but without doctrine—military education and relevant literature—even the best weapons will not suffice.
