Any account of Oman today must begin with the legendary sultan who ruled the country for half a century. He was the late Sultan Qaboos of Oman, a member of the Al Said dynasty. Qaboos, who never married or had children, ruled the sultanate with an iron fist. Born in 1940, he seized power at the age of just 30 in a violent coup against his father, Said bin Taimur, on July 23, 1970, with British support. Some even claim the coup was orchestrated by the British.
Sultan Qaboos’s death in 2020, after half a century at the helm of the small sultanate, left a void in the country’s leadership. It is impossible to overlook his personal responsibility for transforming Oman from a poor, neglected country into a stable, modern state by building infrastructure, developing a healthcare system, and fostering a cohesive society. His greatest achievement was channeling oil revenues into infrastructure and public services. However, he left behind an economy dependent almost entirely on oil and gas.
Absolute Monarchy
Politically and in terms of its system of government, it is worth noting that until his death, Qaboos held the positions of prime minister, defense minister, foreign minister, finance minister, commander of the armed forces, and numerous other offices, with no separation of powers whatsoever. Oman has no parliament and no regular elections. It is an absolute monarchy. Sultan Qaboos embodied the phrase L’État, c’est moi (“I am the state”) in the fullest sense of the words. After the death of the all-powerful sultan, his cousin Haitham bin Tariq was chosen as his successor, in accordance with a recommendation Qaboos had left before his death. Six Gulf states are ruled by dynastic families, and Oman has been governed by the Al Said family since the 18th century.
The official and dominant religion among Oman’s population is Islam, but Omanis are neither Sunni nor Shiite. They belong to a third branch of Islam that emerged after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. Most Muslim citizens of the country follow the Ibadi school of Islam. They are Ibadis. The Ibadi school takes its name from Abdullah ibn Ibad, a Muslim theologian and political leader who lived in the 7th century CE.
While Shiites believed that leadership, or the imamate, must remain within the Prophet Muhammad’s family, namely Ali and his descendants, and Sunnis believed that the leader should come from the Quraysh tribe, the Prophet’s own tribe, the Ibadis developed a more democratic approach. According to their view, any worthy, decent, and honest Muslim, regardless of ancestry, tribal affiliation, or skin color, can be elected imam, the spiritual and political leader.
Alongside the Ibadi majority, Oman is also home to Sunni and Shiite Muslim minorities, as well as small communities of migrant workers and foreign nationals belonging to other religions, primarily Hindus, Christians, and Buddhists. In Omani mosques, Ibadis, Sunnis, and Shiites gather to pray together, a phenomenon rarely seen in other Arab countries, where each branch accuses the others of heresy while claiming to represent “true Islam.” The Ibadi community is characterized by openness, acceptance of others, and tolerance toward other religions. Oman is also home to Christian and Protestant churches, as well as Hindu and Buddhist temples.
The Terror-Supporting Mufti
As early as 1975, Sultan Qaboos appointed Ahmed al-Khalili as the sultanate’s mufti. Now 84, he still holds the title of Grand Mufti of Oman. Over the course of 51 years, he has accumulated considerable power and influence. During Sultan Qaboos’s reign, Mufti al-Khalili was relatively moderate. He expressed support for the Palestinian cause on numerous occasions, but in comparatively restrained terms compared with his stance today, under the current sultan.
As early as 11 a.m. on October 7, 2023, Oman’s Grand Mufti al-Khalili expressed support for the massacre of Israeli civilians, posting a message in support of the “Palestinian resistance” in its struggle against Israel.
His post read: “May God grant success to the brave Palestinian resistance in its confrontation with the tyrannical occupying enemy (and God will prevail over whoever prevails over Him. Indeed, God is mighty and glorious).” He subsequently praised Palestinian unity and called for material and moral support for Hamas.
On the first anniversary of the massacre, the inciting mufti continued to praise Hamas terrorists, attack Israel, and express support for armed struggle against it. In interviews with Arab media outlets, he consistently and categorically opposed agreements with Israel, including the Camp David Accords, the Oslo Accords, and even the Abraham Accords.
A month after the massacre, in November 2023, at the beginning of the war in Gaza, a parade was held by students at one of Oman’s schools. The children reenacted a march by the al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s military wing, wearing green Hamas headbands and carrying toy weapons, with a “Palestine” flag displayed on a schoolbag.
On the first anniversary, October 9, 2024, the mufti wrote in English: “A year has passed since ‘Operation Al-Aqsa Flood’ (the October 7 massacre), and the ‘brave heroes’ continue day and night to confront the ‘brutal enemy,’ backed by ‘evil and arrogant powers.’”
These events do not reflect the Ibadi school of Islam. On the contrary, as noted above, this branch advocates coexistence and opposes all forms of violence. Yet this mufti has dared to go much further under the new sultan, emboldened by the influence he has accumulated over more than half a century.
The statements of Grand Mufti Ahmed al-Khalili undermine the moderate image Oman seeks to preserve. Decades in office have given him public authority and influence that extend far beyond his formal religious position.
The implications go beyond political hostility. Praising those responsible for a murderous attack lends religious legitimacy to violence. The history of Amin al-Husseini, once the Grand Mufti of Palestine, illustrates the dangers of exploiting religious authority to incite hatred against Jews.
Avoiding Involvement or Actively Supporting Iran?
Oman’s geographical position obliges it to take Iran into account. The two countries lie on opposite sides of the Strait of Hormuz, whose stability is vital to trade and regional security. Avoiding a crisis with Tehran is therefore clearly in Oman’s interest. Oman has not joined any military coalition or Arab alliance against Iran or the Houthis, a stance that angers its Gulf neighbors. Questions and doubts are frequently raised in the Arab media, with Gulf affairs commentators asking the most pressing and recurring question: Does Oman support the regime in Iran and the Houthis, or does it not? The second question is whether Omanis are helping smuggle weapons and military equipment to the Houthis, amid numerous reports to that effect. Despite Oman’s categorical denials, tensions between the sultanate and its neighbors persist.
In practice, Muscat has developed a policy of maintaining open channels of communication and pursuing quiet diplomacy to avoid confrontation and win the favor of all sides. It has mediated between Iran and the United States, including on the nuclear issue, and has preferred to stay out of confrontations. Supporters of this policy also point to Omani condemnations of attacks against Gulf states. They argue that ties with Iran are intended to reduce risks, not to join the Iranian camp. The geographical argument is convincing when it comes to talks and coordination over maritime navigation. It is less convincing when questions arise about the presence of the Houthis and arms smuggling. Critics of Oman point to its hosting of senior Houthi officials, military cooperation with Iran, and refusal to take joint action against them.
Allegations that Iranian weapons are being transferred to the Houthis are particularly serious. Reports of military components being intercepted in trucks bearing Omani license plates and aboard vessels in the region warrant investigation. Hosting Houthi representatives cannot be exempted from scrutiny either. There is a difference between staying in the country for negotiations and conducting ongoing political activities from within the sultanate. The label “mediator” does not eliminate the need to establish where the line is drawn.
Trying to Appease Both the United States and Iran
Oman’s policies have repeatedly angered the White House. In fact, US President Donald Trump threatened Oman at least twice in 2026, amid a war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran in late February. The threats followed a dispute over who controls the Strait of Hormuz, after Oman continued talking to Tehran while Washington wanted it to be the only party engaged in dialogue.
Following reports that Oman and Iran were discussing the collection of fees for passage through the strait, Trump called on the Sultan of Oman to “change his behavior, or we will have to blow them up.” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent simultaneously warned of sanctions if Oman cooperated with Iran in collecting such fees.
On August 17, Trump said: “If Oman interferes, we will bomb them to the ground.” That same day, in the Oval Office, he reiterated the threat, stressing: “I don’t think they have behaved nicely, but we will deal with them easily, like the others.” Trump did not specify exactly what Oman had done. Reports in early October repeated the same wording amid continued discussions over the strait.
Broadly speaking, Oman is angering the United States because of its dialogue with Iran over the future management of the Strait of Hormuz and maritime services there, involving the coastal states. From Washington’s perspective, an Omani-Iranian arrangement could entrench Iranian control over the strait or introduce transit fees without US consent, particularly after the United States declared the strait to be “US territory.”
Nevertheless, Oman is also considered a US ally. It hosts American facilities, has secured the release of American citizens held in Tehran, and mediated an end to Houthi attacks on US ships. Iran itself attacked an Omani port and oil facilities during the war, although with less intensity than the attacks directed at neighboring countries.
Incitement or Deliberate Terrorism?
The history of Israeli-Omani relations demonstrates that the sultanate is capable of taking a different approach. Quiet contacts preceded the Oslo Accords, which subsequently made it possible to bring those contacts into the open. Rabin visited Oman in 1994, and further contacts took place with Shimon Peres, followed by the opening of an Israeli representative office in Muscat. Its closure following the Second Intifada demonstrated the weight of the Palestinian issue.
Nevertheless, contacts continued. The meetings between Omani Foreign Minister Youssef bin Alawi and Tzipi Livni in 2008, Netanyahu’s historic visit alongside the Mossad chief in 2018, and the meeting between Netanyahu and Minister Alawi in Warsaw in 2019 all pointed to the possibility of closer relations. Qaboos presented Netanyahu’s visit as an attempt to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Following the signing of the Abraham Accords, reports suggested that Oman might be the next country to normalize relations with Israel. However, the accession of the new sultan and the October 7 massacre put an end to that prospect.
The case of Omani co-pilot and terrorist Hamam al-Hamami, a 29-year-old whose father is Omani, adds a security dimension to these questions. On October 9, 2026, the UAE attorney general announced that the pilot had planned to crash into the passenger terminal at Ben Gurion Airport. According to the announcement, the plan was inspired by the September 11 attacks. It is true that the findings made public provide no evidence of a connection to the mufti or the Omani regime. Nevertheless, the influence of the Omani mufti’s incitement, and its potential impact on young people in Oman, must be examined.
Oman now finds itself between a rock and a hard place, and its future looks uncertain amid the war in the Gulf. If Oman wants to be part of the West, it must immediately dismiss its inciting mufti and stop supporting the regime in Iran, including by expelling all Houthis residing on its territory. It must also stop assisting them and prevent them from receiving weapons and military equipment through its territory. Oman cannot continue playing a double game indefinitely. It will have to choose whether it stands with the United States or is part of the hostile regimes aligned with Iran.
