Two weeks after the ceasefire that ended Operation “Rising Lion,” and without wasting valuable time, representatives of the Palestinian Authority, including Vice President Hussein al-Sheikh, accompanied by General Intelligence Chief Majed Faraj, Palestinian National Council Chairman Rawhi Fattouh, and Ambassador Samir al-Rifai, traveled to Syria for an official meeting with al-Julani at the presidential palace in Damascus. During the visit, the delegation met with Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, better known as al-Julani, at the presidential palace.
The PA’s official statement claimed that the visit took place within the framework of strengthening relations between the two states, ostensibly in a manner that serves the interests of the two “brotherly” peoples. Of course, this was not a courtesy visit involving afternoon tea, but rather a coordination meeting intended to project power, laying the groundwork for a future convergence of struggles between leaders who share an anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli terrorist agenda, wrapped in a Western facade and tailored suits. The objective is to present these interactions to the media as diplomatic dialogue. It is quite possible that Mahmoud Abbas was eager to dispatch his representatives to conduct and document the meeting because global public attention has long been focused on the ongoing worldwide energy crisis, naturally pushing the Palestinian issue to the margins of the international public agenda.
Nevertheless, the question remains: why is the Palestinian Authority holding an official meeting with al-Julani in Syria at this particular moment?
To understand the various motivations of the leaders involved, it is necessary to examine Ahmad al-Sharaa’s background, Syria’s demographic structure, and the current realities within the country. According to current estimates, approximately 400,000 residents of Syria identify as Palestinian refugees, some dating back to 1948 and others having arrived later. They maintain the belief that they possess a “right of return” to territories within Israel predating the establishment of the state. It is important to note that these residents do not enjoy equal rights with Syrian citizens; they live in refugee camps and historically suffered marginalization throughout Assad’s rule.
From a long-term strategic perspective, PA representatives may have rushed to this meeting in order to advance another step in the implementation of the “Phased Plan” that guides their thinking, a plan that reflects opposition to the existence of the State of Israel and seeks to weaken Israel’s status as an emerging superpower by creating alliances with states and entities that share similar worldviews.
Viewed more broadly, al-Julani’s Syria does not currently operate as a classic nation-state but rather as an ideological space where an effort is underway to forge a new Sunni-Islamist identity upon the ruins of Assad’s old order. Within the governing vacuum created by years of civil war, entities associated with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) are no longer content with military and security control alone. They seek to construct deep social, educational, and economic infrastructures that will shape a new generation marked by ideological loyalty. When these mechanisms intersect with the leadership of the Palestinian Authority, an axis of interests emerges that is not necessarily focused solely on immediate military force-building, but rather on channels of influence and perception, the shaping of public opinion, and the construction of renewed regional legitimacy for the struggle against Israel.
If we analyze al-Julani’s avoidance of direct military action against the State of Israel, it can be argued that such indications do not demonstrate that Syria has abandoned its agenda. Rather, its strategy is now being pursued under the cover of international diplomatic instruments. On the surface, al-Julani appears to operate along two vectors: one emphasizing messages of reconciliation, reducing ongoing regional tensions, and aligning with Western norms and values; the other advancing systems of control and indoctrination that resemble the model employed by Hamas in cooperation with UNRWA in Gaza.
Educating a New Generation of Jihadists
Alongside the softened diplomatic rhetoric that al-Sharaa presents to the West, it is difficult to ignore the gap between the English-language messages directed at the international community and the developments taking place on the ground within Syria itself. While foreign media outlets receive messages of stability, reform, and pragmatism, there is a clear trend toward the expansion of religious, educational, and cultural institutions with a distinctly Islamist character. The combination of ideological educational institutions, alternative welfare systems, and the appointment of HTS members to key government positions may indicate that the new regime seeks to establish a religious state model resembling the systems of control built by Hamas in the Gaza Strip or Hezbollah in Lebanon.
A considerable body of evidence suggests that al-Julani’s government currently supports schools operating under the name Dar al-Wahy al-Sharif (DWS), an Islamist educational network of kindergartens and elementary schools in northwestern Syria established in 2017 and directly linked to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. These educational institutions serve as a central instrument for shaping consciousness around a return to jihadist identity and ideology, focusing heavily on Quranic studies and fostering a generation of children characterized by militancy and religious rigidity.
Photographs from the field indicate that students in this school network have been seen in Syria over the past two years wearing military uniforms, simulating operational activities while carrying weapons. They have also participated in rehearsals for accompanying martyr funeral processions. In addition, there is currently a trend of growing influence among the associates of the Syrian president, who dismissed the only Druze minister in his government and replaced him with Bassel Sweidan. Sweidan is a former senior figure in Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) who managed the organization’s “War Booty Committee.” The committee was later transformed into a private company called Iktifaa’. Following Assad’s fall, Iktifaa’ took control of former state-owned factories from the Assad era as well as assets belonging to senior figures of the former regime, such as al-Qaterji, a businessman associated with Iran, Hezbollah, and the “Syrian Resistance for the Liberation of the Golan.”
The strategic significance for Israel extends beyond the direct military threat. It stems primarily from the possibility that a new regional environment may emerge in which radical Sunni Islamist ideologies receive political recognition and international legitimacy under the guise of statehood. Whereas jihadist organizations once operated as isolated underground militias, as was the case with al-Julani in his previous incarnation as the leader of al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch, a new model of “terrorists in suits” is now emerging. These are leaderships that employ diplomatic language, state institutions, and civilian mechanisms to advance a radical agenda in a more indirect and sophisticated manner. This reality requires a reassessment of Israel’s security doctrines and foreign relations in response to threats that are expressed not only through missiles and terrorist attacks, but also through long-term ideological influence.
The PA Identifies a Diplomatic Opportunity in Syria
The severe economic and humanitarian crisis in Syria provides fertile ground for the expansion of extremist ideological organizations such as HTS. When the state struggles to provide education, welfare, employment, and personal security, organizations with external resources fill the vacuum and establish deep dependency among the local population. This creates a process in which ostensibly civilian assistance becomes a tool for building political and religious loyalty, similar to Hezbollah’s model in Lebanon. In this reality, HTS educational institutions are not merely schools but a strategic mechanism for shaping collective consciousness, cultivating an ideologically committed generation, and ensuring the continuity of the fundamentalist Islamist project for years to come.
For the Palestinian Authority, the renewed rapprochement with Damascus may indicate an effort to rebuild its regional standing after years of political erosion and declining credibility in the Arab arena. Mahmoud Abbas, as chairman of the PA, understands that power centers in the Middle East are changing and that Arab states are increasingly preoccupied with domestic issues centered on economic interests, energy concerns, and regional influence struggles. Within this reality, the PA seeks to preserve its relevance by forging new alliances with Sunni power centers, even when these involve actors with a distinctly jihadist past. From its perspective, any regional channel of influence capable of exerting political or psychological pressure on Israel is considered a strategic asset worthy of cultivation.
The PA may view al-Sharaa’s regime as a new model of Islamist leadership that has succeeded in obtaining international legitimacy without entirely abandoning its radical ideological foundations. Consequently, the connection between the two is natural in light of the similarities they perceive. For the PA leadership, cooperation with such a regime could provide a dual advantage: strengthening ties with Palestinian and broader Islamic audiences that view al-Julani as a “revolutionary” figure, while simultaneously maintaining a diplomatic framework that presents these activities as legitimate interstate relations. This creates a new arena in which the boundaries between political activity and ideological cooperation become increasingly blurred.
The issue of Palestinian refugee camps in Syria may also play a role in the growing rapprochement. From the PA’s perspective, the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees living in Syria represent not only a humanitarian population but also a central political and psychological asset surrounding the concept of the “right of return.” Strengthening relations with the new regime in Damascus could enable the PA to deepen its influence within the refugee camps and reestablish political, social, and religious influence mechanisms that were eroded during the years of civil war. In this sense, the meetings in Damascus are not merely symbolic gestures but an attempt to recreate a continuum of Palestinian influence within Syria’s evolving landscape.
In addition, there is an important psychological dimension from the Palestinian Authority’s perspective: the very fact that these public meetings are taking place in the presidential palace in Damascus sends a message to the Palestinian public and the Arab League that the PA remains a central political actor in the region despite its internal weakening in Judea and Samaria and the growing domestic criticism it faces. The photographs, ceremonies, and joint statements are intended to create a sense of historical continuity for the “Axis of Resistance,” even though deep ideological differences exist in practice between the PA’s secular-nationalist orientation and the Sunni Islamist actors operating in Syria. In doing so, the PA seeks to reposition itself as an integral component of the future shaping of the Middle East in the post-Syrian civil war era.
It therefore appears that the Middle East is currently undergoing a profound transformation that is manifested not only through wars, missiles, or overt military confrontations, but also through slower and more sophisticated processes involving the penetration of extremist ideologies into institutions of government, education, and civil society. The challenge facing Israel and the West is not merely the identification of armed enemies, but the ability to understand how movements with jihadist backgrounds are learning to adopt diplomatic language, utilize state mechanisms, and operate under a veneer of legitimacy in the international arena. In this reality, the future threat to Israel may not come from tunnels or rockets, but rather from deep ideological systems seeking to shape a new generation of radical loyalty under the guise of political stability.
