At this moment, with Hamas’s control in Gaza rapidly deteriorating, giving any leeway to the organization poses a significant risk. This includes considerations such as ceasefire agreements, temporary pauses, or providing food to the enclave’s residents via armed proxies. Simultaneously, truly holding Hamas accountable for its hostage-taking would shift perceptions of the group’s actions in Israel’s favor.
Hamas must face consequences, dictated by Israel’s terms rather than its own: this entails Hamas losing additional territory and sacrificing higher-ranking terrorists, given the organization’s disregard for civilian casualties. Increasing pressure in this direction may push Hamas leaders to pursue agreements more aligned with Israeli interests. As this pressure persists, Hamas’s military power and influence among Gazans will likely diminish.
Israel should capitalize on the month of Ramadan to weaken Hamas’s grip on power. Priorities should include opening humanitarian crossings for residents of Rafah, Khan Yunis, and central camps toward coastal areas south of the Besor River. Parallel efforts should focus on dismantling remaining Hamas strongholds and gaining control of the Philadelphia Corridor.
The Gaza “Mud Paradigm” and the Month of Ramadan
Since Israel assumed control of the northern Gaza Strip after the massacre carried out by Gazans under Hamas leadership, Israel has faced three challenges: gaining control of Rafah, addressing the Ramadan challenge, and securing the release of captives. Negotiating with Hamas presents a unique challenge, as Hamas often sets difficult, if not impossible, conditions. Israel has yet to give in to their demands, and it seems that Hamas leader Yihyeh Sinwar is aiming to lead Israel into conflict in Gaza during the month of Ramadan, in order to unify the various fronts of the anti-Israel axis and complicate additional arenas that would hinder Israel and make it difficult for it to achieve the three main objectives of the war.
However, buying into Sinwar’s Ramadan paradigm would be a mistake, considering the lessons learned from the Gaza “Mud Paradigm”. This paradigm led Israel to refrain from ground operations in Gaza for years, following expert warnings against entanglement. This restraint allowed Hamas to establish terrorist bases in the enclave. Israel has since overcome this challenge, surprising many by dispelling Hamas’ illusion of invincibility. Therefore, there is no need to fear intense warfare during Ramadan to achieve strategic goals.
Nonetheless, it is imperative for Israel to maintain distinct battlefronts during Ramadan and respond decisively and forcefully to any provocations. A robust military defense and unwavering faith in the justness of its cause against its adversaries will help surmount the challenges of Ramadan. IDF soldiers and other security personnel are deeply committed, projecting zero tolerance for disruptions in Israel, Judea, and Samaria, as expected by the political leadership.
Moreover, the unemployment and economic hardships affecting tens of thousands of Arab families in Judea and Samaria are significant factors. Alongside the incitement and solidarity with Gaza, these conditions could lead to heightened outbreaks of violence. Eighty percent of the population identified with the atrocities committed by Hamas on October 7th.
Israel’s steadfast belief that this is a just struggle is the answer to the challenge. Granting freedom of expression is one of Israel’s great symbols, yet preventing its exploitation for the purpose of harming Israeli symbols is equally important. Those who cruelly slaughtered our citizens should have taken into account Israel’s powerful response and the fact that the kidnapping of civilians and sadistic abuse would be met with an iron fist extending into Ramadan and beyond.
Israel must allow freedom of expression but handle it with determination, promptness, and excessive force in all spheres of order. Alongside this, it is necessary to deal forcefully with agitators, whether they be politicians, religious figures, public figures, or others. We are in a state of emergency. Let all of Israel’s enemies know that any attack on it will lead to an asymmetrical and severe response. What was will not be, whether in terms of the expectations of Gazans, Lebanese, and others, or in terms of wartime and “months forbidden to fight”; only this way will Israeli deterrence be established in both the near and distant futures.
The Gaza Spring
Furthermore, Israel must capitalize on the fact that the Gaza Strip is at a crossroads. The hungry and frustrated residents of Gaza have begun to break the barrier and openly rebel against Hamas’ nominal rule. Blockades of aid convoys by families of the captives and their supporters have reduced the Gazan population’s supplies to less than half of what it was, and the threat to Hamas’ authority is becoming more significant day by day. Hamas feels that the ground is slipping from beneath its feet, and for the first time since its violent takeover of Gaza and the seizure of power from the Palestinian Authority in 2007, its standing among the civilian population is wavering.
In many places throughout the occupied Strip, in Jabalia, Khan Yunis, Rafah, and Gaza neighborhoods, individual citizens or pockets of resistance are rising against Hamas’ reign of terror. They echo familiar cries from other parts of the Arab world: “The people want to topple the regime.” It seems as though we have returned to the Arab Spring days of 2011 that had initially passed over the Gaza Strip.
The most significant reason for the protests is Hamas’ neglect of the Strip’s citizens, harsh violence against any opposition, and displays of anarchy. But beyond that, it is the citizens’ desire to receive food rations directly from humanitarian aid convoys. Humanitarian aid is provided to Gaza’s citizens for free by countries and organizations, but within the Strip, it’s sold at inflated prices and serves as Hamas’ food distribution network.
Hamas will do everything in its power to control the distribution of food and aid products because whoever controls the food supply during wartime is the ruling authority. In other words, food distribution allows Hamas to maintain its control.
The Paradigm of Self-Rule
Since the State of Israel has set the dismantling of Hamas’ rule as one of the three primary war objectives, the fact that it allows Hamas to supply food to the residents of the Strip hinders this achievement. Therefore, all equipment entering the Strip must pass through Israel’s scrutinizing eye.
Monitoring the entry of goods and equipment into the Strip is crucial given Israel’s long standing attempts to assure Egypt of its sincere intentions while failing to encourage Egypt to fulfill their role in preventing the rearmament of the Strip. Instead, Egypt allowed the transfer of weapons to Hamas and deterred Israel from operating in the Strip for years.
Moreover, in the coming months – as long as the war continues – Israel must establish government units to provide food and aid to the Strip. Israel naturally fears assuming the responsibility of controlling the civilian population, but no one will put out the fires for it. Faced with a clear choice between establishing government units and dealing with civilian needs and entrusting the management of the Strip to foreign entities, following the events of the October 7th massacre, the choice should be straightforward.
In light of Israel’s experience, it should be clear that there is no entity in the Strip that it can rely on to serve its interests. Evidently, Gazans fear of Hamas was so significant that no entity in the Strip, not even clear enemies of the organization, dared to warn of Hamas’ intentions, and there was not a single entity who refrained from rejoicing the appalling massacre that occurred on the seventh of October. Not one.
No sovereign state entrusts its security to another state, as there is an inherent problem in this: every security organization must ensure clearly and certainly that no organization in the Strip allows it to prepare and organize for terrorist activities, such as the horrific one we experienced.
Therefore, Israel needs to disconnect from the paradigm of political disengagement and compel the Gazan population to completely disengage from Hamas, which has wreaked havoc on the residents of the Strip, and to call for its removal from any position of control whatsoever.
In conclusion, the following steps must be taken to lead Gazans to distance themselves from Hamas: 1) Intense warfare against the remnants of Hamas’s organized rule; 2) eradication of the terror cells remaining in the territory; 3) dismantling its symbols of authority; 4) distancing Hamas from the distribution of supplies and food; 5) pursuit of its civilian operatives; 6) a resolute stance in negotiations for the release of captives; 7) simultaneously demonstrating Israeli unity and confidence.
