Introduction: The Gap Between the Druze Model and the Arab Reality
Disparities across population groups characterize the Israeli service system. Jews and Druze are subject to mandatory service, while the Arab population is exempt. This situation raises questions regarding civil equality, social cohesion, and national security.
The arrangement with the Druze since the 1950s created a precedent for integrating minorities into the security system (Ben-Dor 1979). However, attempts to extend this model to the Arab population have encountered political and social resistance. The central question is whether a similar model can be applied, despite the identity differences between the groups (Zeedan 2019).
This article addresses one of the most sensitive and decisive questions in Israel: whether, and under what conditions, it is possible to extend mandatory security and civil service to Arab citizens. The point of departure is a comparison to the Druze model, often regarded as a success story of integration, set against the unique obstacles to integrating the Muslim and Christian Arab population, where national identity and the connection to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict play a central role. To this end, the study traces the development of conscription arrangements since the early years of the state, examines the structural and identity-based differences between the groups, and analyzes the potential implications of policy change for state security, social cohesion, and perceptions of civil equality. Based on academic literature, statistical data, and international comparisons, the article proposes a gradual model of integration within a civil service framework, seeking to balance the principle of equal burden-sharing with the collective rights of minorities (Kymlicka 1995; Tamir 1993; Moskos et al. 2000).
2. Conscription in Multicultural States
The academic literature on conscription in multicultural states presents a complex and ambivalent picture. One central approach views shared mandatory service as an integrative mechanism that can help build a common civic identity and strengthen solidarity among different groups in society. According to this perspective, military service creates an institutional framework for daily interaction among individuals from diverse ethnic, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds, thereby fostering a sense of shared fate and reinforcing attachment to the state (Moskos 1977; Moskos, Williams & Segal 2000). Comparative studies indicate that in countries such as Switzerland and Singapore, where broad-based conscription exists, service has contributed to the formation of a supra-group civic identity and the reduction of intergroup tensions through mutual exposure, cooperation, and the creation of cross-sector social networks (Haltiner 1998; Kwa 2002).
However, the critical literature emphasizes that the integrative impact of service is contingent on the socio-political context in which it occurs. In deeply divided societies characterized by an intense national conflict between majority and minority, military service may דווקא intensify feelings of exclusion and alienation. When the military is perceived as an institution embodying the ethos and interests of the majority group, obligating minority members to serve in it may be interpreted as a violation of their collective identity, generating resistance and even mass refusal (Cohen 2008). Empirical examples can be found in the Turkish context, where segments of the Kurdish population view military service as participation in a mechanism operating against their national group, leading to ambivalent or even oppositional attitudes toward the obligation to serve (Yeğen 2007). These findings underscore that conscription is not necessarily a universal mechanism of integration, but rather a social institution whose outcomes depend on the state’s legitimacy in the eyes of minority groups and on the nature of majority–minority relations within it.
The Druze Model as a Test Case
The Druze case has received extensive scholarly attention as a relatively successful model for integrating a minority into the security apparatus of a Western state. Historical-political studies indicate that this integration resulted from a combination of structural and identity-based factors: the Druze community is characterized by a distinct religious identity separate from Sunni and Shiite Islam, a hierarchical communal structure, and traditional leadership that granted legitimacy to the service arrangement with the state (Ben-Dor 1979; Parsons 2000). Additionally, in the Israeli context, a form of civic identity developed among the Druze that is not grounded in broader Arab-Palestinian nationalism, enabling the development of state loyalty without a sharp identity conflict between civic and national belonging (Zeedan 2019).
At the same time, critical literature points out that the model’s success has also entailed social and political costs. Studies on Druze identity in Israel describe a process of distancing from the broader Arab sphere alongside the development of institutional dependence on the state (Firro 1999; Khaizran 2014). These processes are sometimes accompanied by internal tensions among Druze youth, a sense of isolation from the Arab environment, and difficulty in developing a full civic identity independent of military service (Cohen 2008). Accordingly, although the Druze model is perceived as relatively successful, these findings cast doubt on its applicability to other minority groups with distinct national identities and political conflicts with the state.
The Arab Population in Israel and the Question of Service
The academic literature on the Arab population in Israel’s attitudes toward military service points to a consistent pattern of broad opposition. Studies on the national identity of Arab citizens of Israel indicate that most define themselves as part of the Palestinian collective, and that service in the Israeli military is perceived as a violation of their national identity and as an act contradicting their collective belonging (Smooha & Haidar, 2004; Ghanem, 2001). This perception is rooted in the historical memory of the Nakba, in familial and cultural ties with Palestinians outside the state’s borders, and in the understanding of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as a national conflict in which they are not neutral actors (Rouhana 1997).
Recent empirical findings reinforce this picture. Public opinion surveys indicate a low level of willingness to serve in the military or even in alternative civil service frameworks, with only a small minority of Arab youth expressing willingness to enlist and a significant majority opposing mandatory service (IDI 2023; Musawa 2024). These data point to a structural difficulty in implementing a universal conscription model within a population that views service as contradictory to its collective identity.
At the same time, the literature also highlights internal heterogeneity within the Arab population. Studies on the Christian community in Israel indicate a greater willingness to integrate into service frameworks, driven by pragmatic considerations of social mobility and labor-market integration (Tsimhoni 1993; Diament & Anabtawi 2015). Accordingly, in recent years, there has been a moderate increase in the number of volunteers for military and civil service, although their overall proportion remains low. Similarly, studies on the Bedouin population in the Negev point to a tradition of voluntary military service in some tribes, alongside a gradual erosion of willingness to serve due to social and state-related tensions (Nasasra 2017; Khaizran 2014). These findings suggest that opposition to service is not uniform, though it still characterizes the dominant pattern among the Arab population in Israel.
International Models of Civil Service as an Alternative to Military Service
In many democratic countries, alternative civil service models have been developed to allow citizens who object to military service on conscientious grounds to serve in civilian frameworks. In Germany, for example, a model existed for decades combining mandatory service with the option of alternative civil service (Zivildienst), designed to enable freedom of conscience while preserving the principle of equal burden-sharing (Poutvaara 2009; Levy 2010). Civil service included work in welfare institutions, hospitals, education, and social services, with scope and duration similar to military service. Studies indicate that this model enabled effective integration of religious and pacifist populations without undermining the legitimacy of mandatory service (Mjøset & Van Holde, 2002).
Norway developed a different model of universal-selective conscription, in which all citizens are required to register and undergo screening. Still, only some are actually drafted into military service, while others may serve in civilian frameworks or be exempted (Skjelsbæk 2014). Studies of this model suggest that it reduces the sense of coercion and allows for greater institutional flexibility, while at the same time creating de facto inequality between those who serve and those who are not recruited (Poutvaara 2009).
Israel, too, has long maintained a system of national-civil service, primarily intended for religious women unable to serve in the military due to religious beliefs. Studies of national service point to partial success in providing an alternative to military service, alongside problems of underfunding, limited social recognition, and bureaucratic complexity (Levy 2012; Kimmerling 2001). In recent years, national service has been expanded to additional populations, including Arab youth. Still, its scope remains relatively limited, and it is not yet perceived as socially equivalent to military service (Peled & Shafir, 2005).
3. Historical Background: Conscription Arrangements Since the Early Years of the State
The Initial Exemption Decision and Its Rationale
The decision of the Israeli government in the early years of the state not to impose conscription on the Arab population was not primarily grounded in a normative conception of minority rights, but rather in security and practical considerations. In the aftermath of the War of Independence and amid low levels of trust in the loyalty of the Arab population, the military and political leadership assessed that broad conscription could create security risks, including exposure to sensitive information and even situations in which Arab soldiers might be required to fight members of their own people (Kimmerling 2001; Morris 2008).
In addition, policymakers feared that mandatory military service would deepen feelings of alienation and provoke active resistance among the Arab population. During a period when military rule was imposed across many Arab areas, the state preferred to avoid moves that could ignite widespread protest and undermine political and security stability (Lustick 1980; Ghanem 2001). Accordingly, the decision not to conscript was perceived as a pragmatic step aimed at ensuring short-term stability, rather than a principled determination regarding the civic status of Arabs in Israel.
This policy stood in tension with the Zionist ideal of the “people’s army,” which viewed universal military service as a central mechanism for building a shared civic society and fostering national cohesion (Horowitz & Lissak 1978). The exemption granted to the Arab population created a substantial deviation from the principle of civic equality, but at this stage, it was perceived as a circumstantial necessity. Over time, this temporary arrangement became a structural norm that proved difficult to change, and it continues to shape relations between the state and the Arab minority to this day (Peled & Shafir 2005).
The Special Arrangement with the Druze
The arrangement between the State of Israel and the Druze community took shape gradually during the 1950s. Already during the War of Independence, there were cases of Druze volunteering for defense forces and later for the Israel Defense Forces, as part of the Druze leadership viewed military service as a means of securing the community’s status in the new state and distinguishing it from the broader Arab population (Ben-Dor 1979; Parsons 2000). In 1956, a formal arrangement was established under which members of the Druze community would be subject to mandatory military service, similar to Jews.
The decision generated internal controversy within the community. Some groups opposed compulsory service and sought to maintain neutrality, but the traditional leadership succeeded in consolidating broad support for the agreement. Military service was perceived as a social contract between the community and the state: in exchange for loyalty and service, the community would receive recognition, protection, and resources (Firro 1999; Zeedan 2019). From the state’s perspective, the arrangement served as proof that a Muslim minority could be integrated into the security system, while at the same time reinforcing an institutional distinction between the Druze and the general Arab population.
Over time, military service became a central component of Druze identity in Israel, and enlistment rates among members of the community remained relatively high, even leading to integration into senior command positions (Zeedan 2019). At the same time, the literature points to social and identity-related costs: Druze individuals often experience tension between civic loyalty and regional-cultural belonging, and a degree of distancing from the broader Arab environment has emerged (Khaizran 2014; Cohen 2008). In addition, claims of ongoing discrimination against Druze localities raise doubts regarding the extent of the benefits the community receives in return for its integration into the security system (Peled & Shafir 2005).
The Complexity of the Bedouin Population in the Negev
The Bedouin case is complex and differs from the Druze case. Already during the British Mandate period, some tribes maintained a tradition of service in security forces, with Bedouins serving in police and British military units, and later some continued to volunteer for the Israel Defense Forces after the establishment of the state (Khaizran 2014; Nasasra 2017). For some tribal leaders, service was perceived as a means of establishing ties with the authorities and securing the community’s status within the new political system.
However, unlike the Druze arrangement, Bedouin service has always remained voluntary, and its scope has depended on the level of trust between the tribes and the state. In recent years, there has been a decline in willingness to serve, partly due to policies regarding unrecognized villages, house demolitions, and land disputes (Nasasra 2017; Meir 2013). Many Bedouin youth experience a gap between expectations of civic loyalty and feelings of exclusion and inequality, which undermines motivation to enlist.
The Bedouin case illustrates the limitations of a compulsory model. Even where a tradition of service exists, the absence of a sense of civic fairness and political legitimacy makes it difficult to expand recruitment. Therefore, any attempt to impose service without addressing fundamental issues such as land rights, planning and construction, and civic equality is likely to encounter significant resistance and undermine the legitimacy of the service institution itself (Yiftachel 2006; Peled & Shafir 2005).
Difficulty in Imposing National Service
Over the years, several attempts have been made to expand mandatory service in Israel to include the Arab population within a civilian framework. As early as the 1970s and 1980s, proposals were raised to establish mandatory civilian service that did not involve military duty, but they did not mature into legislation. The reasons were complex: on the one hand, some political actors held a liberal position according to which freedom from compulsory participation in service frameworks is a fundamental right, especially for a national minority (Kymlicka 1995; Peled & Shafir 2005). On the other hand, parts of the Arab leadership opposed any compulsory model, fearing that civilian service would serve as a precursor to military conscription or as a mechanism of population control (Ghanem 2001; Rouhana 1997).
In the 2000s, the national service system was expanded to allow Arab youth to participate, but only voluntarily. While the number of participants has gradually increased, it remains low relative to the population size (Levy 2012). Among the main barriers identified are insufficient organizational infrastructure, limited funding, low awareness, and political opposition from segments of the Arab leadership (Peled & Shafir, 2005; Khaizran, 2014). As long as national service is perceived as a secondary substitute for military service rather than a legitimate and equivalent form of civic contribution, its potential for expansion remains limited.
4. Analysis of the Differences Between the Druze and the Arab Population
The most fundamental difference between the Druze and the Muslim and Christian Arab population in Israel lies in the dimension of national identity. Over time, the Druze have developed a distinct communal identity that does not include identification with broader Arab or Palestinian identity. This identity is based on a unique religion, a separate communal history, and a self-perception as a distinct group, which enabled the Druze leadership to construct a narrative of a historical alliance with the Jewish state based not on shared nationality but on mutual interest and recognition of religious-communal distinctiveness (Firro 1999; Parsons 2000; Zeedan 2019).
In contrast, the majority of the Arab population in Israel defines itself nationally as Palestinian. This identity is grounded in the collective memory of the Nakba, in familial and cultural ties with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and in a sense of belonging to the broader Arab world (Smooha 2002; Rouhana 1997). Palestinian identity does not necessarily negate Israeli citizenship, but rather coexists alongside it in constant tension: an Arab citizen may belong to the state in civic terms, while maintaining national identification with the Palestinian people and its aspirations (Ghanem 2001). This identity tension makes military service particularly problematic. Service in the Israel Defense Forces is perceived by many as serving in a military that operates against members of their own people, and therefore as a betrayal of national identity, not merely a personal preference but a deep normative conflict (Rouhana 1997; Khaizran 2014). An individual who belongs to two national communities in conflict faces an almost irresolvable dilemma, a situation fundamentally different from the Druze case, where no such identity conflict exists.
Another factor explaining the difference between the Druze and the Arab population is communal structure and leadership. The Druze community is characterized by a clear hierarchical structure, with traditional religious and secular leadership that holds significant authority over its members. When the Druze leadership reached an agreement with the state on military service, it was accepted by most members of the community despite internal opposition. This traditional communal structure enabled the effective implementation of the decision.
By contrast, the Arab population in Israel is far more heterogeneous. It includes Muslims, Christians, and atheists; urban and rural populations; and educated and traditional groups. It does not have a single central leadership accepted by all. Arab parties in the Knesset represent different and sometimes opposing currents, and internal disagreements are common. Any attempt to impose a decision on the entire Arab population without internal consensus is likely to encounter organized resistance and lack of cooperation.
Moreover, in recent years, there has been a trend toward weakening traditional leadership among the Arab population and the rise of an individualistic, human rights-oriented consciousness. Many young Arabs are no longer willing to follow the directives of tribal or family elders and instead make decisions based on personal considerations. This trend complicates any attempt to create a collective agreement between the state and the Arab population, as there is no single representative body capable of binding all members.
A third factor is the geopolitical and political context. In the 1950s, when the arrangement with the Druze was formed, the Arab–Israeli conflict was in a different state. There was not yet an organized Palestinian political entity, the Palestinian national movement was weak, and the Arab population in Israel was isolated and disoriented in the aftermath of the war. Moreover, the Druze were not part of the broader national conflict, and therefore their military service was not perceived as participation in a war between two peoples.
Today, the situation is entirely different. Palestinian identity is strong and organized, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is clearly defined as a national conflict, and the Arab population in Israel is identified with the Palestinian side. Every Israeli military action in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip directly affects the sense of identity of Arab citizens in Israel. It creates tension between Israeli citizenship and Palestinian identity. In this context, imposing mandatory military service is perceived as a provocative act and normatively untenable.
5. The Security and Social Challenges of the Current Situation
Military Manpower Crisis
One of the central arguments in favor of expanding mandatory service concerns the Israel Defense Forces’ workforce crisis. The military faces an ongoing demographic challenge: on the one hand, demand for personnel is increasing due to multiple theaters of conflict, persistent security threats, and heavy reliance on the reserve system; on the other hand, the actual enlistment rate has been declining over time. This decline stems, among other factors, from the growth of populations exempt from service, increased medical exemptions, higher dropout rates, and the difficulty of imposing additional reserve duty on those already serving (Levy 2012; Cohen 2010).
Data published in 2024 indicate a drop in enlistment rates to approximately 53% of eligible service members, compared with about 70% three decades ago. The decline is particularly pronounced among men, where exemption rates have risen significantly. This situation creates an accumulating burden on those who do serve, necessitates extended reserve duty, and adversely affects the quality of life of soldiers and their families (Levy 2012).
At first glance, expanding the recruitment base to include the Arab population, which constitutes about one-fifth of the population, could significantly increase the workforce supply. However, the issue is not merely quantitative but also qualitative. A modern military relies on skill, motivation, and legitimacy, not just numbers. Forced conscription of a population that opposes service may create disciplinary problems, organizational strain, and even security risks, thereby becoming more of a burden than an asset (Ben-Eliezer 1998; Peled & Shafir 2005).
Another argument in favor of expanding mandatory service is that the current situation, in which large sectors do not share the security burden, undermines social cohesion and the legitimacy of the service institution. When some citizens serve and make sacrifices while others benefit from security without a parallel contribution, a sense of injustice and inequality emerges. This sentiment is intensified when it concerns populations that enjoy full civil rights but are not obligated to serve, such as the Arab and ultra-Orthodox populations (Levy 2012; Peled & Shafir 2005). Public opinion surveys indicate high levels of frustration among the Jewish population. A 2023 survey by the Israel Democracy Institute found that a large majority of the Jewish public believes that military or national service should be mandatory for all citizens. Qualitative studies based on interviews with soldiers and reservists similarly point to a sense of disproportionate burden-sharing and criticism of the state for not mandating broader participation (Cohen 2010; Levy 2012).
However, it is necessary to examine whether imposing compulsory service on the Arab population would indeed strengthen social cohesion or, conversely, undermine it. If conscription is perceived as a provocative act and leads to protest or mass refusal, it may exacerbate tensions between Jews and Arabs and weaken the legitimacy of the institution of service itself (Rouhana 1997; Jamal 2011). Social cohesion depends not only on formal equality in burden-sharing but also on mutual trust and reciprocal recognition of rights. Coercion without consent may undermine the normative foundations of civic solidarity (Peled & Shafir, 2005).
Economic Implications
The absence of service among the Arab population also has complex economic implications. At first glance, young people who do not serve enter the labor market earlier and accumulate experience and human capital while their Jewish peers are in military service. In practice, however, the Arab population in Israel is characterized by lower employment rates, lower average income, and higher levels of poverty. Contributing factors include structural discrimination, lack of infrastructure in Arab localities, educational gaps, and language barriers (Semyonov & Lewin-Epstein, 2011; Ghanem, 2001).
One barrier to labor market integration is the lack of military service, which in Israel is seen as an important civic marker. Many jobs, particularly in the public sector and in security-related industries, require military service or a recognized alternative, and the social and professional experience gained during service functions as a significant network for employment integration (Levy 2012). Arab youth who do not serve are therefore excluded from key channels of social mobility.
This gives rise to the argument that civilian service could contribute to economic integration through professional training, work experience, and social networks, and could also serve as a signal of legitimacy to employers. Studies indicate that Arabs who participate in civilian service enjoy higher employment rates and incomes than their peers who do not serve (Khaizran 2014). However, among many in the Arab population, there is a prevailing view that economic integration should be based on substantive civic equality through investment in education, infrastructure, and the fight against discrimination, rather than on service perceived as undermining national identity (Rouhana 1997; Jamal 2011). Therefore, it remains unclear whether the potential economic benefits outweigh the political and identity-related costs associated with service.
6. Normative Discussion: Collective Rights versus Individual Equality
The Liberal Argument for the Right of Refusal
From a normative perspective, the question of whether a state may compel its citizens to perform military or civilian service involves a clash between fundamental values. From a classical liberal standpoint, freedom of conscience is a fundamental right that should not be infringed except in exceptional circumstances. An individual who opposes military service on moral, religious, or political grounds is entitled to refuse, and a democratic state is obligated to recognize such refusal. The liberal approach distinguishes between general civic duties, such as paying taxes or obeying the law, and duties that implicate an individual’s deep moral identity, such as military service, which may compel action contrary to one’s conscience (Rawls 1999; Dworkin 1977).
Accordingly, many democratic states recognize the right to conscientious objection and provide alternative civilian service. Germany, for example, allowed civilian service for many years for those opposed to military service, and the United States grants exemptions to individuals who object to all forms of military service on religious or moral grounds. The underlying principle of these models is that in a free state, individuals should not be compelled to act in contradiction to their fundamental values (Walzer 1970; Kymlicka 1995).
In the case of the Arab population in Israel, the liberal argument gains additional force. This is not merely a matter of individual refusal but of a broad collective stance rooted in national identity and a moral perception that sees military service as harming their own people. Coercion in such a context would constitute a broad violation of freedom of conscience for a large ציבור and would contradict the fundamental liberal principles of a democratic state (Rouhana 1997; Peled & Shafir 2005).
The Republican Argument for Civic Duty
From a civic-republican perspective, military or civilian service is not merely a right but a fundamental duty derived from citizenship itself. This view conceives of citizenship as a reciprocal system of rights and obligations: citizens benefit from the state’s protection and resources. They are therefore obligated to participate in public life and share the common burden. Service is seen as a central expression of civic participation and as a means of strengthening a sense of belonging and social solidarity (Walzer 1970; Sandel 1996).
From this perspective, a broad group exemption such as that granted to the Arab population may undermine the principle of civic equality. When some citizens bear the burden of security while others benefit from it without a comparable contribution, the sense of justice is eroded, and social cohesion is weakened (Levy 2012; Peled & Shafir 2005).
At the same time, the republican tradition also recognizes that civic duties must be perceived as legitimate by citizens themselves. Perceived coercion that is unjustified may undermine civic trust and damage the very solidarity it seeks to promote (Habermas 1996). Therefore, even from a republican perspective, a democratic process of consent is required, along with adaptation of the service framework so that it is acceptable to the population expected to participate in it.
The Collective-Group Argument for Minority Rights
Beyond individual arguments, there is also a collective-group argument concerning the rights of national and cultural minorities. Theories of multiculturalism emphasize that a democratic state is composed not only of individual citizens but also of communities with shared identities. According to these approaches, the state should recognize the right of minority groups to preserve their culture and national identity, and should not compel full integration into the majority’s cultural institutions(Kymlicka 1995; Tamir 1993). Collective identity is viewed as a fundamental asset for the self-respect and well-being of group members.
In the case of the Arab population in Israel, this argument carries particular weight. It concerns a national minority with a consolidated collective identity, a shared history, and broad political and cultural connections. Within this framework, refraining from service in the Israeli military is perceived by many as part of preserving Palestinian national identity, whereas compulsory service is seen as an attempt to impose cultural assimilation and undermine group cohesion (Rouhana 1997; Jamal 2011).
According to the multicultural approach, a democratic state may require basic civic loyalty such as obedience to the law and payment of taxes, but it may not compel participation in institutions identified with the national ethos of the majority, foremost among them military institutions (Kymlicka 1995; Peled & Shafir 2005). Abstention from service is not necessarily an expression of disloyalty, but rather a legitimate means of preserving collective identity while maintaining membership within the civic framework.
7. Possible Models for Gradual and Voluntary Integration
Expansion of Civilian National Service
The first possible model is a significant expansion of civilian national service while preserving its voluntary nature. This model assumes that it is neither feasible nor desirable to impose military service on the Arab population, but that a civilian service framework can be created that is acceptable and attractive to many young people. The service would focus on clearly civilian fields such as education, healthcare, welfare, environmental protection, and community activity, without a direct security component (Kymlicka 1995; Peled & Shafir 2005).
The advantages of this model lie in preserving freedom of conscience and avoiding coercion, while creating a legitimate channel for civic contribution. The service may provide professional skills, work experience, and opportunities for social integration, without generating the identity conflict associated with military service (Jamal 2011). Its success requires significant institutional investment, both in infrastructure and in funding and public recognition, for the service to be perceived as a respectable track rather than a marginal alternative.
However, the model also has clear disadvantages. It does not solve the problem of the military workforce and does not create full equality in the security burden. In addition, as long as national service is perceived as a secondary substitute for military service, it will struggle to gain equal social recognition (Levy 2012). Therefore, the model’s success also depends on a shift in perception within the Jewish public, so that civilian service is recognized as a public contribution of equal value to military service.
Creation of Technological and Medical Tracks in the IDF
A second model proposes the creation of designated tracks within the IDF that do not involve combat or the carrying of weapons and are open to voluntary participation by Arab citizens. These tracks would focus on technological, medical, logistical, and administrative fields, where the direct moral conflict is lower. In this way, Arab youth could contribute to the security system without feeling they were acting against their own people, and in return would receive professional training, service conditions, and appropriate compensation (Levy 2012; Cohen 2010). The advantages of this model lie in the gradual, tailored integration of the Arab population within a military framework, while reducing identity-based tensions. Technological and medical roles are perceived as less morally problematic and may therefore be more acceptable to parts of the Arab public. In addition, this model contributes to increasing the military workforce and strengthening a sense of civic partnership (Ben-Eliezer 1998).
However, the model also has significant disadvantages. The very act of integration into the IDF may provoke political and social opposition among parts of the Arab population, as the military is perceived as an institution with a distinctly national character (Rouhana 1997; Jamal 2011). Furthermore, there are security concerns related to exposure to sensitive information and the organizational complexity involved in integrating groups that may be fundamentally opposed to service. Finally, as long as participation remains voluntary, the model does not resolve the question of inequality in the security burden (Peled & Shafir, 2005).
A Graduated Model of Conditional Obligation
A third model proposes the creation of a graduated system in which the obligation to serve depends on the degree of civic affiliation and the willingness to integrate within the state framework. Within this framework, the receipt of public benefits, such as scholarships, housing assistance, or employment preference, could be conditioned on participation in civilian service. Citizens who are not interested in these benefits would be able to refuse service without direct criminal sanctions being imposed (Sandel 1996; Kymlicka 1995).
A central advantage of this model is the balance between the principle of obligation and freedom of choice. It creates a positive incentive for service rather than direct coercion, and may therefore be more acceptable to parts of the Arab population and reduce sharp political opposition (Jamal 2011). Practically speaking, it is a pragmatic solution that allows for a gradual increase in the number of participants without creating a confrontation over the very principle of obligation. However, the model also has significant disadvantages. It does not create full equality and may reinforce a distinction between “serving” and “non-serving” citizens, thereby undermining the principle of equal citizenship (Peled & Shafir 2005). In addition, linking civil rights to service may be interpreted as the commodification of citizenship and a violation of civic dignity, especially in the case of a national minority sensitive to institutional coercion (Walzer 1970).
8. Summary and Conclusions
The central conclusion emerging from this study is that there is no simple or perfect solution to the issue of extending service obligations to the Arab population in Israel. The tension stems from a clash between three fundamental values: the security need for a broad workforce pool, the principle of civic equality, and the collective right of a national minority to preserve its identity (Kymlicka 1995; Peled & Shafir 2005). Advancing any one of these values almost inevitably comes at the expense of the others, and therefore any practical model carries a normative cost. The Druze model, often presented as a precedent for successful integration, is the product of unique historical circumstances: the consolidation of a distinct communal identity and a lack of identification with Palestinian nationalism (Firro 1999; Zeedan 2019). By contrast, the Arab population in Israel largely identifies itself as part of the Palestinian people, and therefore applying a similar model ignores this identity and political context and may exacerbate social conflict (Rouhana 1997).
In light of the above, the option of imposing mandatory military service on the Arab population should be rejected. Such a model violates the collective rights of the minority and the individual’s freedom of conscience, and may generate severe social conflict and even mass refusal (Rawls 1999; Rouhana 1997). Forcing service in a military perceived as acting against members of one’s own group is not only normatively illegitimate but also practically unworkable. In addition, there are real security risks: a modern military relies on motivation, trust, and public legitimacy. Forced recruitment of a population opposed to service may create discipline problems, impair performance, and even pose information-security risks, such that the organizational and security damage may outweigh the quantitative benefit (Ben-Eliezer 1998; Levy 2012).
The preferable alternative is a significant expansion of civilian national service while preserving its voluntary nature. A professional and attractive framework should be developed that enables Arab youth to contribute to society in civilian fields such as education, healthcare, welfare, and community life, without identity conflict (Jamal 2011; Peled & Shafir 2005). Such a framework may provide professional training, work experience, and social recognition. However, the model’s success also depends on a perceptual shift within Israeli society. Civilian service must be regarded as equivalent in value to military service, rather than as a secondary substitute. To this end, symbolic and institutional recognition mechanisms should be created, including equal social rights, ceremonies of appreciation, and public recognition that establish its status as a full civic contribution (Levy 2012). Only under these conditions can broader participation among Arab youth be expected.
Alongside the expansion of civilian national service, designated tracks within the IDF may be created, open only to voluntary participation and adapted to the Arab population. These tracks would focus on technological, medical, and logistical roles, where the perceived moral conflict is lower compared to combat roles (Levy 2012). These tracks should incorporate significant incentives, high-quality professional training, increased financial compensation, and guaranteed employment prospects after service, similar to models of professional armies that encourage motivational rather than coerced recruitment (Moskos 1977). This model allows for respectful integration for those interested, without imposing a collective obligation that may be perceived as infringing upon collective identity (Kymlicka 1995). The number of participants is expected to remain limited, but its value may be symbolic and social: reducing alienation, creating channels of interaction, and improving trust between groups (Jamal 2011).
Any policy in the field of service must be accompanied by parallel efforts to address underlying socio-economic factors. Civic integration cannot be built solely on a security obligation, but rather on substantive equality in citizenship (Peled & Shafir 2005). Therefore, action is required in the following areas: investing in education and higher education systems in Arab localities, developing infrastructure and public services, combating employment discrimination, and ensuring equal access to state resources.
Without such measures, any demand for service will be perceived as illegitimate and will deepen alienation (Rouhana 1997). Moreover, in the context of an ongoing national conflict, willingness to engage in civic cooperation also depends on a sense of recognition and collective dignity, not only on material incentives (Smooha 2010). In conclusion, the issue of extending service obligations to the Arab population in Israel is among the most complex and sensitive in Israeli society. The analysis shows that there is no single definitive solution: any policy balances security, equality, and group rights (Rawls 1999; Kymlicka 1995). As noted, the Druze model cannot be generalized, as it relies on unique conditions of communal identity and historical-political context that do not exist among the broader Arab population (Firro 1999). Therefore, imposing military obligation is likely to fail both normatively and practically.
The preferred alternative is a multi-channel model: a gradual and voluntary expansion of civilian national service, the opening of designated voluntary tracks in the IDF, and structural efforts to address inequality. Although this approach does not fully resolve the tension between the values, it allows for their cautious advancement in parallel: security needs, civic equality, and respect for collective identity (Peled & Shafir, 2005). Only such an integrated policy may generate public legitimacy and reduce tensions over time.
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