Mohammed bin Salman, the son of Saudi King Salman of the House of Saud, known as MBS, has been the Crown Prince and de facto Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia since 2017. His rise to power marked a shift in Saudi domestic and foreign policy, including a more pragmatic approach toward Israel, primarily in the context of the shared threat from Iran. However, his statements to the media, and it is worth noting in this context that all interviews given by bin Salman to foreign media regarding Israel have evolved and gone through many iterations over the years. Recently, these statements have been influenced by Arab public opinion, the Palestinian issue, and the Israeli war in Gaza. In the past, his remarks about Israel were rare, but he began to present a pragmatic approach toward Israel as part of the struggle against Iran. In 2018, in an interview with The Atlantic, he compared Iran’s leader, Ali Khamenei, to Hitler, implying shared interests with Israel against Tehran.
Later, he expressed a relatively positive stance toward Israel while emphasizing the need to resolve the Palestinian issue. In 2018, he said, “We do not see Israel as an enemy, but as a potential ally, with many interests we can advance together.” This was the first time he publicly acknowledged the potential for cooperation. After the Abraham Accords in 2022, in another interview with The Atlantic, he reiterated this: “We do not see Israel as an enemy, but as a potential ally. But we must resolve some issues before we get there.”
In September 2023, shortly before the Hamas attack, bin Salman said in an interview with Fox News: “Every day we get closer to normalization with Israel, but the Palestinian issue is critical. We need to resolve it.” This statement reflected optimism and entry into a new era, but also a basic condition. In the United States and in Israel, there was great optimism. There was talk of expanding the Abraham Accords. Normalization between the two countries seemed to be on the way. A kind of formula was even devised that would grant the Saudis what they wanted, a sort of ladder to climb down from the demands intended for the Palestinians: granting them autonomy to satisfy everyone, especially the Arab street and the Saudi domestic arena, which refuses to normalize “for free,” meaning without Israeli concessions.
The October 7 Turning Point
As noted, bin Salman’s statements toward Israel initially reflected a relatively positive approach. He viewed Israel as a potential ally in confronting Iran, but relations hardened after October 7, 2023. Before that, normalization seemed to be on the way. However, after the massacre and during the “Swords of Iron” war, everything was turned upside down. The war reshuffled the deck. In practice, Saudi Arabia viewed Israel’s actions in Gaza as “war crimes,” including the destruction of infrastructure, the killing of civilians, and the siege. The Saudis publicly condemned this and demanded an immediate ceasefire and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital as a condition for normalization. Without this, there would be no agreement, a position they maintain to this day. Against the backdrop of the ongoing war in Gaza, bin Salman’s stance became more rigid.
In addition, on November 21, 2023, bin Salman called for an arms embargo on Israel during a virtual summit of the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). In his statement, he demanded that all countries stop exporting weapons and ammunition to Israel in the context of the war in Gaza. In September 2024, in a speech to the Saudi Shura Council, he said: “The Kingdom will not recognize Israel without an independent Palestinian state.”
In November 2024, as the war progressed and images of destruction in Gaza, including pictures of the dead, spread, the tone sharpened. He accused Israel of “collective genocide” in Gaza. This was his harshest statement since the beginning of the war. In September 2025, bin Salman reinforced his position. He said in response to the idea of encouraging the migration of Gaza residents: “Gaza is Palestinian land, and the rights of its residents cannot be taken.” He described the Israeli attacks on Qatar as “brutal aggression.” In November 2025, ahead of his visit to the White House with President Trump, Saudi Arabia emphasized that there would be no normalization without a “road map to a Palestinian state.”
Bin Salman refused to join the Abraham Accords, which surprisingly survived the war, without progress on the Palestinian issue, despite American pressure. In the meeting, he demanded an “irreversible path” to a Palestinian state.
Saudi condemnations of Israel did not always come from bin Salman himself. On the contrary, he speaks to the media relatively infrequently. Most of the condemnations came from the Saudi Foreign Ministry, which issued hundreds of condemnation statements against Israel during the “Swords of Iron” war, in addition to Saudi officials who participated in the many Arab summits held since October 2023. For example, just one month after the Hamas attack, in November 2023, an exceptional Arab-Islamic summit was held in Riyadh. The summit condemned Israeli actions in Gaza and called for a ceasefire. As of the writing of these lines, four additional Arab summits have been held, in which the Saudi condemnation of Israel was unequivocal, including a constant demand for withdrawal to the 1967 lines and the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.
The Somaliland-Style Threat
Israel turned the failures of October 7 into a strategic victory, with the destruction of the Iranian axis and the restoration of deterrence. The military victories created political opportunities, with stronger American support from the Trump administration and the Democrats’ electoral defeat serving as a force multiplier.
In practice, Israel faced a multi-front war against Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and additional proxies. Despite Israel’s failure to prevent the massacre in the first days of the war, Israel achieved significant victories on the military, diplomatic, and economic fronts, which altered the balance of power in the Middle East. Israel’s victories include the destruction of Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorist infrastructure in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the destruction of most of the weapons stockpiles of the former Syrian regime, in addition to the elimination of the entire leadership of Hamas and Hezbollah and dozens of Houthi leaders. Israel ultimately succeeded in restoring its deterrence vis-à-vis its enemies. Israel also captured and continues to hold parts of southern Lebanon and northern Syria, as well as approximately 50 percent of the territory of the Gaza Strip.
At the end of December 2025, Israel surprised the entire world when it recognized Somaliland. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland caused enormous alarm in the Arab and African worlds. Israel was perceived as drawing closer to Saudi Arabia via the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia expressed strong opposition to Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. This first-of-its-kind recognition was perceived as a step within the framework of the Abraham Accords and the Israeli doctrine of building alliances with minorities or non-Arab entities, such as Israel’s strong ties with the Kurds and with the Druze. The Saudis were furious because this recognition has strategic, political, and legal implications for the Gulf states. Saudi Arabia, as the leader of the Arab and Islamic worlds, cannot be seen as compromising Arab-Islamic solidarity; therefore, it views the recognition as a “unilateral step” that violates international law and encourages a dangerous precedent. In an official statement, the Saudi Foreign Ministry emphasized full support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial unity and viewed the recognition as an attempt to create “parallel entities” that weaken Somalia. Moreover, Saudi Arabia mobilized two additional states, Turkey and Egypt, to support and strengthen Somalia against Somaliland and Israeli recognition. These two states oppose Israeli expansion.
As noted, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland was perceived as a direct threat to Saudi interests in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, regions that are strategic for trade, oil, and security. Somaliland, due to its location near Yemen, could, in Saudi eyes, become a base for Israeli military and economic influence, thereby increasing geopolitical tensions. Saudi Arabia fears that this would weaken its influence in Africa and encourage an “Israeli-Emirati-Ethiopian axis,” rivals of Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
A Weakened Iran Is Preferable to a Strong Israel
The reasons and roots of the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel lie in Israel’s position, which in 2015 opposed the nuclear agreement between the Obama administration and Iran. At that time, unofficial ties flourished between the two countries. Israelis were allowed to be interviewed in Saudi media, and the Abraham Accords encouraged dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Many Saudi figures, including Saudi bloggers, came to Israel and to the Knesset. Many Israelis, including Communications Minister Dr. Shlomo Karhi, visited Riyadh.
We all remember the intense diplomatic campaign waged by the Kingdom against Israel during the Swords of Iron war, when, in coordination with the Palestinian Authority and France, it mobilized dozens of Western countries in a drive to recognize a Palestinian state.
Today, normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel does not appear on the horizon; however, officially, the Saudi position has not changed regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital and a withdrawal to the 1967 lines. At the same time, Iran’s weakening and its current position at the eye of the storm vis-à-vis the Trump administration, which threatens to topple the regime and collapse the Iranian axis that was active in Syria and Lebanon, are still not sufficient for Saudi Arabia to return to the normalization track with Israel. Saudi Arabia considers economic viability. The Houthis’ attack on Aramco facilities in 2019 caused extensive damage to the Saudi government. Therefore, in recent years, the Saudis have preferred industrial quiet and not to provoke Iran and the Houthis. Accordingly, Israel is not at the top of the Kingdom’s priorities. The motivation for normalization has declined significantly. The fact that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman are trying to save the Iranian regime and are pressuring the Trump administration not to attack Iran stems from deep concern among the Saudis in particular and the Gulf states in general. They have two reasons for this concern:
1. The Saudis do not want a regional war that would harm them and their economy. The Saudis want stability that will allow them to continue benefiting from oil sales. Although they loathe the regime in Iran, they are willing to concede to it in order not to set the entire region ablaze, especially if its proxies, the Houthis and the Iraqis, stand by Iran, and the United States does not intervene.
2. The fear that Israel might draw closer to them in the Gulf, not via the Red Sea through Somaliland, but via Iran. This refers to an Israeli-Iranian alliance with a new regime that would replace the current one if the United States succeeds in toppling the ayatollah regime. The Shah’s son, Reza Pahlavi, is known as a friend of Israel. He has stated several times in the past that a new Iran would establish relations with Israel, and this is the last thing the Saudis would want.
