The military conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, referred to by Hezbollah as the “Support Campaign for Gaza,” is often attributed to the fighting in Gaza. This is because the current conflict began the day after the October 7th massacre, when Hezbollah launched a missile attack on northern Israel.
However, it should be remembered that the terrorist organization’s provocations started as early as the beginning of 2023. Hezbollah provoked Israel by setting up two tents on Mount Dov, within Israel’s sovereign territory. Leaks published in Israel revealed that the two Hezbollah tents were placed there in February of that year. Despite this serious breach, Israel chose to respond diplomatically rather than militarily, as Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah had anticipated.
The placement of the two tents at that time was a direct order from Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. The move was influenced by internal Israeli protests and instability caused by attempts to pass judicial reforms and the numerous demonstrations that followed. Nasrallah frequently quoted Israeli media reports about the dissent. Another reason for Hezbollah’s provocation was the political vacuum in Lebanon: Nasrallah exploited the governance void created by the absence of a functioning president and government since October 2022 to further his control over Lebanon and strengthen his position against Israel. Notably, his previous provocation led to diplomatic concessions from Israel, following the maritime border agreement signed on October 27, 2022, between Israel and Lebanon, under then-acting Prime Minister Yair Lapid.
The tents were intended for one purpose: to demand from Israel the northern part of the village of Ghajar and gain additional territorial concessions. According to the Lebanese, more than 13 border corrections are required in Lebanon’s favor. Regardless, Nasrallah’s motives then and now remain the same—he seeks to take control of half of the village of Ghajar, following the Lebanese government’s refusal to deploy the Lebanese army there as per UN Security Council Resolution 1701. In September 2022, as part of a plan to encourage Israeli tourism to the village, Israel approved the entry of Israelis to Ghajar, whereas previously, entry was only permitted for residents and those with prior approval from the IDF.
This plan undoubtedly enraged the Lebanese. However, before a solution to the tent provocation could be found, Israel experienced the massacre by Hamas, forcing the IDF to launch a war in Gaza. Nasrallah, justifying his organization’s existence by defining it as a “resistance organization against Israel,” initiated a support system for Gaza’s terrorist organizations, partly to engage the Israeli army on an additional front.
Fighting Israel to Promote a Loyal President
The political crisis in Lebanon deepened with the end of former President Michel Aoun’s term in September 2022, leaving the country without a president. The responsibility to elect a new president lies with the 128-member parliament. Hezbollah lacks a majority and needs Christian votes. However, political divisions, exacerbated by Hezbollah’s influence, have thwarted the election process, as the organization seeks a compliant president who will protect its interests. Nasrallah’s provocations, including setting up tents in Israeli territory and engaging in the “Operation Swords of Iron,” primarily aim to pressure Western powers to address Lebanon’s political vacuum and force the opposition, especially the March 14 Alliance (a Sunni-Christian coalition opposed to Hezbollah), to elect a president that aligns with its agenda.
This strategy is intended to secure a close and intimate relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hezbollah’s patron, by appointing a “puppet president” who will avoid challenging Hezbollah’s dominance and ensure the group’s weapons remain outside state control. Nasrallah’s calculated restraint during the current conflict underscores his preference for political leverage over war. Since the onset of the military confrontation, Nasrallah has carefully avoided escalating the fighting. He is well aware that the Gulf states, which funded and assisted Lebanon’s reconstruction in the summer of 2006, are no longer friendly to Lebanon, primarily due to Hezbollah and Iran. Consequently, he cannot afford the costs of a war that could expand to include Beirut, the capital of Lebanon.
So, what exactly does Nasrallah want? As mentioned, Nasrallah is not interested in a full-scale war like the Second Lebanon War. However, he does want the election of a president favorable to him. Along the way, he is also keen to justify his existence as an organization fighting against Israel while protecting Palestinian rights. Nasrallah aims to show Lebanese citizens, and the Arab world in general, that he is an integral part of the resistance axis (Turkey, Qatar, Iraq, and Yemen) and wants to influence Lebanese politics, particularly regarding the identity of the next president. If he truly desired a full-scale war, he likely would have joined the October 7th attack or at least significantly escalated the fighting in the north and against Israel overall.
The Price that Hezbollah Hides
In all his speeches, Nasrallah has consistently referred to the fighting against Israel as a “campaign to support Gaza.” This campaign is secondary to the fighting in Gaza and aims to harm Israel and its security, but not as a fully independent war. Nasrallah also maintains that once the IDF ceases operations in Gaza and withdraws, Hezbollah will stop firing at Israel. This was indeed the case during the first ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, which included the release of some hostages at the end of November.
Regarding the objectives of the fighting, Nasrallah claims they are to exhaust Israel, impose an economic burden of government funding to accommodate tens of thousands of the northern region’s evacuees, and force the IDF to allocate a significant portion of its forces to the north, which he argues will harm Israel and somewhat ease the pressure on the terrorist organizations in Gaza. Retrospectively, it is clear that Nasrallah’s statements are not accurate. Israel did not avoid any operational moves in Gaza due to the firing in the north, although he can still claim he supports Hamas in its difficult times.
As of early May 2024, Hezbollah has more than 310 fatalities, most of whom are field operatives. The death toll includes dozens of senior commanders, regional commanders, and key figures in the Radwan Force, Hezbollah’s elite unit. In addition to the loss of life, many areas in southern Lebanon have been completely destroyed. Lebanese and pro-Iranian Arab media are making significant efforts to conceal the damage of the war in southern Lebanon and do not broadcast images or videos of the extensive damage caused by Israeli bombardments. Naturally, the Arab media portrays Hezbollah as a strong organization defending the Palestinians. In one of his speeches, Nasrallah justified the casualties and property damage in Lebanon by stating that “there were no drones in the Second Lebanon War.”
Another aspect not visible in the Lebanese landscape due to censorship is the suffering of nearly 100,000 displaced people from southern Lebanon who fled due to Israeli bombardments. This issue continues to preoccupy Nasrallah and Hezbollah and profoundly affects Lebanese society. As the confrontation with Israel intensifies and prolongs, tens of thousands of Lebanese internally displaced people continue to find themselves fleeing the conflict zone. Thousands of Lebanese refugees from southern Lebanon are currently in Beirut, staying in community centers, schools, and with relatives. The wealthier ones have traveled abroad or are staying in hotels. Unlike the evacuees in Israel, who receive support and assistance from the state, the displaced in Lebanon are left without government support. This disparity highlights the broader socio-economic consequences of Hezbollah’s actions. The lack of comprehensive support mechanisms underscores Hezbollah’s influence on governance. By perpetuating conflict and instability, Hezbollah further solidifies its grip on power in Lebanon by preventing the election of a new president who would earn the trust of the majority of the Lebanese people. Hezbollah destabilizes Lebanon by being the deciding factor in whether there will be war in the country. One militia dictates Lebanon’s fate.
Hezbollah’s Christian Opposition
The Taif Agreement, brokered in Saudi Arabia in September 1989, ended the bloody Lebanese Civil War that began in April 1975. This agreement, a compromise between Lebanon’s Christians and Muslims, redefined the role of the President, who, according to the Lebanese constitution, must be from the Maronite Christian community. While Christian supremacy was preserved, many presidential powers were transferred to the Sunni Prime Minister. However, the most significant aspect of this agreement was the disarmament of Lebanese militias, with their weapons handed over to the Lebanese Army, except for Hezbollah, which was designated as a resistance movement. This weakened the Christian faction in Lebanon politically, militarily, and demographically. While the Christian birth rate declined, the Muslim birth rate, especially among Shiites, increased. Additionally, thousands of Christians emigrated to European countries, while the Muslim faction chose to stay in Lebanon. As a result, the Christian faction lost its influence to the Shiites and Hezbollah.
The main representative of the Christian faction is Samir Geagea, the legendary commander of the Lebanese Forces, who is currently one of Hezbollah’s most prominent opponents. The Lebanese Forces is the military arm of the Christian Phalange Party. Geagea opposed Hezbollah’s military involvement in the Gaza war. “From day one, this is not our war,” he consistently stated in every interview. “As Lebanese, we have sympathy for the Palestinian cause, but we should not be a party to this war,” he declared in recent months. In another interesting statement on May 3, he explicitly said, “Hezbollah’s support for Hamas has harmed Lebanon and did not help Gaza.” Geagea’s stance is clear—he refuses to accept this war and continues to oppose it. Many Lebanese share his view, but he is the only one who dares to say it publicly. The fear of Hezbollah’s retaliation prevents many from speaking out as Geagea does.
Not only the Christian faction, but most Lebanese oppose Hezbollah’s war with Israel. They see Hezbollah’s actions as geopolitical manipulation, exploiting Lebanon’s weak establishment and the Christian faction to advance its agenda of maximal control over Lebanon. In their eyes, Nasrallah’s tactics reflect a dominant approach aimed at solidifying Hezbollah’s power within Lebanon and positioning it in the region. As Lebanon navigates its prolonged political crisis, characterized by a leadership vacuum and external pressures, Hezbollah’s role becomes decisive in determining Lebanon’s future path, especially with its control over decisions of peace and war.
The Involvement of the Lebanese Establishment in Fighting Israel
Contrary to the common belief in Israel and worldwide that only Hezbollah is militarily active and firing at Israel, the reality is different. While Hezbollah has indeed launched thousands of rockets and hundreds of drones at Israel in recent months, it is important to acknowledge the involvement of other organizations such as the Islamic Jihad, various Palestinian factions, and the Amal Movement. The Amal Movement is particularly noteworthy as it symbolizes the involvement of the Lebanese establishment in the fight against Israel, not just Hezbollah and the other factions.
The Shiite Amal Movement, from which extremist elements split off to form Hezbollah in the early 1980s, is led by none other than the Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Nabih Berri. Dozens of Amal operatives have been killed by the IDF. Their photos, displayed with the movement’s logo, serve as clear evidence of the Lebanese establishment’s involvement in the conflict against Israel. This involvement is not just declarative, as demonstrated by Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati’s support for Hezbollah’s actions and his condemnation of Israel. It can be definitively stated that Amal operatives, under the command of Speaker Berri, are actively launching rockets at Israel.
Hamas’s Demise – an Elusive Goal
One of the objectives of Israel’s recent military campaigns against Hamas in the Gaza Strip is to undermine its status as both a military force and a political authority. In my estimation, this is undoubtedly a lofty goal for Israel to achieve. However, the elimination of Hamas as an ideological movement representing an idea is a task that is likely beyond feasible realization in practice.
How Should Israel Respond?
Eight months into the “Operation Iron Swords” war, there is no end in sight. Israel’s deterrence capability has suffered a significant blow over the past few decades, culminating in the events of October 7. Israel has become the “bullied child of the neighborhood,” with attacks coming from Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria. This loss of deterrence is linked to Israel’s policies of containment and restraint in recent years. The tent incident was perceived by Nasrallah as a sign of Israel’s weakness, as he has expressed in numerous speeches over the past few months. Nasrallah will not cease firing at Israel as long as the IDF is fighting in Gaza and has not withdrawn from the Strip. Nevertheless, Israel must restore its deterrence capability and inflict significant damage on Hezbollah, even at the cost of an all-out war. The IDF will need to operate in Beirut and beyond. Israel must act against all those who have attacked it with retaliatory measures, including Iraqi operatives and the Houthis in distant Yemen. The IDF’s long arm must reach all these actors. A swift response against the Lebanese Ministry of Defense and even against the Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, who sends his operatives to fire at Israel, is a necessary action given the current situation.
