The year 2025 was marked by a geo-strategic shift in our region following Operation “With the Lion.” This operation was made possible, among other factors, thanks to a series of impressive Israeli achievements against Hezbollah, which led to the fall of the Assad regime and subsequently to the elimination of most of the Syrian army’s capabilities. The result was that the Israeli Air Force established aerial dominance across the region and opened a corridor toward Iran.
In the Gaza arena, the deep maneuver by the IDF and the existential threat posed to Hamas’ survival, as well as the airstrike in Doha in September 2025, created the foundation for President Donald Trump’s twenty-point plan and for the ceasefire that began on October 10, 2025. The plan was further backed by UN Security Council Resolution 2803, and its implementation would enable the fulfillment of the five war aims set by the Israeli government.
The return of all living hostages and twenty-seven bodies out of twenty-eight (as of this writing), along with Israeli control of fifty-three percent of the Gaza Strip, are highly significant achievements, yet the campaign is far from over. Hamas has not been disarmed, the Strip has not been demilitarized, and no alternative governance has been established. Hamas routinely violates the ceasefire, and the IDF, restrained and limited regarding preemptive actions against the terror group’s force buildup, responds harshly and disproportionately to establish clear rules of engagement and impose a high cost on Hamas. The restraint placed on the IDF stems from American pressure, as the administration in Washington continues to push for the implementation of the Trump Plan and believes Hamas can be persuaded, through Turkey and Qatar, to disarm.
Qatar and Turkey: Israel must keep a close watch
The most significant challenges Israel will face in 2026 are the renewed strengthening of Hamas and the consolidation of its rule in the Gaza Strip, alongside Hezbollah’s reconstruction efforts supported by Iran. The latter is also working vigorously to rebuild and expand its ballistic, UAV, and drone capabilities, while simultaneously intensifying cyber operations and terrorist activity targeting Israeli and Jewish sites abroad.
In practice, Israel remains engaged in an active war on five main fronts: Iran, the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, Lebanon, and southern Syria. Two centers of gravity appear most prominent – the Gaza Strip and Lebanon – and in both arenas, Israel will need to reach a decisive outcome to weaken Iran and enable better preparation against its force buildup and the very real possibility of an offensive move by Tehran.
In the second circle of challenges stand Turkey and Qatar. It is important to reiterate that these are two states that support Hamas and seek a significant and influential role in the Gaza Strip, with Turkey also aspiring to maintain a military presence there. Both states are hostile toward Israel and act against it on the international stage while providing active assistance to Hamas, including financial support and hosting the organization’s leaders and military operatives.
Turkey allows Hamas’ military operatives to organize terror activity against Israel, primarily in Judea and Samaria.
Both states seek influence in the Gaza Strip, though for different purposes. Qatar aims to leverage this role to strengthen its position as a regional and global actor, while Turkey seeks to capitalize on its current standing as a regional hegemon. In the Israeli context, Turkey is becoming a substantial threat due to its regional ambitions, its escalating hostility, and its expanding presence in Syria. This includes, among other elements, a military presence, assistance in rebuilding and rearming the Syrian army, and, it appears, support for Sunni terror groups in southern Syria and encouragement of their activity against Israel.
Avoiding excessive restraint
Israel’s significant achievements since July 2024 have led to a genuine reshaping of the regional order and solidified its status as a leading power. These achievements have also improved the conditions for expanding the Abraham Accords and for a profound transformation of the new regional architecture, backed and led by the United States.
The weak link and main obstacle to this transformation is the Gaza Strip. The likelihood of successful implementation of the twenty-point plan is not high, and Israel must act in ways that will secure legitimacy, primarily American, for renewing the military campaign to dismantle Hamas and demilitarize the Strip in a manner that enables the plan’s realization. The prospect of entrenching a reality in which the Gaza Strip remains divided east to west along “the yellow line,” with Hamas retaining effective sovereignty in the area it controls in the eastern part of the Strip. At the same time, the IDF is unable to dismantle the organization or achieve complete demilitarization, which is dangerous and detrimental to Israel. American restraint imposed on Israel may become a dangerous precedent regarding Hezbollah and Iran as well, and restrict its freedom of action in Syria.
The United States’ deep involvement in the region – the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran – alongside deepening strategic ties with Qatar and Saudi Arabia and defense alliances with them, places Israel in a difficult position regarding freedom of action in the face of challenges and threats across all fronts. The close personal ties between Turkish President Tayyip Recep Erdogan and the Qatari Emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, with President Trump, along with the esteem he shows them, further constrict Israel’s room for maneuver.
At the same time, it must not be forgotten that the United States remains Israel’s most crucial strategic pillar. Therefore, Israel’s core challenge is maintaining a high level of coordination and cooperation with the American administration and ensuring its full support, while preserving operational freedom across all arenas. This is a tension that is difficult to resolve, given American interests and President Trump’s determination to shape a new regional architecture through expanding the Abraham Accords, in which he seeks to include Syria and Lebanon, cementing his status and image as a peacemaker.
The challenge of Israeli leadership
The year 2026 will place Israel before difficult tests. Its map of challenges is complex and extensive, with interlinkages and mutual influences among the various arenas that make separation nearly impossible. Weakness in one arena will inevitably affect the others, and in all of them, the United States plays a role and has interests that do not necessarily align with Israel’s.
The coming year will necessarily be a test of Israeli leadership and its ability to integrate military command with statecraft in a way that manages the central tension between preserving the close and special relationship with the United States and safeguarding Israel’s vital security interests.
This leadership challenge becomes even more complex in an election year and within a reality of toxic politics shaped by the heavy shadow of the conscription law, the Netanyahu trial, and his request for a presidential pardon. Added to this is a severe crisis of trust between the political and military echelons, a sharp decline in Israel’s international standing, and a wounded society still traumatized since October 7, 2023, despite the impressive resilience it demonstrated throughout the years of war. Alongside internal social fractures, public trust in state institutions continues to erode.
Although the Israeli economy has shown remarkable resilience and indicators point to significant growth expected in the coming year, these too may prove fragile if the security reality deteriorates. Such deterioration would necessitate expanded military operations and large-scale reserve mobilization, reigniting the conscription law crisis and fueling divisive politics.
Given all this, 2026 will be a year in which security and diplomatic challenges are intertwined with social, economic, and political ones. The manner in which Israel’s leadership acts will determine whether this is the year in which Israel breaks through and consolidates its status as a power fully integrated into the new regional architecture. The possibility exists, the chances are significant, and the matter is in our hands, yet wavering resolve could undermine both possibility and opportunity.
