Israel has been conducting a comprehensive war for about three months, mostly in the Gaza Strip against Hamas and other terrorist organizations. However, the Lebanese arena poses the most significant and substantial threat to the Israeli Home Front. For now, Hezbollah appears to be uninterested in a widespread war with Israel for two main reasons: First, the Shiite terrorist organization is careful to attack Israel using less advanced combat methods such as short-range rockets. Despite also utilizing relatively powerful “Borkan” rockets, their primary use currently is in mortars, anti-tank missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Second, in addition to their limited attacks, Hezbollah sends continuous public messages that it does not desire an all-encompassing war. On November 3, 2023, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah stated that “the possibility that the current situation in southern Lebanon will drag into a comprehensive, actual war depends on developments in Gaza and Israel’s behavior toward Lebanon.”
On January 5, 2024 Nasrallah said in a speech that residents of the northern border in Israel could return to their homes only if the Israeli government decides to end the war in Gaza. On December 24, 2023, Hezbollah’s Central Council member Nabil Kaouk stated that Hezbollah would continue to support Gaza as long as the attacks persist. On December 31, 2023, Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem said, “Israel, first and foremost, must stop the war in Gaza for the war in Lebanon to end.” On January 8, Qassem stated, “We do not want to initiate an all-encompassing war, but if Israel decides to open a comprehensive war against Hezbollah, we are on the ground to respond in kind. On January 19, Ali Daamoush, Hezbollah’s Deputy Head of the Executive Council, said, “Resistance does not want to be dragged into a war, but if forced into one, it will not hesitate, and it is fully prepared to confront with all its strength and courage.”
It seems that Hezbollah’s conduct is guided by a complex and delicate balance between the need and willingness to take risks for the sake of its reputation as an Arab-Islamic organization defending Palestinian interests. It is even prepared to endure losses for this cause while avoiding an all-encompassing war with Israel that could result in significant consequences. Its primary goal in the near term is to engage numerous Israeli military forces along the northern border to prevent Israel from using them in a war against Hamas. Additionally, Hezbollah aims to inflict relatively minor damage on Israel, relative to its military capabilities, under the assumption that such actions will not lead Israel to open a war against it.
According to various reports in the media and statements from Israeli officials, Israel is indeed planning to address the Hezbollah and Lebanon issue. However, it appears that the direction is misguided and based on the October 6th conception. The Israeli idea, supported by the United States and France, is to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River, either through diplomatic means or military actions if diplomatic efforts fail. Military efforts would aim to give renewed force to U.N. Resolution 1701 or, alternatively, lead to a new decision in the UN Security Council based on Resolution 1701. If these diplomatic and political efforts fail, there are plans for a military operation in southern Lebanon to push Hezbollah north. Nevertheless, Hezbollah has already stated its readiness to withdraw from southern Lebanon if Israel withdraws from Shebaa Farms. For example, on December 6, 2023, Defense Minister Yoav Galant declared that Hezbollah would be pushed beyond the Litani River, either through diplomatic or military means, and only after the terror organization is removed from the border, will residents evacuated from the confrontation line be allowed to return to their homes. On January 18, Galant mentioned that Israel prefers a diplomatic solution to address the northern issue.
UN Resolution 1701 – Dead and Irrelevant
An assessment of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 of 2006, 18 years after its adoption, reveals an absolute failure. The Lebanese army failed to enforce the decision and prevent Hezbollah’s presence in southern Lebanon. Similarly, the international forces, incapable of acting against Hezbollah’s attacks on Israel or its military buildup, have been ineffective. After the 2006 war, Hezbollah maintained a facade of compliance with the decision, but over time, it realized the need to showcase its activities openly, evident in the last two decades.
Hezbollah now possesses an arsenal of over 200,000 missiles and rockets, along with around 1,000 precision-guided missiles. This arsenal includes explosive UAVs, anti-aircraft missiles, advanced anti-tank missiles, cyber capabilities, and commando forces. This arsenal poses a threat to population centers and strategic sites in Israel. South of Lebanon, where according to Resolution 1701, Hezbollah should not have a presence or military buildup, Hezbollah has established a military infrastructure embedded in the Shiite population and the rugged mountainous terrain. This is coupled with numerous weapons smuggling routes from Syria and Iran into southern Lebanon.
The idea of pushing Hezbollah beyond the Litani River is based on an outdated and naive perception from before October 7th. Such a displacement will not change the reality, certainly not in the long run. If Hezbollah does withdraw north of the Litani, a move with low to non-existent probabilities, it can quickly return to the south. Israel is unlikely to respond aggressively, as observed in the past two decades. Moreover, it is highly probable that international forces will fail to force Hezbollah’s withdrawal to the north, either through implementing a new agreement or after Hezbollah returns to the south for a brief period following a withdrawal to the north.
It is possible that pushing Hezbollah north of the Litani River will enhance the security – or the sense of security – for the Israeli population near the Lebanon border, facilitating a return to their homes. However, it is crucial to emphasize that Hezbollah’s threat to Israel doesn’t end with infiltrating the border and taking control of border-adjacent towns; it extends as a threat to the entire state of Israel. Therefore, it is a mistake to examine the issue solely from the perspective of northern border communities.
Israel cannot rely solely on a new decision by the UN Security Council (certainly not based on the previous decision 1701) that doesn’t provide sustained security, as demonstrated in the last two decades. Israel’s security cannot be based on foreign forces, especially those lacking authority and capabilities to deal with Hezbollah’s threat and its military buildup.
In this situation, Israel will need to shift from a strategy of deterrence to a strategy of decisiveness. The use of Israel’s military force cannot occur within the framework of a “deterrence operation” in the style of the Second Lebanon War but rather in the context of a comprehensive war aimed at decisively defeating Hezbollah. Therefore, Israel needs to prepare the Israeli public for a broad war in Lebanon that will destroy Hezbollah, including occupying all of southern Lebanon and targeting key cities and infrastructure.
Israel must take responsibility for its fate and not rely on foreign countries and entities to do the job for them. Only a decisive defeat of Hezbollah, including the destruction of its infrastructure across Lebanon, can lead to a more secure reality for Israel and bring about calm and stability in the coming decades.
