“In the vision I see before me, we will create an entire system, essentially a ‘hexagon’ of alliances around, or within, the Middle East. This includes India, Arab states, African states, Mediterranean states (Greece and Cyprus), and states in Asia that I will not specify at the moment”; thus Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu opened the cabinet meeting on February 22, 2026.
Netanyahu’s “hexagon” vision is an attempt to translate global multipolarity into an Israeli strategic asset. It proposes a new role for Israel, one not confined to defense, but rather that of a global axis. The doctrine will ultimately be tested by Israel’s ability to bridge the gap between political vision and an actual institutional framework.
The strategy presented by Netanyahu rests on five axes, or geographic spheres, with Israel serving as a kind of hub, or effectively the sixth axis. The Israeli axis connects the Middle East, with Israel positioned as the center of the three continents: Asia, Africa, and Europe. In this way, he created a hexagonal structure of alliances.
The vision should be understood as a proposal to reframe Israel’s regional operating environment: a shift from reliance on diplomatic arrangements and bilateral deterrence toward a multidimensional structure integrating security coordination, infrastructural connectivity, and geo-economic cooperation. The innovation in this conception lies in the attempt to transform existing relationships into a networked configuration with institutional and infrastructural logic.
This vision challenges Israeli discourse regarding “regional order,” which constantly oscillates between a focus on threats and military balance, and a focus on normalization and economic opportunities. The vision of the “regional hexagon” seeks to unite these poles into one broad and coherent framework that aims to position Israel as a nexus enabling security coordination and infrastructural-economic connectivity in the face of global cross-border challenges.
In practice, this is the first detailed reference to Netanyahu’s vision regarding reshaping the Middle East and designing a new regional structure, as a strategic necessity following Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack, which led Israel into a multi-front regional war that continues to this very day.
Already in the early days of the war, the prime minister referred to this context and declared Israel’s intention to lead regional change. Although he did not use the terminology common in strategic jargon, he was aiming at second-order change, namely a transformation of the existing system itself, as distinct from first-order change, which constitutes change within an existing system.
His strategic vision remains, by nature, principled, general, and abstract, as visions tend to be, and it raises a series of questions, gaps, and obstacles regarding its implementation. Nevertheless, it certainly can and should be regarded as a strategic compass toward which Netanyahu seeks to steer. At the same time, it is important to distinguish between “regional architecture” as an orderly whole composed of institutions, coordination mechanisms, projects, and incentives that generate sustained operational capacity over time, and an “architecture of understandings,” which describes a collection of diplomatic arrangements (declarations, agreements, visits) not necessarily backed by implementation mechanisms and infrastructure. This distinction is especially important when attempting to assess whether a political vision merely seeks to expand circles of partnership, or whether its essence is the construction of a resilient configuration that includes standards, risk management, and resource allocation.
The strategic horizon outlined by Netanyahu can be understood as the intended outcome of the “total victory,” in his words, in the war imposed upon Israel, a war that exposed, alongside Israel’s military, technological, and economic strengths, as well as its impressive national and social resilience, the weakness of the Arab states in the region, the necessity, importance, and immense advantage of institutionalizing a framework for regional cooperation, and above all, the new strategic opportunity space opened before Israel and its ability to integrate more deeply and significantly into the region.
It is important and necessary to understand this vision also within its political context. The realization of the vision, or at the very least the beginning of its implementation, could serve Netanyahu in securing success in the upcoming elections (toward the end of 2026). This would constitute a significant achievement that he could present as a form of victory, and perhaps one that might somewhat soften the trauma experienced by the Israeli public due to October 7, as well as the responsibility attributed to Netanyahu for that failure.
To successfully begin translating the vision into concrete action, a significant and unequivocal achievement vis-à-vis Iran will be required, whether through a substantial weakening of the regime or its replacement, an achievement that would ensure the neutralization of the Iranian threat and of Iran as a generator of regional instability. In Netanyahu’s understanding, a major achievement against Iran would create a domino effect on Hezbollah and Hamas, enabling the disarmament of both organizations. In addition, it would moderate Houthi motivation to contribute its share to the struggle of the resistance axis. A significant achievement against Iran would effectively mean dismantling the resistance axis led by Iran and producing a fundamental structural change in the balance of power, security, and deterrence in the Middle East.
In addition, Netanyahu will need to find a way to neutralize the Palestinian minefield, namely the political deadlock and absence of a diplomatic horizon, in a manner that would allow Arab states that declare their commitment to resolving the Palestinian issue to join the initiative and overcome domestic opposition.
Alongside American backing for the initiative, Netanyahu will need to establish broad domestic legitimacy, something that may be difficult to generate under the current coalition composition, as well as manage wisely and creatively the inherent tensions stemming from the foundational interests of the various actors involved. For example, India, a regional power with an East Asian orientation that maintains close relations with Iran, or Cyprus and Greece, members of the European Union whose interests are influenced by the EU and its broader priorities.
Implementing the vision requires translating abstract ideas and principles into patterns of action, institutions, cooperation frameworks, and substantial financing. Close personal relationships between leaders, such as that between Netanyahu and the Prime Minister of India, may provide helpful momentum, but realizing the vision requires reliance on state institutions and interests, as well as commitment to investing the necessary time and resources.
From War to Regional Order
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s opening speech at the cabinet meeting on February 22, 2026, on the eve of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel, was not merely ceremonial. It should be understood as an explicit declaration of a strategic vision seeking to define Israel’s place within the emerging regional order following years of intense warfare. In Netanyahu’s view, this strategic vision constitutes the necessary closing of the circle of the October 7 trauma, a remedy for the failure and stain that continue to haunt him, despite all his efforts to shift responsibility away from himself and onto the security establishment, the intelligence community, and even the judicial system, in an attempt to minimize his own share of responsibility for what Israeli society perceives as the most traumatic failure since the establishment of the state. Indeed, Netanyahu presents an ambitious, even far-reaching aspiration in his declaration of intent to build a “complete system,” a “hexagon” of alliances that would position Israel not as a state struggling for survival in a hostile environment, but as a vital hub in a network of partnerships, an architecture extending beyond the Middle East and linking three continents. A new and influential center of gravity within the international system.
At the foundation of the vision stand two central assumptions: first, that Israel has severely damaged the “radical resistance axis” led by Iran, thereby opening a strategic “window of opportunity”; and second, that a new radical Sunni axis, namely political Islam led by Turkey, may grow stronger in the vacuum created by Iran’s weakening and the dissolution of the resistance axis. The legitimacy and motivation for shaping the regional hexagonal architecture derive from the shared interest of the partners in the new architecture to prevent the strengthening and rehabilitation of both threatening axes, and to stabilize the regional security reality through a broad range of security and economic strategies, in a manner that ensures security, stability, and economic prosperity.
The Anatomy of the “Hexagon”
Netanyahu outlined five circles of partnership, six “sides,” if Israel itself is counted as the axis. Netanyahu is careful to present the vision in regional terms and avoids portraying Israel as the hegemonic actor within the expanded regional structure. However, a careful analysis of his remarks, both in his statement before the cabinet and in previous statements, makes it possible to understand how he perceives Israel’s contribution to the shaping process, as well as how Israel itself would benefit from the initiative.
From a geo-strategic perspective, the India-Greece-Cyprus axis enables Israel to position itself as a state connecting between “systems” rather than merely between neighbors. India is perceived as a rising power with a conception of strategic autonomy, expanding maritime capabilities, and a clear incentive to broaden westward trade routes. Greece and Cyprus, by contrast, are smaller players but possess institutional value: they are connected to the European Union, serve as logistical nodes in the Eastern Mediterranean, and stand at the center of regional disputes with Turkey concerning maritime boundaries and infrastructure. From this emerges the potential for “system connectivity”: cooperation that does not end with declarations, but rather encompasses the ability to coordinate standards, projects, and risk management across a broad geographic arc.
The following table presents these elements in a general and schematic manner:
As noted, what all these partnerships share, according to Netanyahu, is a “different perception” of the regional reality, one that identifies radical regional orders of any kind, as represented by Iran, political Islam led by Turkey, and jihadist movements, as a fundamental threat to their security and prosperity and as a destabilizing force in the region. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the potential partners in the expanded regional structure do not represent a homogeneous or monolithic bloc. India, for example, maintains strategic relations with Iran; Arab states formulate their positions toward Israel cautiously and condition progress in normalization processes on progress in the Palestinian track, while their leaderships face highly hostile public opinion toward Israel; and Mediterranean states such as Greece and Cyprus, members of the European Union, are inclined toward diplomacy and a broader European orientation. Accordingly, the “hexagon” should be understood as a regional architecture based on diverse forms of cooperation across a broad range of shared interests, rather than as a formal alliance.
The Network Dimension: An Additional Layer in the Security Concept
Historically, Israel’s security doctrine has rested on four pillars: deterrence, early warning, decisive victory, and defense. The principle guiding Israel throughout its existence has been that Israel would defend itself by itself. In the proposed vision, Netanyahu adds a fifth layer to Israel’s security doctrine, namely the network dimension. Alongside Israel’s own capabilities, additional capabilities would stand, both in terms of deterrence and defense, enabled through regional security cooperation.
Security cooperation between Israel and Arab states in the region has already existed in practice since Israel was incorporated into the United States Central Command (CENTCOM). It was also expressed in the defensive dimension in an impressive manner during June 2025 (Operation Rising Lion), and even more prominently during Operation Roaring Lion, known in the United States as Epic Fury. During the latter operation, Israel demonstrated impressive military and intelligence capabilities and actively assisted in the defense of Arab Gulf states. The capabilities demonstrated by Israel convinced the leaders of the Gulf Arab states of Israel’s necessity and important contribution to their security and defense. Israel is not abandoning the principle of defending itself by itself, but rather reinforcing and strengthening this capability with an additional significant layer. Security cooperation contributes to strengthening regional deterrence against the radical axes and would enable the rapid and effective suppression of these forces should they seek to undermine the regional system’s security stability.
At the foundation of the doctrine stands what Netanyahu calls an “axis against axes”: Israel seeks to create a coalition of states that see “eye to eye” regarding the danger posed by the radical axes, both Shiite and radical Sunni alike. However, since this is not an alliance but rather a regional structure based on shared interests, understandings, and cooperation, the question of the depth of security commitment remains open: Does the “hexagonal” architecture offer mutual security guarantees? Are there mechanisms for decision-making and operational coordination that would also enable offensive action against an emerging threat? Or is this merely loose and voluntary intelligence and logistical cooperation, while the traditional hedging strategy of the Gulf states continues to prevail?
The possible innovation in the conception, from the security perspective, lies in the assumption that some core threats, particularly missiles, UAVs, and the integration of hybrid means, require regional rather than solely national logic. In practical terms, this does not necessarily mean creating an “alliance” with a mutual defense clause, but rather expanding coordination mechanisms: early warning systems, sharing aerial and maritime operational pictures, rehearsing infrastructure disruption scenarios, and defining standards for the protection of critical facilities. A central feasibility question concerns the willingness of partners, particularly Arab states and India, to share sensitive information, and whether it is possible to create “sufficient” cooperation even under conditions of partial trust.
The Physical Dimension of the Architecture
The physical dimension of the new regional architecture is intended to rest on two foundations: the first is the integration of national infrastructure with regional infrastructure, and the second is the maritime-land connection linking India in the east to Europe in the west through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel (IMEC). These two foundations are meant to shape a transcontinental space and enable continuous connectivity that would facilitate infrastructural and economic activity on scales far beyond anything previously known to the potential partners. This connectivity enables economic, energy, transportation, and infrastructural leverage, creating unique force multipliers as the basis for regional economic power that would lead to regional prosperity and stability through voluntary interdependence and cross-border cooperation.
Indeed, in presenting his vision before the cabinet, Netanyahu linked Israel’s “internal infrastructure,” referring to the Tziklag airport project in the Negev and Ramat David in the Jezreel Valley, to the development of the Negev and urban planning, tying them directly to the regional strategy. This linkage, even if still vague, corresponds to a genuine geo-economic logic. The construction of the airport in Tziklag (south) and the development of the existing airport at Ramat David (north) are not merely tourism and domestic economic development projects. Broad and dispersed aviation capacity also constitutes a security-logistical capability, a decentralization that reduces infrastructural vulnerability under attack. A southern airport could serve as a logistical “anchor” for connectivity with the Red Sea and African states, an axis Netanyahu explicitly mentions as part of the hexagon.
The IMEC project, the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor, unveiled in September 2023 at the G20 summit in New Delhi, positions Israel as a physical link between India and Europe through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel itself, and Mediterranean partners. Initiatives in the style of IMEC illustrate how connectivity transforms from an economic tool into a strategic instrument. If Israel seeks to integrate into such a corridor, it must offer “functionality” and not merely “location”: logistical efficiency, security, enabling regulation, and risk insurance. In this context, Greece and Cyprus could serve as Europe’s infrastructural-regulatory gateway, while Israel connects the Middle East to the Eastern Mediterranean.
Greece and Cyprus are the natural European links in this corridor. They are gateways to the European Union and possess ports, submarine cable lines, and energy infrastructure, including Israeli natural gas reservoir infrastructure and the capability to transport oil from the port of Eilat to Ashkelon. This connection gives the “hexagon” a tangible physical dimension, not merely a political vision but an architecture with concrete “pipelines.” Greece and Cyprus fulfill a dual role: they are Mediterranean security partners through joint exercises and intelligence sharing, while also serving as “entry gates” to European infrastructure. By virtue of being part of this regional architecture, these states, which are not major powers, gain strategic weight far exceeding their formal size.
In the Eastern Mediterranean, energy and electricity are not merely economic sectors but instruments of influence: they connect European regulation, national needs for supply security, and threats to critical infrastructure. Over the years, the Israel-Greece-Cyprus framework has served as a platform for advancing cooperation in gas and electricity infrastructure. A prominent example is the plans to connect electricity grids via a submarine cable, carrying the potential to integrate Israel into the European energy sphere through Cyprus and Greece. At the same time, such projects are exposed to financing problems, regulatory uncertainty, and geopolitical and security risks at sea, and therefore constitute a clear test of the “hexagonal” architecture’s ability to transform vision into functioning infrastructure.
From a geo-economic perspective, the “hexagonal” architecture can be viewed as a response to de-risking processes in supply chains. States and business actors are seeking stable transit routes, market diversification, and reduced dependence on geopolitical bottlenecks. Within this framework, an effective regional architecture is not measured solely by trade volumes, but by its ability to create the conditions for trade: compatible regulation, standards, reduced transit times, and insurance against disruption risks. From this derives the importance of logistical projects and cooperation in protecting trade routes and infrastructure.
Artificial Intelligence and Quantum Computing as Force Multipliers
In an era in which data, cloud services, and submarine communications constitute “critical infrastructure,” regional architecture is also shaped through digital projects: fiber-optic cables, data centers, and secure connectivity between systems. Yet this is precisely where unique limitations emerge: information security requirements, compliance with European standards in the case of Greece and Cyprus, and questions of political trust. Therefore, if the “hexagonal” architecture is also meant to include a digital layer, practical arrangements of regulation and compliance will be required, not merely declarations of innovation.
In his vision, Netanyahu harnesses Israel’s technological power, and technology in general, to strengthen the hexagonal architecture. In his view, artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing “are the present, not the future.” This statement is more than a political promise; it expresses an intention to shape Israel’s technological-cognitive power as something distinct from the traditional model. If Israel succeeded in exporting security and intelligence equipment, the “next dimension” is the export of technological-cognitive power.
India is a central and highly important partner due to the close ties between the states, the already existing security, economic, and technological cooperation, and India’s capacity for mass production, implementation capabilities, and large number of skilled engineers. Within the framework of technological cooperation, Israel could contribute its technological advantages to product development, while India would contribute its unique capabilities for the mass production of those products.
Historical experience demonstrates that economic cooperation contributes to stability, although there have also been cases in which states maintaining economic cooperation nevertheless descended into conflicts and wars. However, when it comes to technological cooperation, especially with a security dimension, mutual dependence is created and the price of abandonment becomes more costly and dangerous. Technological cooperation, translated into the security sphere in a way that contributes to the security and strengthening of all partners, could become the strong adhesive of the hexagonal architecture through four mechanisms: (1) joint R&D projects; (2) standardization and regulatory compliance agreements; (3) applications for protecting critical infrastructure, including cyber defense, threat detection, and the management of traffic and supply chains; and (4) connections between capital, talent, and markets.
The Importance of the Intercontinental Connection
Netanyahu views the integration and fusion of the six axes into a single conceptual and operational framework as essential. The connection between east and west, between India and Greece and Cyprus through the Middle Eastern intermediary space, carries profound significance, yet at the same time is far from self-evident. India is a giant state, the world’s largest democracy, and a rising Asian power. Greece and Cyprus are small states integrated into the European Union, while the Middle Eastern states are unique in their own way, unlike India, unlike Greece and Cyprus, and even unlike Israel itself.
Although the choice of India as the “anchor” of the Asian dimension in the hexagon holds considerable strategic potential, it also carries inherent limitations, as already noted. India pursues a “multipolar” foreign policy: it maintains deep ties with Iran through the Chabahar port project, with Russia through arms and energy cooperation, and with Arab states through labor remittances and oil. New Delhi’s relations with Iran limit the extent of trust that can be placed in an Indian partnership as “part of a front” against Iran. In this context, the “hexagon” requires a careful definition of security expectations from India and creative thinking regarding patterns of security cooperation.
While India represents the “Indo-Pacific” axis, an enormous power that is not part of an Atlantic alliance and preserves strategic autonomy, Greece and Cyprus represent the “Western” axis: access and orientation toward the European Union, NATO frameworks in the case of Greece, and Mediterranean cooperation. In Netanyahu’s view, Israel should not choose between the two, but rather attempt to serve as the “axis” connecting them.
Special relations with a global power and securing its support have historically constituted a significant pillar in Israel’s national security doctrine. During the state’s early years, France played this role, and after the arms embargo imposed on Israel by French President Charles de Gaulle in 1967, the special relationship between Israel and the United States began to develop. In practice, throughout the years, Israel never truly confronted the dilemma of relying on the United States as its sole axis, since the United States never had a genuine substitute for Israel, even as the international system became multipolar and revisionist actors sought to reshape the world order based on American hegemony. Even now, Israel will not relinquish the American pillar, but in Netanyahu’s conception, the hexagonal architecture constitutes an Israeli attempt to translate global multipolarity into a strategic asset.
Critical Analysis: Between Vision and Reality
Any analysis of the “Hexagon Doctrine” must begin with the question of whether Israel is sufficiently large, influential, and legitimate in the eyes of the potential partners to serve as a connecting “axis.” History teaches that the great “axis states” of history, Britain between the Atlantic and the Empire, Singapore between East and West, succeeded through a combination of geographic position, internal stability, legitimacy, and institutional resources. Israel meets some of these criteria, but not all of them. In addition, it is important to address the gaps between the vision and current geopolitical reality, as well as the internal tensions among the potential partners, stemming from their geopolitical status, their foundational interests, and their very identity and character as states and societies.
The realization of Netanyahu’s vision faces five central challenges:
The First Challenge: Rhetoric Versus Commitment, Institutional Arrangements, and Financing
A governmental speech is a declaration of intent, not an agreement. The vision of the “hexagonal” architecture, as formulated, is not accompanied by sufficient substance or depth to establish a possible framework regarding mutual security, binding economic arrangements, or infrastructural cooperation based on linking the national infrastructures of the different states. The vision remains an abstract idea that has not yet been translated into resilient institutional architecture. Therefore, the essential question before us is not “Is the vision correct?” but rather “What mechanisms will ensure its implementation, and to what extent will the potential partners be committed to realizing the vision?”
In most cases, regional visions fail not at the diplomatic stage but at the financial-regulatory stage. Cross-border infrastructure projects require long-term financing, cost-sharing, state and international guarantees, and insurance against security risks. In the absence of such mechanisms, “architecture” remains merely declarative. Accordingly, the true test of the vision lies in the ability to establish and institutionalize working frameworks that bring together government ministries, regulators, banks and financing institutions, and infrastructure companies, translating strategic objectives into projects with timetables, risk-return metrics, and clearly allocated responsibilities.
The Second Challenge: The Palestinian Arena as a Destabilizing Factor and Obstacle
An Israel that seeks to serve as a “corridor” and “axis” connecting the three continents, Asia, Africa, and Europe, must enjoy internal stability and address the Palestinian dimension, since no regional partner will invest in infrastructure passing through territory whose legal and security status remains disputed. Netanyahu, both in the speech itself and in his broader approach, avoids addressing the Palestinian question and deliberately obscures his intentions regarding the “day after,” whether in the Gaza Strip or regarding the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian arena in general, leaving the issue to the ideological right wing within his government. The deadlock in Gaza, the status quo deteriorating into a war of attrition, and the reality of “smoldering embers” in Judea and Samaria amid the growing weakness of the Palestinian Authority and worsening economic conditions, constitute the “elephant in the room” of the doctrine. The “hexagonal” architecture requires the expansion of the Abraham Accords, with normalization with Saudi Arabia serving as a crucial key for this purpose, yet expanding normalization with Arab states is contingent upon progress on this front.
The Third Challenge: Relations with the United States in a Reality of Conflicting Interests
Personal friendship between Netanyahu and Trump does not eliminate structural tension. The United States seeks “agreed arrangements”: ceasefires, the reconstruction of Gaza, and Lebanese stability. Israel, according to the doctrine, is based on “active deterrence” and the construction of a bypassing alliance. American interests as a global power do not overlap completely with Israeli interests, and in certain cases even contradict them. A prominent example can be found in the imposition of a ceasefire on Israel in Lebanon and in restraining Israel’s responses to severe Hezbollah violations of that ceasefire. Since American backing constitutes a necessary condition for the realization of the hexagonal architecture, coordination and cooperation with the American administration are required. From Washington’s perspective, maintaining a certain degree of Israeli dependence on the United States serves as a means of influence and restraint in cases where Israel might endanger American interests. Israel, by contrast, seeks to hedge risks associated with excessive dependence on a single actor and avoid placing all its eggs in one basket. It seeks to preserve the special relationship with the United States while simultaneously building additional sources of power. The inevitable question in this context is whether Netanyahu’s vision truly aligns with American interests in the region and how broad or significant Netanyahu’s room for maneuver actually is.
The Fourth Challenge: India and Iran, the Limits of the Alliance
India is developing Iran’s Chabahar Port, purchasing Iranian oil, and maintaining open diplomatic channels with Tehran. The formulation “states that see eye to eye regarding reality” is misleading if one assumes that India “sees” the regional reality in the same way Israel does. New Delhi sees Iran as a market and views cooperation with Iran as an interest, alongside seeing Israel as a partner. From India’s perspective as a regional power, geographically closer to Iran than to Israel and dependent on it energetically, this is not necessarily contradictory. Therefore, enlisting India in a shaping initiative of this scale requires a precise mapping of what India can and is willing to contribute to the process and the vision, and finding ways to bridge the inherent tensions between its interests as a regional power and the organizing logic of the “hexagonal” regional system.
The Fifth Challenge: The Center of Gravity of the Hexagonal Architecture
Classical alliances possess a single center of gravity or power that regulates and stabilizes the alliance, such as the United States in the case of NATO. In Netanyahu’s vision of the “hexagonal” architecture, he identifies the Middle East as the hub of the system, the axis connecting the three continents, and Israel as the hub of the hub, but without formal “dominance.” In practice, however, such a structure lacks an agreed and hegemonic center of gravity and therefore constitutes a flexible networked structure. Such a structure may indeed remain stable in the absence of crises, but historical experience demonstrates that flexible alliances of this kind tend to unravel during moments of crisis if they lack institutional commitments anchored in an agreed hegemonic center of gravity. The test of the “hexagonal” architecture will come precisely at those moments.
Greece, Cyprus, and in a different manner India, are “middle powers” in the classical sense: states that are neither superpowers nor marginal actors. Middle powers tend to seek leverage through multilateral cooperation, precisely as this vision proposes. Yet middle powers also strive to preserve maximum autonomy, which limits the depth of commitment that can be expected from them. Saudi Arabia brings with it immense wealth and aspirations to position itself as the leader of the Sunni Arab world, while the United Arab Emirates contributes both wealth and technological advancement alongside ambitions to establish itself as the economic and financial center of gravity of the Gulf and beyond. Israel sees itself as a military and technological power. The multiplicity of actors, agendas, and interests, in the absence of a hegemonic center of gravity, constitutes a complex challenge in the effort to build a stable, harmonious, and functioning architecture.
A possible response to this challenge lies in a minilateralist approach based on the logic of limited yet focused cooperation, enabling partners with differing interests to converge around a shared language of “stability” and “coping with extremism.” Such an approach justifies investment in infrastructure and technology as components of security, not merely as economic goals. However, such a minilateralist framework also carries risks: it may complicate the recruitment of partners who prefer ambiguity and could intensify regional polarization dynamics.
The Bottom Line
Netanyahu’s vision of the “hexagonal” architecture is a strategic vision with impressive internal logic, yet at the same time remains abstract and fraught with implementation challenges. Netanyahu seeks to translate the reality of a multipolar world, Israeli security victories that, although partial rather than absolute, position Israel as a regional military power displaying military determination alongside impressive intelligence and technological capabilities, and India’s rise as a global power, into a regional architecture that would position Israel not as an exception, but as an “axis.” Connecting Greece and Cyprus with India under the same framework is an original, ambitious, and far-sighted move, reflecting an understanding that the new architecture cannot be based solely on the Middle East, but must simultaneously be shaped and managed within Indo-Pacific, European, and African categories.
Netanyahu’s vision can be understood as one based on a “network architecture,” whose central institutional characteristic is the avoidance of a single binding legal commitment, such as a treaty alliance, in favor of an accumulation of coordination frameworks, projects, and cross-sectoral working mechanisms. This model is particularly suited to a region where some actors face domestic political constraints, and therefore cooperation tends to be functional, maritime security, cyber, energy, logistics, rather than declarative. In policy terms, the advantages are flexibility, speed, and the preservation of sovereign and operational autonomy important to the partners, while the disadvantages are the absence of leadership or a center of gravity, the limited resilience of the framework during crises and disputes, and the difficulty of maintaining intergovernmental continuity. Therefore, the key test lies in creating an “institutional routine”: working teams, budgeting, operational standards, and performance metrics.
Yet between vision and implementation there remain substantial gaps: the absence of institutional mechanisms alongside high costs and the lack of guaranteed financing sources; the assumption that Israel can serve as an “axis” without resolving the Palestinian dimension; potential tension with the United States; the specific limitations of partners such as India, which preserves strategic sovereignty, alongside Greece and Cyprus, which seek to maintain autonomy within a European Union orientation; and the multiplicity of agendas, interests, and ambitions among the other partners, all in the absence of an agreed center of gravity and hegemon, something that would weigh heavily on the system’s stability during moments of crisis and dispute.
Accordingly, the true test of the vision will not lie in speeches, but in whether, in the coming years, it gives rise to an architecture with an “institutional skeleton”: written agreements, active coordination mechanisms, and physical infrastructure connecting the partners. Until such a moment, the “hexagonal” architecture remains only a vision with potential, still a strategic aspiration awaiting realization.
