The Trump administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy represents a fundamental shift in how the United States approaches the Middle East, with significant implications for Israel that go far beyond the document’s few explicit mentions of the country. While Israeli officials and the media have expressed concern that Israel is referenced only six times in the strategy, the real story lies not in what the document says about Israel, but in the broader reorientation of American priorities that it signals.
The Deliberate Downgrading of the Middle East
The strategy explicitly states that America seeks to avoid the “forever wars” that have characterized its involvement in the Middle East, while preserving core interests, including ensuring Israel’s security. This represents a delicate balance: maintaining commitments while fundamentally redefining the region’s place in American strategic thinking.
The document declares that the Middle East will no longer dominate US foreign policy in day-to-day planning and execution, portraying this shift as positive, arguing that the region is allegedly less of a constant threat than it once was. For Israel, this is a double-edged sword. While Washington continues to affirm its commitment to Israeli security as a core interest, a reduced American footprint means that Israel may be required to become more self-reliant in managing regional threats.
The “Operation Midnight Hammer” Factor
The strategy argues that Iran has been significantly weakened both by Israeli military actions since October 7, 2023, and by a US operation dubbed “Operation Midnight Hammer” in June 2025, which allegedly struck Iran’s nuclear program. This claim, though not independently verified, provides the strategic rationale for a reduced American military presence in the region. From Israel’s perspective, if accurate, this represents a significant shift in the Iranian threat landscape that could reshape regional dynamics.
However, this optimistic assessment may not align with realities on the ground. Despite claims of regional stability, violence continues on multiple fronts, with ongoing Israeli operations in Gaza, escalating tensions in the West Bank, continued strikes in Lebanon, and expanded military operations in Syria. The disconnect between the strategy’s rosy outlook and conditions on the ground points to either overly optimistic assessments or a deliberate effort to justify strategic disengagement.
Transactional Realism and the Abraham Accords
The strategy’s approach to the Middle East is characterized by what it terms “transactional realism” and “flexible realism”. This means accepting Middle Eastern states and their leaders as they are, without imposing democratic reforms or social change, while pursuing areas of mutual interest. For Israel, this approach has both positive and negative dimensions.
On the positive side, expanding the Abraham Accords remains an explicit priority, with normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia likely high on the agenda. A proposed “Core Five” forum comprising the United States, China, Russia, India, and Japan would initially focus on Middle East security, particularly the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. This suggests that the administration views Israeli–Arab normalization as central to its regional strategy.
On the negative side, the transactional approach means that American support may become more conditional and directly tied to tangible benefits for US interests. Israeli experts note that the government may be required to shift from a model of economic aid toward an emphasis on mutual military cooperation and on demonstrating how Israel serves American interests to appeal to the MAGA base.
The Imperative of Burden Sharing
A central theme running throughout the strategy is burden sharing with allies. While the emphasis is primarily on NATO, this principle extends to all American partnerships. The approach stresses that wealthy and capable states must take primary responsibility for their own regions and contribute far more to collective defense. For Israel, this likely means expectations of greater self-reliance and increased defense spending, even as the country already maintains one of the highest defense budgets in the world as a share of GDP.
The strategy also signals expectations that regional partners will deepen their engagement. It views the Middle East as increasingly becoming both a source and a destination for international investment in industries including nuclear energy, artificial intelligence, and defense technologies. This economic dimension could open new opportunities for Israeli-Arab cooperation while reducing the region’s dependence on direct American involvement.
The Limits of American Intervention
Perhaps most significant for Israel is the strategy’s apparent tilt toward non-interventionism. The document sets a high threshold for what constitutes justified American intervention, anchored in a narrow definition of national interest rather than broad commitments. The administration has made clear that it will not welcome new wars between Israel and its adversaries, whether Hamas, Hezbollah, or Iran.
This creates a new constraint on Israeli military planning. Suppose Israeli leaders contemplate primary operations, whether a campaign to dismantle Hezbollah in Lebanon or a large-scale reentry into densely populated areas of Gaza, they cannot assume automatic American support or protection from international repercussions. There is likely to be little receptivity in Washington to such plans, which would fundamentally alter the strategic calculus that has guided Israeli decision-making for decades.
The Unspoken Tension
Beneath the surface of continued support lies a more complicated reality. Trump’s personal relationship with Prime Minister Netanyahu has been strained, with the former president reportedly frustrated by Netanyahu’s congratulation of Biden after the 2020 election and skeptical about whether Netanyahu genuinely seeks a deal with the Palestinians. This personal dynamic, combined with Trump’s apparent openness to the perspectives of Arab leaders, suggests that Israeli influence in Washington may be less assured than in previous administrations.
Nearly half of Israelis now believe that the United States has more influence over their security decisions than their own government, underscoring concerns about sovereignty and dependence. At the same time, with 69 percent of Israeli weaponry originating from the United States, Israel has limited options if American priorities diverge significantly from its own.
Strategic Implications for Israel
The 2025 National Security Strategy presents Israel with several strategic imperatives:
Greater self-reliance: With reduced American involvement, Israel must enhance its ability to manage regional threats independently while maintaining a qualitative military edge without assuming automatic American intervention.
Diplomatic recalibration: Israel needs to invest more in regional partnerships, particularly through expanding the Abraham Accords, as the United States shifts toward an offshore balancing approach.
Economic reorientation: The move from aid paradigms to investment means Israel should emphasize technological partnerships, joint ventures in artificial intelligence and cybersecurity, and integration into regional economic networks.
Strategic communication: Israeli leaders must more effectively articulate how Israeli actions serve American interests, particularly in countering Iranian influence and preserving regional stability.
Operational constraints: Large-scale military operations will face greater scrutiny and potential American opposition, requiring Israel either to build broader international coalitions or to accept higher diplomatic costs for unilateral action.
The 2025 National Security Strategy does not abandon Israel. It explicitly maintains Israeli security as a core American interest. However, it fundamentally redefines the terms of engagement. The United States is shifting from a posture of deep, day-to-day involvement in Middle Eastern affairs to one of selective engagement driven by narrowly defined national interests.
For Israel, this transition calls for adaptation rather than alarm. The country has built formidable military capabilities and cultivated new regional relationships that position it well for an era of reduced American presence. At the same time, the shift also requires recognition that American support, while continuing, will be more conditional, more transactional, and more explicitly tied to demonstrable benefits for American interests. The era of unconditional commitment, if it ever truly existed, has decisively ended.
The real test will come not in what the strategy says but in how it is implemented, whether in response to future Iranian provocations, escalation with Hezbollah, or crises in the Israeli-Palestinian arena. The document provides a framework, but the details of US-Israel relations will be written in responses to challenges yet to come.
