On April 26 in Ramallah, following the PLO Central Council’s meeting two days earlier, the organization’s Executive Committee approved the appointment of Hussein Shahada Muhammad al-Sheikh as Deputy to Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), who serves as Chairman of the Executive Committee and President of the State of Palestine. Before this new role, al-Sheikh served as Minister of Civil Affairs for the Palestinian Authority and Secretary-General of the Executive Committee (his successor as Secretary-General will be selected on May 3). He is also a member of Fatah’s Central Committee.
Hussein al-Sheikh was born in 1960 in Ramallah. At the age of 18, he was sentenced by an Israeli military court to prison on charges of involvement in terrorist activity. He served nearly 11 years in an Israeli jail, until his release in 1989, two years after the outbreak of the First Intifada. After holding various positions within the Fatah movement, he was appointed 2007 as head of the General Authority of Civil Affairs with ministerial status. In this role, he became responsible for ongoing civil relations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. Al-Sheikh’s ties with Israeli counterparts granted him status and power within the Palestinian system, mainly due to the Palestinians’ heavy dependence on Israel.
Al-Sheikh was first elected to Fatah’s Central Committee in 2008, but today, he enjoys little popularity or public support among Palestinians. In recent years, he has gained Abbas’s trust and appears to be accepted by both Israel and the United States. As a result, his status has been solidified as a potential leadership candidate in the post-Abbas Palestinian arena.
In recent years, al-Sheikh has been considered Abbas’s loyal confidant and trusted associate. He regularly accompanies the PA President in meetings at his Ramallah office and abroad with Arab and international leaders. Al-Sheikh is considered one of the wealthiest individuals in the Palestinian Authority, having amassed his fortune, among other means, through ownership of several Palestinian quarries, convenience stores, and gas stations. He also owns a spacious villa in the city of Jericho.
To cement his position on the Palestinian political scene and gain recognition, especially from the U.S. administration, as a potential successor to Mahmoud Abbas, al-Sheikh visited Washington in October 2022. During this visit, he met with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman. This visit was particularly significant, as it was the first by a senior PA official to the U.S. in five years.
Abbas’s decision to appoint al-Sheikh as Deputy Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee may eventually prove to be meaningful and forward-looking, potentially decisive in the future contest over the Palestinian Authority’s leadership.
Far from National Consensus
In my role as an advisor to Defense Ministers on Arab affairs, we maintained ongoing working relations with al-Sheikh and met with him from time to time. Conversations with him were generally conducted in an open and businesslike manner. I clearly remember statements he made to the media in which he criticized Israel’s positions regarding the Palestinians, claiming that “there is no partner on the Israeli side for the peace process,” and even referred to his meetings with Israeli officials as “negotiations with the enemy.” Recently, his name has been associated with corruption and sexual harassment scandals.
Al-Sheikh’s appointment as Deputy Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee was not a consensus-based or uncontested move within the Palestinian system. It was accompanied by fierce debate within Fatah’s leadership. The appointment was received with strong disapproval from senior members of the movement who see themselves as natural successors to Abbas, particularly Jibril Rajoub, Mahmoud al-Aloul (Abbas’s deputy as Fatah Chairman), and Tawfiq Tirawi. In contrast, General Majed Faraj, head of the General Intelligence Service, is now considered close and allied with al-Sheikh, even though he was previously identified as a rival and potential competitor for Palestinian leadership.
Other Palestinian factions, especially the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, also opposed the appointment. Additionally, the move drew harsh criticism from Hamas. In a statement released to the media, the terror organization rejected al-Sheikh’s appointment, calling it “a disgraceful step, far removed from national consensus and the will of the Palestinian people.” Hamas further stated in its announcement that the decision “reflects the Executive Committee’s insistence on paralyzing its institutions, rather than serving as a comprehensive umbrella for our people’s struggle and its vibrant forces.”
Moreover, Hamas emphasized that “our Palestinian people’s top priority is to end the aggression, genocide, and starvation campaign, and to unite efforts to confront Israel and the settlements—not to divide roles and the power pie to appease foreign elements.” The statement concluded with a call for the Palestinian factions “to reject the decision and adhere to rebuilding the PLO on democratic foundations, far from dictates and a patronizing approach.” Furthermore, as part of its opposition to the appointment, Hamas launched a campaign against al-Sheikh, during which it released a recording of him criticizing and even cursing Abbas. Al-Sheikh, for his part, accused Hamas of fabricating the recording, and a similar statement was issued from Abbas’s office.
The International Community Embraces
Abbas’s decision to appoint Al-Sheikh as his deputy came following heavy Arab pressure, primarily from Saudi Arabia, to name a successor. This pressure peaked during the Arab League Summit held in Riyadh at the end of February 2025. According to reports in Arab media, Abbas initially attempted a meaningless, purely formal maneuver, proposing the creation of a deputy position to the Chairman of the Executive Committee without specifying who would fill the role. Ultimately, however, Abbas was forced to comply due to mounting pressure.
On Saturday, April 26, immediately after his appointment as Deputy Chairman of the Executive Committee, Al-Sheikh received congratulatory phone calls from foreign ministers of Arab states and countries in the international community. Among them was Egypt’s Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Atty, who emphasized the centrality of the Palestinian issue to Egypt and clarified that “there will be no peace or stability without a just solution.”
The minister also pointed to Egypt’s continued efforts to stabilize the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and promote a political process that would lead to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict “by international legitimacy resolutions, and in a manner that guarantees the establishment of an independent Palestinian state along the June 4, 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.”
The Saudi Foreign Ministry, on behalf of the Kingdom, praised the reforms undertaken by the Palestinian leadership, including the creation of the new role of Deputy Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee and the appointment of Al-Sheikh to the position. Media outlets reported that Al-Sheikh also received a congratulatory phone call from Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who praised his appointment and emphasized “the depth of relations between Turkey and Palestine and his country’s support for the national rights of the Palestinian people, foremost among them the establishment of an independent Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.”
It is still too early to determine whether Al-Sheikh’s appointment as Deputy Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee constitutes a final stamp that cements his status as the likely future leader of the Palestinian Authority in the post-Abbas era. However, there is no doubt that the appointment grants him a significant advantage and increases his chances, especially if he uses the remaining time of Abbas’s tenure to strengthen further his standing within the Authority and among the Palestinian public.
The Day After Abbas
From my recent conversations with key Palestinian Authority officials in Ramallah, a clear impression emerges that the prevailing assessment in the Palestinian arena is that the appointment does not necessarily cement Al-Sheikh’s position as Abbas’s definitive successor. They emphasized that alongside Al-Sheikh, other senior Fatah figures aspire to the role; therefore, it is not inconceivable that another candidate may ultimately be chosen.
Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) is among the founding generation of Fatah and has, since the death of Yasser Arafat in Paris in November 2004, effectively held the three most critical positions in the Palestinian leadership: President of the Authority, Chairman of the Executive Committee, and Chairman of Fatah—the largest and most dominant faction operating under the organizational umbrella of the PLO. He was elected President of the Palestinian Authority in January 2005 and has served continuously without new elections as required. All three leadership roles have granted Abbas an unchallenged status and significant power and authority.
Therefore, whoever serves as his deputy, especially at this moment in time, as Abbas nears his 90th year (born in Safed, November 1935), is expected to enjoy a significant advantage over other contenders for leadership, particularly if he uses the time wisely to solidify his political and public position. Should he do so, his chances of ultimately emerging as the next leader of the Palestinian Authority will increase considerably.
In the past, a scenario was not ruled out in which, following the Abbas era, and to prevent a power struggle among contenders that could become violent, three different individuals would be appointed for a limited period to the three key leadership roles at the top of the Palestinian hierarchy: President of the Palestinian Authority, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, and Chairman of Fatah.
