The conception developed and adopted within Aman regarding Hamas—before the terror attack carried out by the organization on October 7, 2023, which claimed the lives of 1,200 Israelis—had a significant impact on Israel’s decision to refrain from viewing Hamas as an existential threat and to avoid dismantling its military and governmental capabilities in the Gaza Strip. Despite knowing about Hamas’ military buildup and operational plans to invade Israel, Aman assessed that Hamas was not only deterred and uninterested in war with Israel but also seeking a path to reconciliation. The capabilities of Hamas to launch a large-scale, coordinated attack involving thousands of fighters infiltrating Israel were underestimated. Based on this conception, and to focus on what were perceived as more pressing security challenges, such as Iran’s nuclear program and Hezbollah’s precision missile project—both defined as existential threats—Israel opted against decisive action to dismantle Hamas.
Former IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi (2019–2023) candidly acknowledged several months after the Hamas attack, the conception and conduct of the military echelon regarding Hamas:
“I must admit, we did not perceive the Gaza Strip and Hamas as an existential threat. The strategy in the field was to concentrate on Iran and the northern arena while doing everything possible to calm other areas: Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip.”
Assumption 1: Hamas is Deterred from War and Seeks Reconciliation
The conception that Hamas was deterred from war and preferred to pursue reconciliation solidified primarily during Aviv Kochavi’s tenure as IDF Chief of Staff. In fact, during his earlier term as head of Aman (2010–2014), Kochavi spearheaded this conception of Hamas and convinced the political leadership that Hamas was deterred and that Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’ leader in the Gaza Strip, prioritized the welfare of Gaza’s residents over warfare. Even though this assumption collapsed during the 2014 Gaza War (Operation Protective Edge), when Hamas escalated the conflict unexpectedly, the perception within Aman and the IDF did not fundamentally change afterward.
Kochavi’s successor in Aman, Herzi Halevi—who later succeeded him as Chief of Staff—also adhered to the conception that Hamas was deterred and uninterested in conflict with Israel. He believed the goal should be to limit Hamas’ military buildup and improve the economic situation in Gaza to prevent religious extremism and terrorism. In 2017, when Aman’s control department attempted to challenge the prevailing view by drafting a document outlining a scenario where Hamas forces breached the border fence and captured five Israeli communities and military posts, Aman treated the assessment skeptically. They argued that even if Hamas had plans, they had neither intended nor were they prepared to implement them.
Brigadier General Saar: Hamas Prioritizes Economic Concerns
Major General Tamir Heyman, head of Military Intelligence (Aman) from 2018 to 2021, shared a similar perception of Hamas. In June 2019, he stated, “Hamas is highly deterred from war; it has no interest in engaging in one, and the organization is deeply committed to remaining on the path of reconciliation.” Heyman also noted that Hamas increasingly bore “sovereign responsibilities that create tensions within its identity between being a resistance organization and a governing authority responsible for the sewage system in Gaza.” In an interview in August 2022, after his release from the IDF, Heyman elaborated on his view of Hamas, which effectively illustrated the prevailing Aman conception regarding the Palestinian terror organization:
“The security establishment found itself in a complex reality without a comprehensive strategy for the Palestinian arena. Simultaneously, it couldn’t ignore the realities on the ground or remain paralyzed. Therefore, since the political leadership opted to ‘manage the conflict’ and postpone any decisive resolutions regarding the Palestinian arena, the security system had to address Gaza separately and pursue a ‘reconciliation’ approach with Hamas.”
Explaining Hamas’ behavior, Heyman likened the organization to a bachelor who ousted his nagging landlord (the Palestinian Authority) and suddenly found himself responsible for running the household. Over time, responsibility began generating daily concerns, resulting in a less daring approach than its earlier resistance phase. Heyman described Hamas as undergoing an evolutionary process toward institutionalization, similar to other terror organizations. However, he emphasized that Hamas had not fully completed this process and remained a terror organization prone to bursts of chaos and violence.
Heyman highlighted that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and its leadership were acutely aware of Gaza’s dire state. This awareness motivated them to seek reconciliation with Israel to address the needs of the local population—two million people in a densely packed 360 square kilometers with high unemployment and severe social challenges. Heyman believed the recognition of Gaza as a “pressure cooker” created a mutual interest between Israel and Hamas: Israel would not directly fund Hamas, but in exchange for absolute calm, it would allow Qatari funds to address Gaza’s fundamental issues. These included aid for residents, infrastructure improvements in water and electricity, and salaries for government officials. Acknowledging Hamas’ ongoing military buildup, Heyman argued that reconciliation was in Israel’s interest, as it ensured both legal responsibility for Gaza and security for the communities in southern Israel.
Aman’s perspective on Hamas was further demonstrated by Brigadier General Amit Saar, Aman’s incoming head of the Research Division and a leading expert on the Palestinian arena. In a July 2020 interview, Saar stated that Hamas was deterred and that economic concerns in Gaza were its primary focus:
“Hamas has no interest in confronting Israel. It is deterred. What concerns it most is the economic situation in Gaza. The state’s component in Hamas’ identity is growing stronger. Since 2007 (when Hamas violently took control of Gaza and ousted the Palestinian Authority), it has also acquired the identity of Gaza’s governing authority, and it is judged on this daily. The primary factor shaping Hamas’ reality is the economy, the first thing its leaders and public wake up to in the morning and the last thing they think about at night.”
According to Saar, unlike other totalitarian leaders in the Arab world, Hamas’ leaders are concerned about the public’s plight. Thus, Hamas communicates with Israel through limited violence, such as border fence confrontations and incendiary balloons. When Hamas perceives Gaza’s economy as choked and nearing collapse, it signals Israel through controlled violence, demonstrating its desire for reconciliation. However, Hamas still aspires to destroy Israel. For now, it focuses on significantly improving life in Gaza and seeks reconciliation with Israel in exchange for calm. Like Heyman, Saar believed that Israel and Hamas shared a mutual interest in enhancing Gaza’s living conditions and that Israel should ensure Hamas has something to lose, leveraging economic factors to maintain calm:
“As long as Hamas feels there is progress—projects, international funds—it will endure. If it senses no progress or perceives deceit, it will signal. As long as Hamas sees a chance for reconciliation and conditions for it, it is interested in maintaining calm. Meanwhile, it survives, and survival is sufficient for now.”
Despite his view that Hamas was deterred and sought reconciliation, Saar was acutely aware of Hamas’ vigorous military buildup and uncompromising ideology to destroy Israel:
“Hamas has a clear hierarchy. At its base lies its ideology. Above that is its military buildup. Higher still is its vision for a Palestinian state in Gaza, and at the top is the use of force. Hamas is willing to negotiate the use of force and, to some extent, its statehood project. However, it will not compromise on its military buildup or ideology. In the long run, Hamas believes it will prevail, wearing Israel down over successive rounds of conflict until Israel disappears from the map. Hamas has four objectives: to surprise us, paralyze our citizens, embarrass us, and make us pay a very high price if we confront it.”
Regarding Operation Protective Edge and the perception of Hamas’ deterrence, Saar argued that strategic clarity between Israel and Hamas was lacking at the time. Now, both sides understand each other better, enabling improved risk management. Saar concluded that while Hamas is highly deterred, despair cannot be deterred. Reflecting Heyman’s and his predecessors’ views, Aman’s equation seemed that preventing despair and bolstering deterrence required economic improvements for both Hamas and Gaza.
Major General Haliva: Five Years of Complete Calm
Despite assessments that Hamas was deterred and uninterested in war, the May 2021 conflict (“Operation Guardian of the Walls”) proved otherwise, as Hamas launched rockets toward Jerusalem, surprising Aman and the IDF. Although Hamas was severely battered during the operation, the IDF’s objective was not to topple Hamas’ rule in Gaza but to reshape the deterrence equation. Following the operation, the IDF—particularly Aman—was confident that Hamas had received the message and was now deterred by Israel. Tamir Heyman stated that “Operation Guardian of the Walls created a balance of losses for Hamas that cooled its enthusiasm for engaging in another campaign against Israel. It won’t last forever, but it buys us more time.” At the same time, Aman emphasized its improved operational capabilities to severely damage terror organizations if necessary, citing increased precision and intelligence that enhanced combat effectiveness.
Heyman’s successor, Major General Aharon Haliva, was even more assertive about Hamas’ deterrence after the operation:
“I believe we can achieve five years of complete calm with Gaza.”
Haliva supported reconciliation efforts with Hamas as a means of maintaining calm along the border and improving the welfare of Gaza’s residents:
“…If the approach to Gaza isn’t fundamentally changed, up to the point of reoccupying it, then reconciliation with our enemies is inevitable. With an enemy, you make certain kinds of agreements… Ultimately, we must care for the two million people living there.”
Although he supported reconciliation, Haliva acknowledged that it wouldn’t prevent Hamas’ military buildup:
“There’s no connection between reconciliation and armament. The enemy arms itself, regardless, even during combat. There must either be reconciliation or reoccupation of Gaza. Hamas needs to understand that choosing calm is beneficial. The condition must be calm and a reduction in armament. Guardian of the Walls created excellent conditions for Israel to achieve this.”
In September 2022, Haliva reiterated his assessment, stating that he expected calm with Hamas to last for five years and identifying a stabilizing economic process in Gaza with the potential for prolonged peace.
Assumption 2: Hamas Cannot and Will Not Penetrate Israeli Territory
Before Operation Guardian of the Walls, the IDF and Aman believed that Hamas could harm Israel primarily through rocket fire and underground tunnel infiltrations. However, the construction of the barrier between Israel and the Gaza Strip reinforced Aman’s and the IDF’s conception that Hamas was deterred. It added a new layer of confidence: Hamas would not be capable of invading Israel. Completed in December 2021 for 22 billion shekels ($6 billion), the underground barrier, dubbed by then-Defense Minister Benny Gantz as an “iron wall between Gaza and Israel,” laid the groundwork for believing that Gaza-based infiltration was impossible.
The barrier’s construction was part of a defensive strategy formulated under IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi, with Southern Command Chief Herzi Halevi leading its implementation. Recognizing that Hamas and Hezbollah were planning ground offensives aimed at causing destruction, taking hostages, and generating psychological impact, Halevi advocated for a defensive infrastructure to both stop and deter potential attacks. According to the subjective perception of senior IDF officials, establishing the barrier significantly increased Hamas’ deterrence. Chief of Staff Kochavi and incoming Aman Chief Aharon Haliva—then completing his term as Head of IDF Operations—believed that the barrier and the surrounding security fence deprived Hamas of the ability to invade Israel.
This assumption led to a decision to scale back intelligence collection on Hamas’ tactical network and its mid-level military leadership. Instead, intelligence efforts focused on indirect fire capabilities and anti-tank squads, such as locating rocket launchers, munitions, and launch sites. These were seen as Hamas’ primary remaining tools for waging war against Israel.
In parallel with the assumption that Hamas was deterred and incapable of invading Israel, the IDF and Aman were aware of Hamas’ invasion plans, which centered on a large-scale incursion into Israeli territory, targeting nearby communities for mass killings and hostage-taking. However, it was assessed that there was a significant gap between Hamas’ ambitious plans and its ability to execute them. At most, a limited raid or escalation akin to Guardian of the Walls in May 2021 was anticipated. Aman and the IDF did not recognize that Hamas was closing the gap between its plans and operational capabilities. By November 2022, the assessment remained that although Hamas had prepared a special force of 3,000 fighters for an attack, its operational capabilities would limit it to deploying no more than 70 fighters at a time.
Letters from the Head of the Research Division to the Prime Minister: Was There a Warning of War?
Despite Aman’s conception that Hamas was deterred and inclined toward reconciliation with Israel, Aman issued general warnings to the political echelon about the potential for escalation in light of Israel’s socio-political crisis related to judicial reform. Brigadier General Amit Saar, head of Aman’s Research Division, warned Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu twice during 2023 that the political and social crisis was encouraging Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas to take risks against Israel.
In the first warning, dated March 19, Saar wrote:
“All players in the system indicate that Israel is in a severe, unprecedented crisis threatening its cohesion and weakening it. For our main enemies—Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas—this weakness reflects a linear process leading to Israel’s collapse. The current situation is seen as an opportunity to deepen its vulnerabilities.”
He further noted:
“There is a recognized opportunity to create a perfect storm—internal crisis, widespread escalation in the Palestinian arena, and challenges from additional fronts, creating multidimensional and sustained pressure. This perception underpins Hamas’ high motivation to carry out attacks, particularly from the north, and also drives Iran to encourage its proxies to advance attacks against Israel.”
In a second letter to Netanyahu, dated July 16, Saar wrote:
“The worsening crisis deepens the erosion of Israel’s image, exacerbates its deterrence vulnerabilities, and increases the likelihood of escalation. Initially, regional actors debated whether this was another round in an ongoing political crisis. Over time, as events worsened, they assessed it as a deep crisis marking one of Israel’s weakest points since its founding.”
Saar emphasized that this assessment was not only public but also reflected in closed-door strategic discussions among Israel’s adversaries, particularly in Iran, Lebanon, and Gaza. For these adversaries, especially the Iranian regime and Hezbollah, this was not merely an assessment but a confirmation of their worldview: Israel is an “illegitimate, weak, and fragmented society destined to disappear.” Saar also warned that this perception eroded three pillars of Israel’s deterrence: the alliance with the U.S., societal cohesion, and the IDF’s strength. He concluded that these combined crises were leading adversaries to believe Israel was unlikely to undertake significant military initiatives, including strikes against Iran, operations in Lebanon, or decisive action against Hamas in Gaza.
In this context, the critical question arises: If the head of Aman’s Research Division conveyed to the Prime Minister that Israel’s enemies were seizing an opportunity to harm it and even highlighted that Hezbollah posed the most immediate threat, why did Aman and the IDF continue to adhere to the conception that Hamas was deterred and uninterested in war? Could it have been Aman’s “Western” thinking—that Hamas sought Gaza’s economic welfare and had too much to lose in a confrontation—that led to this conceptual failure? After all, Aman acknowledged that in Hamas’ strategic hierarchy, the ideology of destroying Israel and military buildup took precedence over establishing a Palestinian state in Gaza.
Notably, even as Hamas escalated violence in mid-2023 through attempts to inflame the West Bank while distancing Gaza from direct involvement, Israel continued its reconciliation efforts with Hamas. Thousands of workers entered Israel daily, goods moved in and out of Gaza, and materials for reconstruction were supplied. A similar pattern was observed in 2022 amid a wave of Palestinian terror. Aman and the IDF presented assessments that the attacks were carried out by “lone wolves” and not directed by Hamas, which was “highly deterred from war with Israel.”
Even as in the lead-up to October 7, 2023, Israel’s enemies signaled weakness, Aman and the broader security apparatus maintained their belief in Hamas’ deterrence. Similar to the failures of the Yom Kippur War fifty years earlier, Aman exhibited conceptual blindness. These signs failed to challenge Aman’s assumptions even when clear indicators suggested Hamas was preparing for an attack. In the days leading up to the October 7 attack, Aman assured the political echelon that Hamas was uninterested in escalation. Even on the night of the attack, as the IDF and Shin Bet identified a sequence of warning signs, Aman Chief Aharon Haliva—absent from a key conference call between the Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, Southern Command Chief Yaron Finkelman, and Operations Directorate Chief Oded Basiuk—believed the signals indicated a Hamas exercise, not preparations for an assault.
Who is Responsible for the Conception?
Despite claims that the conception of Hamas as deterred was formulated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the political leadership immediately after Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014 for political considerations—and subsequently adopted by Aman and the IDF—the fact remains that as early as the conclusion of Operation Cast Lead (December 2008–January 2009), during the twilight of Ehud Olmert’s government, then-Aman Chief Amos Yadlin declared that Hamas was deterred. He stated that Operation Cast Lead had “strengthened Israel’s deterrence.”
In practice, nearly every time the IDF struck Hamas hard—whether during a short round, such as Operation Closed Garden in May 2019, which lasted two days, or during a prolonged campaign, such as Operation Protective Edge, which lasted 51 days—Aman assessed that Hamas had learned its lesson and was deterred. Even if Netanyahu’s political leadership sought to maintain the division between the West Bank, led by the Palestinian Authority and Fatah, and the Gaza Strip, led by Hamas, to prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian state (a claim disputed by some, citing Netanyahu’s failed attempts to reach a permanent agreement with Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, mainly due to Abbas’ rejectionist policies), the argument that Aman was “steered” into formulating a conception favorable to the political leadership appears unfounded.
Aman, regarded as one of the most respected intelligence organizations in the world, operates independently and professionally, relying on extensive intelligence data. It is not designed to cater to the political echelon. Simply put, Aman mistakenly believed that Hamas was deterred, a mistake that came at a high cost to the State of Israel.