The Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria, under the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), is undergoing a period of transition and approaching a new stage in its development. This stage could last for an extended period and be accompanied by power struggles and confrontations, including violent ones.
Since the Palestinian Authority was established as part of the Oslo process, which launched political negotiations between Israel and the PLO, following the signing at the White House in Washington of the “Declaration of Principles” in September 1993, pursuant to the “Cairo Agreement” (also known as the “Gaza-Jericho First Agreement”), signed by the parties in the Egyptian capital in May 1994.
The recently reached agreement between the United States and Hamas on a “roadmap” for implementing the second phase of the arrangements for the situation in the Gaza Strip, following the “Swords of Iron” war, as reflected in President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan, continues to push developments in the Palestinian Authority into the background. Indeed, the arrangements now being discussed regarding the future of the Gaza Strip do not treat the Palestinian Authority under Abbas as a central, active and relevant partner, or as an actor with a significant and important role. Far from it! They are pushing the Palestinian Authority to the sidelines, something that is particularly evident in the fact that, at the same time, they incorporate regional actors, international parties and prominent Palestinian figures, most notably Mohammed Dahlan, who was expelled from Fatah after being accused of attempting to oust Abbas from office. As a result, a reality is taking shape on the ground in which Judea and Samaria is not merely a tense security arena, but also a focal point in the struggle over the future of the entire Palestinian political system.
The current situation in the Palestinian Authority is therefore the product of several major political and security processes that feed into one another: continuing and even intensifying violent clashes, almost on a daily basis, at longstanding flashpoints between settlers and Palestinians, which periodically claim lives on both sides, including in response to the expansion of Israeli control through the establishment of new outposts in the area; the continued activity of IDF forces in efforts to thwart and prevent terrorist attacks in cities and refugee camps; the worsening economic situation in Palestinian Authority territory; and an increasingly intense struggle within Fatah over Palestinian leadership in the era after Mahmoud Abbas, who will turn 91 this coming November (born in 1935).
Accustomed to One-Way Terrorism
Yet in recent months, there has been a noticeable escalation in violent incidents by settlers against Palestinians, involving damage to their property, homes, vehicles, land and agricultural assets. The main flashpoints include the Nablus area, southern Mount Hebron, the Jordan Valley, the Ramallah area, and villages located near outposts or major traffic routes. These events are significant not only because of their number, but also because of their cumulative effect and their impact on the ground. In conversations I held with Palestinians from Judea and Samaria, they complained that farmers are afraid to work their fields, families are avoiding construction or development and maintenance work in their villages, children are changing their walking routes, and local businesses are being affected when acts of violence lead to changes in patterns of daily life. This is taking place amid a prolonged sequence of threats and actual acts of violence, including the placement of roadblocks to make it difficult, delay and even prevent Palestinian movement; incursions into agricultural areas; damage to olive trees; and the establishment of new outposts. This is a new reality for them, after years in which they had become accustomed to being the only ones carrying out attacks.
It is important to note that human rights organizations and international actors, for their part, are exploiting this reality to create a symmetry between “Jewish terrorism” and the terrorism to which we have been accustomed for decades. It is clear that this situation is creating pressure on the Palestinian Authority, which helps explain, for example, the incident in which a settler, reserve soldier and resident of Gush Talmonim, Shlomo Rosenthal, was detained by the Palestinian police on August 23, 2026, in the Binyamin area.
Rosenthal was traveling along the Ma’ozim route, near Beitunia, when he encountered a roadblock manned by Palestinian police officers. According to him, the officers tried to take his weapon, beat him severely and injured his face, sprayed him with pepper spray, handcuffed him, and took his weapon, phone and car keys. He was taken in the direction of Ramallah, and only after several hours was he returned to IDF custody through the coordination mechanisms.
Initially, the security establishment claimed that he had entered the Ein ’Arik area in Area A and had been “rescued.” However, following an IDF investigation, it was determined that the Palestinian roadblock had in fact been set up in Area C and that the Palestinian police officers had no authority to detain him there. According to him, a Palestinian crowd was involved in the incident and attempted to vent its anger on him. This case is undoubtedly a product of the new reality from the Palestinians’ perspective.
Under these circumstances, Palestinians living in Judea and Samaria told me that the difficult living conditions are reflected in the pressure exerted by IDF forces and settlers, which is pushing them to leave the area and emigrate to other places. Specifically, they emphasized that a decision in this direction is being made by Palestinians of their own free will, given living conditions that place them in real danger to their lives, while the process is moving in one direction and continuing to escalate.
From the Palestinian perspective, the trends of escalation on the ground are not developing in a political vacuum. Palestinian sources with whom I spoke believe that as Israel’s political system approaches the date of the Knesset elections (October 27, 2026), political confrontation among parties representing the political right in Israel, particularly the national and Religious Zionist camps, is intensifying. They told me that parties and ministers associated with the settlement enterprise are seeking tangible achievements: expanding construction, legalizing outposts, strengthening control over the territory, and toughening policy toward the Palestinians. In their assessment, in such an atmosphere, any step aimed at restraining the settlers could be perceived as a concession or a sign of weakness. According to them, a situation is developing on the ground in which the enforcement of law and order by Israeli security forces, namely the military and police, is in practice quite limited. At the same time, the messages conveyed by the political leadership are more tolerant toward the settlers, and the political cost the Israeli government pays in confrontations with extremist activists in the settlements is higher from its perspective. Under these circumstances, a growing perception is taking hold on the Palestinian side that settler activity is not an exception to government policy, but an integral part of it, and that it is effectively granted a considerable degree of immunity and authorization to continue and escalate.
IDF Operations and Residents’ Frustration
Meanwhile, the IDF continues to operate almost on a daily basis with the aim of thwarting and preventing terrorist attacks in various areas of Judea and Samaria, with an emphasis on Jenin, Tulkarm, Nablus, Qalqilya, and other areas. These operations include arrests, raids and searches, the seizure of weapons and other means of combat, the demolition of infrastructure, and, at times, airstrikes. From the Israeli perspective, the purpose behind these operations is, of course, to prevent the emergence of independent Palestinian armed infrastructures, particularly in northern Judea and Samaria, and to carry out preventive operations based on intelligence, with a forward-looking approach aimed at thwarting attacks against Israeli targets. The assumption within the security establishment is that if these groups are allowed to organize in advance, receive funding and enjoy freedom of action, they could eventually develop into more institutionalized, complex and sophisticated military frameworks.
It is important to note that the Palestinian Authority is currently perceived by significant segments of the Palestinian public as incapable of providing residents with the protection expected of it, preventing IDF forces from entering to carry out operational missions using a broad range of means, or curbing provocative activity and violent attacks by settlers. From the Palestinian perspective, this creates a clear contradiction: Israel wants the Palestinian Authority to assist it in maintaining security and stability in the area, yet in practice, its actions on the ground דווקא weaken its legitimacy as well as the PA’s operational capabilities.
The Day After Mahmoud Abbas
The most sensitive issue currently on the Palestinian scene concerns the question of succession at the end of the Mahmoud Abbas era as president of the Palestinian Authority. In recent years, Abbas has become a “lame duck,” someone whose future is behind him, and the author of this article has encountered assessments to this effect, including, to put it mildly, unflattering remarks from many Palestinians, particularly those holding official positions, including senior figures in the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah. It should be noted that Abbas was elected president of the Palestinian Authority in elections held in January 2005, several months after the death of his predecessor, Yasser Arafat, in November 2004, while receiving medical treatment at a hospital in Paris. Today, Abbas effectively holds all three key positions at the top of the Palestinian leadership: president of the Palestinian Authority, head of the PLO (chairman of the PLO Executive Committee), and head of Fatah, the largest and most dominant movement among the Palestinian factions operating under the PLO umbrella. In this way, Abbas holds the main centers of power in his hands and functions in practice as the sole and absolute ruler. However, as time passes, the struggle over the question of succession following the end of the Abbas era is intensifying, as is the question of how the baton will actually be passed to the person chosen to succeed him.
The Eighth Fatah Conference, which convened from May 14 to 16, 2026, under Mahmoud Abbas, at four locations: Ramallah, Gaza, Cairo and Beirut, was intended to renew the movement’s institutions, present a united leadership and lay the groundwork for the next stage. In practice, however, it failed to put an end to all the rivalries or eliminate them. Quite the opposite. It demonstrated just how deeply the internal system within Fatah is characterized by divisions between rival camps, saturated with conflicting personal interests and security, organizational and economic centers of power seeking to advance their particular interests.
Under these circumstances, President Abbas’s central initiative at this time, at least officially and publicly, is to hold elections for the Legislative Council, the Palestinian parliament, which are scheduled to take place on November 28, 2026, and elections for the presidency of the Palestinian Authority in early 2027. According to a statement issued by Abbas on the matter, the elections will take place in Judea and Samaria, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. According to information received by the author from Palestinian sources, Abbas decided to hold the elections following pressure exerted on him by Arab states, particularly Egypt and Jordan, as well as by actors in the international community, especially the European Union. These actors, for their part, emphasized the need to advance tangible and visible reforms and democratization measures within the Palestinian arena.
From Mahmoud Abbas to Yasser
Within Fatah, an assessment has become increasingly prevalent in recent months that Mahmoud Abbas is seeking to pave the way for his son Yasser to assume a central role in the upper echelons of the Palestinian leadership, and even to succeed him as president of the Palestinian Authority. It should be stated immediately: in an examination conducted by the author with accessible senior Palestinian officials, he found no evidence that Abbas has made a deliberate, explicit and direct decision to transfer power to his son. At the same time, Yasser’s advancement within the movement in itself constitutes a sufficient move, with a low threshold for provoking opposition, particularly because the Palestinian system does not operate according to a binding, clear and agreed constitutional mechanism of succession. Nevertheless, Yasser’s election as a member of Fatah’s Central Committee undoubtedly represents an important stage in his path toward advancement within the Palestinian leadership. This has prompted open criticism from Palestinian political and academic circles, which viewed it as a clear indication of what they described as “the inheritance of power within the family.”
Yasser Abbas is 64 and is known primarily as a businessman. He owns companies operating in the tobacco and construction sectors in the Palestinian territories. He previously lived permanently in Canada, before gaining a foothold in the Palestinian political system in recent years. His standing within the Palestinian system has grown steadily in recent years, particularly after accompanying his father on several official visits abroad, mainly to Moscow and Cairo in 2025, where he participated in meetings with Presidents Vladimir Putin and Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, respectively. Last year, Abbas appointed him to head the PLO’s Lebanon Affairs Department, which was tasked with overseeing the transfer of weapons from Palestinian factions to the Lebanese army.
Reports published in the media have previously stated that Yasser Abbas and his brother Tareq have, over the years, been the subject of widespread allegations concerning the use of public funds to support their economic activities and promote commercial monopolies in Judea and Samaria. In this context, the media quoted Tahani Mustafa, a researcher at King’s College London, as saying that Abbas “is trying to push his son into a very senior position within Fatah, as well as in Palestinian political life.” She noted that many view the move as an attempt by Mahmoud Abbas to consolidate his power by surrounding himself with a circle of loyalists and legitimizing moves and arrangements that he seeks to establish at the top of the leadership. It is reasonable to assume that Abbas’s rivals will fear not only the possibility that his son could become president, but also a “more moderate” scenario in which he does not reach the pinnacle of the Palestinian leadership, but is nevertheless able to influence appointments, resources, business connections and the political system from behind the scenes.
The concern over the realization of hereditary succession within the Palestinian governing system is particularly damaging to Fatah, which presents itself as a national liberation movement rather than an organization based on family ties, loyalty and affiliation, in which power passes from father to son as in a monarchical-dynastic regime.
Several figures currently stand out within the Fatah leadership as contenders for succession at the end of the Mahmoud Abbas era: Hussein al-Sheikh, secretary-general of the PLO Executive Committee and vice president of the Palestinian Authority, who maintains extensive ties with actors in the international arena and within Israel’s political system and is positioned at the heart of the official Palestinian establishment; Jibril Rajoub, chairman of the Palestinian Football Association, who has a strong organizational base, extensive security experience and clear ambitions to attain a leadership position; Mahmoud al-Aloul, Mahmoud Abbas’s deputy as chairman of Fatah, who is one of the movement’s veterans and has held a historic position at its top since its establishment; and Marwan Barghouti, who is serving five consecutive life sentences for carrying out terrorist attacks and enjoys broad public support and an aura of a national leader.
Information that came to the author’s attention from accessible Palestinian sources indicates feelings of anger and dissatisfaction on the part of Rajoub and al-Aloul, as reflected in their boycott of meetings of Fatah’s Central Committee. If this information is ultimately confirmed, it could indicate that this is not merely a dispute over procedural or technical matters. It could point to power struggles within Fatah concerning the allocation of positions, the design of the succession mechanism, the promotion of associates, and fears over the concentration of power around Hussein al-Sheikh or the Abbas family. At the same time, caution is warranted, and the absence from one Fatah meeting or another should not be presented as evidence of a significant rupture within its ranks. Past experience shows that temporary boycotts, deliberate messages conveyed through the media, and personal pressure exerted on senior activists are sometimes an integral part of an internal negotiating mechanism and do not necessarily indicate a split or genuine rupture.
It should be noted that the Palestinian media recently reported information from an unidentified source within Fatah claiming that Mahmoud Abbas and his son Yasser own villas in Lebanon that were purchased with “Palestinian money.” The source stated that Yasser Abbas lives in a villa he owns in the Ashrafieh area of Beirut, while Mahmoud Abbas owns another villa in the Burj al-Barajneh area. In this context, the source linked corruption and the management of public funds to the economic and financial crises characterizing the situation in the Palestinian Authority.
Disappointment with Fatah
In conversations held by the author with Palestinian figures, including individuals currently serving in official positions within the Palestinian Authority, he has recently encountered a critical assessment of Fatah. From their perspective, the movement is now facing a complex historic moment, caught between its legacy as a national liberation movement, whose practical meaning is a terrorist organization, and its increasingly fragile position as a governing body. According to them, the movement has lost some of its popular support, and it has no choice but to conduct a rapid and thorough assessment of the situation in order to take the necessary steps “before it is too late.”
The author considers it appropriate to present the assessment of Palestinian historian Dr. Adnan Milhem, a lecturer in Palestinian history at An-Najah University in Nablus, regarding the current state of affairs within Fatah. In a media interview, he noted that over the years Fatah has split into two separate functional directions: “Fatah the party,” which operates as the body responsible for governing and preserving its symbols, and “Fatah the movement,” represented by the youth, professional unions and prisoners, who still adhere to the spirit of revolutionary struggle and resistance. According to Dr. Milhem, the 1993 Oslo Accords and the subsequent establishment of the Palestinian Authority brought about a radical transformation: the movement shifted from a revolutionary project into a governing body. It began losing its social and intellectual presence and became captive to the complexities of power at the expense of organizational action. He said that Fatah’s institutions have so far failed to find a formula that reconciles the models of revolution and governance. This is while most of the leadership of “the party” is based abroad, whereas the leadership of “the movement” is based in the Palestinian territories.
According to Dr. Milhem, Israel’s goal since 1993 has been to dismantle Fatah as the framework of Palestinian governance and distance it from its popular base. He described the movement’s current condition as the “weakest and darkest” organizational and political phase in its history. He also argues that the movement increasingly resembles a ruling party rather than a revolutionary movement, relying more on the history of its struggle than on its actual experience in government. He concluded by arguing that “democracy is Fatah’s cure, and dictatorship is its shroud.” Nevertheless, he emphasized that he believes the movement still possesses “a renewed spirit capable of renewal, but the window available for internal examination and revolution may be shorter than many estimate.”
The Deteriorating Economic Situation in the Palestinian Authority
The Palestinian Authority has been mired for some time in an increasingly severe economic crisis. More specifically, it is primarily struggling with an inability to allocate the resources required to manage and operate the central systems of the Palestinian establishment, as they were established approximately three decades ago. A World Bank report stated that the transfer of clearance revenues, namely the taxes and customs duties collected by Israel on goods destined for the Palestinian Authority, has been completely halted since May 2025, despite these funds being its primary source of revenue. It should be noted that these funds, which generally amount to between NIS 750 million and NIS 800 million per month and account for approximately 65% of the Palestinian Authority’s budget, have not been transferred in full in recent years due to deductions and freezes imposed by Israel.
The Palestinian Authority’s fiscal deficit amounted to $1.3 billion during 2025, equivalent to approximately 8% of the PA’s gross domestic product. As a result, salaries are being paid only partially, while payments to suppliers and the pension fund are being delayed. Under these circumstances, Palestinian Authority institutions rely on employees who do not know when they will receive their salaries or what percentage of their wages they will receive. This situation not only creates difficulties in making a living, but also threatens institutional discipline, efficiency and actual employee loyalty. The private sector is also suffering from an economic slowdown, while the Palestinian Authority, as noted, is delaying payments to suppliers, meaning that the government crisis is having a negative impact on the economic condition of companies and banks.
Throughout 2026, the population in Palestinian Authority territory has continued to suffer from severe shortages of fuel and cooking gas. During April of this year, some gas stations were closed due to a severe fuel shortage, and the population has pointed an accusing finger at the Palestinian Authority, holding it directly responsible for the situation.
The Bottom Line
Any discussion of the Palestinian arena today must take two major factors into account. The first is the continuation of the United States’ war against Iran, with the confrontation diverting its attention away from other issues on the regional agenda. Under these circumstances, the situation in the Gaza Strip becomes a secondary concern. The second is the upcoming Knesset elections in Israel, scheduled for October 27 of this year. The election results will undoubtedly have a very significant impact on the nature of Israeli policy toward the Palestinian Authority and more broadly. As of today, following the events of October 7, 2023, a renewal of the political process remains a distant and almost unrealistic idea.
The current situation in the Palestinian Authority requires Israel to be prepared and ready for a range of developments and scenarios, chief among them the end of Mahmoud Abbas’s historic tenure after more than a generation during which he concentrated three key positions at the top of the Palestinian leadership in his own hands: the PLO, the Palestinian Authority and Fatah. In addition, looking ahead, Israel must prepare for scenarios of crisis and escalation in Judea and Samaria resulting from possible power struggles that could spill over into violence surrounding the succession to Abbas; escalating confrontations between settlers and IDF forces and Palestinians at flashpoints, including as a result of demonstrative and provocative actions by settlers who are no longer willing to tolerate terrorism, amid attempted attacks and efforts by Palestinians to initiate violent disturbances; and a further deterioration in the economic situation of the Palestinian population and the weakening of governance there, in a way that increases the motivation to promote popular protests and terrorist attacks against Israeli targets.
