The Fertile Crescent in the Middle East, spanning Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Cyprus, and parts of Egypt and Turkey, has long been known as the “cradle of civilization.” It is a region historically characterized by fertile soil and by its proximity to major rivers such as the Euphrates, the Tigris, the Nile, and the Jordan, which enabled early agricultural development, permanent settlement, and the rise of cultural centers. The term “Fertile Crescent” was coined in the nineteenth century by the American archaeologist James Henry Breasted, who saw in the region’s geographical form and its nourishing rivers a crescent shape. Yet the very waters that sustained prosperity for millennia have in recent decades become a source of tension and conflict between states, such as Iraq and Turkey, or Egypt and Ethiopia.
The water shortage of the past fifty years is not the result of a single factor but stems from the combination of natural processes and political dynamics. On one hand, population growth and urban expansion have driven a sharp rise in water demand, placing increasing pressure on limited existing resources. On the other hand, climate change has triggered prolonged droughts, desertification, and declining rainfall, all of which significantly reduce available water sources. Added to this reality is another problem: poor and inefficient water management in many countries, alongside insufficient infrastructure capable of storing and preserving the dwindling resources.
In addition to these factors, practical and local processes further exacerbate the situation, including illegal well-digging, water theft, and resale at exorbitant prices, as well as the absence of desalination facilities in countries facing severe water shortages. Overuse of water, especially in agriculture and industry, both of which consume large quantities of freshwater, increases pressure on reserves and highlights the need for more efficient technologies. Contributing to the crisis are actions such as dam construction, the diversion of water flow to downstream states, the pollution of water sources by natural or deliberate means, and hydro-geographical control, in which certain countries enjoy an advantage due to their location that allows them to control shared river sources.
Freshwater: The Beating Heart of the World
Groundwater lies beneath the Earth’s surface, stored in cracks, rock pores, and underground sediments. The rock layers that contain water, known as aquifers, serve as a vital reservoir of freshwater. Most groundwater originates as rain or melted snow that slowly filters through porous soil and rock into the subsurface. The ability of the ground to hold water depends on the porosity and permeability of these geological layers.
Groundwater is significant because it supplies roughly half of the world’s drinking water and is considered a natural source of generally high and reliable quality. It also provides about 40 percent of the water used for global irrigation, a critical figure for arid regions. In the context of climate change, groundwater can be seen as a protective resource that helps buffer the effects of droughts and climate shocks. It also sustains ecological systems by feeding rivers, springs, lakes, and wetlands, ensuring continuous flow during dry periods.
Despite their crucial importance, groundwater resources face a range of serious challenges, and pollution is a central threat. Sewage runoff, agricultural and industrial chemicals, and fuel leaks can contaminate groundwater. Another challenge is aquifer depletion caused by excessive pumping that outpaces natural recharge. In coastal areas, there is also the danger of seawater intrusion into groundwater reserves once water levels drop, degrading water quality and complicating its use.
The consequences of the water crisis directly affect everyday life at both the individual and national levels. The shortage of clean drinking water, particularly in regions with low rainfall, has led to sharp increases in water prices to the point where a liter of water can cost as much as, or even more than, a liter of fuel. Border and navigation disputes also intensify when rivers that serve as boundaries between states begin to dry up. In some cases, the possibility has even been raised that future water crises could escalate into armed conflicts.
The water crisis also carries implications for food security. The decline in water quantity and quality directly undermines agricultural production. In addition, the lack of clean water creates conditions that allow diseases to spread among humans and animals, causing broader public health failures.
The Euphrates and the Tigris – the Rivers That Failed
Iraq was once known as the “Land of the Two Rivers”—a translation of the Greek term Mesopotamia —because of its location between the Euphrates and the Tigris Rivers. This region, including today’s Iraqi territories, served as a focal point for the rise of many ancient civilizations, such as Sumerian, Babylonian, and Assyrian. For generations, the region’s inhabitants relied on the rivers as sources of life; they provided the foundation for agricultural development, the rise of cities, and the growth of productive areas known as the “land of black earth.”
However, in recent years, climate change has exacerbated the water shortage in Iraq and turned it into an existential threat to the state. For citizens whose lives and livelihoods depend directly on access to water, managing their resources has become increasingly complex, as the Tigris and Euphrates — which once served as a stable and vital source throughout history — no longer provide for the country’s needs.
Social, economic, and political developments, along with particularly high population growth rates, have led to increased demand for water. Combined with inefficient resource management and internal and external challenges, Iraq’s ability to ensure sensible allocation of its resources has weakened. Today, the country finds itself trapped between two centers of pressure: on one hand, climate change, on the other, the policies of upstream countries — two trends that have caused a significant depletion of its water reserves.
Control by Upstream Countries
Iraq has been severely harmed by the lack of comprehensive coordination and by the accelerated development of water resources in rivers flowing into it, including large dams and reservoir projects in both Turkey and Syria. This move contradicts the principle of fair water allocation among countries sharing river banks. In practice, these policies caused a dramatic reduction in the amount of water available to Iraq, shrinking the flow to only some 45%, according to various statistics.
Estimates suggest that Iraq has lost about 60% of its water resources over the last hundred years, primarily due to actions by Turkey and Iran upstream. Whereas at the beginning of the century, the natural flow of the rivers was about 1,350 cubic meters per second, in recent years, recorded flows have dropped to less than 150 cubic meters per second — a dramatic decline.
Rainfall in the mountains of Turkey feeds the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which flow into Syria and then into Iraq. The two rivers join on their way to the Persian Gulf and form the Shatt al-Arab, the border between Iraq and Iran. Here, Iran enters the picture as well: it has carried out significant actions that directly affect Iraq: it filled the Kerkha Dam. It cut around 90% of the water supply destined for Iraq, and even diverted the courses of more than 42 major rivers and tributaries back into its territory. These moves increased salinity, particularly in the Shatt al-Arab river region, leading, in recent years, to millions of dead fish surfacing across the rivers.
Turkey has likewise pursued a policy involving a series of Southeastern Anatolia projects, including the Atatürk Dam and the Ilısu Dam over the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. These dams have reduced Iraq’s share of the water that should have flowed to it by about 70%. Blocking the natural flow from Syria and Iraq contradicts the principles of international law, but given a sensitive political reality and fear of escalation, Iraq chose to accept the situation. In November 2025, it even signed an agreement with Turkey, an immediate attempt to stabilize its water system.
The reality is clear: Turkey controls the rivers’ sources, and this power allows it to influence the amount of water available to Iraq directly. The result is a deep water crisis in Iraq affecting three major domains — agriculture, drinking water, and energy production.
The main agreement between the two countries was signed in April 2024 during Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Baghdad and was expanded in November. The agreement was intended to establish a shared cooperation system for managing the water resources shared by the Euphrates and Tigris, which are experiencing severe drought due to a combination of Turkish dams, climate change, and increased water consumption. Its goal was to create a fairer water-allocation mechanism, strengthen Iraq’s water infrastructure, and reduce tensions between the countries.
Under the agreement, Turkey committed to guarantee a minimum flow of about 500 cubic meters per second in the Euphrates via a joint monitoring mechanism, along with preliminary understandings for seasonal flow management to prevent severe drought periods. In addition, a clause known as the “oil-for-water deal” was signed: revenues from Iraqi oil imported into Turkey, estimated at US$1.8 billion per year, were to be directed to funding projects of Turkish companies through a joint fund.
Although Iraq chose not to confront Turkey, the decision has drawn criticism from experts. They argue that Baghdad should have sought international arbitration, especially given alleged violations of international law by Turkey. On the other side, proponents of the agreement claim that it averted the possibility of a major military confrontation, provided a quick solution to the water shortage, improved agriculture — which accounts for about 70% of water consumption in Iraq — and even gave Turkey stable access to the oil market and a positive regional partner image.
Egypt and Ethiopia – The Struggle over the Dam
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, or GERD, is the largest hydroelectric project in Africa and one of the most significant national undertakings in Ethiopia’s history. Its construction on the Blue Nile began in 2011, funded mainly by the Ethiopian public through bonds and donations — a reflection of the belief that this is a national project meant to ensure the country’s energy independence. Today, the dam is fully operational, has become a central national symbol in Ethiopia, and even appears on the new banknotes.
Ethiopia announced the completion of the works in July 2025, and on September 9, the dam was officially inaugurated in the presence of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. It is the largest dam of its kind on the continent, with a production capacity of 5,150 megawatts. It supplies electricity to millions of citizens, but was built and activated without a binding agreement with Egypt and Sudan regarding Nile water allocation. This past season actually saw a surplus of water, and releases from the Ethiopian reservoir caused significant flooding in both Sudan and Egypt — a reminder of the dam’s far-reaching impact on the entire region.
On March 23, 2015, Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el Sisi signed the “Declaration of Principles” on the Renaissance Dam at a meeting in Khartoum, alongside Ethiopian prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn and Sudanese president Omar al Bashir. The agreement did not establish a binding water allocation arrangement and did not halt construction, which was already underway. Instead, it outlined general principles: cooperation, fair use of water, preventing significant harm, peaceful dispute resolution, and joint studies on the dam’s impact.
The signing triggered sharp criticism inside Egypt. Sisi’s opponents argued that this was a “historic mistake” that granted the dam legitimacy without securing Egypt’s water rights. Others regard the move as a calculated political choice: the Egyptian president had been in office only a year after the military takeover and sought international support and regional legitimacy. He aimed to improve relations with neighboring states, calm Sudan — which at the time supported Ethiopia — and avoid a military confrontation that might have severely harmed Egypt and its economy.
Although Egypt experienced flooding in 2025 due to water releases from the Ethiopian dam, the core issue remains unresolved: there is no binding agreement between Egypt and Ethiopia on water distribution. Both countries rely on the Nile as a critical source for agriculture and consumption. The primary concern is that filling and operating the reservoir during dry years will reduce the amount of water reaching Egypt.
Ethiopia holds the upper hand in this conflict: it controls the dam and can set the pace of filling and the pattern of water releases. This advantage leaves Egypt highly vulnerable in dry years and creates a volatile situation that could escalate at any moment, mainly if a severe drought occurs.
No One Is Upending the Game, for Now
The water crisis in the Fertile Crescent will continue to serve as a focal point of regional tension, yet outright “water wars” remain distant, mainly because countries like Iraq and Egypt are weaker than Turkey and Ethiopia. Even so, disputes and frictions over water are clearly visible and at times reach formal tensions between states.
For example, Iraq has more than once accused Turkey and Iran of “stealing water” through dams and river diversions, a phenomenon that has led to the worst water crisis in its modern history. In August 2025, Iraq’s water minister warned that “2025 will be the most difficult year in a century,” following reductions in river flow by Turkey and Iran. These two states would not have dared harm Iraq under Saddam Hussein when the country was strong and stable, but today Iraq is seen as weak, and Turkey and Iran exploit its resources.
Egypt faces similar tensions around the Ethiopian mega dam. Egyptians have labeled the dam an “existential threat” and a “water weapon” in Ethiopia’s hands and have, in the past, threatened military action, including attacking the dam. Yet experts caution that such a move would be self-destructive: Ethiopia is militarily strong, and striking the dam would cause catastrophic flooding in Egypt.
There is no doubt that water scarcity will worsen in the coming years due to climate change, population growth, and other factors. Still, countries like Iraq and Egypt currently avoid entering direct military confrontations and prefer to manage water disputes through diplomacy, as they have done so far.
