1. Introduction
Since its establishment on May 14, 1948, the State of Israel has faced unique security challenges stemming from a complex geopolitical reality. As a small nation of 600,000 people in its early years, surrounded by hostile Arab states—Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq—without strategic territorial depth or significant allies, Israel was compelled to develop a security doctrine that would ensure its survival under existential threats. Over the years, Israel’s security doctrine has evolved in response to shifts in the nature and source of threats, developments on the diplomatic front, and changes in the country’s military, technological, and economic capabilities.
Since the outbreak of the “Iron Swords War,” fundamental strategic questions have once again emerged—not only among military and political elites but throughout Israeli society—regarding the conceptual foundations of national defense. This study explores the evolution of Israel’s security doctrine, from the vision of David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, through the influence of Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s “Iron Wall” concept, to the updates made under Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership and the potential implications of the Iron Swords War for Israel’s future defense strategy.
Our research identifies three central principles that have emerged over time: the shift from a doctrine of decisive victory to one of defense and containment; the adoption of a policy of “quiet will be met with quiet” in confronting asymmetric threats; and the transition from targeting enemy intentions to targeting capabilities through the ongoing “campaign between wars” (CBW).
Analyzing Israel’s security doctrine requires examining three main periods:
- Ben-Gurion’s doctrine and the influence of Jabotinsky’s “Iron Wall”
- Doctrinal shifts from the 1980s to the early 21st century, including key events such as the peace treaty with Egypt, the Intifadas, and the Gulf War
- The security doctrine under Netanyahu’s governments, with a focus on the Iron Swords War
Finally, we will explore future directions for Israel’s security doctrine in light of the lessons learned from the Iron Swords War.
2. Ben-Gurion’s Security Doctrine and the Influence of the “Iron Wall”
2.1 Ze’ev Jabotinsky and the “Iron Wall”
In 1923, Ze’ev Jabotinsky, a leader of the Revisionist movement, published his article “On the Iron Wall” in two parts: “On the Iron Wall” and “The Ethics of the Iron Wall.” In these writings, he proposed a political-security doctrine arguing that peace with the Arab population of Palestine could not be achieved as long as they believed they could prevent the establishment of a Jewish national home. Jabotinsky asserted that a metaphorical “iron wall”—a strong Jewish military force—was necessary to deter the Arabs and demonstrate that any attempt to uproot Jewish settlement in Palestine was doomed to fail. Only once the Arabs realized they could not undermine the national home would it be possible to reach lasting political agreements and compromises.
The “Iron Wall” idea was based on a sober analysis of the realities in Mandatory Palestine, where Jewish-Arab clashes were frequent. The violent events of 1920, 1921, and 1929, including attacks on Jewish communities in Jerusalem and Hebron, reinforced Jabotinsky’s belief that the conflict was fundamentally national—not merely economic or territorial. He wrote: “As long as the Arabs hope they can prevent us from becoming a majority in the Land of Israel, they will never give up.”
Jabotinsky rejected the approach of the Labor Zionist movement, which advocated cooperation with Arabs and territorial compromises as a path to peace. He believed that any concession would be seen as weakness and would only fuel Arab aggression. Instead, he advocated building a powerful military force that would make the Zionist enterprise unassailable—like an iron wall that could not be breached.
The influence of the “Iron Wall” was evident even during the British Mandate. Organizations such as the Irgun (Etzel), inspired by Jabotinsky, supported the use of force in response to Arab attacks and British repression. Founded in 1931, the Irgun carried out retaliatory operations against Arab villages from which attacks had been launched, as well as operations against the British, including the 1946 bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, which killed 91 people. These actions embodied the spirit of the “Iron Wall”—emphasizing the display of power as a tool for deterrence and for cementing the Jewish presence in the land.
With the establishment of the state in 1948, the “Iron Wall” concept became a foundational element of Israeli strategic thinking, even if it was not always acknowledged explicitly. It influenced David Ben-Gurion’s formulation of Israel’s security doctrine.
Jabotinsky did not focus solely on military force; he also emphasized the importance of overall national strength, including settlement and economic development. He believed that the establishment of Jewish settlements throughout the land was integral to constructing the “wall,” as it demonstrated the Zionist commitment to holding on to the land. For example, he supported the founding of new communities in remote areas such as the Galilee and the Negev as part of a strategy to consolidate Jewish control over the territory. This approach significantly influenced Israel’s settlement policies after independence, particularly during the 1950s, when dozens of new communities were established to strengthen the borders.
2.2 Ben-Gurion’s Security Doctrine
David Ben-Gurion, as the leader of the Zionist movement and the first Prime Minister of Israel, formulated the young state’s national security doctrine against the harsh backdrop of the 1940s and 1950s. At that time, Israel was a small country with a population of only about 600,000 in 1948, surrounded by hostile Arab states—Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq—whose populations and resources far exceeded Israel’s. Lacking strategic territorial depth, significant alliances, or extensive economic resources, Israel needed to develop a doctrine that would ensure its survival under existential threats. Ben-Gurion’s security doctrine was based on three core principles: deterrence, early warning, and decisive victory, along with the concept of a “people’s army” and a territorial defense system. These principles are detailed below:
Deterrence: The aim of deterrence was to instill in the Arab states the belief that any aggression against Israel would be met with a painful and determined military response. This deterrence was based on the ability to project military strength, including through reprisal operations against infiltrations and fedayeen attacks during the 1950s. One example is Operation Black Arrow on February 28, 1955, in which an IDF unit attacked an Egyptian military base in Gaza in response to fedayeen attacks. About 40 Egyptian soldiers were killed in the operation, sending a clear message that Israel would not tolerate attacks on its civilians. Similar actions against Jordan, such as Operation Samaria in 1956, reduced border infiltrations and enhanced deterrence. These operations served as practical expressions of the “Iron Wall” concept, emphasizing that any attempt to harm Israel would be met with harsh retaliation.
Early Warning: Due to the lack of strategic depth, Israel could not afford to be surprised by an attack. Therefore, the development of advanced intelligence capabilities was critical for identifying enemy intentions and preparing a swift response. This capability enabled Israel to maintain a relatively small standing army during peacetime while relying on rapid reserve mobilization in times of emergency. The intelligence successes prior to the Sinai Campaign and the Six-Day War demonstrated the importance of early warning. For example, in 1967, Israeli intelligence—through wiretaps, aerial photography, and agents—identified Egypt and Syria’s military buildup, enabling Israel to launch a preemptive strike on June 5, 1967. In that attack, the Israeli Air Force destroyed about 90% of the Egyptian Air Force on the first day, leading to a swift victory and the capture of Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights.
Decisive Victory: Given its limited resources and lack of territorial depth, Israel could not afford prolonged wars of attrition. The doctrine emphasized the need to decisively defeat the enemy quickly, ideally by moving the battle onto enemy territory as early as possible. This approach was evident in the Sinai Campaign, during which the IDF captured the Sinai Peninsula in just a few days, and in the Six-Day War, during which Israel seized large territories in only six days. Swift victories minimized damage to Israel’s civilian population and conserved the limited resources of the young state. In the Six-Day War, the destruction of the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian air forces on the first day ensured Israeli air superiority and led to a crushing victory. Decisive victory also meant conducting short and rapid campaigns, using a powerful strike force based primarily on the reserve system. Even during the Yom Kippur War, despite the collapse of deterrence and early warning, Israel aimed to quickly achieve decisive results against its attackers. This began with a failed counterattack in Sinai on October 8, followed by the understanding that a phased approach was needed to concentrate the IDF’s limited resources. Vigorous action led to the defeat of the Syrian army on the Golan Heights, while holding actions were conducted in Sinai against the Egyptian army. Once Syria was beaten back, efforts were focused on the Sinai front, culminating in the crossing of the Suez Canal.
People’s Army: Ben-Gurion recognized that Israel’s small population necessitated the maximum utilization of manpower—both quantitatively and qualitatively. Therefore, the army was built around a small regular core and a large reserve force, alongside a system of territorial defense (Hagmar) responsible for protecting frontier settlements. Established in the 1950s, the Hagmar included local units tasked with defending border communities—such as kibbutzim and moshavim—against infiltrations and attacks. This system enabled Israel to respond to local threats while freeing up regular forces for strategic operations. During the War of Independence, for example, Hagmar units helped defend settlements under attack, such as Kibbutz Negba, which survived Egyptian assaults thanks to its local defenders.
This doctrine proved itself in Israel’s early military successes. In the War of Independence, despite being a fledgling state with limited resources, Israel repelled the invasion of five Arab armies and secured its existence. After the war, to allow the small regular army time for training, the Border Guard (Magav) was established, originally tasked with peacetime border protection. In the Sinai Campaign, cooperation with France and Britain enabled Israel to achieve strategic goals, including the opening of shipping lanes in the Straits of Tiran and the weakening of Egypt’s military capabilities. The Six-Day War—Ben-Gurion’s doctrine at its peak—showed how a combination of intelligence warning, preemptive strikes, and rapid victory could result in a decisive triumph. In that war, Israel tripled its territory and gained the strategic depth it had lacked since its founding.
At this stage, with Israel having gained strategic depth and more defensible borders—from the Suez Canal in the south, along the Jordan River in the east, and up to control of the Golan Heights and the ridge-line—there was a need to reassess the security doctrine and adapt it to the new reality. Unfortunately, the intoxication of victory, and perhaps the departure of Ben-Gurion, the father of the doctrine, from the leadership ranks, led the IDF and the State of Israel to rest on their laurels and neglect the matter. Very soon after the Six-Day War, the War of Attrition broke out, followed by Palestinian terrorism and infiltrations from the Jordanian border, which occupied the IDF and likely contributed to the failure to revisit and update the doctrine.
The acquisition of significant strategic depth should have sparked a conversation and, in our view, influenced the security doctrine. Perhaps the understanding emerged that rapid decisive victory was no longer an imperative, and that especially in the Sinai theater, a buffer zone could be created to allow the IDF to prepare differently. Such shifts in thinking should have translated into changes in force structure and basic operational concepts—for example, mobile defense versus static defense, the way outposts were constructed, the equipping of infantry forces with anti-tank weapons, and so on. However, since no debate or update took place, Israel entered the Yom Kippur War with the same fundamental assumptions and force posture that no longer matched operational reality.
The failure of early warning in the Yom Kippur War did not prevent the IDF from carrying out decisive operations, thanks to the rapid mobilization of reserves. On October 6, 1973, Israel was surprised by a coordinated attack from Egypt and Syria, leading to the deaths of approximately 2,600 soldiers and a national crisis. It must be noted that the heroism of the soldiers and commanders compensated for the failures of the generals and politicians—this would not be the last time. Had there been a proper debate on the security doctrine, in our assessment, the Bar-Lev Line would not have been built as it was, and the automatic, immediate attempt to launch a counteroffensive on October 8 on the canal front—a move that came at great cost—would not have occurred.
The intelligence failure stemmed, in part, from a flawed assumption that Egypt would not start a war without achieving at least partial air superiority and significant aerial capabilities. This led to the establishment of a commission of inquiry. The Agranat Commission, formed after the war, pointed to deficiencies in the intelligence warning system and recommended improvements in intelligence capabilities and decision-making processes. The war also underscored the need for improved home front defense, as enemy rockets and long-range artillery struck Israeli communities for the first time. For example, Syrian artillery shelled settlements in the Golan Heights, and Egyptian surface-to-surface missiles struck bases in the Sinai—highlighting that the Israeli home front was more vulnerable than ever.
The commission did not give sufficient weight to the cultural causes of the intelligence failure, particularly the process in which we projected our own logic onto the enemy and assumed that he would act based on our expectations. In this context, the commission recommended the establishment of an intelligence review unit to challenge prevailing intelligence assessments (“devil’s advocate”). Over the years, this unit was weakened, and its influence on intelligence assessments all but disappeared. As a lesson from that war, former head of Military Intelligence, Major General Aharon Yariv, established the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (later the Institute for National Security Studies) to create a civilian alternative for intelligence evaluation. None of this helped on October 7, when herd thinking and uniformity of perspective among decision-makers was exposed, along with an unwillingness to accept any challenging conclusions regarding Hamas’s intentions.
The Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War both exposed the limitations of relying solely on deterrence. Three months after the resounding victory in the Six-Day War, Egypt initiated the War of Attrition, which lasted nearly three years. Similarly, following the Yom Kippur War, Syria launched a war of attrition that continued for many months, under the assumption that limited warfare could achieve political goals. This failure led to the understanding that Israel must improve its intelligence capabilities and prepare not only for short, decisive wars, but also for wars of attrition. The lessons from that war influenced the development of Israel’s security doctrine in the decades that followed, with emphasis on enhancing home front defense and adapting to new types of threats.
2.3 The Influence of the “Iron Wall” on Ben-Gurion’s Doctrine
Despite the ideological differences between Jabotinsky (leader of the Revisionist movement) and Ben-Gurion (leader of the Labor movement), a clear influence of the “Iron Wall” concept can be seen in Ben-Gurion’s security doctrine. The idea that peace could only be achieved through military strength echoed in Ben-Gurion’s principles of deterrence and decisive victory. The reprisal operations of the 1950s, in which the IDF attacked Arab targets in response to terror attacks, were practical manifestations of this idea: a show of force intended to make it clear to the enemy that aggression would be met with a harsh response. For example, Operation Black Arrow in 1955, where an IDF unit attacked an Egyptian military base in Gaza, sent a clear message to Egypt that Israel would not tolerate attacks on its citizens. Similar operations, such as Operation Samaria against Jordan, strengthened deterrence and reduced border infiltrations.
However, Ben-Gurion did not adopt Jabotinsky’s doctrine in full. While Jabotinsky advocated an uncompromising stance toward the Arabs, Ben-Gurion believed it was possible to combine military strength with diplomatic efforts to reach agreements. An example of this is his willingness to accept the UN Partition Plan in 1947, in contrast to the Revisionists, who opposed partitioning the land. Ben-Gurion saw the establishment of a Jewish state—even on limited territory—as a necessary step toward building the “wall” that would enable Israel to grow stronger and face future challenges. He wrote in his diary in 1947: “A Jewish state, even if small, is the foundation of the power that will secure our future.”
In addition, Ben-Gurion emphasized the importance of building a strong army but also recognized the need for international legitimacy. He understood that Israel, as a small country, depended on the support of world powers and therefore worked to strengthen ties with countries like France and Britain in the 1950s. This approach differed from that of Jabotinsky, who focused primarily on local military strength without significant attention to the international arena. For example, the collaboration with France and Britain during the Sinai Campaign was the result of the understanding that Israel needed international alliances to achieve strategic goals. France supplied Israel with aircraft, tanks, and military equipment, and Britain supported the operation due to its own interests in the Suez Canal issue. This cooperation enabled Israel to achieve a military victory and to ensure the opening of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships. This collaboration laid the groundwork for a significant military procurement pipeline from France up until the Six-Day War.
The influence of the “Iron Wall” was also evident in the emphasis on military power as the foundation of deterrence. Like Jabotinsky, Ben-Gurion understood that Israel could not afford to appear weak, as weakness would encourage aggression from its neighbors. Retaliatory operations, as well as investment in building the IDF into a modern and advanced military, reflected this commitment to military strength. For instance, Ben-Gurion promoted the establishment of military industries, such as Israel Aerospace Industries, which began producing aircraft and military equipment as early as the 1950s. However, Ben-Gurion added a dimension of diplomatic flexibility, which was less prominent in Jabotinsky’s doctrine, recognizing that Israel had to combine military power with diplomatic efforts to ensure its survival.
The combination of military strength and diplomatic efforts was also evident in Ben-Gurion’s decision to invest in nuclear capabilities. In the 1950s and 1960s, Israel began to develop a secret nuclear program in cooperation with France, which led to the construction of the Dimona reactor. According to foreign sources, this highly classified program was intended to provide Israel with an additional “Iron Wall”—a strategic deterrent to prevent Arab states from launching an existential war against it. Although Ben-Gurion never officially acknowledged the existence of this program, it became a central component of Israel’s security doctrine, under a policy of “nuclear ambiguity” that served deterrence without provoking negative international responses. The nuclear program, which began taking shape in the 1950s, symbolized Ben-Gurion’s commitment to long-term strategic power, while maintaining Israel’s military edge over its enemies.
Ben-Gurion also recognized the importance of building a social and economic infrastructure to support military strength. He promoted the development of Israeli industry and the absorption of mass immigration in the 1950s, during which hundreds of thousands of immigrants from Arab countries and Europe arrived in Israel. The absorption of immigrants, despite the economic and social challenges, strengthened Israel’s workforce and turned it into a country with significant growth potential. For example, the establishment of new settlements in the Negev and Galilee contributed to expanding Israel’s territorial control and reinforced spatial defense.
3. Changes in Security Doctrine from the 1980s to the End of the Century
3.1 The Peace Agreement with Egypt and the First Intifada
The 1980s marked a significant turning point in Israel’s security doctrine. The peace agreement with Egypt, signed on March 26, 1979, under U.S. mediation, was a historic diplomatic achievement that removed the threat from the strongest Arab state. This agreement, which led to Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula by 1982, ensured a period of stability on the southern border and reduced the risk of a full-scale war with Arab states. However, the agreement also shifted attention to the Palestinian issue, which became the core of the Israeli-Arab conflict. The outbreak of the First Intifada in December 1987, characterized by mass protests, stone-throwing, and terrorist attacks in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, presented a new challenge: dealing with a popular uprising in territories under Israeli control.
The Intifada highlighted the limitations of Ben-Gurion’s doctrine, which focused primarily on threats from enemy states with regular armies. Confronting terrorism and uprisings required a different approach, including the use of police forces, targeted operations, and the development of new technologies to address asymmetric threats. For example, the IDF began deploying special forces and undercover units to conduct counterterrorism operations. These units carried out arrests, targeted killings, and intensive intelligence operations aimed at preventing attacks and weakening Palestinian organizations such as Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The undercover units Shimshon and Duvdevan, established in 1986, specialized in covert operations in Palestinian cities. The war on terror also required close cooperation with the General Security Service (Shin Bet), which developed a doctrine of preemption using technological tools and human intelligence (HUMINT).
The Intifada compelled Israel to develop new capabilities in intelligence and technology. The use of surveillance cameras, armored vehicles, and crowd control equipment became an integral part of the effort to deal with the uprising. For example, the establishment of checkpoints at the entrances to Palestinian cities such as Nablus and Bethlehem helped reduce the number of attacks inside Israel. In addition, there was an increased need to protect civilians within Israel, which led to the construction of security fences and additional measures to defend towns and cities. These checkpoints, set up during the Intifada, became symbols of the struggle against terrorism but also drew international criticism for allegedly infringing on Palestinian freedom of movement.
Meanwhile, the peace agreement with Egypt and the growing focus on the Palestinian issue led to international efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution. The Madrid Conference (1991), which featured direct talks between Israel and the Palestinians and Arab states, marked the beginning of a political process aimed at reducing regional tensions. The Oslo Accords (1993), signed between Israel and the PLO, were the peak of this process and led to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. These agreements were intended to provide a framework for peace based on a two-state solution, including the partial transfer of control over areas in the West Bank and Gaza to the Palestinian Authority. However, the Oslo Accords did not bring calm, and the wave of terrorism in the 1990s, including deadly suicide bombings on buses and in city centers, showed that the Palestinian threat remained a major challenge.
The wave of terrorism, which peaked in 1996 with attacks such as the one in Jerusalem’s Mahane Yehuda market that killed 16 civilians, sparked public criticism in Israel of the Oslo Accords and the notion that peace could be achieved through territorial concessions. The rise in terrorism reinforced the belief that Israel must maintain military strength as a prerequisite for any political agreement, while ensuring improved intelligence and defensive capabilities.
3.2 The Gulf War and the Threat to the Home Front
The First Gulf War (1991) introduced a new threat to Israel: ballistic missiles launched from Iraq toward the Israeli home front. During the war, Iraq fired 39 Scud missiles at Israel, hitting major cities such as Ramat Gan, Tel Aviv, and Haifa, causing property damage and casualties, though the loss of life was relatively limited. This threat underscored the need to develop air defense systems, such as the Patriot system, which was operated for the first time during this war by the United States, and later more advanced systems like the Arrow, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome. While the Patriot succeeded in intercepting some missiles, it also revealed the technological limitations of the time, as some interceptions were inaccurate, and missile debris itself caused damage upon falling.
The Gulf War also demonstrated that Israel could not always rely on a swift military victory, as envisioned by Ben-Gurion’s doctrine. International pressure, especially from the United States, prevented Israel from taking military action against Iraq, out of concern that such a move would jeopardize the international coalition against Saddam Hussein. As a result, Israel was forced to absorb the attacks without responding militarily—a rare departure from the retaliatory policies of the 1950s and 1960s. This reality highlighted the need for enhanced home front protection, including the construction of shelters, the development of missile warning systems, and the improvement of intelligence capabilities to detect distant threats. For example, after the war, Israel established the Home Front Command and the “Tzofar” (Siren) alert system, which became central components of home front defense.
The Gulf War also marked the beginning of a new era in which the threat to the home front became a central element of Israel’s security doctrine. While in the 1950s and 1960s the focus was on border defense and shifting the battlefield into enemy territory, Israel now had to invest in protecting the civilian population. This included the construction of public and private shelters, the development of advanced alert systems, and increased investment in intelligence. Additionally, the war highlighted the importance of international cooperation, as the United States provided Israel with military assistance in the form of Patriot systems and diplomatic support, strengthening Israel’s status as a strategic ally of the West.
The threat to the home front also led to the recognition that the nature of threats to Israel was changing. Whereas in the past, the main threat came from states with regular armies, new threats emerged from more distant countries such as Iraq, and from non-state actors like Hezbollah, which began to gain strength in Lebanon in the 1980s. These developments required Israel to develop new offensive and defensive capabilities, including long-range missiles and air defense systems. For example, in the 1990s, Israel began developing the Arrow missile defense system to intercept ballistic missiles, which became a key component of the country’s defense doctrine. The system, developed in cooperation with the United States, was designed to counter threats such as ballistic missiles from Iran or Syria.
3.3 The Meridor Committee: Adding the Defensive Pillar
In the early 2000s, in light of evolving threats, a committee led by Minister Dan Meridor was appointed to re-examine Israel’s national security doctrine. Operating between 2003 and 2006, the committee found that threats to Israel had significantly changed since the days of Ben-Gurion. In addition to state threats such as those from Syria and Iran, there was a growing threat of terrorism from organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as the increased danger to the home front from missiles and rockets. The committee proposed adding a “fourth pillar” to Israel’s security doctrine: defense. This shift marked the beginning of a departure from the foundational principle of decisive victory and a transition toward a doctrine of containment. The IDF, too, was swept up in the logic of containment and subordinated to political considerations, as a direct consequence of its involvement in implementing political agreements and the engagement of senior IDF officials in the Oslo negotiation process (the “gray suits” generation). The following are the principles of the doctrine proposed by the Meridor Committee:
Israel’s handling of current and emerging threats must rely on a combination of four efforts: prevention, deterrence, defense, and offense; Israel must maintain significant military power and project a deterrent image in the regional arena in the face of a broad range of threats; this military strength should be built primarily on independent national power, maintaining a qualitative edge and the ability to translate it into both diplomatic and operational action; in parallel with maintaining national strength, Israel should strengthen its special relationship with the United States and develop strategic ties with other key international players; the use of force to achieve objectives should be context-based, measured, and aligned with ethical and legal standards, as well as policy considerations and legitimacy requirements. The following is an analysis of these components:
Defense: Developing active and passive defense systems to protect the home front, such as missile interception systems (e.g., Iron Dome, which began development in this decade) and shelters. This came in response to the growing threat of rockets and missiles from organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas. The Iron Dome system, first deployed in 2011, became a symbol of Israel’s ability to protect its citizens from rocket attacks. Developed in cooperation with the United States, the system successfully intercepted hundreds of rockets during rounds of fighting in Gaza, significantly reducing damage to the Israeli home front. For example, during Operation Pillar of Defense (2012), Iron Dome intercepted about 85% of the rockets launched toward Israel, saving many lives. However, the interception of missiles and reduction of damage to the civilian rear also enabled a policy of containment and reduced the perceived necessity of decisively defeating the enemy—particularly the terrorist organizations Hezbollah and Hamas, which continued to amass increasingly sophisticated indirect fire capabilities.
Integration of Diplomatic Efforts: The committee emphasized the importance of promoting diplomatic processes alongside the use of military force as a means of reducing tension and creating regional stability. The peace agreement with Jordan (1994), signed after the Oslo Accords, demonstrated that political agreements could reduce threats and bring calm to borders. The agreement with Jordan included security and economic cooperation, which strengthened regional stability. For example, cooperation in managing water resources in the Jordan River contributed to maintaining stable relations between the countries.
International Legitimacy: The committee acknowledged that Israel’s military operations must be carried out with the support—or at least the understanding—of the international community, especially major powers like the United States. This was in response to growing criticism of military actions in the territories, particularly during the Second Intifada (2000–2005). For example, Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, in which the IDF reentered Palestinian cities in the West Bank, sparked international criticism over harm to Palestinian civilians, highlighting the need for legitimacy in military actions.
Although the committee’s recommendations were not officially adopted as binding policy, they influenced Israel’s security strategy in the following decade. One example was the growing investment in defense systems such as Iron Dome, which became a central component in protecting Israel’s home front, especially during rounds of conflict in Gaza. Additionally, the committee stressed the importance of addressing asymmetric threats such as terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Organizations like Hezbollah, which grew stronger in Lebanon after Israel’s 2000 withdrawal, and Hamas, which took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, presented new challenges that required an integrated approach of military operations, advanced intelligence, and homeland defense.
The Second Intifada, which began in September 2000, reinforced the need for a conceptual shift. The wave of suicide bombings, which peaked in 2002 with attacks such as the Park Hotel bombing in Netanya on Passover eve—killing 30 civilians—led to Operation Defensive Shield and eventually to the construction of the West Bank security barrier. Built between 2002 and 2006, the barrier reduced the number of attacks inside Israel and exemplified the shift toward active defense as part of the security doctrine. For instance, before the barrier was built, dozens of suicide bombings occurred in 2001 alone. The barrier, along with aggressive counter-terror operations, led to a sharp decline in attacks. Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, during which the IDF regained control of Palestinian cities, showed that Israel was prepared to use substantial force to restore deterrence, even at the cost of international criticism. The operation included extensive actions against terrorist infrastructure, including the arrest of more than 4,000 militants and the destruction of weapons depots and bomb labs, which resulted in a significant reduction in attacks in subsequent years.
The Second Lebanon War served as another test of the evolving security doctrine. The war, which began after the abduction of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah on July 12, 2006, revealed the challenges of confronting a sophisticated terrorist organization equipped with long-range rockets. Hezbollah launched around 4,000 rockets at northern Israel over 34 days, causing significant damage to the Israeli home front, the deaths of 44 civilians, and hundreds of injuries. The war highlighted the need for improved home front protection and the limitations of limited military operations against non-state actors. Although the IDF inflicted heavy damage on Hezbollah, including the destruction of command centers and weapons depots, the war did not end with a clear victory—mainly due to poor ground warfare management. The army had suffered from years of neglect in equipment and training and had been largely preoccupied with counter-terror and guerrilla warfare in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The inconclusive outcome left the Israeli public with a sense of frustration and led to widespread criticism of the war’s management and the lack of decisive results. The Winograd Commission, established to review the war, pointed to failures in strategic planning and decision-making and recommended improved coordination between military and political leadership.
The Second Lebanon War also led to increased investment in air defense systems. For example, after the war, Israel accelerated the development of the Iron Dome system, which became operational in 2011. The system, which intercepted hundreds of rockets during rounds of fighting in Gaza, became a central pillar of Israel’s home front defense. Additionally, the war underscored the importance of precise intelligence, as Hezbollah successfully concealed much of its infrastructure, including rocket launchers and tunnels, making it difficult for the IDF to strike effectively. These lessons influenced the evolution of Israel’s security doctrine in the following decade, with a focus on enhancing technological and intelligence capabilities.
Other significant lessons focused on the readiness and equipment of the reserve forces and the overall preparedness of the ground army. Although these issues were addressed in the years following the Second Lebanon War, they were later neglected once again.
This chapter reflects an attempt to reassess the doctrine in light of changing threats—an effort that, due to political considerations, never fully matured or concluded. As a result of the absence of a process to update the doctrine, there was no structured dialogue with the defense establishment and no comprehensive regulation of the necessary changes in the IDF’s force-building processes. The most problematic aspect was the infiltration of a containment-oriented mindset in place of Ben-Gurion’s emphasis on decisive victory. This was a fundamental shift that impacted the State of Israel up to October 7 and never received the proper public debate and scrutiny.
4. The Containment Doctrine and the Formulation of Security Strategy Under Netanyahu
4.1 The Development of the Containment Doctrine
Israel’s withdrawal from the security zone in southern Lebanon in May 2000, under the decision of Prime Minister Ehud Barak, marked a significant shift in Israel’s security doctrine, transitioning from decisive victory to containment of threats. The withdrawal, carried out in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 425, aimed to reduce direct friction with Hezbollah and improve Israel’s international legitimacy. However, it also exposed the country to new threats. The abduction of three Israeli soldiers—Binyamin Avraham, Adi Avitan, and Omar Sawaed—near Mount Dov in October 2000 by Hezbollah, shortly after the withdrawal, highlighted the weakness of the containment doctrine. Prime Minister Barak’s decision not to respond to the abduction deepened Israel’s vulnerability and exposed its inability to deter a non-state actor operating in a complex geopolitical environment.
The containment approach that developed after the withdrawal focused on preventing escalation while maintaining relative calm along the northern border. Israel increasingly turned inward, prioritizing defense over offense, through the use of technology and the construction of an upgraded security fence along the Lebanese border. The containment doctrine also aimed to incorporate diplomatic efforts to preserve international support and attempts to enlist international actors to prevent Hezbollah’s rearmament. Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon, former Defense Minister and Chief of Staff, addressed the Hezbollah rocket threat on several occasions. His well-known statement that Israel would “let Hezbollah’s rockets rust in their launchers” reflected his strategic approach of avoiding full-scale confrontation while maintaining deterrence. In reality, this marked a deepening of the containment doctrine. Hezbollah’s military buildup—which included the accumulation of tens of thousands of rockets that ultimately did not “rust”—was later used against Israel during the Second Lebanon War in 2006.
The Second Lebanon War in 2006 marked a turning point in Israel’s security doctrine, as it exposed the IDF’s unpreparedness to implement a strategy of decisive victory in Lebanon and effectively deepened the policy of containment. At its peak in the years following the war, without any formal declaration, a policy of “quiet will be met with quiet” emerged as the central approach to dealing with Hezbollah in the north and Hamas in the Gaza Strip—both of which were growing stronger as part of the radical axis led by Iran.
The “quiet will be met with quiet” policy constituted a complete abandonment of the doctrine of decisive victory. At its core was the idea that the State of Israel effectively allowed its enemies to grow stronger, thereby mortgaging its future security for the coming generations. It was akin to parents taking a low-interest loan that their children would eventually have to repay. The underlying assumption was that Israel would use the period of quiet to achieve economic growth and improved living standards while attempting to convey to its enemies that they, too, could benefit economically if they cooperated.
The reluctance to use force to prevent the radical axis from building the “ring of fire” conceived by Iran around Israel stemmed from an unwillingness to confront Hamas to the point of conquering the Gaza Strip or to prevent Radwan forces from positioning themselves along the northern border in preparation for a potential invasion of Israel.
The series of operations in Gaza (“Cast Lead,” “Pillar of Defense,” “Protective Edge,” and “Guardian of the Walls”) did not reflect a shift away from the containment approach. On the contrary, they were practical expressions of it. For example, in Operation Protective Edge, which lasted 50 days, the IDF destroyed approximately 32 Hamas attack tunnels and thousands of rockets. Yet the operation failed to prevent Hamas from rearming after the fighting and resuming tunnel construction and enhancement. A similar pattern occurred after Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2012.
This policy drew criticism within Israel, as many argued that it allowed Hamas to strengthen itself between rounds of fighting, focusing on containment rather than decisive victory.
Meanwhile, Israel developed the “campaign between the wars” (CBW) doctrine, focusing on targeted actions to prevent enemy armament, primarily Hezbollah and Iran in Syria. This doctrine represented a shift from targeting enemy intentions to targeting capabilities, through precise airstrikes on arms shipments, depots, and military infrastructure.
Between 2013 and 2023, Israel conducted hundreds of strikes in Syria against Iranian and Hezbollah targets, including precision missiles and advanced weaponry, based on high-quality intelligence. Similar strikes occurred in other locations, including distant countries like Sudan.
4.2 Netanyahu’s Security Doctrine
Benjamin Netanyahu, who served as prime minister for extended periods (1996–1999, 2009–2021, 2022–present), formulated a security doctrine document (2016). Although it was presented and discussed in the government and security cabinet, it was never formally approved. His security vision was based on three main pillars:
The Iranian Threat: Netanyahu focused on preventing Iran’s entrenchment in Syria and halting its nuclear development. He led an extensive diplomatic campaign, including speeches at the UN (2012, 2015) where he displayed a chart of an “Iranian bomb” to illustrate the threat. Simultaneously, Israel carried out hundreds of airstrikes in Syria against Iranian and Hezbollah targets and, primarily covertly, operated inside Iran to sabotage its nuclear program. These actions were part of the CBW doctrine, aimed at degrading enemy capabilities before they became tangible threats.
Economic and Technological Power: Netanyahu emphasized strengthening Israel’s economy and technological edge as the foundation of national security. The Abraham Accords (2020), signed with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, enhanced Israel’s regional standing and led to economic and security cooperation. These agreements resulted from diplomatic efforts based on a shared interest in confronting the Iranian threat.
The CBW Doctrine: Developed under Netanyahu, this doctrine focused on preventing enemy armament through targeted strikes on infrastructure and capabilities. Examples include strikes in Syria on Hezbollah arms convoys, destruction of Hamas tunnels and infrastructure in Gaza, and covert actions against Iran’s nuclear program. This approach reflected the shift from countering intentions to countering capabilities, relying on precise intelligence and advanced technologies.
This doctrine did highlight important issues, such as the Iranian threat as an existential danger and the significance of technological and economic development—issues whose fruits were evident in the recent campaign against Iran. However, perhaps due to the lack of in-depth public discourse around the doctrine presented by the prime minister, other threats—such as those posed by Hamas and Hezbollah—were neglected and inadequately addressed.
4.3 Operation “Iron Swords” and Beyond
The Abraham Accords contributed to the containment strategy by strengthening Israel’s regional alliances. The agreements created a joint front against Iran and reduced Israel’s diplomatic isolation while promoting security and technological cooperation.
However, the containment approach was shattered by reality with the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, which led to Operation “Iron Swords.” The attack revealed that reliance on deterrence and containment failed to prevent an unprecedented escalation.
The war involved a large-scale ground operation in the Gaza Strip, during which the IDF seized extensive areas and destroyed terrorist infrastructure, including tunnels and weapons depots. The Iron Dome system proved highly effective in intercepting thousands of rockets, significantly reducing damage to Israel’s home front.
Nonetheless, the war posed serious challenges, including international criticism over civilian casualties in Gaza and the need to manage a humanitarian crisis. For example, UN reports cited thousands of Palestinian deaths and severe humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip, leading to increased international pressure on Israel to cease hostilities.
The “Iron Swords” war demonstrated the integration of offensive and defensive strategies. On one hand, Israel aimed to destroy Hamas as a military force, employing both ground and air forces; on the other, it relied on defense systems like the “Iron Dome” and “David’s Sling” to protect the home front. The war also highlighted the importance of precise intelligence, as the initial intelligence failure led to a reevaluation of information-gathering processes and risk assessment. For example, internal IDF reports indicated that warnings regarding unusual Hamas activity were received but were not given sufficient weight.
The war marked a fundamental shift in Israel’s security doctrine. The maneuver in Gaza, the strikes against Hezbollah, the destruction of Syrian military capabilities, and finally Operation “Rising Lion” signaled the direction: no longer containment, but a return to the pursuit of decisive victory and the destruction of threats. The elimination of threats, particularly Israel’s significant achievements in Lebanon and Iran, presents an opportunity to return to the “Iron Wall” doctrine—or as Prime Minister Netanyahu calls it: “Peace through strength.”
5. Necessary Changes in the Security Doctrine
5.1 Return to the Doctrine of Decisive Victory
The doctrine of decisive victory, which focuses on the destruction of enemy capabilities rather than deterrence operations, became essential following the “Iron Swords” war and Israel’s confrontation with threats from Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iranian infrastructure in Syria, and the ballistic missile and nuclear programs in Iran.
The extensive ground operation in Gaza, during which the IDF seized territory, destroyed underground tunnels and weapons depots, and eliminated senior Hamas figures, reflected the need for decisive action to destroy the organization’s military capabilities and prevent similar future attacks. The doctrine of decisive victory is required to ensure that organizations like Hamas cannot rebuild their strength.
In Lebanon, the confrontation with Hezbollah demonstrated that offensive operations can be carried out to destroy Hezbollah’s capabilities and target its leadership. Focused airstrikes in Syria, within the framework of the “war between the wars” doctrine, in which weapons shipments from Iran to Hezbollah—such as anti-aircraft missiles—were destroyed, showed that preemptive strikes alone are insufficient. Victory over Hezbollah required neutralizing its infrastructure, targeting its fighters (Operation “Pagers”), hitting weapons depots and command centers, and striking the organization’s leadership (including the elimination of Nasrallah and others)—all to prevent the group from maintaining offensive capabilities and force it into lengthy recovery processes. These strikes also weakened Hezbollah’s political position within Lebanon, which now, with American backing, seeks to dismantle the organization’s military capabilities.
The seizure of a security zone in southern Syria and control over the Hermon crest, along with the destruction of Syrian army capabilities within days of the Assad regime’s fall, also demonstrated the shift toward a decisive victory approach. Finally, the attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities and long-range missile systems place Israel’s security doctrine in a new era.
The need for a doctrine of decisive victory also stems from public pressure in Israel for a strategic shift after the failure of the containment concept, as revealed on October 7, and from the understanding that confronting the radical axis led by Iran requires determined action. A decisive victory doctrine, combining military action with diplomatic efforts (“peace through strength”), is essential to ensure Israel’s security against threats from states and organizations—and this is the path Israel is now pursuing.
5.2 Transition to Enforcement
Following the significant blows to Hezbollah and the damage inflicted on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, Israel must now maintain its achievements through enforcement aimed at preventing its enemies from rearming and rebuilding threats against the State of Israel. This is evident in the continued series of strikes in Lebanon even after the ceasefire agreement. Israel acts based on intelligence to prevent Hezbollah from restoring its strength.
We are witnessing similar IDF activity in Syrian territory, aimed at denying residual capabilities of the Syrian army to assist terror elements attempting to pose a threat to Israel, as well as to foil Iranian efforts to establish a foothold in the country.
After the painful blow Iran suffered in Operation “Rising Lion”, Israel will soon face the need to carry out enforcement within Iran as well, to prevent the ayatollahs’ regime from attempting to rebuild its nuclear and missile programs.
The enforcement approach is not only intended to prevent acute attacks against Israel but also to hinder the enemy from developing strategic capabilities. This is achieved through a range of tools beyond military means—such as economic, legal, and diplomatic tools. The enforcement approach, as developed following the war in Lebanon, requires close cooperation with the United States to provide international legitimacy for the use of force and secure backing for extensive enforcement actions, as is currently being implemented in Lebanon and Syria. This approach also demands the maintenance of continuous intelligence access across multiple arenas and the preservation of Israel’s operational freedom throughout the Middle East.
5.3 Security Sustainability
The shortage of weapons and spare parts that hampered the IDF’s operational capabilities during the war (especially during the Biden administration) revealed just how dependent Israel is on others to maintain its security policy. This includes the ability to sustain advanced procurement, development, production, and acquisition programs that would allow the State of Israel to implement any military plan it deems necessary, based solely on its own security interests.
Israel must strive for security sustainability (primarily in the sense of independence in weapons systems and armaments). This can be achieved by diversifying procurement sources and establishing domestic production of critical weapons and platforms. In addition, to overcome dependency on the United States, Israel should examine the possibility of securing alternative sources for acquiring ammunition, weapons, and advanced combat systems—either as supplements to or replacements for those currently purchased from the U.S.—in line with its needs to expand its military force structure.
Israel should diversify its procurement of critical systems across several countries to the extent possible. It must also establish partnerships with other countries that share similar interests to promote long-term security sustainability.
In this context, ensuring security sustainability requires reducing dependency on the United States as much as possible, including the gradual reduction—ultimately leading to the elimination—of American military aid. This should be accompanied by increased investment in and development of Israel’s domestic defense industry. Furthermore, Israel must reassess and redefine its threat scenarios and reference contingencies, as well as the stockpile levels required to meet them, to ensure sufficient reserves for protracted warfare and emergency situations.
6. Summary
The evolution of Israel’s security doctrine reflects the shifting strategic reality in which the country operates. While during Ben-Gurion’s time the focus was on rapid military victory over regular armies, today Israel faces more complex threats, including terrorism, hybrid warfare, and cyber threats.
Jabotinsky’s concept of the “Iron Wall” continues to influence Israeli policy, but it has undergone significant adaptations. Today, the “wall” comprises not only military force but also advanced defense systems, technology, intelligence, and diplomacy. The original concept must be updated to align with current realities, in which economic and financial resilience, as well as reliance on advanced technological capabilities, play a greater role than ever before. The combination of these factors enables the development of a defensive force, weaponry, intelligence, and the capacity to endure high-intensity and prolonged combat.
The shift from a doctrine of decisive victory to one of defense and containment reflects the recognition that full defeat of non-state actors is difficult to achieve. The policy of “quiet will be met with quiet,” which dominated in Gaza prior to October 2023, showed its limitations over the years—especially on October 7th—as it allowed Hamas to rebuild its strength between rounds of fighting and prepare its plan to significantly harm Israel.
The “Iron Swords” war marked a partial return to the doctrine of decisive victory but underscored the need to update Israel’s security doctrine and align it with contemporary realities.
The shift from targeting intentions to targeting capabilities reflects the understanding that preventing the enemy’s armament is more effective than waiting for offensive intentions to materialize. Strikes in Syria and Gaza, aimed at terror infrastructure, have shown that this approach can reduce significant threats—but it requires accurate intelligence and advanced technological capabilities.
Israel’s security doctrine has evolved from one based solely on offensive strategies and decisive victory to a more integrated doctrine combining defense, containment, and prevention. The “Iron Wall” remains a conceptual foundation, but it must be adapted to the current challenges facing the State of Israel. The “Iron Swords” war demonstrated that despite technological and military advances, fully defeating non-state actors remains a major challenge. The future of Israel’s security doctrine will require continued investment in technology, a stable economy, intelligence, and diplomacy—while upholding the fundamental principles of deterrence and defense.
