Erdogan and Assad maintained a close and friendly relationship until 2011. Their relations changed fundamentally when Syria became the battleground of a civil war between regime supporters associated with the Alawites and regime opponents, predominantly Sunnis. As a devout Sunni aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, Erdogan viewed the Arab Spring as a golden opportunity to end Alawite dominance in Syria in favor of a government aligned with the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood.

Against this backdrop and to ensure a non-violent transfer of power, Erdogan urged Assad to hold democratic elections. According to Erdogan, this would allow the Sunni majority in Syria to defeat Assad at the ballot box, potentially avoiding war.

However, as expected, Erdogan’s requests were not met positively, leading to a severing of ties and even open hostility. Initially, Ankara preferred to use Turkmen fighters and the “moderate Syrian opposition,” composed of radical Sunnis, as mercenaries against Assad.

However, in 2016, a month after the failed coup attempt in Turkey, Erdogan decided to demonstrate his control over the Turkish military, and Syria proved to be a convenient stage for this display. Rocket attacks by ISIS on southern Turkey and the presence of the Kurdish PYD (Democratic Union Party) organization along the Syrian border provided Erdogan with a pretext for a military response. It is important to note that Ankara views the PYD as having a symbiotic relationship with the Kurdish PKK, which is recognized as a terrorist organization not only by Turkey but also by the US and Europe.

In hindsight, the anti-Kurdish initiative significantly contributed to Erdogan’s political stability. He managed to garner the support of nationalist Turks in parliament, allowing him to advance his agenda, including obtaining extraordinary powers that turned him into an all-powerful president.

Amid this uncompromising anti-Kurdish stance, Turkey conducted military operations in 2016, 2018, and 2019 against both ISIS and the PYD, as well as against the YPG’s military wing. As a result of these operations, Turkey gained full control over the regions of Jarabulus, Afrin, Tel Abyad, and Ras Al-Ayn. In other words, since then, Turkey has officially become an occupying force in Syria.

The Creation Turned Against Its Creator: The Free Syrian Army

Turkey used these occupied territories as it pleased. To dilute the Kurdish population in northern Syria, Ankara relocated Syrian refugees who had taken shelter in Turkey and dispersed them throughout the regions it had newly captured. This move was considered effective and strategic, “killing two birds with one stone”—both reducing the Kurdish presence in northern Syria and easing the burden of Syrian refugees in Turkey.

Turkey further encouraged voluntary migration to the occupied Syrian regions by providing essential services to the residents. Ankara opened hospitals, post offices, banks, schools, and other governmental institutions in the occupied areas of northern Syria. Turkey even constructed new roads to these territories to facilitate the delivery of basic services from Turkey. In essence, Turkey created a new political entity dependent on Ankara. It is important to emphasize that this population is not Turkish but consists of Arabs and Kurds, forming the “Free Syrian Army,” or the forces of the “Syrian opposition.” Rough estimates suggest that the population of this new entity reaches about 100,000. Turkey uses them against ISIS and the PYD, while the Syrian opposition enjoys the protection of the Turkish military, safeguarding them from Assad’s army invasions.

Given this history, it is clear why many in Syria are concerned about headlines suggesting Erdogan might normalize relations with Assad. In 2022, the last time such headlines appeared, the Syrian opposition held protests in 33 different locations in northern Syria, which included burning Turkish flags and violent actions against Turkish forces in the area.
As if that weren’t enough, on November 13, a Syrian Arab woman named Ahlam Al-Bashir carried out an attack on the famous Istiklal Street near Taksim Square in Istanbul. This attack resulted in six deaths and injuries to 81 Turkish citizens. It is important to note that since this attack and until Erdogan’s recent announcement, there had been no significant attempts to normalize relations between the two countries. Therefore, this is the first normalization attempt since that failed effort.

Joint Maneuver of Turkish and U.S. Armies in Northern Syria, 2018

What’s Behind the Reconciliation Effort?

As they have been in the past, the reasons are clear today. By normalizing relations, Erdogan aims to offload the Syrian refugees, whose official number has reached 3.5 million. It is no secret that, against the backdrop of a deteriorating economy and the “job occupation” by Syrian immigrants, especially in low-wage and temporary jobs, the Turkish president is losing public support. Additionally, Ankara wants to stop funding the Free Syrian Army due to economic decline and lack of resources. Since February 2020, after the retaliatory operation against Assad’s army following the death of 36 Turkish soldiers in Idlib, this body has not engaged in combat for over four years.

However, the challenges on the ground remain unchanged, indicating that normalization will not be an easy task. On June 30, the day after Erdogan’s announcement about normalizing relations with Assad, social unrest erupted in Kayseri province in central Anatolia. According to reports, a Syrian migrant sexually assaulted a six-year-old Syrian girl. Although the crime was committed against a Syrian girl and not a Turkish one, many Turkish nationalists saw this incident and the rapprochement between Erdogan and Assad as an opportunity to intimidate and drive Syrian refugees back to Syria. Consequently, violent protests against Syrian migrants, reminiscent of European pogroms, led to numerous cases of damage and arson to the migrants’ property and vehicles.

Erdogan condemned the violence against the Syrian refugees, yet the Syrian response was swift. Similar to 2022, Syrians organized massive protests against Turkey, burning Turkish flags and throwing stones at Turkish trucks in the occupied areas. The “Syrian revenge” cannot be solely explained by what happened in Kayseri province. It is evident that the Syrian opposition in the Turkish-controlled areas fears abandonment by Turkey. If Turkey and Assad’s regime indeed reach an understanding, such an agreement would logically end the Turkish occupation in northern Syria. This is not only what common sense dictates, but also what the Syrian dictator publicly states. In other words, all residents and fighters associated with the Syrian opposition would be in immediate danger when their place of residence returns to Assad’s control. Ankara, for its part, is trying to involve the Syrian opposition in the negotiation process with Assad’s regime. However, the Syrian dictator claims that they are a group of terrorists and refuses to consider them as interlocutors. Therefore, from the perspective of the Syrian opposition, such normalization between Turkey and Assad is seen as a betrayal by Turkey. Given that the Syrian opposition receives no international support other than from Turkey, it is clear that this is an intolerable Turkish abandonment.

Memorial Ceremony in Istanbul Following the Syrian Attack in the City in 2022
Photo: Kurmanbek

The Kurds Promote Elections in Syria

Currently, as part of normalizing relations, Damascus naturally demands a complete withdrawal of the Turkish military from all occupied Syrian areas. However, from a Turkish perspective, such a withdrawal would threaten its security. The presence of the Kurdish PYD organization along the Turkish-Syrian border troubles Ankara. In its view, a withdrawal could lead to the Kurds filling the resulting power vacuum. Therefore, Ankara is trying to convince Assad that the Turkish withdrawal from occupied territories should be gradual and not immediate. Assad, on his part, is unwilling to compromise on this issue and refuses to normalize relations until he sees the Turkish army withdraw. Erdogan is attempting to find common ground by enlisting Assad to take military action against the “terror problem,” referring to the Kurds. Erdogan believes this could prevent the PYD from taking control of northern Syria.

Meanwhile, the Kurdish organization isn’t sitting idly by. It seeks international legitimacy for the “Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria” (controlled by the PYD) by announcing its intention to hold free elections in various regions of northern Syria. By organizing elections in six major cities, 40 towns, and 105 villages, the Kurds aim to demonstrate their strength and sovereignty. Erdogan has warned that his country will not accept the establishment of a “Terroristan” within Syria and has managed to postpone the elections for now. Additionally, Turkey’s National Security Council issued an official statement threatening the PYD and warning that Turkey will not accept any new “facts on the ground.”
Turkey managed to postpone the elections from May 30 to June 11 and then again to August 6. It remains unclear if the elections will indeed take place on that date. The PYD rejects all Turkish claims that the organization poses a threat to Turkey’s security and accuses Erdogan of interfering in Syria’s internal affairs.

Syrian Rebels Against Turkish Occupation in Northern Syria
photo: Qasioun News Agency

Eastern Imagination: Fear of Zionist Imperialism

One cannot ignore the timing of events in Turkey and Syria coinciding with the elections in the United States. In 2018, during his presidency, Donald Trump ordered the majority of American forces to withdraw. Turkey responded with a military operation in 2019 to take control of northern Syria, prompting Trump to reverse his decision and maintain the troops. Now, Erdogan believes that if Trump is re-elected, he will return to this policy of regional abandonment, and Erdogan needs to be prepared for the possibility that Kurdish forces might fill the ensuing vacuum.

It is unclear what Trump’s policies will be if he is re-elected, but it is evident that Israel would prefer to see Syria remain divided and weakened at this stage.

Additionally, it is crucial to understand that after October 7, Ankara unequivocally designated Jerusalem as an antagonistic rival. This isn’t a clash of real interests but a completely irrational phenomenon: anti-Semitic conspiracy theories have taken root in Ankara’s power centers, convincing themselves that Israel poses a threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. They believe that through the vision of the “Promised Land” or “Greater Israel,” the Jewish state supposedly aims to expand its territory, aspiring to conquer Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and even southeastern Turkey. From this skewed perspective, Israel’s attempts to establish deterrence on the northern front with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria are seen as an effort to create a total war, perceived by conspiracy advocates as an attempt by Israel to expand the conflict to seize land from its neighbors. Erdogan uses this perception to signal to Assad that it is in his interest to restore relations with Turkey against the Israeli threat.

It is clear that the brewing normalization between Turkey and Syria will have direct implications for Israel. For instance, two days before Erdogan’s announcement calling for restoring relations with Assad, on June 27, Erdogan had a phone conversation with Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati. Citing “aggressive threats from Israel,” Erdogan declared his support for Lebanon, which obviously included backing the Hezbollah terrorist organization. Against this backdrop, it can be said that through normalization with Syria, Turkey is also trying to penetrate Lebanon.

It is important to note that regardless of events in Syria, Turkey is already present in Lebanon. Since 2006, as part of the UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon), Turkey has participated in missions on the Israel-Lebanon border with approximately 100 soldiers. It can be assumed that in the event of improved relations with Hezbollah, Turkey might increase the number of soldiers on the Lebanon border, thus attempting to deter Israel by using its troops as a shield to protect Hezbollah under the guise of defending Lebanon.

Bottom Line: Turkey Seeks a Way Out of Syria

In conclusion, as demonstrated here, the normalization of relations between Turkey and Syria has significant implications not only for the two countries but for the entire region. Given the immediate challenges such as Syrian migrants, the radical Syrian opposition, the Kurds, and Assad’s precondition for the withdrawal of Turkish forces from occupied territories in the north, it seems that the task won’t be easy to accomplish.

Taking steps toward normalizing relations with Assad highlights Ankara’s efforts to extricate itself from the Syrian quagmire in which it has been deeply mired. The recent protests by the Syrian opposition in northern Syria and their violent actions against Turkish security forces and trucks underscore and remind us that the Syrian opposition could pose a significant security threat to Turkey, as evidenced by the 2022 Istanbul bombing. While Turkey currently seems to ignore this fact, if the Syrian opposition becomes convinced that Turkey is about to abandon them to Assad, it is likely they will fight for their lives, and Turkey will pay a price.

Recent developments and statements from the Turkish administration suggest that Turkey will continue to drain its resources and limit its political maneuverability due to its fixation on the Kurdish presence. Despite threats, Ankara seems unlikely to invade further territories in northern Syria beyond those it already occupies, especially given the Trump administration’s 2019 opposition to a military operation in the region. The current trend indicates Turkey’s desire to extricate itself from this situation. In this context, Ankara is likely to seek the Assad regime’s assistance in curbing the Kurds, which could lessen Turkey’s hostility toward Syria.

Although Israel is not a central consideration in the normalization of Turkey-Syria relations, it seems that in light of Turkey’s adversarial stance toward Israel, Ankara is trying to “turn lemons into lemonade” – seeking to extract political benefits from its anti-Israel position.

Erdoğan Nearing Reconciliation with Assad?: "Killing Two Birds with One Stone"
Photo: ymphotos / shutterstock.com