The IDF’s leadership, along with newly appointed Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, now faces numerous internal and external challenges as part of an extended, complex, and essential recovery process—one of the largest in the history of the Israeli military. The IDF must navigate a strategic recalibration and fundamental corrections while simultaneously continuing a multi-front war, conducting significant force-building efforts with massive budgets, implementing organizational changes, establishing new units, preparing for advanced technological threats, replenishing weapon stockpiles, restoring a sense of security for border-area residents, and, most importantly, rebuilding public trust in the IDF while addressing a deep internal leadership and ethical crisis.
All this must be done while maintaining constant readiness, alertness, and operational preparedness in an ongoing multi-arena conflict. A crucial aspect of this effort is completing investigative reviews, implementing personnel changes across different ranks, applying urgent and long-term lessons, and simultaneously projecting strength and deterrence against Israel’s adversaries.
The current process of rebuilding and correcting, stemming from the immense failure of October 7, 2023, resembles the situation the IDF faced after the devastating setbacks that led to the Yom Kippur War. Back then, Israel’s leadership and military command faced similar challenges of recovery and reform. The man who led the IDF during that period was Chief of Staff Mordechai (Motta) Gur, who assumed his role in April 1974, shortly after the publication of the Agranat Commission’s interim report and the resignation of Chief of Staff David Elazar. Gur, a seasoned officer with a distinguished combat record (including commanding the Paratroopers Brigade during the liberation of Jerusalem’s Old City in the Six-Day War and twice serving as Northern Command chief), focused on force-building and military expansion at a time when combat in the Syrian enclave was still ongoing but nearing its end—similar to how the war with Egypt had concluded after three weeks of fighting.
Building a New Spirit
Despite the similarities between then and now, some key differences stand out. First, today’s prolonged conflict creates instability and uncertainty, whereas in 1974, the recovery process occurred during a temporary ceasefire. During the Yom Kippur War, Israel faced only Egypt and Syria, both with conventional standing armies. Today, Israel confronts threats from seven different fronts, including Iran, which introduces new strategic complexities.
In the Yom Kippur War and its aftermath, the threat of surface-to-surface missiles (from Egypt) was already a factor, but not on today’s scale, range, or destructive capacity. Modern threats against Israel now include drones, UAVs, and other advanced technologies that did not exist more than fifty years ago.
In October 1973, the IDF emerged from the war with a deep crisis. Despite achieving significant military successes—capturing territory west of the Suez Canal in the south and advancing deep into Syria in the north—the intelligence and operational failures at the war’s outset and heavy casualties created an urgent need for reform. Chief of Staff Gur’s primary mission was to rehabilitate the IDF, restore its sense of capability and professionalism, and prepare it for future conflicts.
To achieve this, Gur implemented significant reforms in the army’s structure, combat doctrine, and operational readiness based on the Agranat Commission’s findings and internal IDF evaluations.
The most critical element of post-war recovery was restoring soldiers’ trust in their leadership and fostering a new spirit within the IDF. Gur strongly emphasized regaining the confidence of combat troops by encouraging open discussions and lessons-learned sessions with their commanders, who, in turn, were instructed to demonstrate leadership and lead by example.
Extracting lessons and preparing for future wars played another crucial role in recovery. It was determined that the IDF would improve combat techniques and enhance the speed and accuracy of its intelligence-gathering capabilities. Additionally, operational plans, particularly concerning Syria and Egypt, were reassessed, and military exercises and battle simulations were refreshed to improve force readiness for any scenario.
The IDF emphasized intensive training in all field units to improve operational fitness, including brigade- and division-level drills. A renewed focus was on professional fundamentals, including tank, infantry, and joint-force coordination exercises. The standing army’s status was strengthened, and training and support for reserve forces, which formed a key component of the IDF’s strength, were improved.
Chief of Staff Gur also prioritized changes in intelligence and early warning systems. In response to the intelligence failures preceding the war, a major restructuring of military intelligence (Aman) took place, improving processes and perceptions while enhancing cooperation between intelligence agencies. Technological and human intelligence-gathering capabilities were also developed, including new surveillance and reconnaissance tools. A monitoring mechanism was introduced, and greater emphasis was placed on understanding the enemy.
To strengthen battlefield intelligence and prevent another surprise attack like Yom Kippur, new collection tools were developed, including early-stage drone technology and other emerging capabilities. A culture of critical thinking and challenging intelligence assessments was encouraged to prevent the kind of rigid strategic assumptions (“the concept”) that led to the 1973 failures.
The IDF also had to consider the broader geopolitical changes brought about by the war. This included preparations for the disengagement agreements with Egypt and Syria and adjustments to Israel’s deployment in the Sinai—a process that culminated in the Sinai withdrawal and the establishment of new bases in the Negev following the 1979 peace agreement with Egypt.
Integration of Forces and Improved Coordination Between Branches
Gur did not settle for investigating the failures; he demanded that all military branches learn from their mistakes and implement the lessons in practice. Thus, the Chief of Staff initiated a comprehensive effort to analyze the war’s operational, intelligence, and command failures through investigative committees and lessons-learned processes, emphasizing personal and systemic responsibility. Simultaneously, the General Staff’s procedures were re-evaluated, particularly the decision-making processes at the senior levels, recognizing that complacency and rigid thinking contributed to the Yom Kippur War surprise.
Instead of the prevailing assumption that future wars would be short—like the Six-Day War and the Sinai Campaign—Gur insisted on preparing the military for prolonged conflict, emphasizing endurance, logistical resilience, and the attrition of the enemy over time. As a result of this approach, new frameworks, and operational adaptations were introduced as part of the renewed force buildup. The armored corps adopted more advanced tanks, such as the Merkava Mark 1, alongside strengthening active defense systems and developing combat doctrines better suited to counter advanced anti-tank weaponry. The infantry corps was reinforced, focusing on integrating mechanized forces with urban warfare, and regional commands were established to improve coordination between commands and military branches.
The Air Force also implemented significant corrective measures. After suffering heavy losses due to the advanced air defense systems of the Egyptian and Syrian armies, Gur led efforts to improve the Air Force’s attack doctrine and integrate electronic warfare. The General Staff also prepared plans to employ the Air Force against ground threats flexibly.
The Yom Kippur War underscored the critical importance of the reserve forces, and Gur took steps to enhance this component as well. These included reducing mobilization and emergency training times, upgrading equipment, improving service conditions for reservists to boost motivation, and integrating doctrinal changes into training programs.
The Chief of Staff ordered large-scale exercises simulating real combat scenarios to improve military readiness, emphasizing prolonged warfare and responses to tactical and strategic surprises. Following these exercises and as part of them, Gur also improved the synergy between the Air Force, armored corps, navy, and special units, highlighting the advantages of coordinated joint operations.
Beyond preparing for full-scale war, Gur recognized that the IDF would also need to handle irregular warfare. He prepared the forces for insurgencies and asymmetric warfare scenarios, particularly in areas such as Lebanon and the West Bank.
The Heavy Price Paid (Again) by Civilians
Under Gur’s leadership, the IDF became a more capable and prepared military, restoring public trust in the army and soldiers’ confidence in themselves and their commanders. While his successors reaped the benefits of this restoration, Gur’s contribution in laying a professional and solid foundation was critical in transitioning the military from shock and despair following the war to a force better prepared for future conflicts and operations.
Gur’s initiatives shaped the IDF for years to come. The force buildup and doctrinal changes he implemented significantly contributed to the military’s readiness in subsequent operations, including Operation Litani (1978) and the First Lebanon War (1982). The IDF emerged from the Yom Kippur War battered but organizationally and professionally strengthened. Learning and implementing lessons became an integral part of the military culture, a transformation in which Gur played a decisive role.
The IDF’s unprecedented and rapid expansion characterized the period following the Yom Kippur War. This included increasing the number of divisions from seven to twelve, the number of tanks from 2,100 to 3,600, and the number of armored personnel carriers (APCs) and half-tracks from 3,450 to over 8,000. There was also a significant increase in artillery pieces and other weaponry, with most of the newly acquired equipment being of the most advanced models. In contrast, a substantial portion of outdated equipment was decommissioned. The Air Force also modernized, acquiring F-16 and F-15 fighter jets, Kfir aircraft, advanced attack helicopters, and sophisticated command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) systems while phasing out older equipment (Uri Bar-Joseph, Never Again: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on IDF Force Buildup, Open University).
Regarding the workforce, Dr. Emmanuel Wald noted that the number of active-duty soldiers grew from 75,000 to 180,000 during the 1970s, while the reserve force increased from 225,000 to 370,000. Most of this expansion occurred in the years following the Yom Kippur War, particularly in 1974, when the number of combat personnel increased by approximately 25% in less than a year (Dr. Sapir and Prof. Ben-Ari, Behind the Scenes of Manpower Growth Following the Yom Kippur War – Analyzing the Organizational Mechanisms, Dado Center).
However, this expansion came at a heavy price. The defense budget’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) share surged to around 30% in the four years following the war, only returning to approximately 20% after 1977. This spike was financed through high taxation, burdening civilians and lowering their standard of living. In general, the massive allocations to defense and rising oil prices weakened Israel’s economic resilience, leading to inflation that peaked at 445% in 1984 and an enormous deficit in the balance of payments (Uri Bar-Joseph, ibid.).
