On February 10, 2026, Hamas’s Ministry of Health in the Gaza Strip reported 72,037 Palestinian fatalities since the beginning of the war on October 7, 2023. Hamas’s Ministry of Health is the source of reporting on the number of dead and wounded, cited by international organizations and the international media. In general, these actors treat Hamas’s reports as reliable, despite its clear interest in inflating the number of casualties to frame and reinforce the narrative of “war crimes” committed by Israel and the killing of “innocent civilians indiscriminately and in violation of international law.” Hamas’s narrative, together with previous narratives such as the starvation narrative, or the siege and resistance to the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip, constitute the foundation of Hamas’s war of narratives, both externally and internally, as a means of suppressing criticism, preserving support for the organization, and encouraging the recruitment of new operatives to fill the enormous gaps in its ranks.
In previous articles, I have addressed the problematic nature of Hamas’s reporting regarding the number of fatalities and casualties and the lack of reliability and logic therein. However, on February 8, Hamas’s Ministry of Social Development announced on its Facebook page the distribution of a financial grant totaling more than 9.6 million shekels to 19,306 widows of martyrs. Other reports from the Gaza Strip indicate that many additional widows of martyrs did not receive the assistance grant and have appealed to the Ministry of Social Development demanding that they receive it.
The report by the Ministry of Social Development almost singlehandedly undermines the numbers war that Hamas has carefully waged since the outset of the conflict and up to these days. It corroborates the assertion of a phenomenal IDF achievement regarding collateral damage, the essence of which is the avoidance of harm to uninvolved civilians. John Spencer, a researcher at West Point in the United States and the world’s leading and most prominent expert on urban warfare, defined this achievement as the “golden standard,” stating that it represents the lowest terrorist-to-civilian casualty ratio in the history of urban warfare.
It is important to emphasize that, systematically and deliberately, Hamas’s Ministry of Health refrains from distinguishing between those killed by IDF fire and those killed by Hamas fire or by other Palestinian organizations, such as the failed Islamic Jihad rocket at Al-Ahli Hospital in southern Gaza on October 17, 2023. Moreover, Palestinians murdered by Hamas and other organizations on charges of collaborating with Israel, looting humanitarian aid, opposing Hamas, or attempting to flee combat zones in accordance with IDF instructions are included in the casualty list of Hamas’s Ministry of Health. That list also includes all those who died of natural causes, old age, or illness. According to data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, approximately 6,500 people die each year in the Gaza Strip.
Hamas’s Eliminations are also Counted
Accordingly, taking into account that the figure of 19,306 refers only to Hamas operatives killed in the war. At the same time, it is known that thousands of additional terrorists from Islamic Jihad and other smaller organizations were killed, and considering reports of additional widows of Hamas operatives demanding the grant, it may reasonably be assumed that the number of terrorist operatives from all organizations killed in the war reaches approximately 30,000. If one subtracts from the total number of casualties, 72,037, those killed by Hamas and other organizations, whether due to failed rockets during the first months of the war that fell within the Strip, the statistics reported by the IDF based on previous rounds and intelligence assessments indicating 10 to 12 percent of rockets launched from the Strip malfunctioned or fell short and exploded within the Strip, or for the other reasons mentioned, as well as the number of deaths unrelated to the war, the figure of approximately 42,000 civilians allegedly killed by IDF fire necessarily becomes lower. Although it is difficult to estimate the number precisely, even a rough estimate ultimately indicates a terrorist-to-uninvolved civilian casualty ratio of between 1:1 and 1:1.7. There is no doubt that this is the lowest ratio known in comparison to any other urban war in the Middle East and beyond, and that the estimate clearly aligns with John Spencer’s assessments. The achievement is even more impressive when considering the complexity and uniqueness of the combat arena in the Gaza Strip.
Beyond the fact that this is one of the most densely populated places in the world, Hamas prepared for war for about a decade and a half. During this period, the organization invested hundreds of millions of dollars, and according to some estimates, even more than that, in digging defensive and offensive tunnels throughout the Strip, deliberately using civilian infrastructure and facilities such as schools, clinics, hospitals, mosques, and even cemeteries. In practice, nearly every public building, in addition to thousands of private homes and residential buildings, was connected to the extensive tunnel network. Civilian infrastructure served as camouflage, a source of food, water, energy, and communications, and as a human shield against IDF attacks. The organization, which since its takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007 became an effective sovereign controlling the population and the territory and operating in every respect as a state or quasi-state entity. The organization also succeeded in harnessing civil society to serve and support it through processes of education and indoctrination, alongside entrenching the population’s dependence on Hamas as a governing authority. In effect, the organization became deeply embedded within civil society, the vast majority of which supports it, assists it, or is deterred by it.
Beyond the enormous investment in tunnel construction, the organization invested substantial resources in developing independent weapons-production capabilities and in constructing a broad, diverse, organized, and disciplined military array. The immense resources required to build these military capabilities were obtained through tax collection, the takeover of international aid resources, and overt and covert financial assistance from Qatar and Iran, alongside Turkish assistance in transferring funds into the Strip through networks of money changers and support from Turkish intelligence for the establishment of the organization’s external military leadership in Turkey and its ability to operate conveniently and securely from there under Turkish intelligence protection.
Will Exposing the Truth Change the Narrative?
To the complexity of the combat arena in the Gaza Strip, due to all that has been explained, was added another heavy and significant layer of complexity: the presence of Israeli hostages held by Hamas, some of whom were kept in tunnels and other sensitive locations. The IDF acted with extreme caution and refrained from operating freely and extensively in all parts of the Strip and against significant centers of gravity of the organization, out of concern for harming the hostages or endangering their lives.
Indeed, the data and the manner in which the war was conducted under conditions unfamiliar in other urban combat arenas point to a significant IDF achievement, including a strikingly low collateral damage rate compared with other urban wars. Israel failed to convince the international community and the international media of the scale and importance of this achievement. In fact, Israel suffered a resounding defeat in the war of narratives against Hamas. Nevertheless, alongside the impressive IDF achievement, it is important to note that there were also instances of deviation from the rules of engagement, disciplinary offenses up to and including war crimes, and it is hoped that all of these are being investigated and addressed as required. However, as serious as the aforementioned deviations are, and with the understanding that all must be dealt with to the fullest extent of the law, they constitute a relatively negligible number of offenses and an even more negligible number of war crimes, given the duration and complexity of the war.
Hamas’s manipulative strategy has long been exposed, yet this has not sufficed to persuade many in the international media and international organizations, including the UN. It is doubtful whether even Hamas’s official report regarding the number of widows and the payment of assistance grants will change the approach of those who adopt Hamas’s narratives and reports and regard a terrorist organization as credible, and more gravely, as more credible than the IDF and the State of Israel with respect to reporting on events in the Gaza Strip. The State of Israel and the IDF cannot despair. They must act with intensified effort and across the broadest possible range and on every media and other platform to undermine Hamas’s narrative and to damage its standing and credibility both internationally and domestically, in the Gaza Strip and in the broader Palestinian arena. The war of narratives is an inseparable part of the war against Hamas, and we must not leave the arena of consciousness under Hamas’s control.
