The “Report on Terror Attacks in Judea and Samaria for 2023” by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center highlights a sharp rise in both the number and quality of attacks – as well as in Israeli casualties – compared to the previous year. Most of the attacks were shootings that occurred despite the extensive IDF presence in the region, a high number of pre-emptive arrests, and numerous counterterrorism efforts that thwarted attacks.
Beginning in March 2022, Israel has been engaged in an active war against terrorism in Judea and Samaria. After about four months of stalemate – and as Jenin became a central hub of terrorism – the IDF launched Operation “Home and Garden” on July 3, 2022. Since that operation, fighting has expanded with increasing frequency of IDF incursions into the refugee camps in Jenin, Nablus, Jericho, and Tulkarm.
However, alongside traditional operational tools for counterterrorism, it is worth considering the integration of influence operations as a supportive element in combating and thwarting terrorism. As the name suggests, influence operations aim to affect various target audiences, encouraging them to act in more favorable ways.The target audiences may include decision-makers among the enemy, the perpetrators of attacks, and their families.
Influence operations focus on the cognitive realm on three levels: cognitive, emotional, and behavioral. At the cognitive level, the goal is to instill in the target audience or subject of influence a very specific perception of reality and events. At the emotional level, the aim is to evoke and amplify various emotions within the target audience or subject, such as anger, fear, anxiety, etc. At the behavioral level, the objective is to motivate the target audience or subject of influence to act in a very specific manner.
Broad Support for the 10/7 Massacre Among the Palestinian Public
Counterterrorism requires comprehensive and deep intelligence capabilities. These include identifying the entire “value” chain of the perpetrators, including the funding network and money flow, logistics and weaponry accumulation for terrorist activities, enemy guidance and intelligence systems, and, finally, intelligence on the operational system executing the attacks. The characteristics of terrorism in the current campaign are not similar to the spontaneous attacks that marked the period between 2015-2017; rather, the war on terror in Judea and Samaria since March 2022 is characterized by organized attacks by militarily structured terrorist infrastructures. In this reality, the ability to operate in the realm of influence and consciousness is significantly broader. This is due to the ability to act against organized system target audiences, roles within terrorist organizations, and, of course, the Palestinian public providing a supportive environment.
Since the events of October 7, the IDF has expanded its operations in Judea and Samaria to strike Hamas infrastructure, thwart attacks and terrorist organizations, and prevent Judea and Samaria from becoming another active and extensive front in the war. The deep support of the Palestinian public for Hamas and the massacre that occurred in the Gaza envelope creates a psychological and moral infrastructure that encourages more terror attacks.
For example, Tulkarm has recently become a prominent terror hub, with terrorist infrastructure organizing in the city and the Nur al-Shams refugee camp, leading to an increase in shooting attacks from the city adjacent to the security fence towards nearby communities (such as the shooting incident in Bat Hefer).
Not only are the Palestinian Authority’s security mechanisms unable and unwilling to even attempt to tackle the terror infrastructures in the cities ostensibly under their control, but these security personnel themselves often participate in the attacks. The historic visit of Abu Mazen to Jenin, during which he made promises regarding the restoration of governance, has become a laughingstock. This was yet another expression of the Palestinian Authority’s helplessness, whose survival actually depends on the actions of the IDF forces in all the terror hubs in Judea and Samaria, especially the prominent ones like Jenin, where Abu Mazen visited, and Tulkarm.
Exposing the Chain of Terror
To operate in the cognitive domain and conduct effective influence operations, it is necessary to first map all relevant stakeholders within the enemy’s ranks. This includes everyone from the most senior decision-makers to the lowest levels involved in terrorism. This mapping will allow the classification of relevant target audiences and determine the effectiveness of actions aimed at these audiences. For instance, specific actions should target groups seeking to carry out attacks in the seam zone, particularly shooting attacks towards communities near the fence. This requires analyzing intelligence collected for counterterrorism purposes by the IDF and the Shin Bet and interpreting it in the context of influence operations. By doing so, a target audience map can be created, identifying where action is needed. Next, it is necessary to examine the best ways to influence these audiences to create highly effective operations.
Groups of similar target audiences will have certain operational characteristics, and as a result, similar influence characteristics. The first step is profiling the basic characteristics of members within these target groups to develop a methodology suitable for identifying and influencing these members. This methodology should be based on several components, including a comprehensive profile of the target audience and its classification by community and ideological affiliation and by the type of operational activity it engages in. In some cases, terror attacks are spontaneous acts of passion. These are independent, unplanned actions by perpetrators operating without logistical, intelligence, or operational support, and without the direction of organizational infrastructure. In both cases, it is possible to define activities in the cognitive domain that will help prevent or at least reduce attacks through influence operations on the civilian population among which these terrorists operate. The goal of these influence operations is to disrupt the support provided by the civilian population, thereby hampering the ability of terrorist infrastructures to organize and operate. Some of the intelligence that can be gathered comes from social media conversations between attackers and their social environment.
Developing a Psychological Doctrine
The primary intelligence and operational challenge is creating a methodology suited to segmenting relevant target audiences and devising a customized action plan for these audiences.
It is evident, for example, that the October 7 massacre was also an influence operation by Hamas. One of Yahya Sinwar’s objectives in deciding to attack and massacre the communities in the Gaza envelope was to generate a massive wave that would sweep up the ‘fire belt’ that Iran has built around Israel into broader action. Part of this belt included the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria, where many weapons were smuggled – mainly through Jordan – in an ongoing Iranian effort. That goal was not achieved. The reality on the Palestinian street, devoid of energy, has not yet led to a popular uprising with characteristics similar to those we saw in the first or second intifada.
However, there is no disputing the level of motivation among terrorist organizations, from Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades to Islamic Jihad and Hamas. These organizations are incentivized by Iran, which continues to funnel money and weapons, with Hamas leadership in Gaza and abroad (such as in Turkey) diligently working to develop and direct terror infrastructure throughout Judea and Samaria. Against this backdrop, it is necessary to formulate an effective methodology to support operational activities with cognitive components. For example, Israel could tarnish Iran and Turkey by exposing their involvement and support for Palestinian terrorism through a coordinated online and diplomatic campaign aimed at various relevant target audiences.
Some activities within an expanded influence operation can be conducted openly and officially identified with Israel, while other parts can be carried out covertly, either identified with Israel or not. Additionally, some actions, especially on social media and through communication channels, can be executed without any Israeli fingerprints. What is crucial in this context is to identify the relevant target audiences, characterize the messages, and tailor the actions to each audience based on its unique characteristics, all with the aim of driving these audiences to actions that disrupt and impair Iran and Turkey’s operational capabilities and divert them from their efforts to support terrorism in Judea and Samaria.
Integrating Influence Operations into the Overall System
The ongoing fighting in Gaza, the perceived resilience of Hamas against the IDF, and the sense of achievement in the Palestinian public are encouraging terror elements in Judea and Samaria. Encouragement is also derived from the perceived gap between Israel and its ally, the United States, as well as Israel’s isolation from other countries around the world.
Similarly, the protracted war of attrition in the north, with Hezbollah expanding its fire and demonstrating a commitment to supporting the Palestinians as long as the war in Gaza continues, serves as an incentive for all terror infrastructures in Judea and Samaria. Hamas’s strategy of opening multiple, united fronts against Israel could become a reality as these terrorist organizations, supported by Iran, see this moment as opportune and act to implement it.
That perception of reality must be challenged through influence operations aimed at creating an alternate perception of reality. By impacting the emotions of various target audiences, it is possible to motivate them to engage in actions that disrupt, undermine, and weaken behaviors that translate into support for terrorist activities.
The scope and severity of terrorism, alongside the weakness of the Palestinian Authority, compel us to utilize all possible operational tools at our disposal, with influence operations emerging as a most-relevant tool. One of the targets of such influence operations could be the Palestinian security personnel, aiming to reduce the risk of them turning against us. This would also prevent the developing terrorist infrastructure in Judea and Samaria from being used to increase Palestinian motivation to harm Israel and to delay the achievement of war objectives in Gaza through intensified terrorism.
Therefore, a change in the IDF’s operational policy and readiness for escalation is required. Alongside the continued intelligence and military effort to inflict sustained damage on terror infrastructures, preparedness for potential significant attacks on communities near the fence, such as Bat Hefer, Kokhav Ya’ir, and others, needs to be improved. Alongside these, an extensive cognitive effort must be deployed to create synergy among all efforts. One of these could be amplifying the idea that Palestinians along the seam line will have to “pay in land.” Given the pressure in Israel to establish a security buffer zone similar to the one being built in the Gaza Strip, this zone would be established near communities and east of the separation fence to prevent hostile elements from approaching the fence in areas where houses are close to the fence.
As part of the cognitive effort, it is crucial to ensure that the loss of Palestinian land does not end with the clearing and fencing of the area. In addition to the necessary clearing, these areas need to be prepared with observation and detection tools, deployment of military or border police forces, and defining rules of engagement. All these should create an improved defense system that disrupts infiltration and raid attempts on communities near the fence, enhances the security of residents in these communities, disrupts the sense of achievement and motivation for terrorism, and strengthens the awareness of its costs. This would serve as a basis for motivating Palestinian residents to disrupt terrorist efforts from their areas and land, whether through direct action against the terrorists or by reporting to Palestinian security mechanisms or IDF forces.
In influence operations, the benefit-to-cost ratio is particularly high, allowing for significant achievements at relatively low costs in resources. Therefore, this is a critical effort, particularly in the ongoing war in Judea and Samaria, and especially against the growing threat to the communities adjacent to the separation fence.
