A year after October 7, it can be said that beyond the crimes against humanity committed by Hamas in southern Israel, the attack damaged Israel’s deterrence and exposed critical weaknesses in its readiness and ability to protect its citizens. This, of course, harmed Israel’s image as a regional power in the Middle East.
It is evident that the peace agreements Israel has signed thus far, such as the Abraham Accords, are the realization of Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s “Iron Wall” vision. That is, Arab states that failed to erase Israel from the map were forced to accept its existence and, over the years, signed peace agreements with it one after another.
The shift in their stance—from attempting to destroy Israel to seeking peace agreements—did not stem from Zionist sympathy but rather from a pragmatic assessment of the balance of power and the realization that if they could not eliminate Israel, they should join forces with it. Naturally, the power dynamics in the region were influenced not only by Israel’s growing strength but also by broader global changes, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Shiite threat to Sunni states, and leadership transitions in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. These factors significantly contributed to the shift. However, none of these factors would have sufficed without Israel’s military, aerial, and technological superiority, which fostered an image of an invincible state.
This general understanding is also crucial in assessing Turkey’s policy toward Israel since October 7. It is important to remember that Israeli-Turkish relations were built at the height of the Cold War between the USSR and the US, with Turkey seeking to align itself with the West by strengthening ties with the US. Since Israel was seen as close to the US, it was perceived as strong, partly due to this connection. Ultimately, while Arab states had different reasons for drawing closer to Israel, their common denominator was the recognition that Israel was a powerful state.
With the outbreak of the war in Gaza, this image was severely damaged. Following Israel’s declaration of war and the escalating violence, all normalization efforts with the Arab world—including expanding the Abraham Accords—were frozen. While the Arab world “suspended” relations, Turkey deteriorated them to an unprecedented low.
A month before October 7, President Erdoğan hosted Prime Minister Netanyahu at the “Turkish House” opposite the UN headquarters as part of normalization efforts. The two leaders smiled for the cameras and discussed potential cooperation, primarily in the energy sector. However, the events of October 7 led to an immediate rupture and further deterioration of relations.
As a staunch Islamist, Erdoğan’s sympathy for the Palestinian cause did not surprise Israel. However, Israel was taken aback on October 25 when Erdoğan declared Hamas a “freedom-fighting organization attempting to liberate occupied lands” in a speech at the Turkish parliament. Later, Erdoğan went even further, comparing Hamas to Turkish militia fighters during Turkey’s War of Independence against Greece.
As mentioned, his pro-Palestinian statements were expected, but for Jerusalem, Erdoğan’s abrupt shift from being pro-Palestinian to pro-Hamas was intolerable. On October 28, during the “Great Palestine Rally” in Istanbul, Erdoğan referred to Israel as a “meaningless pawn that can be discarded” on the Middle Eastern chessboard. Following this statement and other harsh remarks in the same speech, Israel decided to recall its ambassador from Ankara. From Turkey’s perspective, its interpretation of October 7 was clear—Israel was weak, and as such, there was no reason to maintain normal relations with it.
Punishing Dual Citizens
Following the apparent collapse of normalization, Ankara’s shift manifested in its proposal to serve as a “guarantor” in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—naturally in favor of the Palestinians. In diplomatic language, this was a request for international legitimacy to retain the right to intervene militarily in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on behalf of the Palestinians. This was both a genuine intent and an attempt to humiliate Israel by proposing that the US act as a guarantor for Israel, similar to the Republic of Cyprus model. While diminishing Israel, Turkey sought to portray itself as a global power on par with the US, imposing a solution on two supposedly equal entities—Israel and Palestine.
The deterioration of relations deepened after Turkey’s local elections on March 31. Following the unprecedented defeat of Erdoğan’s party in significant cities and conservative strongholds in the periphery against an opposition that called for a tougher stance on Israel, Erdoğan had little room for maneuver and decided to use foreign policy to regain public favor. Thus, Turkey suspended exporting 54 products, including cement and steel, to Israel in April. By May, Turkey announced a complete cessation of trade relations with Israel. Considering that the Tel Aviv-Istanbul flight route had already been halted immediately after the war broke out, this move effectively sealed the fate of bilateral relations.
Turkey made additional attempts to degrade relations with Israel further. In April, reports emerged of plans to launch a “Mavi Marmara 2” flotilla to Israel. Diplomatic pressure from the US apparently prevented this move—at least for now. At the end of the month, a rare incident occurred in Jerusalem’s Old City when a Turkish imam stabbed and wounded a police officer before being shot dead.
During the same period, Turkey denied an emergency refueling request from an El Al aircraft in Antalya, forcing the Israeli plane to leave Turkish airspace and refuel in Greece. This incident also illustrated the “allied landscape” of the Eastern Mediterranean. Due to Turkey’s consistently hostile decisions, Israel had no choice but to strengthen its partnerships with Greece and Cyprus in various sectors where Turkey had previously played a significant role, such as tourism and trade.
Yet, even these measures did not exhaust Turkey’s hostility toward Israel. On July 10, the “Free Struggle Party,” also known as “Turkish Hezbollah,” submitted a bill to the Turkish parliament targeting dual citizens—Turkish-Israelis—aiming to penalize them for their “contribution to the ongoing genocide in Gaza.” That same day, the bill passed its first reading. However, the parliament must approve it in two additional readings before it becomes law. Given the party’s ability to secure a majority, it is likely that this legislation will pass. If it does, the consequences will be devastating—not only for Israeli-Turkish relations but also for the Jewish community still residing in Turkey.
Will Turkey Attack Israel?
Erdoğan has continued to exploit this anti-Israel momentum fully. On July 28, during a party gathering in the city of Rize in northern Turkey, he even issued a military threat against Israel, citing Turkey’s actions in various arenas such as Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh. These examples reveal the intent behind his words. While he may not be planning to deploy Turkish military forces to fight against Israel, it is not out of the question that Turkey might at least supply weapons and UAVs to Israel’s enemies.
Of course, Erdoğan is not the only figure in the Turkish leadership pushing a belligerent narrative against Israel. The most prominent example is Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. After Israel took control of the Philadelphi Corridor and successfully assassinated Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Fidan stated in front of the cameras during a visit to Egypt that “Israel’s owner must pull it by the collar”—an apparent reference to the United States. With this remark, he continued to belittle Israel, portraying it as a mere protectorate of the US, disregarding its sovereignty like Turkey’s historical approach to Cyprus. This attitude ultimately led to Turkey’s occupation of northern Cyprus.
This rhetoric persisted as long as Israel was perceived as weak in the war, even after the sophisticated assassination of Haniyeh in Tehran. However, everything changed dramatically following “Operation Beepers.” Although Israel did not claim responsibility for the operation, it was widely attributed to the Israeli Mossad and seen as a resounding success. The unprecedented cyber operation, which turned off hundreds of Hezbollah operatives at the push of a button, restored some of Israel’s lost prestige. Additionally, the elimination of senior terrorist figures and the impressive Israeli Air Force strike deep in Beirut, using bunker-penetrating missiles to target arch-terrorist Hassan Nasrallah, altered Ankara’s perception entirely.
Just as the ayatollahs in Tehran struggled to digest the “new order” imposed by the IDF in the Middle East, Turkey could not ignore Israel’s display of power. Moreover, Israel demonstrated remarkable defensive capabilities on September 1 when it successfully intercepted a massive attack involving hundreds of missiles and UAVs without sustaining any casualties. While Turkey’s leadership is aware of these facts, the Turkish public was misled by false reports in local media claiming that some of the missiles hit Israeli cities, causing damage and casualties.
These Israeli successes, coupled with direct threats towards Iran, have restored Israel’s deterrence after months in which terrorist organizations in the south and north seemed to overshadow Israel’s military capabilities. However, the situation has now reversed, and Israel is once again perceived as a strong power—perhaps even stronger than before the war.
The new reality suggests that not only has Israel reaffirmed its position as the dominant player in the region, posing a threat to Iran, but Ankara now views it as a potential rival that could even surpass Turkey—an insight that may influence Turkish policy in the opposite direction.
Despite the well-known fact that Israel has no intentions of threatening Turkey or challenging its territorial integrity, it is crucial to acknowledge that some aspects in Turkey are promoting rhetoric portraying a strong Israel as a direct threat. According to this narrative, Israel adheres to a vision of the “Promised Land,” which allegedly includes southeastern Turkey, northern Cyprus, and essentially the entire Middle East—from Gaza to Lebanon and Syria. Advocates of this theory claim that the two blue stripes on Israel’s flag symbolize this vision of “Greater Israel,” with the upper stripe supposedly representing the Euphrates River (which flows through Turkey) and the lower stripe symbolizing the Nile River. Furthermore, some even point to the “mythological map of the Promised Land,” allegedly depicted on the back of Israel’s 10-agorot coin. What Israelis see as a simple governmental emblem—an engraved menorah on a rock—is perceived by believers in this conspiracy theory as the “future borders” of a so-called Greater Israel.
This absurd notion, which might seem like pure fantasy to the average Israeli, is regarded as an unquestionable truth by many ordinary Turks. Moreover, Turkish leaders intentionally cultivate and reinforce this perception for political gain by fueling public hostility. According to a survey conducted by the Turkish company Areda on October 3, a staggering 89.4% of Turkish citizens believe that Israel has “grand plans” to occupy parts of Turkey.
This deeply ingrained belief among the Turkish public led the Turkish parliament to hold a closed session on October 8 regarding the “Israeli threat to Turkey,” featuring briefings from the foreign and defense ministers. The protocol from this discussion will only be declassified for public release after ten years.
Bottom Line
The list of damages suffered by Israel due to its intelligence and military failures on October 7 must now include a severe blow to its deterrence capabilities. One of the immediate consequences of this was the severance—if not complete breakdown—of relations with Turkey and the broader freezing of ties with the Arab world. In the early months of the war, Israel’s inability to stop the rocket threat from Gaza and its lack of response on the Lebanese front, which led to the unprecedented evacuation of tens of thousands of Israelis from their homes, were perceived as undeniable proof of Israel’s weakness—not only by Ankara but also by others.
However, the bold moves that followed—such as taking control of the Philadelphi Corridor despite US opposition, the assassination of Haniyeh in Tehran, and the elimination of Nasrallah—alongside the cyber strike attributed to Israel that severely disrupted Hezbollah’s capabilities, have helped Israel restore its image as a strong state. Nonetheless, rather than reversing its hostile stance, Turkey has leveraged Israel’s resurgent strength to foster a narrative suggesting that Turkey could be Israel’s next target on its path toward achieving the so-called vision of “Greater Israel.” This rhetoric led Turkey to hold a closed parliamentary session to discuss the supposed “Israeli threat”—the outcomes and operational decisions of which will remain classified for at least a decade.
At this stage, it is challenging to predict Turkey’s future actions toward Israel. These decisions will depend on further developments in the war—particularly concerning Iran—the outcome of the US elections, and the future of US-Israel relations. Until then, despite Turkey’s continuous provocations against Israel, it would be wise for Israel to avoid unnecessary reactions and maintain a calculated diplomatic approach befitting a regional power.
