October 7th will be remembered not only as a tragic day for Israel but as a pivotal moment in the country’s foreign relations. On that day, a new era dawned in the Middle East, completely reshaping regional politics. While the preceding period is gradually fading from memory, just a few months earlier, before the outbreak of war, the Middle East was witnessing prevailing winds of peace and normalization. Thanks to the success and positive momentum generated by the Abraham Accords, Israel successfully shattered its historical isolation in the region. Notably, all the region’s moderate states, seeking prosperity over more conflict and destruction – such as the United Arab Emirates and even, behind the scenes, Saudi Arabia – rallied behind this positive trend.

Beyond its impact on the Arab world, the Abraham Accords had a profound influence on non-Arab players. Recognizing the unprecedented display of power at the Negev Summit (an event held at the end of March 2022 with senior representatives from the UAE, Egypt, Bahrain, and Morocco, united against Iran), Turkey, under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, comprehended that the Abraham Accords would persist even after Donald Trump’s departure from the White House. Against this backdrop, and with the aim of gaining acceptance in the Abraham Accords axis, Ankara decided to adopt a conciliatory foreign policy, acknowledging the need to reconcile with Israel and other Middle Eastern countries. In doing so, Erdogan normalized relations with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and even with Egypt under al-Sisi. Beyond geopolitical considerations, Turkey’s struggling economy necessitated liquid funds to slow down the depreciation of the Turkish lira against the dollar – a need that prompted Erdogan to make this drastic change in Turkish policy.

"Erdogan did not become a fan of Israel - it was the Abraham agreements that led to the normalization of relations”

Israel’s Honeymoon with Turkey, Interrupted

The initial warmth in Israel’s relationship with Turkey was abruptly halted, and the dynamics between the two nations before the war necessitate examination within this context. Simply put, Erdogan did not evolve into a Zionist enthusiast, and Israel did not independently achieve the normalization of ties with Turkey – the credit for that belongs to the Abraham Accords.

Prior to October 7th, Erdogan regarded Israel as a robust nation, surrounded by newfound alliances in the Arab world. Moreover, Israel’s undisclosed partnership with Azerbaijan during the 2020 Second Karabakh War led to Baku assuming a role as a conduit for relations with Ankara. Both Turkey and Israel supported Azerbaijan during the Caucasus conflict, supplying military equipment and technology for its confrontation with Armenia – Iran’s ally in the South Caucasus.

Against the backdrop of the Abraham Accords and the Azerbaijan connection, a positive atmosphere developed between Jerusalem and Ankara. In March 2022, President Erdogan extended an invitation to Israeli President Isaac Herzog, who visited Ankara. Both nations jointly declared the initiation of a new era in their relations. Public endorsements from both sides contributed to a thaw in relations across all fronts. For instance, alongside bilateral ministerial visits, the intelligence agencies of both nations, after years of discord, collaborated to thwart an Iranian terrorist plot targeting Israeli tourists on Turkish soil – a move that bolstered Turkey’s standing in the eyes of the Israeli security establishment. Concurrently, Israel enhanced its standing among the Turkish public, thanks to the generous humanitarian aid provided immediately following the devastating earthquake in February of the preceding year.

This favorable perception set the stage for a historic diplomatic encounter between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Erdogan on the sidelines of the UN summit in the United States. Despite past disagreements, the summit concluded successfully, with both leaders expressing intentions for collaboration in the exploration of gas in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, these relations came crashing down with the eruption of the conflict in Gaza.

Turkey does not align with the weak

In reality, the Hamas attack on Israel and the dysfunction of the security apparatus on the first day of the war tarnished the reputation of “mighty Israel” in Ankara. After a few days of complete silence, President Erdogan urged both sides to exercise restraint and avoid violence. Nevertheless, as expected, Israel, as a sovereign state, did not remain passive and began air strikes on the Gaza Strip to showcase its military strength.

Needless to say, as the distressing images from Gaza circulated globally, Erdogan found it increasingly challenging to uphold positive relations with Israel. Alongside the grim Gaza images, the Turkish opposition intensified pressure on Erdogan to reconsider strengthening ties with Israel. The opposition took a clear pro-Hamas stance from the beginning of the Gaza conflict, while Erdogan adopted a somewhat more conciliatory position towards Israel. In other words, until he confronted Israel, quite ironically, Erdogan remained the “most pro-Israeli politician” on the Turkish political spectrum.

For Erdogan, what proved to be the tipping point was the bombing of Al-Aqsa Hospital. As a reminder, following a failed rocket launch by the Islamic Jihad, dozens of Gazan civilians were killed in the hospital. On the same day, Turkish media reported over five hundred Palestinian casualties, attributing the attack to the Israeli Air Force. Not surprisingly, given the highly one-sided pro-Palestinian coverage, the Turkish public was not indifferent to the events. All leading TV channels accused Israel of committing war crimes. During that time, the mainstream media ignored what happened on October 7th. Within that context, alongside the large protests that occurred both in Ankara and Istanbul, anger against the State of Israel escalated. In social media, reactions were even more extreme, with many users expressing their anger towards Israel and posting anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli messages and tweets.

The unrest in Turkish streets compelled Erdogan to break away from his prior pragmatism, discarding it in favor of a show of solidarity under the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence. In simpler terms, Erdogan, once pragmatic, shifted to a stance deeply rooted in neo-Ottoman ideology, presenting Turkey as the leading force for all “oppressed” Muslim nations. On October 25th, during a speech to the Turkish Parliament, Erdogan labeled Hamas as an “organization composed of freedom fighters aiming to liberate their land from occupation.”

This narrative did not conclude there. Erdogan persisted, adopting even stronger positions on October 28th during a rally supporting the Palestinian struggle against Israel. In his address at the rally, Erdogan stood firm and once again voiced unwavering support for Hamas. However, this time, alongside the significant backing he received, dissenting voices emerged. Numerous social media users distanced themselves from Erdogan’s statements, denouncing Hamas as a terrorist organization and condemning the events of October 7th. Importantly, opposing Hamas did not necessarily imply endorsing Israel for some of these users. Some opted to distance themselves from both Hamas and Israel, while others expressed support for Israel. In these cases, users took precautions by using pseudonyms to avoid backlash from Hamas supporters on social media.

Some of these users supported Israel not out of genuine belief in the righteousness of the Jewish state’s cause but as a specific expression of opposition to Erdogan. Consequently, these users, even on the Palestinian issue, found it challenging to align themselves with Erdogan. Predictably, Erdogan’s dissenters of this nature believed that he cynically manipulated the Palestinian cause to further Islamicize public discourse in Turkey. As a result, clashes occurred in various Turkish locations between secular Turks opposing solidarity with Hamas and supporters of the Islamist terrorist organization. A notable example was the confrontation at the Hamas support tent in Edirne, northwestern Turkey, where secular youth aggressively confronted Hamas supporters.

Such clear anti-Hamas sentiments also emboldened a small group of journalists to express opposition to the terrorist organization. However, due to the lack of independence among Turkish television channels, journalists and TV personalities already dismissed from mainstream television channels opposed Hamas and even declared their support for Israel. Importantly, these actions unfolded exclusively on social media platforms such as Twitter or YouTube. Unsurprisingly, after expressing support for Israel or opposing Hamas, these public figures faced social media backlash, both in institutionalized media and on social media networks.

President Herzog and Turkish President Erdogan at a press conference, 2022
Photo: Haim Tzach, GPO

No Entry for Jews

Despite occasional expressions of support for Israel or scattered instances of animosity towards Hamas and Erdogan, the overall image within the country is markedly negative towards the State of Israel. Unquestionably, the pervasive pro-Palestinian sentiment, disseminated through state-controlled media and Erdogan’s highly provocative statements characterizing Israel as a threat to Turkey’s national security, has significantly tarnished Israel’s reputation in an unprecedented manner.

Consequently, from Istanbul to Ankara and various major cities, anti-Jewish and anti-Israel sentiments materialize in graffiti on walls proclaiming “Entry for Jews strictly forbidden” or on taxi signs declaring “No Israeli passengers.” Another observable phenomenon is the public degradation of the Israeli flag. In markets throughout Turkey, the Israeli national flag is laid out on the ground as “a carpet for the public.” Alongside these overtly anti-Israel and antisemitic symbols, public displays of support for the Palestinian cause are widespread. Many Turks proudly exhibit Hamas flags and giant images of Hamas spokesperson Abu Obeida and the leader of the Houthis from Yemen in public spaces.

In summary, October 7th not only marked the end of a quiet cooperation between Israel and Turkey but also brought to light the deeply ingrained anti-Israel sentiment that had been dormant in Turkish society. It is crucial to note that while this animosity was previously associated with extreme Islamist or Marxist-leftist organizations, today it is evident that anti-Israel sentiment has unfortunately become mainstream. Despite occasional glimpses of support for Israel, whether on social media or sporadically on Turkish streets, the reputation of the Jewish state has never been so negatively perceived. Therefore, it seems even more challenging to repair the relations and return them to the state they were in before October 7th.

State reception at the Turkish Presidential Palace for President Yitzhak Herzog, 2022
photo: Haim Tzach, GPO