The ongoing escalation in Israel’s north, interminable fighting in the south, and friction in other arenas, particularly with Iran, have overshadowed the events of “the Samarian Envelope” – the region abutting Samaria and the Green Line. However, in Bat Hefer, Gan Ner, and other nearby settlements, security challenges remain prominent. The rocket attacks and shootings from the Tulkarem area towards Bat Hefer prove that the concerns of local authorities and residents are not unfounded.
Galit Shaul, head of the Emek Hefer Regional Council, implored the Defense Minister to call an emergency meeting to discuss the defensive doctrine needed to restore residents’ security. This was echoed by Yuval Edelstein, chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, who met with local officials to discuss the situation.
Edelstein emphasized the need for immediate and commensurate solutions to the severity of the problem, cautioning that any delays in response could cost lives. He stressed the urgency to act decisively and with zero tolerance towards the serious incidents, urging proactive measures in light of the severity of recent events.
Given our previous experiences and the warnings received from the field, it seems Israel cannot afford to ignore these signs after October 7th.
During a meeting with local authorities on his tour, Defense Minister Galant tried to assure them with the establishment of rapid response forces comprised of trained local combat unit veterans. “We will equip them, train them, and enable them to intervene promptly,” he said. However, concerns persist among local leaders, who pledge to remain vigilant until action is taken on the ground, hopefully avoiding any unpleasant surprises beforehand.
Free Passage to Israel
It is noted that security flaws in settlements near the separation barrier only came to light following the massacre of southern residents; State Comptroller Matanyahu Engelman and his team had already warned about this in 2022. According to the same report, in 2021, half of the separation barrier (48%) did not fulfill its basic purpose adequately, allowing over 1.4 million unauthorized crossings annually, with only one percent of these breaches receiving a security force response on the ground. Every day, approximately 3,600 Palestinians infiltrated into Israel through breaches in the barrier without hindrance. The State Comptroller pointed out that the construction of this barrier, aimed at preventing Palestinian crossings into Israel, cost the state no less than 8 billion shekels.
At the beginning of December 2023, shortly after the outbreak of the “Iron Swords” campaign, the State Comptroller once again visited to assess the response to the report firsthand, conducting a tour along the separation barrier. The purpose was to examine whether the IDF and the police were adequately prepared to meet the security needs of the central residents and those in the Gaza Envelope, given the events of October 7th. “Complacency is not an option,” he warned during the visit, which included a tour of settlements in the southern Sharon region adjacent to the barrier. He evaluated whether security forces were prepared to prevent incidents similar to those that occurred on that Shabbat in October. Facts on the ground indicate, however, that not much has changed since that damning report showed that the barrier, at least half of its length, did not adequately fulfill its purpose.
Not Just About the Barrier
Local leaders and residents are not comforted by the barriers and checkpoints intended to protect them from infiltration and attacks. Even though 4 billion shekels were invested in the barrier and obstacles along the Gaza Strip, their effectiveness was revealed on October 7th, irrespective of tunnels. Ultimately, these “obstacles” were breached by mass infiltrations of murderers, rapists, and looters, causing a complete security breakdown.
Now, it seems the security establishment has drawn quick conclusions and no longer relies solely on the barrier as a preventive measure. Since October 7th, the IDF has intensified operational activities across all areas of Judea and Samaria, with many operations and arrests conducted in the Tulkarm sector. Significant contributions come from intelligence agencies, Shin Bet, and AMAN, partly cooperating with Palestinian security forces and others. Drones and intelligence units are used to preemptively detect threats. Additional efforts are still needed, as intelligence alone is not enough.
Alongside ongoing security operations against terror infrastructures and preemptive actions, residents of these settlements rightfully argue that all of these insufficient; Israel requires a change in strategic thinking, strengthening cooperation and synchronization among various entities, systematic training, and improved readiness. It may even be necessary to establish a new coordination and control body to ensure events like October 7th do not recur in these settlements or anywhere else. Enhancing defense of these settlements cannot rely on a single type of prevention – neither just the barrier, ongoing security operations, nor any singular means. Rather, a comprehensive defense system is needed, integrating military, intelligence, technological, economic, and diplomatic measures. Only then can we effectively counter the growing threats posed by Palestinian terror elements.
Not Just About the Barrier
Local leaders and residents are not comforted by the barriers and checkpoints intended to protect them from infiltration and attacks. Even though 4 billion shekels were invested in the barrier and obstacles along the Gaza Strip, their effectiveness was revealed on October 7th, irrespective of tunnels. Ultimately, these “obstacles” were breached by mass infiltrations of murderers, rapists, and looters, causing a complete security breakdown.
Now, it seems the security establishment has drawn quick conclusions and no longer relies solely on the barrier as a preventive measure. Since October 7th, the IDF has intensified operational activities across all areas of Judea and Samaria, with many operations and arrests conducted in the Tulkarm sector. Significant contributions come from intelligence agencies, Shin Bet, and AMAN, partly cooperating with Palestinian security forces and others. Drones and intelligence units are used to preemptively detect threats. Additional efforts are still needed, as intelligence alone is not enough.
Alongside ongoing security operations against terror infrastructures and preemptive actions, residents of these settlements rightfully argue that all of these insufficient; Israel requires a change in strategic thinking, strengthening cooperation and synchronization among various entities, systematic training, and improved readiness. It may even be necessary to establish a new coordination and control body to ensure events like October 7th do not recur in these settlements or anywhere else. Enhancing defense of these settlements cannot rely on a single type of prevention – neither just the barrier, ongoing security operations, nor any singular means. Rather, a comprehensive defense system is needed, integrating military, intelligence, technological, economic, and diplomatic measures. Only then can we effectively counter the growing threats posed by Palestinian terror elements.
So What’s the Plan?
In practice, the demands from various sectors on the ground focus on seven key steps:
1. More Forces – Increase the scope of activities and civil security arrangements in the region, both by IDF forces and by police and civil guard units. A pattern of patrols and ambushes in high-risk areas is needed, alongside enhancements to the security perimeter around settlements.
2. More Intelligence – Exert pressure on the Palestinian Authority to enhance cooperation, despite the limitations involved. This pressure should manifest in costly losses to the PA for terror emanating from its territory. Such cooperation is part of an early identification system for terror hubs and their neutralization.
3. More Security – Strengthen defense within settlements beyond the barrier: increased presence of security forces, advanced defense systems installation, and deployment of security cameras and alarm systems.
4. More Emergency Readiness – Immediate response to infrastructure gaps in communication and emergency systems in settlements, accessibility to protected areas, protocols for using fences and gates, shelter readiness, medical equipment, and the like.
5. More Training – It’s insufficient to assemble all defense capacities without ongoing training of residents and officials in settlements and security agencies. It’s crucial that emergency drills are conducted by every responsible entity separately and jointly with all security forces, including the IDF, police, Border Police, and Home Front Command, involving residents to ensure collective and integrated readiness for a swift and effective response in emergency situations.
6. More Explanation to Residents – Initiate educational and community activities aimed at strengthening the mental and social resilience of settlement residents. The understanding that there are defense and emergency systems in place, and that residents have a role in them, will alleviate fears and uncertainties. This is part of a psychological and community support framework necessary for every settlement.
7. Formulating Foreign Policy – The events of October 7th serve as a platform for Israel’s public communication of residents’ concerns. Action should also be taken in the diplomatic and international arena to raise awareness among countries, especially friendly ones, of the security risk faced by Israeli residents beyond the barrier. This can be achieved through diplomatic, explanatory, and communicative efforts emphasizing Israel’s right and duty to protect its citizens.
The Bottom Line
The important lesson we must learn from the events of October 7th is the importance of cooperation and information sharing. Residents understand that despite their respect and support for security forces, they need to be part of the solution – not just the subjects of security. They also need to see the synergy between security forces and themselves. Other state entities must also be involved. Therefore, a comprehensive mechanism needs to be created where every entity has a continuous presence, not just in emergencies. Without integrating forces and resources, we cannot assure residents that events similar to October 7th won’t recur. More than ever, local residents’ sense of security is crucial, but it cannot be achieved without their participation in security solutions.
