Operation “Roar of the Lion,” which began on March 2, 2026, and ended, at least temporarily, with a ceasefire on April 16, 2026, is indeed another chapter in the ongoing war between Israel and the terrorist organization Hezbollah. This time, however, it unfolds within a broader regional context, as part of the 2026 Iran War. The initial agreement, reached for 10 days in April 2026 under American mediation, was intended to enable the first direct negotiations in decades between Israel and Lebanon. Of course, this is a fragile agreement, full of reservations and reflecting the complex interests of all sides.
From the War of Support for Gaza to the War of Support for Iran
About two and a half years ago, fighting on the northern front broke out on October 8, 2023, a day after the October 7 massacre (“Swords of Iron”), when Hezbollah joined as part of the “support front” for Hamas and Gaza. The conflict escalated, lasted a long time, and even included a ground incursion into southern Lebanon. It should be recalled that the ceasefire agreement reached about two years earlier, in November 2024, based on UN Security Council Resolution 1701, brought a temporary cessation of hostilities, a gradual withdrawal of the IDF, which was not fully completed, and a partial deployment of the Lebanese army in several areas of southern Lebanon, along with a commitment to disarm Hezbollah and withdraw it north of the Litani River. However, Hezbollah neither disarmed nor withdrew north of the Litani as stipulated in the agreement. As if that were not enough, after losing thousands of its fighters and causing the destruction of nearly all of southern Lebanon, Hezbollah recently launched another war against Israel. This time, the pretext was revenge for the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, who was eliminated by Israel in an airstrike. In other words, this is yet another war of support—this time, a war of support for Iran.
In fact, at the end of February 2026, the Iran War broke out: the United States and Israel attacked Iranian targets, including, as noted, the elimination of Khamenei. Hezbollah, as an Iranian proxy—established, funded, armed, and supported by Iran—entered the arena on March 2, 2026, launching six rockets and UAVs toward Israel. This was the first such attack since November 2024, carried out as retaliation for the assassination. Israel responded with a broad aerial operation, strikes in Beirut, the Beqaa Valley, and the south, as well as a ground invasion of southern Lebanon up to Bint Jbeil. Israel declared that its objectives were the creation of a “security zone” (buffer zone), the destruction of Hezbollah infrastructure, and the defeat of its military capabilities. Hezbollah did not hide its motives and claimed that the action was “defense of Lebanon” and revenge for Khamenei’s assassination, as well as a response to violations allegedly committed by Israel during the prolonged ceasefire.
The Iranian Demand for a Ceasefire
The ceasefire achieved in Lebanon stemmed from pressure exerted by Iran on U.S. President Donald Trump. Iran is well aware of the damage Hezbollah has caused to Lebanon and acted quickly to save it. Therefore, it linked the negotiations it was conducting with Trump regarding the nuclear issue and the Strait of Hormuz to a ceasefire in Lebanon; indeed, Trump conceded to this demand. In practice, a ceasefire was once again declared, this time a temporary cessation of hostilities that came into effect on April 16, 2026, at 17:00 (U.S. time), for an initial period of 10 days—as a goodwill gesture. It was announced by the U.S. President following the first direct talks in decades between Israeli and Lebanese representatives in Washington (April 14). The agreement included:
- A mutual cessation of military operations.
- A commitment to direct talks on a permanent security arrangement, sovereignty, and borders.
- Preservation of Israel’s right to self-defense.
- The possibility of extending the ceasefire if negotiations progress positively.
The new Lebanese government, led by President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, began rebuilding Lebanon after the elections and pledged to strengthen its sovereignty and limit arms exclusively to the state. However, it quickly found itself caught between a rock and a hard place: internal pressure from Hezbollah on the one hand, and international pressure for a settlement on the other. It is important to note that already in early March, just weeks after the war, the Lebanese expressed willingness to conduct direct negotiations with Israel, but this offer was not accepted at the time.
Diplomacy Instead of Cannons
Direct negotiations between Israel and Lebanon took place for the first time in more than 40 years—since the failure of the May 17, 1983 Agreement. The talks were held in the United States and began against the backdrop of the 2026 Lebanon War, as a result of heavy American pressure from the Trump administration, which saw them as a way to achieve a ceasefire and promote a broader security arrangement in the region. Representing Israel was Yechiel (Michael) Leiter, Israel’s ambassador to the United States, who led the Israeli delegation in the Washington meeting. Representing Lebanon was Nada Hamadeh Moawad, Lebanon’s ambassador to the United States, who led the Lebanese delegation; the talks were conducted under the mediation of Marco Rubio, the U.S. Secretary of State, who hosted the meeting in Washington.
The main issues discussed in the talks:
- Disarmament of Hezbollah: Israel’s central and most difficult demand. Israel demands the complete dismantling of Hezbollah’s military force south of the Litani, including the destruction of long-range missiles and the organization’s weapons stockpiles.
- Demarcation of land borders and regulation of the boundary, including 13 disputed points—primarily in the Mount Dov and Rosh HaNikra areas.
- Withdrawal of the IDF from southern Lebanon. Israel is willing to withdraw gradually only in exchange for the full deployment of the Lebanese army to a “security zone” (buffer zone) that will remain under temporary international/American supervision.
- Return of displaced persons. The return of approximately one million Lebanese displaced from southern Lebanon who fled at the start of the war to Beirut and northern Lebanon.
- Deployment of the Lebanese army and strengthening sovereignty. Lebanon commits to deploying 15,000–20,000 troops in the south and preventing any Hezbollah presence in the area.
- Establishment of a comprehensive peace agreement. This is the more ambitious issue, including full diplomatic relations and an end to the state of war, similar to the Abraham Accords.
What Are the Parties’ Motivations?
There is no doubt that Israel agreed to the temporary ceasefire and to the initiation of direct negotiations with Lebanon as a result of American pressure exerted by President Trump. The desire in Israel, especially among residents of the north, is to put an end to the cycles of fighting with Hezbollah and its attacks, and to destroy it once and for all, including advancing up to the Litani River in order to prevent it from carrying out anti-tank fire against northern communities.
As for Lebanon, the Lebanese were the first to request direct negotiations. Their objective is clear—to achieve a ceasefire that will put an end to Israeli bombardments. The images of destroyed buildings in Beirut and Israel’s threats to strike strategic facilities had their effect.
Hezbollah, for its part, needed the ceasefire as a lifeline. As a battered and weakened organization, with dozens of its fighters surrounded in Bint Jbeil, the ceasefire is nothing less than a rescue for it. However, publicly, Hezbollah’s position is different—as is typical of Iran and the terrorist organizations under its patronage, it officially strongly opposes the direct talks and does not recognize their legitimacy. For example, Naim Qassem, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, described the negotiations as a “shameful surrender” and a “free gift to Israel.” He called on the Lebanese government to cancel the talks immediately and warned that they would “deepen Lebanese divisions.” The organization claims that the ceasefire is its “victory,” achieved thanks to the “resistance,” and not the result of negotiations. Hezbollah has stated that it will not honor any agreement that does not include a full and immediate withdrawal of the IDF and “complete calm” along the border. In practice, the organization continued limited attacks even in the first days of the ceasefire and threatened that it is “ready to return to war at any moment.”
The Direct Negotiations in 1983
As noted, direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel are not new. In the past, there were several rounds of meetings between the two sides, and even a historic agreement was reached, known as the “May 17 Agreement,” named after the date of its signing. This agreement was the result of talks that began on December 28, 1982, with the participation and mediation of the United States. From the outset, there were disagreements on many issues: Lebanon insisted that the talks be military in nature rather than political, while Israel demanded that they be political. Israel wanted the talks to take place in Jerusalem at the level of the two countries’ foreign ministers, while Lebanon preferred that they be conducted at the level of military commanders. Lebanon sought for the future agreement to be based on the ceasefire agreement between Lebanon and Israel signed on March 23, 1949, whereas Israel demanded the cancellation of that agreement and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the states—a full peace agreement, similar to the one signed with Egypt in 1979.
The American administration sent two envoys to the Middle East to monitor and assist the talks: the mediator Philip Habib and his aide Morris Draper. With their assistance, a compromise was reached whereby the talks would be conducted simultaneously in Khaldeh, at a hotel in the southern suburbs of Beirut, and in Kiryat Shmona, with the participation of senior officials from the foreign affairs, defense, and military establishments. The Lebanese delegation, headed by Ambassador Antoine Fattal, a renowned Lebanese expert in international law, included Judge Antoine Baroud, Ambassador Ibrahim Khrama, General Abbas Hamdan, Lieutenant Colonel Said Kaakour, and Lieutenant Colonel Munir Rahim. David Kimche, a former senior Mossad official and then Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed the Israeli delegation, which included Elyakim Rubinstein, Ambassador Shmuel Divon, Avraham Tamir, and other military commanders. Morris Draper led the American delegation, which included Christopher Ross and additional aides.
The main pressing issues discussed were the termination of the state of war between the two sides, the establishment of security arrangements, bilateral relations, and mutual guarantees.
“May 17 Agreement”
Dozens of rounds of negotiations were held between the two sides, but the 34th round between Israel and Lebanon brought an end to the difficult and complex process that lasted about six months. Ultimately, an agreement was signed between the two countries. On May 17, 1983, representatives of the three parties—the United States, Israel, and Lebanon—met in a festive atmosphere in Khaldeh, and later in Kiryat Shmona, to sign the document that was intended to bring security and the appearance of normalization in relations between Lebanon and Israel, and ultimately to lead, within three months, to Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon.
The new agreement, titled “Agreement Between the Government of Israel and the Government of the Lebanese Republic,” was approved by Lebanese institutions. In fact, on May 13 the final meeting of the negotiations took place; on May 14 the Lebanese government was secretly updated on the contents of the agreement; and on May 16 the agreement was presented to the Lebanese parliament and ratified by a majority of 80 members. The smooth approval of the agreement was made possible thanks to the exceptional cooperation between Lebanese Parliament Speaker Kamel al-Assad and Amin Gemayel. Al-Assad, a Shiite Muslim, faced harsh criticism for this cooperation, which undoubtedly provoked the anger of Syria and Islamic elements in Beirut. The entire Christian camp, which included, among others, Pierre Gemayel, Camille Chamoun, Etienne Saqr, Fadi Frem, and many others, supported and welcomed the agreement. The Phalange newspaper Al-Amal praised the “historic” agreement, as it called it, and sharply criticized Arab states for not doing enough to assist Lebanon.
In addition to its approval by Lebanon, the agreement was also approved by the Israeli Knesset by a large majority. The peace agreement with Israel was, in essence, more than a security arrangement and less than a full peace treaty; as such, it constituted a compromise and allowed for a delicate balance between the aspirations and constraints of both sides. The political contents of the agreement reflected a fundamental change in the nature of relations between Israel and Lebanon, even though these relations were not officially described as “peace,” and the word “recognition” was not included in it; nevertheless, the state of war between Israel and Lebanon came to an end. The agreement included the following components: a commitment to respect sovereignty, independence, and borders; a joint declaration ending the state of war; a commitment to prohibit and prevent terrorism and incitement; and a series of arrangements toward normalizing civil, cultural, and economic relations between the two states. The agreement established security arrangements with Lebanon in the area south of the Awali River, defined as a “security zone,” and it was agreed that special efforts would be made there to prevent terrorism by two brigades of the Lebanese army: a “territorial brigade” operating from the international border to the Zahrani River, incorporating the forces of Major Haddad, and a regular brigade deployed from the Zahrani River to the Litani River. These security arrangements were intended to enable the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon, along with the departure of all other foreign forces—Syria and the “armed elements” of the PLO.
The main “weak point” of the agreement was that it did not take into account Syrian interests, Syria’s position of power in the Lebanese arena, and its strong influence over Amin Gemayel’s regime. This “weak point” ultimately underpinned Amin Gemayel’s capitulation to heavy Syrian pressure. In practice, he ultimately refused to ratify the agreement. In addition, the Lebanese government unilaterally announced on March 5, 1984, the cancellation of the agreement, only ten months after it had been signed. The IDF found itself “stuck” in Lebanon, subjected to increasing terrorist pressures encouraged by Syria, and without a political agreement to accompany the end of the war.
Summary and Conclusions
Since 1975, Lebanon has been subject to dictates imposed by foreign actors on its soil. First by Arafat and the Palestinian factions; later by Syria, which occupied most of Lebanon’s territory; and in recent decades Lebanon has been dominated by Hezbollah, which receives its orders from Iran. It is therefore unclear whether the Lebanese today can make fateful decisions such as disarming Hezbollah or signing an agreement with Israel—even a purely security arrangement—let alone normalization and peace in the spirit of the Abraham Accords.
From the Israeli side, we heard the Prime Minister’s speech, which announced the opening of negotiations and even spoke of a peace agreement in the spirit of the Abraham Accords. From the Lebanese side, we heard the speech of the Lebanese President on April 17, which referred to a ceasefire agreement and an Israeli withdrawal. Here, in fact, lie the differences in approach between the two sides.
In any case, the ceasefire agreement imposed on Israel by Trump constitutes the “entry point” for direct talks between Israel and Lebanon. The Iranians have tied the fate of their proxy to their own in the war with the United States. The agreement is fragile, and for now there is no talk of withdrawal. Israel continues to hold positions and outposts in southern Lebanon, yet Hezbollah has neither disarmed nor surrendered. Moreover, it is estimated that it will once again acquire weapons and missiles and strengthen itself during the ceasefire, as it has done in the past. Internal tensions in Lebanon, between Hezbollah supporters and its opponents, could erupt. The fate of hundreds of thousands of displaced persons remains unresolved; some have begun returning to the south despite IDF warnings not to do so.
If the negotiations succeed, they may lead to a historic arrangement between Israel and Lebanon. If not, renewed escalation is likely, potentially reaching the Litani River. The latest Lebanon war once again underscores: the threat from Hezbollah does not disappear with a ceasefire; it requires determined security enforcement, including the genuine disarmament of Hezbollah, international support, and real Lebanese sovereignty. For now, the lull offers a small measure of hope, but realities on the ground will determine the path forward.
