Hezbollah launched a war of attrition against Israel immediately on October 8, in solidarity with Hamas and as part of its commitment to the “Axis of Resistance”. Hezbollah’s leader declared that the organization would continue its attack against Israel as long as the war in the Gaza Strip continued, justifying it as aid to their Palestinian brethren.

It is reasonable to assume that had the IDF not quickly mobilized and reinforced its forces along the Lebanese border, Hezbollah might have joined the war on a larger scale through a ground invasion by its Radwan forces into the Upper Galilee. Shortly after the war began, on October 11, the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defense recommended launching a broad attack on Hezbollah. The Prime Minister, supported by the incoming ministers of the centrist Statesman Camp, tipped the scales and led the Security Cabinet to reject the attack plans.

The reasons commonly attributed to this rejection were the desire to prioritize efforts on the southern front and to avoid a war on two fronts. The decision was to create a distinction between the fronts, focus the main effort in the south, and act defensively in the north. It can be assumed that the United States also had an influence, seeking to restrain Israel and avoid being dragged into a war with Iran. The deployment of a US aircraft carrier to the eastern Mediterranean signaled to the Israeli government that it should not launch a preemptive strike against Hezbollah, as the US would help Israel prevent the opening of the northern front by Hezbollah.

Simultaneously, and with the increasing threat of Hezbollah’s shelling of the borderline communities, the Israeli government decided to evacuate the residents of Kiryat Shmona and all the settlements near the border. This unprecedented decision effectively created a security zone within Israel and “committed” to kinetic diplomacy based on a formula set by Hezbollah. Since then, Israel has adopted a responsive policy that has dragged Israel into a war of attrition in the north of the country. Even when Israel occasionally raises the level of response, and causes damage to essential assets and the elimination of senior Hezbollah organization members, the enemy is not deterred.

Destruction of Hezbollah Outposts in the Second Lebanon War, 'The Decision is Crucial for Security'
Photo: Noam Daoud – IDF Spokesperson

The Collapse of the Zionist Ethos and Loss of Trust

The destruction and damage in the north are increasing, and Israel is perceived as fearing Hezbollah and the expansion of the war. This prolonged war of attrition runs contrary to Israel’s traditional security doctrine. The failure involves the erosion of military power, especially among reserve forces, accumulating economic damage, and a severe blow to public trust in the IDF and the government. Additionally, Hezbollah is learning about Israel’s defense systems, wearing them down, and adapting to them.

The protracted war may lead to the abandonment of the north, with residents away from their homes for eight months—up to the time of this writing—and seeing no end in sight, residents may give up the possibility of returning to their homes and choose to relocate to other areas in the country or even abroad. Such a development is nothing less than the shattering of the Zionist ethos of settlement, based on holding and cultivating the land. This shift could project weakness, inviting further and broader aggression in other arenas.

As mentioned, the ongoing situation in the north is causing a continuous erosion of public trust in the government and the IDF. This erosion is reflected in the words of Eitan Davidi, chairman of Moshav Margaliot in the Naftali mountains near the Lebanese border, who sought to secede from the army and government and demanded the evacuation of soldiers from the moshav. “We are going to change the situation on the ground—no one is providing protection for the moshav or protecting us anyway. I asked the regional defense officer to evacuate the soldiers from here, close the command center and the gates—we want a complete disconnect from the army and the government” (Interview with Maariv, 27.5.2024).

Moshav Margaliot on the northern border, 'We want complete disengagement from the army and the government.’

From Containment to Attack

Hezbollah does not operate in a vacuum – its dependence on Iran requires it to heed Iranian demands. Indeed, Iran compels Hezbollah, as well as its other proxies, to intensify the war of attrition against Israel, operating under a sense of strategic superiority. This perception of superiority is partly due to the United States providing Iran with a strategic comfort zone, avoiding significant strikes against Iranian assets or its proxies, particularly the Houthis who still block the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The U.S. is also conspicuously wary of the war’s expansion and the prospect of its direct military involvement. This comfort zone allows Iran to push Hezbollah to continually escalate its aggression against Israel. This includes precise anti-tank missile fire and rocket barrages at northern settlements, harming civilians under the pretext that these settlements have become military posts, thus deemed legitimate military targets. Moreover, there is frequent use of drones penetrating Israel’s air defense system and striking military targets deep within the country.

After eight months of an escalating war of attrition, with its cumulative damage weakening Israel domestically and tarnishing its image of strength and deterrence internationally, the time seems ripe for a change—from containment and restraint to a more offensive approach. Now, with the progression of the campaign in Gaza and the advance into Rafah, it is necessary to reassess the foundational assumptions made at the war’s outset. This is based on the understanding that it is time to restore state sovereignty in the north, create the security needed to bring residents back to their homes, and halt the worsening military, economic, and social erosion.

First, Israel must outline its strategic goals in this war. The primary goal is twofold: preventing Iran from achieving military nuclear capability and dismantling the ‘ring of fire’ Iran has established around Israel through its proxies, primarily Hezbollah and Hamas. Even if Hamas is not a direct proxy of Iran, it operates within Iran’s strategic framework. The second strategic objective for Israel is to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state that would pose a severe threat to Israel’s stability and security. The very establishment of such a state would be fundamentally linked to the October 7 attack, rooted in a failed and terror-supporting Palestinian Authority, persecuting Israel in international tribunals, and clearly falling prey to Hamas and Islamic radicalism1.

In light of these circumstances, Israel, having lost its veneer as a strong state with immense military and intelligence capabilities, must rebuild its position as a regional power. This can only be achieved by defeating its enemies—Hamas and Hezbollah—and dismantling their ability to operate as sovereign entities and organized, effective military and governmental entities, alongside preventing their future recovery.

  1. For further reading on this topic, see: Kobi Michael and Gabi Siboni, “The Two-State Paradigm in Light of the October 7 Attack and the Regional War”, Misgav Institute, 6.5.2024.
Bab al-Mandab Strait, 'The Houthis still blocks them'

A Security Zone Does Not Require Military Presence

Israel’s power limitations necessitate dealing with Hezbollah in two stages. The first stage involves removing Hezbollah from southern Lebanon and returning residents to northern Israeli communities. The second stage involves broad attacks on Hezbollah throughout Lebanon, including targeting Lebanese state infrastructure wherever it is used by Hezbollah, given the reality of a full-scale war. The removal of Hezbollah forces from southern Lebanon cannot be achieved through diplomatic means. All attempts by various mediators have failed. Even if an “agreement” is reached, it is clear in advance that Hezbollah would not honor it and would move its forces south again, with any international task force in cooperation with the Lebanese army unable to prevent this. UNIFIL, a robust peacekeeping force composed of NATO member soldiers, serves as a living testament to such continuous failure, not to mention other peacekeeping forces like UNDOF on the Syrian border or others in conflict areas worldwide. Therefore, the only feasible way to achieve this goal at present is through military action, culminating in the establishment of a security zone in southern Lebanon to ensure that Hezbollah forces do not return south. Such a security zone does not require a permanent IDF presence within it, but rather effective control over the activities there, enabling the prevention of Hezbollah force infiltrations.

An IDF offensive, even if limited to southern Lebanon, might provoke Hezbollah to escalate its activities by extending rocket fire towards central Israel. In such a case, Israel would also move to the second stage and expand its operations to broadly target Lebanon. Iran, Hezbollah’s patron, would have to decide whether it is willing to “sacrifice” the organization for southern Lebanon or prefer to preserve its capabilities for a time when it can act under a nuclear umbrella. This is a tremendous challenge, but Israel has no other choice.

A necessary condition before any IDF military action in southern Lebanon is a change in operational perception in the north. First, Israel can approve opening fire towards any source of shooting, with the aim of severely damaging any village from which anti-tank missiles or rockets are launched. Every such village must become an area unfit and unsafe for habitation. The new equation should be: any damage to a house in Metula, Kiryat Shmona, or any other settlement will lead to heavy destruction of the village from which the fire was launched. Second, a full evacuation of the entire population of southern Lebanon to beyond the Litani River should be ordered, and the area should be declared a security buffer zone with the most severe rules of engagement. Finally, offensive actions should be taken beyond the border, capturing and controlling areas as needed for security purposes, in accordance with the fundamentals of military doctrine. All these actions should be carried out alongside continued interceptions and attacks on Hezbollah assets throughout Lebanon.

It is important to surprise Hezbollah and undermine the organization’s confidence and its operational and recovery capabilities through commando raids on strategic facilities and targeted assassinations in the enemy’s rear, highlighting its vulnerability and intelligence penetration, embarrassing the organization, sowing confusion in its ranks, and forcing it to allocate resources to security and defense.

The withdrawal from Lebanon - closing the gate between Israel and Lebanon: 'A security strip does not require a military presence’
Photo: IDF Spokesperson.

Hamas Believes Time is on Its Side

The expansion of the war against Hezbollah carries significant risks regarding the extent of damage to the homefront and impact on national infrastructure, strategic military assets, and human lives. However, prolonged containment and restraint also exact a heavy toll on Israel, a toll that could become even heavier if adherence to the same doctrine continues. Part of the price Israel is already paying is also seen in the Gaza Strip, where the Hamas leadership is pleased with Hezbollah’s support and its ability to harass and exhaust Israel by tying down military forces at the northern border. Even if Hamas leadership expected and still hopes for a broader and more significant effort from Hezbollah, they find the current situation sufficient to harden their positions and believe that time, which they think is on their side, will lead to their survival as the sovereign power in Gaza, which would be perceived as their absolute victory and an Israeli defeat.

Israel should coordinate these actions closely with the United States to prepare in advance for a wise and coordinated response to any escalation of the war, including more active Iranian participation or that of its proxies. Adherence to the doctrine of containment and absorption has exhausted itself as Israel’s achievements continue to erode. To create the necessary turnaround, it is essential to quickly and decisively complete the task in the Gaza Strip by dismantling Hamas’ centers of gravity. This will allow the transition to the third phase of the war, which will no longer require the retention of large forces in the Gaza area and will enable the necessary shift of forces and focus to the northern arena.

IDF soldiers in the north, 'Hezbollah does not operate in a vacuum'
photo - Zachi Zax