We frequently discuss potential solutions to the Israeli-Arab conflict in the West Bank and Gaza while almost entirely ignoring the perspectives of the residents. Israelis freely express their views at the ballot box, in open discussions, and through the media. However, Arabs in these areas have far fewer opportunities to convey their feelings and opinions, mainly because they live in an environment of internal terror primarily directed at them. Even Israeli Arabs struggle to express themselves freely. For example, an Israeli Arab woman shared her testimony in Professor Yossi Yassour’s book Life (and Death) Changing Decisions, published by Matar, explaining how a deeply personal decision—one affecting only herself—could endanger her life due to the reaction of her village. This illustrates how limited an individual’s ability to express a dissenting opinion within Arab society is.
This reality certainly affects the results of surveys conducted among Arab communities. However, such surveys are still highly valuable when conducted anonymously, ensuring respondents are reasonably convinced their answers will not be personally linked to them. Universities worldwide conduct such surveys among West Bank and Gaza Arabs, as well as within Arab countries in general, to understand public sentiment, which is not always reflected in their governments’ policies.
In June 2023, before the October 7 massacre and the subsequent war, the ICGS—The Israel Grand Strategy Center conducted a representative telephone survey among West Bank Arabs, particularly from 11 towns: Hebron, Nablus, East Jerusalem, Ramallah, Jenin, Bethlehem, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Salfit, Tubas, and Jericho. The survey, carried out by Stat-Net, aimed to assess West Bank Arabs’ attitudes toward Israel, their subjective perception of their quality of life and happiness, their national identity, and their views on possible solutions to their hardships.
One of the most surprising findings was that younger individuals (under age 35) feel less connected to Israeli Arabs (Arabs of 1948), less connected to the Palestinian people, and more affiliated with their clan. They also show less opposition to the possibility of obtaining Israeli citizenship. Another significant finding was that West Bank Arabs do not feel any real connection to Iran (only 4%), but primarily to Jordan (53%).
West Bank Arabs Identify with Their Clan
One of the most intriguing points was the question of identity and belonging. The survey examined whether respondents primarily identified with their clan, the Palestinian people, the Arab nation, or the Palestinian Authority (PA). The results were striking: an overwhelming majority—65%—identified with their clan, while only 20% felt connected to the Palestinian people. Meanwhile, 7% of West Bank Palestinians saw themselves as part of the broader Arab nation, and only 4% identified with the Palestinian Authority.
The conclusion from these findings is clear: while clan identity dominates over Palestinian national identity among West Bank Arabs, the Palestinian Authority—despite being the governing body in the territory—fails to generate any significant sense of belonging among the local population.
Another fascinating insight emerges when analyzing the results by age group: identification with the Palestinian people is stronger among older individuals. Among young adults aged 18–35, 76% feel connected to their clan compared to only 15% who feel connected to the Palestinian people. However, among those aged 60 and older, 44% identify with their clan, while 42% feel a connection to the Palestinian people. This trend suggests a potential shift toward stronger clan affiliation over Palestinian national identity.
Older Generations Are Less Interested in Israeli Citizenship
The second notable point is the desire for Israeli citizenship. An overwhelming majority of 68% of respondents opposed obtaining citizenship, while only 17% expressed a strong desire to acquire it, similar to Israeli Arabs (Arabs of 1948). Another 11% supported it to some extent. However, this issue also shows a generational trend: opposition to Israeli citizenship increases with age. Among young adults aged 18–35, 62% opposed obtaining Israeli citizenship, whereas among those aged 60 and older, the opposition surged to 86%. Interestingly, income levels did not influence responses to this question, unlike Western societies where living standards often impact political opinions, including trade relations with other nations.
64% of Older Respondents Feel Connected to Israeli Arabs, Compared to Only 30% of Young People
The third key point, complementing the previous one, concerns the degree of affiliation with Israeli Arabs (Arabs of 1948). Survey results indicate that the West Bank Palestinian public is divided on this issue. While 39% feel a strong connection to Israeli Arabs, 25% feel a moderate connection, and 33% do not feel connected at all, a significant majority—64% of West Bank Arabs—think at least some level of affiliation with Israeli Arabs.
However, a fascinating insight emerges when examining the responses by age: this sense of connection weakens over time, as identification with Israeli Arabs increases with age. Among young adults aged 18–35, only 30% feel a strong connection to Israeli Arabs, 26% feel a moderate connection, and 42% do not feel any connection at all. In contrast, among those aged 60 and older, 64% feel a strong connection, 14% feel a moderate connection, and only 20% do not feel any connection.
Another intriguing finding is that income levels had little to no impact on these responses. In other words, while 56% of young adults (ages 18–35) feel some degree of connection to Israeli Arabs, this figure rises to 78% among those aged 60 and older. This suggests a trend of weakening affiliation between West Bank Palestinians and Israeli Arabs over time.
No Political Movement Represents Them
A surprising survey finding before the Iron Swords War was: Which movement represents you the most? 73% of respondents answered none of the movements, 21% identified with Fatah, and only 4% with Hamas. An additional 2% mentioned the Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (1% each).
Ties with Jordan—Not with Israel
Another question in the survey examined how West Bank Arabs believe their standard of living could be improved. Despite the common perception that many seek employment in Israel, an overwhelming 76% of respondents believe that improving the local Palestinian economy is the key to a better quality of life. Only 10% think employment in Israel would achieve this. Additionally, cooperation with wealthy Gulf states does not appeal to West Bank Arabs, with only 4% believing it would improve their standard of living. This reinforces the notion that Palestinians believe in their ability to develop an independent economy—though the feasibility of this aspiration remains unclear.
Another interesting finding is that West Bank Arabs perceive themselves as relatively happy, with an average score of 6.2 on a scale of 1 (not satisfied at all) to 10 (very happy). Notably, neither income levels nor age groups significantly influenced responses to this question.
In one of the final and most intriguing questions, respondents were asked which country they believe West Bank Arabs should strengthen ties with. The results show that the majority favor closer relations with Jordan (53%), while only 12% believe Egypt should be the primary partner. Iran, which positions itself as the protector of the Palestinian cause in the Muslim world, received support from just 4% of respondents. Once again, income and age had little impact on the responses.
Bottom Line
This survey indicates that West Bank Arabs identify more strongly with their clans than with a broader Palestinian national identity. At the same time, affiliation with the Palestinian Authority is almost nonexistent. Moreover, there is a growing trend among younger generations toward stronger clan-based identity. West Bank Arabs are generally not interested in Israeli citizenship, particularly among the older population. Additionally, their sense of connection to Israeli Arabs is weakening, especially among the younger generation.
They believe they can improve their standard of living independently and view Jordan as the country with which they should strengthen ties. They are mainly unimpressed by Iranian patronage, with only 4% expressing affinity for Iran. Most West Bank Arabs feel politically unrepresented—72% believe no political movement represents them, while 21% identified with Fatah and only 4% with Hamas.
It will be interesting to see how the Iron Swords War has influenced West Bank Arabs in these aspects, as it appears that since October 7, the population has become more radicalized in terms of support for Hamas and armed struggle against Israel.
