The escalation of hostilities in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah since late September 2024 has raised doubts regarding the relevance, effectiveness, and potential role of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in a future political settlement in the northern arena. This force was established under UN Security Council Resolution 425 in 1978 following Operation Litani to deploy a regional peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon. After the IDF’s withdrawal from the security zone in May 2000, UNIFIL consisted of only a few battalions. However, following the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006, UN Security Council Resolution 1701 expanded UNIFIL’s mandate, marking the official conclusion of the war. Despite an estimated force size of over 10,000 personnel from 40 countries, recent events have exposed UNIFIL’s limitations in countering Hezbollah’s activities along the border, leading Israeli decision-makers to question its inclusion in a future political resolution at the war’s end.

“Although some of Hezbollah’s violations have been documented by UNIFIL over the years, in practice, the force has not taken measures to prevent the organization’s takeover of the area”

“A Blessing and a Curse” – UNIFIL’s Mandate under Resolution 1701

The resolution, unanimously approved by all UN Security Council members, stipulated the deployment of 15,000 armed UNIFIL troops in southern Lebanon, south of the Litani River, to maintain the ceasefire and prevent hostile military activity in the area. Specifically, Article 11 of the resolution granted UNIFIL the authority to “monitor the cessation of hostilities, accompany and support Lebanese forces during their deployment in the south, assist in providing humanitarian aid, and help the Lebanese army establish a demilitarized zone.” Furthermore, Article 12 emphasized that UNIFIL was authorized “to act against any forceful attempts to prevent it from fulfilling its mission and to protect UN personnel, facilities, and equipment.”

Although the resolution aimed to establish enhanced security arrangements in southern Lebanon, the combination of a weakened UNIFIL mandate—preventing proactive military measures to curb Hezbollah’s armament—and the absence of strict international enforcement mechanisms has allowed Hezbollah to rebuild its military infrastructure rapidly. This process has continued for 17 years since the resolution’s adoption and through the events of October 7, 2023, with active Iranian support, providing the organization hundreds of millions of dollars annually for this purpose. Furthermore, Israeli ground operations in the past month have revealed that Hezbollah operatives have used UNIFIL facilities to entrench themselves effectively, creating a defensive shield benefiting from the international protections granted to UNIFIL installations and personnel.

Although UNIFIL has documented some of these violations over the years, the force has not taken significant measures to prevent Hezbollah’s takeover of the area. Given this failure, a realistic examination of potential “day-after” scenarios in this arena necessitates fundamental changes in UNIFIL’s mandate, which may require its replacement with a more effective international force. This force would need the authority to undertake proactive measures to neutralize threats and prevent Hezbollah’s military buildup in the region, including the use of military force if necessary.

A UNIFIL soldier in a village in southern Lebanon: ‘A weakened UNIFIL mandate does not allow for proactive use of force’
photo: Sebastian Castelier / shutterstock.com

“Kosovo Force” as a Possible Model for an Effective Peacekeeping Force

The Kosovo Force (KFOR) was established under UN Security Council Resolution 1244 in June 1999 to create an effective peacekeeping force led and commanded by NATO in Kosovo. This was initiated following NATO’s military intervention in the region in response to the severe humanitarian crisis caused by the war between Yugoslavia (under Milosevic’s regime) and the Kosovo Liberation Army, which resulted in over a million displaced persons. The formation of KFOR was made possible through agreements between NATO and the key actors in the conflict, particularly the Serbian government. While the force initially consisted of tens of thousands of soldiers, its numbers have since decreased to approximately 4,000 troops today, originating from 32 NATO member states and partner countries. KFOR personnel operate alongside the Kosovo Police and the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX).

Resolution 1244 outlines KFOR’s primary missions, which focus on ensuring security and freedom of movement for all communities in Kosovo, deterring “hostile activities,” and maintaining a safe environment for dialogue between conflict parties. Specifically, NATO’s operational directives guiding KFOR’s activities authorize the force to use military power to protect civilians, maintain security stability, defend government institutions, and engage in self-defense when necessary. Unlike Resolution 1701, which governs UNIFIL’s authority, Resolution 1244 grants NATO—KFOR’s overseeing entity—complete operational flexibility in defining its force’s guidelines. This effectively reflects NATO’s broader security interests without substantial limitations from external stakeholders. KFOR is structured into five task forces, each led by a different NATO member state. In recent years, it has been reorganized into two regional commands.

Is the Kosovo Force More Effective?

The uniqueness of the force as a multinational military body under NATO’s command has allowed it to establish relevance and build a reputation for operational effectiveness. Over its 25 years of activity, the force has been involved in several key events requiring proactive action to maintain security stability in Kosovo.

For example, during the Mitrovica crisis in 2000—where ethnic tensions between Albanian and Serbian communities in the divided city escalated into violence—KFOR established barriers and deployed forces at points of friction between communities. This included enforcing physical separation, even through the use of live fire, which resulted in casualties among both residents and KFOR soldiers. Similar inter-communal clashes occurred in 2004 and 2011, involving violent confrontations between Serbian elements and KFOR forces, including exchanges of fire that led to complete spatial separation between the populations. More recently, in 2023, KFOR troops used force to protect government buildings in Zvečan following disputes over alleged fraud in local elections.

In these and other incidents, KFOR has suffered over 200 casualties from a wide range of nationalities, demonstrating the depth of its involvement in enforcing physical separation between the conflicting parties in Kosovo.

The force has also received significant praise from various international bodies throughout its 25 years. It is considered one of the most successful modern peacekeeping models, alongside missions such as the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG), NATO’s Stabilization Force in Bosnia (SFOR), and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

Former IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi in a meeting with UNIFIL Commander, General Stefano Del Col, in 2019.
Photo: IDF Spokesperson
Advantages and Disadvantages of the KFOR Model in Southern Lebanon
From an Israeli perspective, adopting the Kosovo Force model as a replacement for UNIFIL in southern Lebanon presents both risks and opportunities.
Potential Advantages:
  1. Greater Operational Freedom – Unlike UNIFIL, which operates under a restrictive mandate that has rendered it powerless in its designated area of responsibility, KFOR’s mandate allows it to act effectively in enforcement and de-escalation efforts. While this mandate does not fully address covert hostile activities, such as the construction of offensive tunnels, implementing a similar model in southern Lebanon could give the force the capability to confront Hezbollah operatives in the region—or, at the very least, deter them from openly conducting operations.
  2. Reduced Israeli Dependence on the UN – Deploying KFOR under the supervision of an international military alliance such as NATO could mitigate Israeli criticism of the UN’s performance in normative matters. Israel has long viewed the UN as biased against it and lacking fundamental fairness in handling international conflicts involving Israel. Furthermore, Israel is a NATO partner country. It has maintained extensive bilateral relations with the alliance for many years, including participation in military exercises, intelligence sharing, and high-level diplomatic engagement.
  3. Perceived Political Achievement—Given the heavy toll on human lives, the long-term psychological impact, and the significant economic costs of the ongoing northern conflict, the public is justified in expecting an upgraded multinational force to replace UNIFIL. A force modeled after KFOR could meet this expectation by providing a tangible and practical response to the failures that plagued the previous peacekeeping mission in the region.
Potential Disadvantages:
  1. Lack of Consensus Among NATO Members for Deployment – According to NATO’s operational principles, deploying a peacekeeping force requires unanimous approval from all 32 member states, including Turkey. Given the deterioration in Israeli-Turkish relations since the outbreak of Operation “Swords of Iron”—characterized by confrontational rhetoric at the highest levels—securing Turkish approval would likely be a significant challenge. Moreover, even if Turkey agrees, Israel may oppose granting Ankara any considerable role in maintaining security stability in southern Lebanon. Such an agreement could also prompt Turkey to demand a key role in the post-war political resolution in Gaza, which Israel would likely reject.
  2. Potential Risks for IDF Forces in the Northern Arena – A more robust peacekeeping mandate, with actual enforcement powers and authorization to use force, could lead to future confrontations with IDF soldiers and security forces operating in the border area. For example, in a scenario where Israel wishes to conduct a preemptive operation, such as neutralizing a terrorist cell near the border fence, the presence of a peacekeeping force with absolute authority could create inherent friction. In an extreme scenario, this could result in clashes between IDF and multinational forces. Thus, Israeli approval of a KFOR-style force could limit its operational freedom in the northern arena.
  3. Potential Diplomatic Tensions with the U.S. – A NATO-led multinational force would grant the United States significant influence over the force’s operations and priorities due to its dominant role in NATO’s political, operational, and financial structure. Consequently, if U.S. strategic interests in the region clash with Israeli objectives, this could lead to additional diplomatic tensions between Jerusalem and Washington—an outcome that Israel would be advised to avoid whenever possible, regardless of the future U.S. administration.
A German KFOR force in the city of Zvecan, Kosovo: ‘The force is considered one of the successful models of modern peacekeeping forces’
photo: Nikola Fific / shutterstock.com