The geostrategic position of Turkey’s large territory (783,000 sq km) places it at a crossroads between the Balkans in the west and the Caucasus and Iran in the east, and from the Black Sea in the north to the Mediterranean in the south. This strategic location gives Ankara significant leverage for diplomatic engagements with numerous and diverse countries.
Despite being a NATO member, Ankara has recently adopted an oppositional foreign policy towards the West. Its growing closeness with Moscow and Beijing raises questions and deepens concerns in Western capitals. This isn’t just a perception – Turkey has publicly announced its intention to join BRICS, an organization currently comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia, and the UAE. This move underscores Turkey’s political and diplomatic duality.
From Participation in the Korean War to the Invasion of Cyprus
At its inception in 1923, the new Turkish Republic avoided engaging with various international arenas, preferring isolation based on a strategy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
This traditional foreign policy, known by the famous motto of the Republic’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, “Peace at home, peace in the world,” was ended when Turkey allied with the West in the Korean War in 1950. To secure Turkey’s safety against the Soviet Union and to join the Western alliance, Turkish decision-makers took a risky gamble and paid a heavy price – 721 Turkish soldiers fell on Korean soil. The Turks hoped this sacrifice would pave Turkey’s way into NATO, and indeed, two years later, in 1952, Turkey was officially admitted to the alliance.
As expected, during the Cold War, Turkey fully aligned its foreign policy with the West. For example, as early as 1949, Ankara did not hesitate to recognize the State of Israel to please the USA. In addition, Turkey played a significant role in deterring the Soviet Union by agreeing to host Jupiter missiles on its territory in 1961. Turkey’s loyalty continued after the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, the USA folded to Russia’s demands and likely compromised Turkey’s security by dismantling and removing the missiles from Turkish soil.
The removal of the missiles damaged Turkish trust in the USA. However, the real turning point that led to a shift in Ankara’s foreign policy was the Cyprus issue. In 1964, following tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island, Ankara hinted at using military force to protect the ethnic Turkish community’s rights on the island. The USA did not remain indifferent. Then-American President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a very harsh letter to the Turkish Prime Minister, warning Turkey of a possible strategic abandonment to the Soviet Union. This American response was a humiliating slap in the face for Ankara, instead of the expected support in light of Turkey’s significant gestures towards the USA.
In hindsight, it can be determined that since that event until today, mutual trust between Turkey and the West has been consistently eroding. Undoubtedly, the Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus in 1974 played a significant role in destroying this trust. President Johnson’s response not only failed to change Ankara’s policy towards Cyprus but also ruined their relations. Nevertheless, due to the ongoing Soviet threat to Turkey, Turkey was forced to prevent escalating its grievances with the Americans to the extreme.
Joint Maneuver with China, Instead of the Planned One with the West
The collapse of the Soviet Union reduced the mutual dependence between Turkey and the USA and the West. This fact was evident in the stark contrast between Turkey’s cooperation with the USA during the First Gulf War (1990) and the lack of cooperation during the Second Gulf War (2003). Notably, the Turkish parliament, then under Erdoğan’s complete control, rejected a proposal that would have allowed the US military to open a northern front in Iraq, thereby jeopardizing the success of the war against Saddam Hussein.
These cold relations persisted in 2010 when Turkey, a temporary member of the Security Council under Erdoğan’s administration, refused to support sanctions against Iran promoted by the USA. After the UN imposed sanctions on Iran (Resolution 1929), Turkey continued its economic relations with Iran, circumventing the sanctions by smuggling gold bars on airplanes and opening accounts for Iran in the state-owned Turkish bank Halkbank. There is still an ongoing trial in the USA against Halkbank due to these actions.
That same year, Turkey chose to confront Israel by allowing the launch of the violent “Mavi Marmara” flotilla to Gaza from its territory, resulting in the cancellation of Israel’s participation in a joint military exercise between the Turkish military and NATO, called “Anatolian Eagle,” in Konya, central Turkey. Following Turkey’s decision to exclude Israel from the exercise, other NATO countries also withdrew one by one. As a “fitting Turkish response,” Ankara escalated its stance by conducting a joint military exercise with the Chinese military in September of the same year, at the very same location where the NATO exercise had been planned.
In fact, Turkey sought to send a clear message to the West through this incident, and the message was indeed received, deepening the mistrust between Turkey and the USA and Western countries. However, neither side wanted to push this crisis to the limit. In 2012, feeling threatened by the Assad regime, Turkey demanded NATO deploy Patriot batteries on its territory. The alliance countries could not refuse the request, and the batteries were deployed. However, in 2015, the Netherlands and the USA decided to withdraw the equipment and abandon Turkey, to its dismay, without consulting it at all. Moreover, Turkey’s request to purchase Patriot batteries along with the necessary codes was then denied by the USA.
In its desperation, Turkey tried to show the West that it had alternatives and turned to China, which readily agreed to sell it FD-2000 missile defense systems from the Chinese company CPMIEC. But the USA refused to accept the China deal, and following unprecedented pressure from the USA the deal was ultimately canceled.
The cancellation of the agreement with China only deepened the mistrust between Turkey and the USA. In December 2017, Ankara could no longer hold back and signed a deal to purchase S-400 systems from Russia. This move led to numerous statements from NATO countries, which viewed Turkey as a Trojan horse within the alliance.
The diplomatic statements quickly morphed into action when, immediately afterward, in September 2018, NATO conducted a massive exercise – the largest in 20 years – involving all alliance members. During the Trident Javelin exercise, led by a Polish general, a picture of the Republic’s founder, Atatürk, was placed alongside images of the alliance’s adversary leaders. Turkey responded in shock, withdrawing its representatives from the exercise. Ultimately, NATO was forced to issue an apology, and the crisis officially ended, but the cloud of mistrust that had hovered over Turkey for all several years remained.
From Humiliation to Retaliation
Moving from crisis to crisis, NATO’s relations with Turkey hit another snag a few months later at NATO’s London Summit. Turkey announced that it would oppose the “joint defense plan” prepared for Poland and the Baltic states threatened by Russia. Ankara demanded that NATO declare the Kurdish PYD organization in northern Syria a terrorist organization in exchange for its agreement to the plan. However, NATO refused to do so due to the PYD’s willingness to join the fight against ISIS. This led to yet another crisis. Once again, however, the rope was not stretched to the limit, and Turkey had to back down, receiving nothing in return.
The sequence exhibits a now-frequent ritual whereby Turkey feels humiliated by the West and then responds accordingly. Predictably, Turkey’s response to the PYD incident was not long in coming. In October 2020, Turkey announced that it had unpacked the S-400 systems and even activated them at a military base in the city of Sinop in its north. This city is well known to the USA, which had established a Cold War era base there to monitor movements of the Russian navy and air force in the Black Sea region. Turkey loves symbolism and demonstrated with this move its ability to shift between East and West according to its momentary interests.
That same year, the crisis with the USA worsened when Turkey refused to release American pastor Andrew Brunson, who had been imprisoned on charges of espionage. Turkey hoped to make a “religious personnel exchange” deal with the USA involving the exiled cleric, Erdoğan’s arch-enemy Fethullah Gülen, who settled in Pennsylvania. However, the Trump administration preferred not to negotiate with Turkey and refused to extradite him to Ankara. In his unique style, Trump began issuing threats against Turkey’s economy on Twitter, significantly contributing to the devaluation of the Turkish lira.
Trump’s tweets were followed by real action as Washington imposed sanctions on Turkey’s steel and iron industries. Additionally, he imposed direct personal sanctions on Turkey’s interior minister and justice minister for their involvement in Pastor Brunson’s detention. Ankara had to respond by capitulating and immediately released the pastor.
From the American perspective, military sanctions against Turkey persisted due to its acquisition of Russian S-400 systems under the legislative act CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act).
Following the Trump presidency, the Biden administration continued similar policies and did not hesitate to recognize the Armenian genocide. In this tense atmosphere, relations between President Biden and Erdoğan remained strained; since Biden took office, Erdoğan has not been invited to the White House. After warming relations with Israel before the Gaza war, Erdoğan received an invitation from the White House. However, following his pro-Hamas, anti-Israel, and even anti-American stance, the Biden administration canceled the Turkish president’s invitation to Washington.
NATO, but also Shanghai-BRICS
The Russian invasion of Ukraine underscored to Turkey the importance of remaining in NATO, despite the ongoing tensions with the alliance. Turkey’s apprehension towards Russia is rooted in a tumultuous history dating back to the Ottoman Empire, where it suffered defeat at Russian hands on 14 occasions. Furthermore, Greece’s technological progress provides another justification for Turkey to maintain its NATO membership. Nevertheless, both the US and NATO member states struggle with Turkey, neither fully embracing nor completely distancing themselves from it.
As a result, Turkey finds itself part of a defense alliance with countries it doesn’t enjoy being associated with and can’t fully leverage the benefits this alliance offers. So it continues to publicly flirt with NATO’s rivals. Recently, in September 2022, during the Samarkand Summit organized by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Uzbekistan, Turkish President Erdoğan publicly declared his interest in making Turkey a member of the organization. The SCO, founded in 2001, aims to build trust and enhance political, economic, and security cooperation among China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. However, due to Turkey’s efforts to influence the Turkic-origin “stan” countries through pan-Turkism, China and Russia have not allowed Turkey full membership. Of course, Turkey’s NATO membership does not improve its chances of joining the organization.
Turkey’s attempt to join the Chinese-sponsored alliance and “dance at both weddings” was unsuccessful. Still, Erdoğan, in his speech at the UN just days after being rejected by the competing organization, declared Ankara’s loyalty to NATO.
Turkey’s ambivalence characterizes its foreign policy. In the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Turkey struggles to maintain consistency in its approach. As a NATO ally, Ankara was expected to impose sanctions on Russia, but its actual policy is the opposite. For instance, instead of closing its airspace to Moscow like other Western countries, Ankara has turned Turkey into a major transit hub for Russians. Furthermore, the Erdoğan administration refused to sanction Russian oligarchs and even hosted them and their money in Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey repeatedly declares its support for Ukraine’s NATO membership and Ukraine’s right to self-defense. Alongside verbal support, Turkey supplies Bayraktar TB-2 drones to the Ukrainian army, which are used against Russia. Strange? Yes! Inconsistent? Certainly! But that is Turkey.
Russia exploits Turkey to weaken NATO, and Turkey benefits from Russian energy and tourism. It even collaborates with Russia in the nuclear field. Under Russian supervision, Turkey has begun constructing its first nuclear reactor in Akkuyu, Mersin Province, southern Turkey. Announcing this ambitious project signals a “conditional marriage” for at least the next 50 years, during which Turkey may enjoy the embrace of the Russian bear.
Ankara is keen to demonstrate an independent foreign policy. Recently, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan announced Turkey’s intention to become a full member of the BRICS organization, established in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. In recent years, the organization has expanded, and in August, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE became full members. Needless to say, this organization aims to bring “balance” to the global order “against Western dominance.” One of the organization’s main goals is de-dollarization – to challenge the supremacy of the US dollar in international trade. To minimize their reliance on the dollar, these countries promote trade in their national currencies.
The Economy Doesn’t Make the Choice Easier
In early June, Foreign Minister Fidan participated in the extended summit of the “BRICS+” organization in Russia. Following his visit, Fidan traveled to China, where during his visit to a Chinese research institute, he stated that Turkey indeed intends to join the BRICS organization as a full member. Nevertheless, Turkey has not yet submitted an official application for full membership in the organization.
It’s clear that Turkey’s membership in NATO and its participation in the European Customs Union don’t really allow it to join the organization it has its eye on. This leads to a situation where Fidan makes promises to the BRICS organization on one hand, while Erdoğan attends the G-7 summit in Italy on the other.
Despite Turkish declarations, it should not be forgotten that Turkey’s deteriorating economic situation leaves Ankara with little room to maneuver. More than half of Turkey’s imports and exports are within the European Union. In other words, except for China, Turkey’s trade relations with the other BRICS members do not come close to the level of trade with the West. It seems that Turkish Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek, who recently visited London to attract investment to Turkey, also stated that Turkey’s main focus is on Europe, not elsewhere – namely BRICS.
Various ministers in the Turkish government are sending conflicting messages, which is also reflected in Turkey’s de facto policy. Foreign Minister Fidan says that Turkey is making efforts to realize the vision of the “Middle Corridor” (Trans-Caspian International Transport Route) from China to Europe, as a central part of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative,” while trying to promote investment and trade with the West.
The Bottom Line
Turkey’s zigzagging indicates a transition period where it moves from NATO to another, opposing alliance. For now, it is trying to protect itself from Russia through its NATO membership, while also forging security and strategic agreements with Russia. It is attempting to create trade and economic alternatives to the West, but also wants to enjoy the advantages of the profitable relationship with those same countries. It is hurt by the West and doesn’t know how to handle its relations with it, but also carries a bitter historical memory of its relations with Russia. It flaunts its NATO membership but also flirts with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS countries.
Turkey risks paying a heavy price for the loss of trust with the West. It continues a fruitful dialogue with NATO’s opposition, getting excited about the new lover but refusing to divorce the long-time partner. Both the lover and the long-time partner, the official one, have to accept it as it is for now. However, it’s quite possible that Turkey will soon reach a crossroads where it will have to choose between them.
Under Erdoğan and Fidan, culturally, Turkey is positioning itself to depart from alliances with democratic nations that uphold freedoms of expression and civil liberties, thereby gravitating towards alignment with the Shanghai-BRICS bloc, which is a more natural fit for its interests.
