The multi-front campaign in which Israel has been engaged since October 7, 2023, presents a series of strategic challenges, including its international standing. According to Israeli political and military perceptions, the country’s international position directly impacts its capacity to conduct operations across various theaters.
As of the writing of this article, the erosion of Israel’s foreign relations is notably evident. This deterioration is manifested in the severing of diplomatic ties with several South American countries, including Colombia and Bolivia, as well as a significant decline in relations with key European Union nations like Belgium and Spain. Additionally, several countries, such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, have imposed restrictions on security export components to Israel, while the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor has sought arrest warrants for both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense. Collectively, these factors exert immense pressure on preserving the “tailwind” necessary for continuing military operations alongside Israel’s strategic alliance with the United States, particularly as the U.S. approaches the final stretch leading up to the presidential elections scheduled for November 2024.
One of the most significant principles in the theoretical literature on international relations regarding foreign policy management emphasizes the need for “diversification of supports”—the establishment of alternative support mechanisms to advance the state’s interests while mitigating reliance on a single, dominant player, regardless of its influence. This raises a critical question: How can alternative sources of support be generated to assist Israel’s political-security freedom of action in the current era? In this context, we focus on Israel’s relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—the largest political-military alliance in the world, comprising 32 member states and nearly one billion citizens under its defense umbrella.
Mutual Defense Clause
Established in 1949 as part of the post-World War II American-led global order, NATO aims to ensure collective security for its Western member nations. The heart of the alliance, as defined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of 1949, is the “mutual defense” clause, which stipulates that an armed attack against one member state is considered an attack against all member states—interpreted as a mutual commitment to defend the territory of member nations. Since the establishment of the alliance, the twelve founding states—notably the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy—have been joined by an additional twenty member states over the seventy-five years of NATO’s existence. Most of the countries that joined the alliance did so following the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. However, in the past two years, following the expansion of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, both Sweden and Finland—historically adherents to a policy of neutrality—have chosen to align their fates with NATO. This marks a significant strengthening of NATO’s role in international relations in the current era.
In accordance with the standard practices of large international organizations operating in the international arena, NATO incorporates a wide array of decision-making, consultation, oversight, and coordination mechanisms between its two main “heads”: the military integrated structure and the expansive political-diplomatic apparatus based at NATO’s headquarters in Brussels. Within this framework, NATO employs over 10,000 permanent staff members from each of the 32 member states. This fosters cohesion, enabling the creation of a “community” of Western nations bound by defined values: loyalty to democracy, human rights, and the reinforcement of the rule of law. Although these values have somewhat diminished in recent years—part of a global trend towards populist and “personalist” regimes, such as Viktor Orbán’s in Hungary—NATO continues to uphold these principles as foundational. According to widely accepted metrics in the field of international relations, the average level of democracy among member states remains significantly higher than the minimum threshold recognized in the literature.
Structurally, the alliance’s central decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), convenes several times a year at the highest levels, bringing together defense ministers, foreign ministers, and heads of state. Additionally, the alliance holds an annual summit meeting, hosted by one of the member states, during which all member leaders gather for several days of strategic discussions regarding the organization’s direction and future actions.
The Test of Resilience Against Russia
In the past two years, discussions at the NATO summit meetings—most recently held in Washington in July 2024—have focused on the characteristics of the alliance’s support and assistance for Ukraine. This focus stems from the understanding that Ukraine’s continued military resistance against ongoing Russian aggression is critical to the alliance’s security. This is particularly significant given Ukraine’s land border with four NATO member states: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. There is a widespread recognition that, in the event of a successful Russian military operation aimed at toppling the government in Kyiv, a genuine threat to the security of neighboring NATO member countries—especially Finland, Norway, Estonia, and Latvia—could materialize. Furthermore, the expansion of the Russian invasion of Ukraine has placed NATO at a pivotal crossroads: to position itself as the “Western front” against external aggression, through which Western nations coordinate and execute their efforts to support Ukraine, or risk becoming mired in a strategic paralysis, which would lead to the disintegration of member states and a shift toward inconsistent strategic action plans.
In hindsight, approximately two and a half years after the expansion of the invasion in February of 2022, it can be asserted that NATO has successfully established itself as a relevant, leading, attractive, and dynamic organization, serving as the “nerve center” of the West in its policies against its old-new adversary—Russia. It is no coincidence that the Biden administration seeks to credit itself for this achievement in the current election campaign, wherein a recurring media theme posits that the Biden-Harris administration has “revitalized” NATO after it faced an unprecedented crisis during President Trump’s tenure. It is noteworthy that at the NATO summit in Wales in 2014, it was agreed that each member state would increase its defense and security spending to a level of 2% of its GDP. However, upon Trump’s arrival in the White House in January of 2017, only a few nations complied with this decision. Consequently, Trump demanded that member states fulfill their commitments and publicly threatened not to protect those that did not meet this threshold in the event of a Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Turkey as an Obstacle to Israel
From Israel’s perspective, bilateral relations with NATO are rooted in the Mediterranean Dialogue framework, established in 1995 to foster trust between NATO and prospective partners in the Mediterranean Basin. The initiative comprises seven countries: Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Mauritania. At the time of its inception—during the height of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in the 1990s—the United States and its allies aimed to use this platform to advance political-diplomatic dialogue between Israel and countries with which it had no formal relations. However, these ambitions have, thus far, not materialized, and the initiative has remained largely a bureaucratic mechanism for promoting bilateral cooperation between individual states and NATO.
Within this framework, Israel has participated in several NATO military exercises, primarily focused on maritime operations. However, these joint activities came to an almost complete halt following the “Mavi Marmara” incident in May of 2010, which triggered a diplomatic crisis between Israel and Turkey. As a key NATO member since 1952, Turkey effectively vetoed Israel’s continued participation in these exercises, relying on the “consensus principle,” which requires support from all member states for substantial alliance initiatives, such as military partnerships.
Although bilateral relations between Israel and Turkey have slightly improved since 2016, a further deterioration has occurred in recent years—a trend that reached a nadir following the October 7 massacre and Turkey’s severe response to Israel’s subsequent military actions. Nevertheless, despite Turkey’s opposition, the ongoing war in Ukraine and the strategic focus of Western alliance members on upgrading their capabilities to meet current challenges have provided Israel with significant relative advantages for future partnerships with NATO. This dynamic may compel the alliance to strengthen bilateral ties with Israel, even outside the Mediterranean Dialogue initiative. In this context, three primary “pull factors” contribute to Israel’s positioning as a NATO partner in the medium to long term:
1. The Growing Need for Israeli Defense Exports in Light of the Ukraine War: Since the escalation of the war in Ukraine in 2022, an increasing number of NATO member states have turned to Israel as a hub for high-quality defense exports. This shift arises from the understanding that their defense budgets must grow significantly in an era marked by the resurgence of conventional warfare in their “backyards.” In fact, NATO’s guiding principle requires member states to invest 2% of their GDP in defense—a threshold that many have yet to achieve. Indeed, in the past two years, Israel’s major defense industries—Elbit, Rafael, and Israel Aerospace Industries—have reported a significant increase in orders from European NATO member states, particularly for air defense systems, such as the sale of the Arrow 3 system to Germany for approximately €3 billion, as well as active defense systems, traditional munitions, and advanced capabilities in both defensive and offensive cyber domains.
2. Israel’s Technological Asset, Particularly in Cyber: The cyber threats facing NATO—marked by a rise in sophisticated attacks from Russia and China, along with online assaults on critical infrastructure and increasing attempts to interfere in democratic processes within member states—have reinforced Israel’s position as an essential source of military-technological innovation. Cyber remains at the forefront of Israel’s appeal to potential NATO partners, both on the governmental level—through cooperation with intelligence agencies and national cyber entities—and through its local ecosystem of private corporations and numerous start-ups specializing in this field.
3. Israel’s Cumulative Military Experience from “Iron Swords”: Over the past year, the Israeli intelligence and security establishment, led by the IDF and emergency organizations, alongside civil defense units and various other state entities, has gained unique operational experience in addressing multi-theater conflict scenarios. Moreover, the increasing involvement of the Iranian regime in the Ukrainian theater, through the provision of military supplies and expertise to Russia, positions Israel as a unique knowledge hub in countering this adversary. In conjunction with all of these factors, Israel’s role as a global knowledge center for counter-terrorism and urban warfare continues to enhance its overall desirability. In this context, prior to October 7, 2023, NATO expressed interest in conducting specialized training in combat medicine as part of the Partnership Training and Education Centers (PTEC) program.
