Against the backdrop of continued IDF military activity in recent weeks targeting Hamas strongholds in the Gaza Strip, an intensive effort is concurrently underway by the mediating countries—Egypt and Qatar, with active U.S. support—to establish a new framework for a ceasefire and hostage release deal. From the information recently published in the media, a clear impression emerges that the talks among the relevant parties are currently at a sensitive stage, with all options still on the table and progress toward a new agreement far from guaranteed.
Media reports indicate that new proposals for an indirect agreement between Israel and Hamas are under discussion. According to these reports, Hamas has agreed to a new Qatari-Egyptian framework, which was formulated during Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s visit to Doha in mid-April. The agreement includes the following key components: withdrawal of IDF forces from Gaza; administration of the Gaza Strip by a community-supported administrative committee and forces affiliated with the Palestinian Authority; release of all 59 Israeli hostages held in Gaza; end of the war and withdrawal of Israeli troops from the strip; a declaration by Hamas that it is “laying down its arms”; and reconstruction of the Gaza Strip without displacing Palestinian residents.
The media reports did not provide a clear explanation of what is meant by Hamas “laying down its arms.” The operational implications of this clause remain unclear and open to interpretation. It is ambiguous whether this refers to Hamas entirely disarming or simply ceasing hostile activities against Israel.
Additionally, it was reported that the mediators—Egypt and Qatar—received a commitment from the United States to exert pressure on Israel to accept the new proposal. The three countries are expected to make a concerted effort to secure an agreement to end the war before President Donald Trump’s planned visit to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar in May.
Restarting Efforts
Alongside the Qatari-Egyptian proposal for an agreement between Hamas and Israel, the Saudi journal Al-Majalla published on April 23 a draft framework for renewed negotiations aimed at achieving a permanent ceasefire and hostage release. According to the report, the efforts of Egypt, Qatar, and the U.S. paved the way for this new agreement. The proposed draft includes 12 clauses addressing the following main elements: the release of IDF soldier Idan Alexander, who holds American citizenship, on the first day following the agreement’s approval; a 45-day timeline during which Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners would be released, humanitarian aid would resume, and negotiations would begin for a permanent ceasefire agreement; the release of five hostages on the second day after the deal is approved, in exchange for Israel releasing 66 prisoners serving life sentences and 611 Palestinians from Gaza arrested after October 7, 2023, according to an agreed-upon mechanism and without public rallies or ceremonies; on the second day of the ceasefire, humanitarian aid would resume and infrastructure reconstruction in Gaza would begin; on the second day after the release of the five Israeli hostages, the IDF would begin redeployment in the Rafah area and northern Gaza; on the third day, negotiations—under mediator auspices—would begin regarding the necessary arrangements for a permanent ceasefire, the number of prisoners to be released in exchange for the remaining hostages, further IDF redeployments and Gaza demilitarization, post-war governance arrangements, and a declaration of a permanent ceasefire.
On the seventh day, four hostages would be released, and in return, Israel would release 54 prisoners serving life sentences and 500 Gazans arrested after October 7, 2023 (also without public ceremonies). On the seventh day and following the release of the four live Israeli hostages, the IDF would complete its redeployment east of Salah al-Din Road, and Palestinian movement (without carrying weapons) through the Netzarim crossing would be permitted without restrictions. On the tenth day, Hamas would provide complete information, including medical reports and proof, regarding all remaining live hostages, in exchange for complete information from Israel about Palestinian prisoners arrested after October 7. On the 20th day, Hamas would release 16 deceased Israeli hostages in exchange for 160 bodies of Gazans and provide evidence of the deaths of the remaining Israeli hostages. The negotiations regarding the permanent ceasefire arrangements are to be concluded within 45 days, with an agreement on the release of the remaining hostages (both living and deceased). If the negotiations are not concluded within this timeframe, the ceasefire may be extended as long as hostage releases continue. The guaranteeing mediators—the U.S., Egypt, and Qatar—will make every effort to ensure the negotiations conclude with an agreement on all the arrangements for a permanent ceasefire.
Given the current circumstances, there is a possibility of resuming indirect negotiations between Israel and Hamas based on the Qatari-Egyptian proposal presented to both sides. In recent days, an intensive effort to restart the talks has been observed. This was reflected in a Hamas delegation’s visit to Cairo on April 23 and a visit by Mossad chief David Barnea to Doha on April 24. This followed the earlier visit of Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed Al Thani to Washington, during which he met with Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff.
Clinging to Arms
Hamas is expected to participate in the upcoming round of negotiations on the ceasefire and the issue of the hostages, if indeed it takes place, presenting a resolute and unequivocal position. In public statements, senior Hamas officials have expressed an apparent willingness to release all hostages without exception in a single phase, but only in exchange for a ceasefire and a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip. Hamas leaders present this uncompromising stated position as a fundamental precondition for an agreement with Israel.
In response to a clause in the proposed agreement with Israel referring to the disarmament of Hamas, senior members of the organization emphasized that they were surprised that such an explicit clause was included. Hamas officials expressed strong and unequivocal opposition to “even discussing the issue of weapons,” claiming that, for the organization, progress toward an agreement hinges solely on the demands for an end to the war and an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. For example, Hamas official Sami Abu Zuhri said in an interview on April 14 that the demand for “the disarmament of the resistance” is an impossible condition meant to thwart the attainment of an agreement, adding that “this is not up for discussion and will not happen… the retention of resistance weapons depends on the continuation of the occupation. In its new proposal, Israel does not declare a commitment to a complete ceasefire and merely wants to retrieve the hostages.”
Khalil al-Hayya, a senior member of Hamas’ political bureau and the organization’s representative in indirect negotiations with Israel, stated that “the resistance and its weapons are linked to the existence of the occupation and are a ‘natural right’ of the Palestinian people and all peoples under occupation.” In another context, he emphasized that “Hamas opposes partial agreements and seeks comprehensive negotiations for ending the war and releasing the hostages in exchange for an agreed-upon number of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails.”
Al-Hayya blamed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for the failed talks so far, claiming that “for over a year we held negotiations and fulfilled all our obligations. Netanyahu and his government reversed course before completing the first phase… Netanyahu responded with impossible proposals, and we are ready to immediately begin negotiations for a deal that includes the release of all hostages, in exchange for an agreed number of Palestinian prisoners, a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and the beginning of reconstruction… Netanyahu and his government are using partial agreements as a cover for their political agenda based on continuing the war, and we will not be part of this policy.”
Another senior Hamas figure, Mahmoud Mardawi, was equally unequivocal in an interview with Al Jazeera on April 15 regarding the demand for Hamas’ disarmament: “Hamas will never negotiate over weapons or over those who hold them… disarming the resistance is solely an Israeli proposal, not an Egyptian one.” In another interview with Al Jazeera on April 17, Mardawi stated that “Hamas has no intention of advancing negotiations for a deal without a commitment from Israel to fulfill the demands for ending the war and withdrawing from the Gaza Strip,” and rejected the Israeli demand for Hamas’ disarmament. He firmly argued that this issue is outside the scope of discussion.
Sharp Internal Palestinian Criticism
The Palestinian Authority’s position on the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip was reflected in a strongly worded and unusual statement by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. In a speech delivered on April 23 in Ramallah, he sharply criticized Hamas. He called on it “to hand over the hostages to prevent Israeli excuses,” referring to the organization’s operatives in highly derogatory terms as “sons of dogs.” He also referred to the Hamas coup against the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip in June 2007 as an event that provided Israel with a “pretext to destroy the Gaza Strip,” claiming that 2,165 families were utterly wiped out, 6,664 were partially wiped out, and more than two-thirds of the homes were destroyed in the war. Against this backdrop, he emphasized that “the war must end, because every day hundreds are killed—why?” In a confrontational tone, he addressed Hamas: “You don’t want to hand over the American hostages, sons of dogs? Hand over the hostages and end this affair.”
There is no doubt that this was an unusual and extraordinary statement by the President of the Palestinian Authority, especially considering its timing, during the height of the war. Nonetheless, it undoubtedly reflects his critical, authentic, and well-known stance toward Hamas, which he sees as having brought a severe humanitarian disaster upon the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. His negative attitude toward the organization is undoubtedly also driven by memories of the past—the violent expulsion of the Palestinian Authority from the Gaza Strip and Hamas’ takeover of the area in June 2007, which has since been framed in Palestinian historiography as “a coup against the legitimacy” of the Authority’s rule.
Abbas’ demand that Hamas release the hostages—delivered in coarse language (as we have heard from him on some previous occasions)—undoubtedly also expresses the depth of his anger toward the organization. The murderous terror attack of October 7 is, in his view, a deeply problematic event that severely harmed Palestinian interests and may have a long-lasting, negative impact on future efforts to realize Palestinian aspirations in the political arena vis-à-vis Israel.
From conversations I have had in recent weeks with several senior and veteran Fatah activists in the Gaza Strip, it appears that after a year and a half of war and in light of the heavy blow suffered by Hamas, they now feel more confident in openly expressing their hostile stance toward the organization. This has been visibly reflected in demonstrations and protests against Hamas rule that have taken place in various parts of the region in recent weeks. Senior Fatah officials also expressed strong opposition to President Trump’s call for the transfer of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip. This position was accompanied by clear statements expressing local patriotism—a willingness to continue “sumud,” i.e., steadfastness, remaining on the land and holding on to the Gaza Strip—even under challenging conditions. Some of my interlocutors even expressed a willingness to build, over time, a “culture of peace and coexistence with Israel.”
Fatah officials did not hide their criticism of the Israeli government, which they claim seeks not only to continue the war but even to expand it. They argued that this serves the interests of the governing coalition, which aims to retain power. Regarding the continuation of the war, senior Fatah members seek to change the current reality as a basis for a new organization and regulation of the situation. In practice, they are calling on Israel to stop the war and allow the deployment of an international force, composed of representatives from Egypt, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the U.S., and the European Union.
From their point of view, this international force would be tasked with securing the Gaza borders and advancing the demilitarization of the area. This would involve the disarmament of Hamas and the other “military” Palestinian organizations, based on the assumption that the rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip cannot take place in an area defined as a military zone. At the same time, they emphasized that Israel must open the Rafah crossing and noted that, in their estimation, this step is expected to lead to a large-scale voluntary emigration of Palestinians.
It is important to note that the growing self-confidence observed in these conversations with Fatah activists at this particular time was reflected in unequivocal condemnations of Hamas. In this context, they expressed to me feelings of “revulsion and discomfort” regarding the murderous terror attack on Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip on October 7. At the same time, they voiced harsh criticism of the Israeli military administration’s policies in the Gaza Strip in the late 1970s and early 1980s, claiming that its “unforgivable” mistakes essentially paved the way for the continuous rise of radical militant Islam in the Palestinian arena, particularly in Gaza. From their perspective, a retrospective analysis of developments shows that this culminated in the establishment of Hamas just days after the outbreak of the First Intifada in December 1987—an outcome attributable primarily to Israel.
Israel Is Setting a Timeline
From the totality of information published in recent weeks, it is evident that vigorous contacts are taking place among all relevant parties to move toward concluding a new deal regarding the issue of hostages and a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. At this stage, the overall picture regarding the direction and pace of progress in the talks is dynamic and evolving, making it difficult to draw firm conclusions or confidently predict how developments will unfold. Under the current circumstances, all options regarding potential outcomes of the ongoing negotiations remain on the table. However, given the wide gaps between Hamas’ and Israel’s respective positions, it is likely that even if an agreement is ultimately reached, it will be limited and partial.
Hamas continues to present Israel with resolute positions, demanding an end to the war and a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as preconditions for resuming negotiations. It is essential in this context to note a recent report published in the London-based newspaper “Rai Al-Youm,” which stated that Hamas had received messages from Arab countries warning that if it does not respond to current ceasefire proposals with Israel, Hamas leaders operating outside the Gaza Strip will become Israeli targets. According to the report, Arab countries are pressuring Hamas to agree to disarm in exchange for an end to the war and the withdrawal of IDF forces from the Gaza Strip.
At this juncture, Israel is facing three main options regarding the continuation of its campaign in Gaza:
- A willingness to agree on a new deal for a ceasefire and the release of hostages. As part of this deal, Israel would commit to ending the war and withdrawing its forces from the Gaza Strip. At the same time, Hamas would receive binding international guarantees to prevent Israel from resuming hostilities in the future.
- Continuing military operations in the Gaza Strip under current parameters, to create the necessary conditions to advance toward a new ceasefire and hostage release agreement.
- Escalating military operations in the Gaza Strip by expanding the scale of IDF forces, to achieve decisive control on the ground. This would include providing relevant responses and developing appropriate methods for delivering humanitarian aid to the population.
So far, Israel has consistently avoided making explicit statements about its plans for governance in Gaza on the “day after the war.” It is highly likely that, in a scenario where the IDF expands its military activities to the point of regaining control over the area, the imposition of a military-civilian administration in the territory will become a central issue requiring Israel to make decisions and reach a resolution.
At this point, there is a clear impression that Israel intends to allow for a limited window of time, measured in days or a few weeks, to test the feasibility of advancing negotiations toward a new deal with Hamas. It is assumed that if the ongoing talks ultimately fail to produce a breakthrough, Israel will have no choice but to intensify its military activity as a means of exerting increased pressure on Hamas to adopt more flexible positions that will enable progress toward a new agreement. This was reflected in a direct statement made by the IDF Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, during a visit to the Rafah area on April 24, in which he warned that if there is no progress on the return of the hostages, the IDF will expand the war until Hamas is defeated.
The rationale behind this assessment regarding the potential impact of increased military pressure on Hamas is based on the assumption that the more severe and powerful the blow to the organization—particularly in terms of damage to its military infrastructure (weapon stockpiles, tunnels, etc.) and fighting force—the greater its willingness will be to reach an agreement. This would include, if necessary, softening its maximalist positions and adopting a more realistic approach that considers the objective realities on the ground.
