The frantic efforts led by the U.S. and mediators Egypt and Qatar have yet to yield a real breakthrough. The mediators refer to the initiative as the “hostage deal,” but in reality, it is a deal to end the war—which is the core of the dispute. The gaps between the parties regarding the Philadelphi Corridor remain significant, as do the disagreements over the number of living hostages to be released, the number of Palestinian terrorists to be freed, Israel’s veto power over the identities of senior and particularly dangerous prisoners, and the issue of their deportation or prevention from returning to their places of residence.
As usual, the U.S. insists on projecting optimism about the chances of success, while Israel remains more skeptical. Hamas continues its familiar tactic of stringing everyone along, signaling both agreement and rejection of the proposed framework. Meanwhile, the organization’s senior representatives, including Khalil Al-Hayya, who is close to Yahya Sinwar, are still in Qatar, meeting with the mediators.
Even before Sinwar was elected head of Hamas’ political bureau (August 6, 2024), he was the ultimate decision-maker. He did not allow the organization’s external leadership to impose agreements on him. As Hamas’ leader, his authority over negotiations is operational and formal, and he alone will make the final decision.
Although it is impossible to grasp Sinwar’s thoughts and considerations fully, from a Western perspective, his appointment as the organization’s leader should have incentivized him to reach a deal for at least three reasons. First, such an agreement could secure his survival and Hamas’ continued rule over Gaza. Second, the deal would result in the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, many of whom are Fatah members. Third, the deal’s achievements for Hamas would enhance the movement’s standing in the eyes of the Palestinian public, ensuring its political advantage over Fatah and the Palestinian Authority. Additionally, such an agreement would lead to Gaza’s reconstruction through massive aid, which Hamas would benefit from, allowing it to rebuild its military and governing capabilities. Sinwar could present this deal as a total victory for Hamas, demonstrating that the strongest army in the Middle East did not defeat it. This would also cement his place in Palestinian history.
On the other hand, it seems that Sinwar remains committed to his belief that Israel’s downfall will begin with a broad regional war, through which Hamas will not only survive but also gain the status of a vanguard force, seen as the initiator of a historic shift. With this mindset, Sinwar is expected to continue rejecting the deal while maneuvering, manipulating, and attempting to exploit the pressure on Israel and the growing international criticism against it.
Israel’s Disadvantaged Position
On the surface, the continuation of negotiations in Doha suggests that the U.S., along with Egypt and Qatar, assumes that Sinwar is willing to reach a deal and that the issue lies in bridging the remaining gaps. However, it is also possible that the negotiations themselves are the objective. By prolonging endless rounds of talks, the U.S. avoids admitting failure—a scenario that could cast a shadow over the presidential elections and harm its status and prestige. Similar considerations apply to Qatar and Egypt, which are seeking to maintain their influence as key regional players. The U.S. is stretching the process and pressuring Israel in an attempt to prevent what it sees as a regional war and Iranian involvement in the conflict.
Adding to this dynamic are the open disagreements and lack of harmony between certain members of the Israeli negotiation team, the Prime Minister, and the security cabinet. These divisions are exploited to pressure Israel into further concessions. The U.S. and mediators use leaks about the disagreements and positions within the negotiating team to apply leverage on the Prime Minister—directly or indirectly—by shaping public opinion over the government’s head.
As a result, Israel finds itself in a disadvantaged position in the negotiations, as leaks expose strategic discussions conducted behind closed doors. The government and its leadership can prevent such leaks, even if it requires replacing the negotiation team with skilled professionals who will adhere strictly to the objectives and limitations set by the political leadership.
Since the beginning of the war, and increasingly in recent weeks, it has become clear that various factions and splinter groups in Gaza are holding hostages, both alive and dead. These groups distance themselves from Sinwar and oppose any compromise with Israel. Some of them are even more extreme than Hamas, determined to continue the fight and willing to agree to a hostage deal only in exchange for the release of all Palestinian prisoners held in Israel and a full return to the pre-October 6th situation.
From the perspective of Hamas and the more extreme factions, one of the weak points of the proposed deal is that, by its conclusion, not all their prisoners might be released. It appears that Israel and the mediators are conceding to Hamas’ refusal to provide a list of the living hostages it holds. This refusal—despite a signed agreement—indicates Hamas’ fear of revealing the actual numbers and identities of the hostages, as the accurate count may be significantly lower than estimated or hoped for. Such a revelation could weaken Hamas’ bargaining power and reduce its ability to demand a high price in negotiations.
A fundamental assumption is that under any circumstances, Hamas will keep several hostages as insurance, as Sinwar does not trust any guarantees that Israel will not target him. From his perspective, holding onto hostages remains a crucial tool for perpetuating the struggle and inflicting continued harm on Israeli society—regardless of the hostages held by other factions. For Israel, this reality should redefine all parameters of the deal, as well as the strategic and moral costs it is being asked to bear. Under these circumstances, the agreement in its current form is not a reasonable one for Israel.
Israel cannot ensure the release of all living hostages, nor even the retrieval of all hostage remains. In exchange for a minimal achievement—which could condemn the remaining hostages to death or prolonged captivity—Israel would be forced to relinquish all its leverage. In practice, even if the deal is violated at some stage, Israel would find it extremely difficult to reverse course.
Given the current situation and the absence of any strategic or moral justification for the deal under the proposed terms, Israel must persuade the U.S. and the mediators to reset the entire process. Israel should demand the release of all hostages, both living and dead, within a short timeframe, in exchange for the painful release of Palestinian terrorists based on a predetermined ratio, while ensuring the survival of the last remnants of Hamas leadership only if they exit Gaza alive.
Since the U.S. acknowledges the need to establish a civilian governing alternative to Hamas in Gaza—and since such an alternative cannot be established as long as Hamas remains the ruling power—it is imperative to ensure the complete dismantling of Hamas’ sovereignty and governing and military capabilities. Therefore, there should be no opposition to the demand for the total removal of Hamas remnants from Gaza, particularly its military and political leadership, with Sinwar at the forefront.
This demand should be presented as a unified and agreed-upon stance among all mediators, framed as the only viable option with a strict timeline. If the Hamas leadership refuses the offer, Israel will then have to complete the takeover of Gaza, establish a temporary military administration, finalize the destruction of Hamas’ capabilities, and prepare the conditions for a civilian governing alternative to Hamas.
What Does the U.S. Want?
The top priority for the United States is securing a ceasefire. While the concerns outlined above regarding the hostages are significant to Washington, they remain secondary to the overarching goal of ending the war. The U.S. aims to prevent the conflict from expanding into a full-scale regional war, which would impose intolerable strategic and security costs on Israel. Washington views a ceasefire in Gaza as a means to de-escalate tensions with Hezbollah, potentially halting rocket fire on northern Israel and giving Iran a reason to restrain its proxies. However, freezing the conflict in this manner is untenable for Israel, as it would project weakness and signal that its primary objective is to postpone the inevitable confrontation—while its enemies continue to grow stronger in preparation for the next war.
Suppose Israel fails to convince the U.S. of the necessity to change the parameters of the hostage deal. In that case, it will have no choice but to stand firm on its security interests and take unilateral action to ensure them. The desire of the hostage families to see their loved ones released “now and at any cost” is entirely understandable, and they should not be judged for it. However, the government and political leadership bear a broader responsibility. They are obligated not only to secure the release of all hostages but also to ensure Israel’s security and future by reshaping the security reality, neutralizing severe threats, and strengthening deterrence for years to come.
The government’s overarching responsibility toward all hostages is also rooted in a moral and ethical principle. The Prime Minister and senior political leaders will ultimately have to face the families of those left behind in Gaza—knowing that their fate will be prolonged suffering, if not a death sentence—and justify why it was right, just, and moral to accept a deal that prioritized one category of hostages (those classified as “humanitarian cases”) over others. The demand for the release of all hostages in a single stage will be widely accepted as a moral and legitimate requirement, both by the majority of hostage families and by the Israeli public at large.
