The plight of families whose loved ones are held by Hamas has been at the center of public attention since October 7, and even more so in recent weeks, during the nerve-wracking trickle of hostages’ return. The common term used in the discourse is the “hostage deal,” but behind these two words lies psychological warfare with nuances worthy of closer examination.
Taking prisoners of war has been a standard practice in military conflicts throughout history, but Hamas’s approach stands out as unique. The price it demands in the current war and previous kidnappings is intentionally designed to thwart successful negotiations and serves as yet another stage in the psychological warfare the terrorist organization has been waging since its establishment in 1987, during the early days of the First Intifada. Hamas correctly recognized the disparity between its power and Israel’s and, like its competitor for representing the Palestinians – the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) – turned to revolutionary North Vietnamese-style warfare, combining terrorism, guerrilla tactics, and psychological operations.
Psychological warfare, by definition, involves the use of primarily non-violent persuasion methods directed at different target audiences, foremost among them the soldiers and civilians of the enemy, during times of war. It aims to convince the enemy that victory is unattainable, that the costs of casualties, morale, and global image outweigh the benefits, and that physical strength and weapons will not prevail over the spirit and sacrifice of the operator. Through psychological warfare, the operator seeks to divide the enemy society into its components and set them against each other. To do this effectively, the operator must deeply understand the enemy’s culture and use messages and transmission techniques that can penetrate the barrier of hostility between the sides. In a more concise definition, it can be described as using “public relations” techniques during wartime.
The Palestinians possess certain advantages in the field of psychological warfare. Hamas, for example, is a flexible organization with a short chain of command, allowing for more straightforward implementation of local initiatives. This contrasts with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which operates with a longer chain of command. Additionally, Palestinians are more familiar with Israeli culture and language than Israelis are with local Arab culture.
The saga following the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit stretched over five and a half years until his release. The current phase began with the events of October 7, whose purpose was to shake Israeli society to its core, raising existential questions (such as obtaining a second passport, relocating, or purchasing real estate abroad) and prolonging the event as much as possible. From the perspective of psychological warfare, the primary achievement in the negotiations over the return of the hostages is the erosion of Israeli social cohesion. In contrast, the release of prisoners is only a secondary priority. The so-called “deal” serves as the means through which morale is undermined, frustration is heightened, and political instability is increased within Israeli society. By keeping the fate of the hostages unclear, dripping fragments of information, and demonstrating cruelty – whether through the release of footage showing six dead in a tunnel, staging the “liberation ceremony” of four female observers on stage, or releasing a video of Arbel Yehud’s proof of life just three days before her expected release – Hamas portrays Israel, the regional power, as incapable of overcoming a united popular movement.
At the time of writing, the public has no official information about the health condition of the hostages – let alone visits by Red Cross representatives. Unsurprisingly, Hamas does not refrain from demanding detailed information about the conditions of its imprisoned militants in Israel. It is worth recalling the case of Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser, where Hezbollah managed to maintain ambiguity about their condition until the very last moment. In a live broadcast to the entire Israeli public, a military truck arrived and unloaded two coffins.
Terror, Paralysis, and Helplessness: Hamas’s Psychological Warfare Against Israel
This section will focus on Hamas’s local psychological warfare campaign against Israel without delving into the broader picture involving a hostile American administration, Qatari and European funding aimed at dividing Israeli society, and the operation of a global antisemitic campaign. Faced with Israel’s significant military achievements in Gaza, Hamas, lacking other alternatives, turns to psychological warfare to present what it hopes will be regarded in the long term as another success in its ongoing campaign to establish global Islam.
The directives given to Hamas’s Nukhba forces before they invaded Israeli communities near Gaza—organized rape, murder, and kidnapping, as well as equipping them with GoPro cameras—do not fall under the classic definition of psychological warfare. These acts are primarily violent and are thus categorized as “warfare with psychological effects,” similar to the bombings of London and Dresden during World War II. However, the hostage crisis, despite the violent circumstances of the abductions, falls within the classic definition of psychological warfare. I included the “primarily non-violent” caveat in the definition. The pre-prepared logistics for hiding the hostages in tunnels and apartments in Gaza, the messaging, and the political coordination serve as a case study that should be taught in military academies worldwide.
In psychological warfare, target audiences are divided into three groups: domestic (own population), the enemy, and neutral parties. Different messages are tailored for each audience. However, the challenge arises when these messages conflict. For example, in Israel, there is a contradiction between messages of strength directed at the Arab world and messages of weakness aimed at the Western world. Hamas faces a similar dilemma, projecting strength to its domestic and Islamic audiences while simultaneously portraying weakness and appealing for help to the West.
At the start of the war, the hostages were categorized based on personal details, political connections, and other personal information. They were then distributed across various locations in Gaza with strict compartmentalization. Subsequently, they were photographed in stills and videos for later use in evolving contexts and scenarios. Through these tactics, Hamas, learning from the lessons of Gilad Shalit’s abduction, managed to project both ruthlessness and unrestrained violence on the one hand and Islamic religious mercy on the other.
Different messages are aimed at each target audience. Since war is inherently violent and brutal, it provides ample imagery of cruelty. The first to recognize this was the North Vietnamese Army’s General Võ Nguyên Giáp, who influenced American society by continuously supplying images of civilian casualties in his country, including ones he orchestrated. His disciple, Yasser Arafat, and his successor, Ismail Haniyeh, adopted this principle, launching rockets from civilian areas deliberately. Additionally, the Palestinians have staged numerous events, the most infamous being the Muhammad al-Durrah incident in September 2000. In the current war, the Palestinians continue to stage various events to amplify the real casualty toll and reinforce the perception of Israeli brutality and alleged war crimes.
Hamas oscillates between two overarching themes: cruelty and humanitarian gestures. On one hand, violence is meant to signal that the organization is unrestrained and will stop at nothing to achieve its goals. On the other hand, carefully staged gestures, such as the release of four hostages in a theatrical ceremony, aim to present a façade of humanitarianism. Hamas justifies violence and cruelty as their only option against Israel’s superior weaponry. This was their past justification for suicide bombings following the Oslo Accords and is their current rationale for holding women and children hostage.
From Hamas’s perspective, negotiations are the goal, not the means. The process must be prolonged as much as possible under various pretexts, all while continuously blaming Israel. Negotiations are alternately stalled and restarted, raising Israeli families’ hopes only to crush them, with Israeli decision-makers blamed for the outcome. Blaming the enemy is a central tenet of psychological warfare. Everything that happens is portrayed as the enemy’s fault (blame shift). Initially, this may seem absurd in light of the events of October 7. Still, the blame gradually permeates public consciousness as time passes (and it always does, unless it is reignited from a different angle). In this, Hamas has undoubtedly succeeded. The prevailing belief among large segments of Israeli society is that the Prime Minister is to blame for failing to secure a “deal.”
A population stirred into emotional arousal through constant emotional messages becomes highly susceptible to manipulation. This is the message they begin to believe wholeheartedly. Emotional arousal requires creativity in staging scenarios and crafting macabre scripts designed to instill fear, paralysis, frustration, and helplessness in the enemy, ultimately leading to surrender. The disappointment is so profound that the target population reaches a mental state of blindness to the consequences of its decisions, focusing solely on alleviating the unbearable psychological pressure.
This explains one of the peaks of Hamas’s campaign: broadcasting videos of hostages killed during retreats from advancing IDF forces. Viewers, horrified and transfixed by these “snuff films,” cannot help but think that, with a bit of goodwill, the deaths of those hostages could have been prevented. It is a reality show played out in real life instead of in the horror film genre. The logical next step, orchestrated by Hamas, is to direct public anger toward the political leadership, blaming it for these outcomes.
Every Frame and Every Word is Deliberately Planned
In the past, recruiting agents to send newspapers from enemy countries was necessary to understand their mindset. Today, this is no longer required; the art lies in extracting intelligence (in this case, cultural intelligence) from an overwhelming flood of information. Hamas demonstrates a keen understanding of Israeli behavior, as seen in the video featuring Liri Albak and the video of the release of four female hostages, both of which showcase the organization’s advanced psychological warfare tactics.
Let’s start with the broader context. The video featuring Albak was strategically broadcast before the regular Saturday evening protest at the Beit Ariela library plaza, now known as “Hostages’ Square.” This timing—similar to the release of videos featuring other hostages, such as Idan Alexander and Matan Zingauker—was welcomed by the media, as it filled a typically slow news cycle. This created the familiar pattern of a public relations event: first, reports surface about the video’s release. Then, it is uploaded to an uncensored platform like Telegram, which offers anonymity and logistical ease for the sender. The footage reaches the family, the media, and security forces simultaneously. This distribution method prevents any control over the message or even a delay in analysis and preparation, dragging the security and political systems—customarily required to act rationally—into the emotional flow of events.
The video appears simple and improvised but is meticulously designed. It is edited, featuring the Hamas logo and the red triangle that has accompanied anti-Israeli messages since October. Albak recites or reads a script against a dark background meant to evoke the image of an underground tunnel. Through her words, Hamas communicates directly with the Israeli public, compelling Israelis to consume the enemy’s message against their will. This tactic is reminiscent of Hezbollah’s success in persuading Israelis to watch Al-Manar by broadcasting its operations against the IDF in Lebanon until the withdrawal in May 2000.
The video is one piece of a larger puzzle designed to pressure the Israeli Prime Minister and the security establishment into a full withdrawal from Gaza, framing it as a complete Hamas victory despite the destruction in the region.
The video, spoken in fluent, contemporary Hebrew by the hostage herself, demonstrates Hamas’s mastery of the language and its nuances. For instance, it avoids mispronouncing the letter “P,” which often provokes ridicule among Israelis. This is a lesson learned from the failed “Come Do Terror Attacks” video during Operation Protective Edge—a mistake Hamas has not repeated, showcasing its continuous refinement of messaging.
As with any standard public relations campaign, the message must be repeated multiple times without becoming tiresome. Each message must be timed and contextualized to capture public attention. In Albak’s video, Hamas chose the start of the Gregorian New Year, a time associated with hope and renewal. In Idan Alexander’s video, delivered in English, the message was directed at future U.S. President Donald Trump, who aims to place the Gaza conflict on his agenda.
The messages spoken by Albak are drawn directly from the Hostages Forum campaign: “Look me in the eyes,” “450 days.” These phrases bridge the activists in the square and the hostage herself, amplifying the campaign’s slogans. Additionally, Hamas introduced new emotional messages: “They’ve forgotten us,” “Remember me,” and “My blood is on your hands.” The latter two create a narrative of someone on death row bidding farewell to life, with the subtext being, once again, that only the Prime Minister can prevent this outcome.
Fully aware that the hostages’ families would scrutinize every frame, Hamas embedded a powerful message aimed at further breaking their spirits. Albak says to the camera: “IDF attacks severely injured someone here; stop these attacks!” This heightened the anxiety among the families of other hostages. Her statement that military pressure will not lead to the release of hostages reveals that this pressure does, in fact, concern Hamas. Hence, from their perspective, they must amplify the message to stop it and disseminate it through every available channel.
The “release ceremony” video of the four female observers adhered to the same principles but from a different angle. Here, Hamas directed a uniform message to all its target audiences—domestic, enemy, and neutral (Western)—audiences that usually require contradictory messaging.
Unlike the chaos of the first phase of the current deal, where masses surrounded three Israeli women during their transfer from Hamas to Red Cross representatives, Hamas applied lessons learned. Instead of Nukhba militants surrounding the released women, the video showed vehicles arriving in an orderly convoy, with crowds kept at a distance (refuting Israel’s claims of staged mass support), Red Cross representatives on a decorated stage, and pseudo-official “release certificates.” The aim was to demonstrate to all audiences that Hamas still maintains complete control in Gaza, functions effectively, and portrays itself as humanitarian.
One comment on Platform X noted that the released women looked far better than one might expect after being held in dark tunnels.
Having brought Israeli society to an extreme state of emotional arousal, Hamas now controls the drip feed of messages and hostage releases. Israel remains completely passive, fearing that any action it takes or criticism it expresses could slow the pace of the returns. This explains why celebrations for released prisoners in the West Bank go undisturbed and why little is done to address Hamas violations in Gaza.
A Campaign to Reverse the Equation is Needed
As mentioned, Israel’s efforts can be schematically divided into three target audiences: domestic, enemy, and neutral.
For the domestic Israeli audience, a document should be distributed by the security establishment outlining the principles of Palestinian psychological warfare and its continuation during the “Operation Iron Swords.” The final section of this document should focus on the implementation of this doctrine during the so-called “negotiations,” which are primarily aimed at eroding the cohesion of Israeli society.
Toward the enemy, efforts should be made to amplify the atmosphere of Hamas’s collapse among the Gaza population. This can be achieved through a visual emphasis on mass scenes showing Hamas operatives surrendering (without stripping them or showing their faces) to IDF soldiers. Additionally, recordings of imprisoned Hamas operatives urging their comrades to spare their lives and surrender to the IDF could be released.
A valuable psychological resource lies with the imprisoned Hamas members currently held in Israel. Messages conveyed by them can bypass the hostility barrier of Gaza residents and their supporters, turning the situation on its head. Direct or indirect messages can be communicated through video clips featuring these prisoners, such as excerpts from interrogations. Each clip should conclude with a targeted message. Utilizing the extensive intelligence gathered by the IDF and Shin Bet interrogators and publishing it (within necessary limits) can create a sense of despair about Israel’s deep intelligence penetration into Hamas and Gazan society. According to traditional intelligence practices, this information already exists and remains classified until it becomes irrelevant. Releasing such information requires a significant mindset shift within the security establishment.
For the neutral audience, a campaign must be launched to reverse the equation and shift the blame onto Hamas. This should involve a multi-faceted media campaign utilizing both traditional and new media to tarnish the organization’s image and that of its supporters. The campaign should depict Hamas as an Islamist entity exploiting Palestinian civilian lives to advance its political goals, emphasizing the misuse of aid that has entered Gaza over the past decade, particularly since the war began.
The campaign should also include references to Iran, urging it to exert its influence (if any remains) on Hamas’s leadership in the Gaza tunnels. Historically, Israel has refrained from launching smear campaigns for decades despite the security establishment’s long-standing knowledge of Hamas’s moral and economic corruption.
A unifying and compelling message for all segments of Israeli society accompanying this proposed campaign could be: “Everything first directed against Israel does not stop at Israel.”
In conclusion, it is crucial to understand that“Operation Iron Swords,” from a Muslim perspective, is just one step in a long journey. Israel must act immediately and draw lessons from its handling of the current situation across all its branches to prepare for similar challenges in the future.
The current hostage crisis was built upon the lessons of the Gilad Shalit case, and there is no reason to hope that another abduction scenario is not being planned. It is essential to recognize that psychological warfare is a structured doctrine adaptable to changing circumstances and learnable. The Western and Jewish aversion to psychological warfare due to its association with Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels should not apply to the fight against an enemy like Hamas.
Psychological warfare saves lives and minimizes infrastructure destruction by expediting surrender and encouraging exit from the conflict cycle. Therefore, a more moral approach can prevent the loss of countless lives on both sides.