The war in Gaza will soon reach its one-year mark, and the path remains long to fulfilling the war objectives as defined by the political leadership. Even if an agreement is reached with regards to the so-called “hostage deal,” bringing the conflict to a halt, Israel cannot afford to accept a scenario in which Hamas reestablishes its power and reclaims control over Gaza. This position runs counter to that held by the U.S. administration, which views ending the war as the cornerstone of its regional strategy. In pursuit of this goal, the administration has invested significant political capital and prestige in brokering a hostage deal, viewing it as a necessary step toward bringing the conflict to a close.
If such an agreement is reached, Israel—supported by the U.S. and regional partners—will need to establish a mechanism that ensures the emergence of an effective political alternative to Hamas rule in Gaza. Such an arrangement would provide Israel with the operational freedom needed to create a new security reality in the region and prevent future threats to communities near the Gaza border as well as to Israel at large.
However, should negotiations fail to yield an agreement, Israel would need to act decisively to complete its war objectives, which include thwarting Hamas’s reconstruction efforts. This will require Israel to maintain full operational freedom and intelligence superiority, both of which are needed to systematically dismantle Hamas’s military and governing capabilities.
Militarily, the IDF operates systematically, yet the neglect of the civil component remains an ongoing shortcoming that prolongs the war and prevents the military from achieving its war objectives. Hamas’s takeover of humanitarian aid constitutes a critical systemic flaw: Hamas exploits this aid, using it as a vital lifeline which sustains its operations and recruiting efforts by guaranteeing food for the families of new recruits and paying their salaries through the sale of humanitarian supplies at exorbitant prices to the impoverished civilian population. Should the IDF take control of humanitarian aid distribution, it would cut off Hamas’s civil lifeline and initiate a process that would ultimately dismantle its control over Gaza’s population and territory. Only after Hamas is eradicated can efforts begin to identify local actors capable of assuming responsibility for civil governance in the region.
David Petraeus: Israeli military rule is unavoidable
Applying partial and temporary military rule would grant Israel control over humanitarian aid. For many, the term “military rule” has become taboo, synonymous with prolonged entanglement in Gaza’s quagmire. Yet, the truth is quite the opposite: clinging to current operational patterns without military governance only ensures the continuation of this deadlock. In today’s reality, every area the IDF clears after dismantling Hamas’s terror infrastructure is eventually reoccupied by militants, who return to the same territory. There, they restore their military capabilities, using the area as a base for guerrilla warfare against IDF forces, and launching residual rockets into Israel. Hamas also exploits these areas to bolster its rule, primarily by seizing control of humanitarian aid distribution, and utilizing it to recruit new fighters, rebuild its resilience, and reinforce its grip on power. The resulting pattern forces the IDF to repeatedly revisit and neutralize these areas time and time again, in a seemingly vicious cycle.
And yet the Israeli military and security establishment still recoil at the mention of the term “military governance,” resonating one of the most inherent flaws in the ongoing conflict. This reluctance likely stems from the internal and external pressures imposed on army commanders and policymakers. Yet any well-trained military leader understands that operating in Gaza demands complete territorial control, purging terrorist infrastructure, and stabilizing the region through military rule. Such governance aligns with fundamental military doctrine, as noted by various military leaders and experts, especially in the United States, drawing from both American and global experiences.
For instance, in an article published in the Foreign Affairs magazine (founded in 1922), General David Petraeus (et al), who commanded U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, states that “a short-term period of Israeli authority over Gaza’s security and governance may be unavoidable.1” He further emphasizes that there is no alternative to temporary Israeli military rule in the region, which would eventually need to transition to other governing bodies.
Achieving the war objectives requires continuous and effective control of the territory, ensuring that Hamas cannot reclaim cleared areas to rebuild its military and governmental capacities, particularly through control of humanitarian aid. Israeli control would prevent Hamas from maintaining a stable supply of food, water, medicine, and fuel, thereby severing its grip on the population and eroding its standing as a viable governing alternative once the war is over.
As previously noted, military principles of warfare dictate that following the phases of territorial occupation and the neutralization of threats, the focus shifts to stabilizing the population and the area at large. It is only through this stabilization, facilitated by military governance, that conditions can evolve into a permanent arrangement. While the IDF has demonstrated competence in capturing and neutralizing territories, it has faced challenges in maintaining long-term control over these areas, allowing Hamas to restore its military and governance capabilities. Exercising military rule, which entails a continuous military presence in the occupied and neutralized regions, is crucial for effectively thwarting Hamas’s recovery efforts.
Military control must extend beyond a formidable and effective presence and encompass full oversight of humanitarian aid distribution to the civilian population, severing Hamas’s grip on this process. By taking direct responsibility, the IDF can ensure the aid reaches its intended recipients, improving living conditions amid conflict while significantly weakening Hamas’s operational resilience. With less access to humanitarian resources, Hamas’s influence over the population would erode substantially.
- David Petraeus, Meghan L. O’Sullivan, and Richard Fontaine, “Israel’s War of Regime Change Is Repeating America’s Mistakes”, Foreign Affairs, June 17, 2024
An important message to the population in the Gaza Strip
Under international law, a military’s wartime responsibility is limited to providing essential services to the civilian population, such as shelter, food, water, and basic medical care. Military governance is distinct from civil administration, especially during active conflict. Drawing comparisons with the civil administration in Gaza prior to 1994, the military rule in Judea and Samaria, or even with the earlier military governance models, is misleading and largely influenced by current and former officials within COGAT (Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories). Wartime military governance does not entail managing education systems or rehabilitating infrastructure. Instead, it serves as an operational component within the broader military strategy in Gaza—an essential element for executing military objectives and ensuring the war’s success.
Establishing military governance will also convey a clear message to the civilian population: Hamas is no longer a viable governing alternative—neither during the war nor in its aftermath. This assertion would deepen the civilian population’s loss of confidence in Hamas, liberating segments of the populace from the shackles of fear and creating more favorable conditions for cultivating a local administration to oversee the Gaza Strip post-war.
Furthermore, the introduction of military governance would significantly weaken Hamas, as its diminished leadership under Yahya Sinwar would come to realize that it has lost its most critical asset: control over both territory and the civil population. This realization could drive Sinwar to desperate and reckless actions; however, it might also motivate him to pursue a more substantial effort toward negotiating a deal on terms far more favorable for Israel, thus facilitating the release of more hostages within a shorter timeframe.
It is also crucial to note that military governance, which entails a permanent military presence on the ground and intensified engagement with remnants of Hamas, creates additional intelligence and operational opportunities to deliver a more significant blow to Hamas’s military and governance capabilities. This includes the potential to target more senior figures within the organization and conduct operations for the release of hostages. If military governance is not applied, Israel risks continued stagnation, moving further away from its goal of defeating Hamas as outlined in the war objectives. Military governance is an indispensable element of the current military action, and the security establishment’s resolute rejection of this idea signals a troubling stagnation, potentially reflecting groupthink and a lack of challenge to prevailing conceptions. Therefore, political leadership must direct the military to propose an alternative form of military governance—not civil administration—in a basic and limited format, as required by international law within the context of an active war zone. The government should engage in open, cross-level dialogue to reassess the advantages and limitations of this alternative compared to other options proposed by the military, all aimed at achieving the war objectives.
