Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Kuwait are governed without real opposition. Except for Kuwait, these countries do not have a parliament, and the government is in the hands of the descendants of the royal families appointed by the British during their establishment in the 20th century. In Saudi Arabia, the House of Saud rules; in Kuwait, the Al-Sabah family; in Bahrain, the Al-Khalifa family; in Qatar, the Al-Thani family; in the UAE, the Al-Nahyan family; and in Oman, the Al-Said family with absolute monarchies in each of these countries. The king or prince in the Gulf states holds the exclusive right to make decisions, and opposing them is impossible.
Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, Saudi Arabia has been one of the loudest Arab countries opposing its creation. Saudi Arabia supported the PLO and sent hundreds of millions of dollars to Yasser Arafat and PLO commanders. At that time, Saudi Arabia viewed Israel as an occupying power and aligned itself with other Arab nations in supporting a Palestinian state and opposing Israel’s integration into the region. Saudi Arabia’s role as the custodian of the two holiest cities in Islam, Mecca, and Medina, further strengthened its position and positioned it as a leader of the Arab and Islamic opposition to Israel. During this period, Saudi Arabia participated in the collective strategies of the Arab League, which included the economic and diplomatic boycott of Israel. The kingdom provided financial and political support to the Palestinian cause and opposed any Arab country that advanced diplomatic involvement with Israel. Additionally, Saudi Arabia boycotted Egypt for many years due to its signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel.
Regional Threats from the Late 1970s to the Early Millennium
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 marked a critical turning point in the geopolitics of the Middle East, shifting Saudi Arabia’s primary security focus towards Iran. The rise of revolutionary Iran, led by Shiites with aspirations to export its ideology, posed a new threat that Saudi Arabia viewed as existential. This shared concern with Israel laid the foundation for a strategic realignment, initially covert and informal. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, while Saudi Arabia continued to oppose Israel publicly, both countries recognized their mutual interest in combating Iranian influence. This implicit arrangement became particularly evident during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the Gulf War (1990-1991), where the growing power of the Islamic Republic of Iran posed a clear danger.
The September 11, 2001 attacks led to significant criticism of Saudi Arabia due to the involvement of Saudi citizens. This event marked a period of self-reflection within Saudi Arabia, prompting a recalibration of its foreign policy with a focus on combating extremism and reducing its ideological support for groups opposed to the West. This new reality led to Israel and Saudi Arabia addressing new mutual threats posed by non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda and, later, ISIS. This development, along with Iran’s expanding influence through its regional proxies—Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shiite militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen—brought both countries to recognize the advantages of informal cooperation.
While Saudi Arabia maintained its official public stance of disconnection from Israel, covert intelligence-sharing channels began to emerge in response to these threats. In 2002, Saudi Arabia proposed the Arab Peace Initiative, a reincarnation of King Fahd’s 1981 plan, offering normalization with Israel in exchange for a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on a two-state solution. This initiative marked Saudi Arabia’s first significant diplomatic opening towards a potential peace with Israel. Although Israel did not accept the proposal, it signaled a shift in Saudi Arabia’s position—from outright rejection of Israel’s existence to conditional acceptance based on peace with the Palestinians.
Throughout the first two decades of the millennium, Saudi Arabia took additional diplomatic steps, indicating a measured openness towards Israel, notably as both countries continued to share a strategic interest in confronting Iran. While formal ties remained off the table, the Arab Peace Initiative provided a framework for future normalization. It clarified that Saudi Arabia was open to reconsidering its relations with Israel, provided certain conditions were met.
Since 2016, Iran and Its Proxies Have Pushed Saudi Arabia Towards Israel
Already during the Barack Hussein Obama administration, Saudi media began praising Netanyahu for his disagreements with the U.S. president over the Iranian nuclear issue and the concessions made to Iran. The signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 under Obama’s administration, which sought to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions, heightened Saudi and Israeli concerns regarding Iran’s role in the region. Both countries feared the deal would empower Iran by lifting economic sanctions and providing resources to its regional proxies. This shared threat perception brought Israel and Saudi Arabia closer, with increasing reports of covert intelligence sharing, particularly in areas related to Iranian activity in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.
It is important to emphasize that the hostility between Iran and Saudi Arabia is fundamental and irreconcilable. It is a religious war between Sunnis [the Saudis] and Shiites [Iran and its Shiite militias]. Netanyahu’s speech to Congress on March 3, 2015, against Obama and the nuclear deal and his warning about the Iranian threat helped him gain favor among Gulf countries, especially the Saudis, under the principle “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” For example, in an unprecedented event in Israeli history, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu received explicit praise from many journalists and academics in Saudi Arabia. It was the first time Saudi journalism praised an Israeli prime minister. In recent years, visits by Saudis to Israel have increased—initially with retired General Anwar Ashki visiting Israel multiple times, followed by the recent visit of blogger Mohammed Saud, who is a close associate of the Prime Minister.
It can be said with certainty that Obama’s rivalry with Arab countries brought Arab nations closer to Netanyahu. Obama supported the Iranians throughout his presidency at the expense of the Saudis. The Saudis view Iran as a direct threat to the rule of the Saudi royal family, the House of Saud. The Saudis cannot forget Netanyahu’s support during the Jamal Khashoggi affair. While everyone was attacking Saudi Arabia and its Crown Prince, Netanyahu declared that the stability of Saudi Arabia was essential. In addition to this statement, many experts believe that Netanyahu mediated between the Saudis and President Trump regarding the Khashoggi matter, given his long-standing friendship with Trump. The Saudis know this, greatly appreciate the Prime Minister, and enjoy working with him behind the scenes. The royal visit Netanyahu held with his wife and the head of the Mossad in Oman in October 2018, and the honor he received from the late Sultan Qaboos further solidified Netanyahu’s image among Arabs as a strong man who wants peace and is willing to do anything for peace.
In 2020, as part of the Abraham Accords, under the mediation of the Trump administration, formal diplomatic relations were established between Israel and several Arab countries, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Although Saudi Arabia did not join the agreements, it signaled its support by allowing Israeli flights in its airspace and indirectly endorsing the accords. The agreements redefined the framework for Arab-Israeli relations, emphasizing regional stability and economic cooperation on the Palestinian issue as a prerequisite. Saudi Arabia’s quiet support for these agreements indicates a gradual shift towards accepting Israel’s presence in the region as beneficial for balancing power against Iran. While Saudi Arabia continues to support the Palestinian cause publicly, its Crown Prince’s approach is more pragmatic and signals increasing openness to economic and security partnerships with Israel, at least when they align with the kingdom’s modernization and security goals.
The U.S. Administration Is a Decisive Factor in the Middle East Relations Map
Under Trump, the Abraham Accords were signed, a breakthrough that normalized relations between Israel and several Gulf countries and opened the door for Saudi Arabia to consider its future relations with Israel. While the Biden administration has taken a more cautious approach, the accords remain influential, gently encouraging Saudi Arabia’s steady steps towards quiet cooperation with Israel through covert meetings, intelligence sharing, and mutual economic interests. During the Trump administration, the Middle East witnessed significant changes that paved the way for closer Israel-Saudi relations. Trump’s approach to the region, particularly his firm stance against Iran, resonated with Saudi Arabia’s concerns regarding Iranian influence.
Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018 strengthened the U.S.-Saudi-Israel alliance in the fight against Tehran, creating a strong foundation for cooperation. Trump’s uncompromising approach against terrorism and the designation of the Houthis as a terrorist organization were well-received by the Saudis. Additionally, Trump’s team actively mediated the Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and several Arab countries, including the UAE and Bahrain. Morocco later joined, even Sudan, though its internal civil war halted the process.
The Abraham Accords could not have been signed without Saudi support or at least a green light. Although Saudi Arabia did not join the accords, its indirect support—such as allowing Israeli flights through Saudi airspace—signaled a significant softening of its stance towards Israel.
However, under President Biden, the dynamics changed. While the Biden administration supports the Abraham Accords, its approach to the Middle East focuses more on diplomacy and restraint, particularly regarding Iran and the Houthis, who, in the context of their conflict with the Saudis, have fired numerous missiles at Saudi Arabia, causing significant damage, as studies have shown.
The Biden administration removed the Houthis from the terrorist list, surprising the Saudis. They maintained cautious openness towards Israel and continued covert coordination in security and intelligence matters. Despite Biden’s differing approach, the broader strategic framework between Israel and Saudi Arabia continued to evolve, indicating that the relationships forged during the Trump era are resilient and adaptable to the new diplomatic reality, even as the path to formal normalization remains complex and carefully managed.
The Abraham Accords, which established diplomatic ties between Israel and several Arab countries, profoundly impacted the dynamics of Israel-Saudi relations. From Israel’s perspective, the accords proved that peace with Arab countries is not solely dependent on solving the Palestinian conflict, creating a new model for regional partnership. However, for Saudi Arabia, the Abraham Accords present a double-edged sword: they show that Arab-Israeli peace is possible without the prior condition of a Palestinian state, but they also highlight the need for Saudi leadership to act cautiously, given its historical commitment to the Palestinians.
Furthermore, the Abraham Accords have opened new doors, allowing Israel and Saudi Arabia to reimagine regional cooperation—from joint economic initiatives to stronger security collaboration. They also set a framework where Saudi Arabia could join without abandoning its role as a key player in the Palestinian issue—perhaps as a future mediator of dialogue or as a conditional partner. As the regional landscape changes, the Abraham Accords have paved a path that might enable formal relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel in a way that respects Saudi Arabia’s unique political and religious standing. In this way, the accords serve not only as a historical milestone but as a potential gateway to a future where Israel and Saudi Arabia could emerge as possible allies.
Clear Shared Interests
From Israel’s perspective, an official alliance with Saudi Arabia would enhance its economy, but above all, it would redefine the Palestinian issue. From a security standpoint, cooperation with Saudi Arabia could lead to unprecedented levels of intelligence sharing, military coordination, and counterterrorism efforts focused on shared threats, particularly Iran and its proxies in the Middle East, the Gulf, and Yemen. Both countries view Iran’s growing military capabilities and its support for proxy groups as a rising force that significantly disrupts regional stability. By forming an official alliance, Israel and Saudi Arabia would not only improve their security but also present a united front that could deter Iran’s ambitions in the region. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia’s immense oil wealth and Israel’s expertise in security technology could create a mutually beneficial partnership that strengthens the security infrastructure of both countries.
On the economic front, an alliance with Saudi Arabia opens new opportunities for Israeli tech companies, water management, agriculture, and cybersecurity firms to access one of the world’s largest markets. The Crown Prince’s Vision 2030 aims to reduce Saudi Arabia’s dependence on oil and focus on technology and high-tech. This ambition aligns well with Israel’s leadership in the innovation sector. A formal relationship could, therefore, lead to substantial economic cooperation, from joint investments to collaborative projects in areas like agriculture, water, renewable energy, artificial intelligence, and healthcare. This partnership represents another diplomatic achievement for Israel and a gateway to becoming a core player in the region’s economic transformation. Additionally, peace with Saudi Arabia would open the doors to peace with other Arab countries, such as Kuwait and Oman, and potentially in the future with Qatar and other Islamic countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. It could create a precedent that may influence reluctant countries like Libya and Iraq to follow suit.
Saudi Arabia’s commitment to the Palestinian cause is critical to the peace process between Saudi Arabia and Israel. This is especially true among public opinion in Saudi Arabia and the broader Muslim world. The Palestinian issue remains the central point of tension in Israel-Saudi relations, a legacy that both unites and divides them. For decades, Saudi Arabia positioned itself as a staunch supporter of Palestinian aspirations, using this commitment to bolster its legitimacy across the Arab and Muslim world. Despite growing pragmatic cooperation with Israel, Saudi leaders face the delicate task of balancing these quiet ties with their public support for a Palestinian state. While Israel’s agreements with the UAE, Bahrain, and others in the framework of the Abraham Accords have proven that peace with Israel is possible even without immediate progress on the Palestinian front, Saudi Arabia’s role as the custodian of the holiest sites in Islam adds an extra layer of complexity. This role makes it difficult for the kingdom to formalize relations with Israel without appearing to compromise on its stance towards the Palestinians—even though the boundaries of such compromise are unclear. Despite the warming of ties, Saudi leadership is constrained by local and regional expectations. The Saudis know that an overly open partnership with Israel could alienate their allies and provoke backlash both domestically and internationally. For example, for years, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has indirectly tried to usurp Saudi Arabia’s role as the leader of the Islamic world and as the custodian of the holy sites. He has sought to portray himself as the defender of Arabs and Muslims worldwide by supporting Palestinians and the Al-Aqsa Mosque—thereby boosting his popularity among Arabs at Saudi Arabia’s expense.
Bottom Line: Peace for a Palestinian State
Before “Iron Swords,” Saudi Arabia and Israel were closer than ever to normalization. In one of his statements, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said that his country views Israel as a potential ally with shared interests, “but first, it must resolve its issues with the Palestinians.” This was published by the Saudi Press Agency, quoting the Crown Prince from an interview with The Atlantic magazine. However, this tone changed after the war broke out, and the demands escalated. The Palestinian issue became the main obstacle to peace between the two countries. The “Iron Swords” war not only halted the covert normalization process that began with the Abraham Accords but also strengthened the Saudi position, which refused any normalization with Israel without a commitment to establishing a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. In recent years, Saudi Arabia’s foreign ministers have adopted this stance and have not hesitated to state it publicly in their statements to the media.
In fact, after 13 months of war, the images of the war and the atrocities in Gaza left no room for flexibility. Now, the Saudi position appears uncompromising. Their leaders have also expressed this at the recent Arab and Islamic summit in Riyadh. The summit clearly stated that Israel is committing war crimes and must withdraw from Gaza and Lebanon and that any normalization with Israel would be conditional on the Arab Peace Initiative and the conditions presented at that time. This militant line joins the Saudi calls in the past year for the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital and a return to the 1967 borders as a condition for any normalization with Israel. In fact, in dozens of statements published throughout the war, Saudi Arabia demanded these conditions. The Saudis will not abandon this demand. They have reached an irreversible point. Saudi Arabia is not just any Arab country, and for them, the ball is now in Israel’s court.