During the War of Independence, Moshe Sharett excitedly called his ideological rival, David Ben-Gurion, exclaiming, “They (the Arabs) are leaving!” Prime Minister Levi Eshkol established a short-lived committee to encourage voluntary emigration after the Six-Day War and the mass flight from the West Bank to Jordan. However, the committee was soon dismantled, likely due to financial corruption.
The idea was to use the private sector (via travel agents in Judea and Samaria) to identify emigration candidates and engage countries interested in accepting migrants. The committee secured the agreement with a South American country, providing tens of thousands of blank passports for immediate issuance and ensuring that emigrants arrived at their destinations with documents. The Bank of Israel also assisted by converting currency into that of the destination country. The broadest estimate put the number of emigrants at thirty thousand, though the exact figure remains unknown.
The term “transfer” originated in legal and diplomatic discourse in the 1920s, following population exchanges after World War I. However, it took on a negative connotation during World War II due to Nazi Germany’s deception, which led to the extermination of Jewish populations rather than their relocation. The “Moledet” party, founded by former Central Command Chief Rehavam (Gandhi) Ze’evi, which advocated for voluntary transfer, faced heavy criticism and was eventually erased from Israel’s political map. Various government committees (such as the Ben-Porat Committee) were formed to address the issue, but all their conclusions were shelved.
The word “transfer” has become entirely taboo in the Israeli lexicon. Therefore, former U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposal to relocate the Palestinian population of Gaza to Egypt and Jordan introduces an unprecedented and unexpected scenario in the long-running Israeli-Arab conflict. At first glance, the idea is straightforward: Gaza’s infrastructure has been decimated, most of the population lives in dire conditions after 15 months of war, and a violent terrorist organization controls the area. Gazans might seize the chance if these people are allowed to migrate to a safer place with the promise of economic stability.
As with any innovation, opposition is widespread—each sector has its reasons. In this article, I aim to map out the opponents and outline preliminary strategies that could help Trump’s initiative overcome initial obstacles.
Not Welcomed with Open Arms
The first and foremost opponent of the initiative is Hamas. The terrorist organization will not easily surrender its control over Gaza and will violently target anyone who is perceived as betraying the Palestinian national cause. One only needs to recall how, during the 2006 Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah fired upon South Lebanese civilians attempting to flee north. This scenario is highly likely to repeat itself when Palestinians attempt to leave Gaza. Therefore, to give Trump’s plan a chance of success (and not just for this reason), Hamas’ rule must be decisively dismantled, which would require another military campaign.
Another challenge lies in Arab dignity. Egypt and Jordan will perceive the demand to absorb 1.5 million Palestinians as an affront to their sovereignty and, more importantly, to their national pride. The economic incentives Trump may offer are not guaranteed to convince them, as in the Arab world, honor is the highest priority. The incentives must be accompanied by pressure, which is likely necessitating military intervention, which Trump is keen to avoid.
Public opposition will arise within Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf states, as all these countries contain influential figures who have long benefited from the ongoing conflict. In Gaza, there are longstanding economic ties with Israeli businesses, some owned by former security officials. Egypt and Jordan, both politically fragile with radical elements and struggling economies, have no desire to absorb an additional 1.5 to 2 million mouths to feed. In the Gulf, Qatar funds the Muslim Brotherhood, while Iran would welcome a distraction from global scrutiny. These actors could quickly, individually or collectively, mobilize strategic forces and launch an emotional global campaign featuring themes such as “Being Uprooted for the Second Time,” “Israelis Doing to Palestinians What the Nazis Did to Jews,” and “This Is Not the Jewish Way.” A potential campaign would aim to inflame Palestinian public sentiment by portraying the initiative as a grand deception orchestrated by the “Great Satan” (the U.S.) and the “Little Satan” (Israel), emphasizing that the promises are empty and ephemeral.
The Lesson from Hamas: Close Monitoring of Budgets
Israel’s limited experience in improving living conditions in Gaza in the 1970s through military governance was abruptly halted due to tribal traditions of tight-knit living by choice and PLO violence, which followed the Vietnamese revolutionary doctrine of thwarting any contact with the enemy. The relocation initiative envisioned by President Trump in Egypt and Lebanon will require profound urban, architectural, sociological, economic, and, of course, security planning. Any mistake—even if made with good intentions—could prove fatal, harming both Palestinians and the host country.
Starting with the most straightforward aspect—economics. Encouraging migration on this scale requires significant investment in the population. For a superpower like the U.S., the sums involved are manageable, but past experiences of rebuilding Gaza after previous wars show that most of the funds never reached those in real need. Thus, the first lesson is to use the private sector to execute the project. Under no circumstances should funds be transferred to governments or international organizations like the UN. While private companies also pose risks of fund leakage, they offer greater transparency and allow milestone-based payments to mitigate budget evaporation.
A portion of the budget should be allocated to domestic campaigns in host countries, highlighting the benefits of absorbing Gazans and providing tangible incentives. American persuasion will not rely solely on coercion but will be supplemented with grants and other economic advantages for the host nation. Israel’s experience involving American construction firms in projects (military-related) has been a success and should be replicated in the current relocation initiative.
Host countries naturally seek to centralize new arrivals for control, but this must be avoided. Maintaining a tribal family structure is crucial for migration success; otherwise, a new crisis could emerge with unpredictable political consequences.
Organizers must implement a biometric population registry administratively to prevent corruption. Holders of a “migrant certificate” must abide by host country laws to receive grants and entry approval. This database will also enable security oversight to alleviate host nations’ concerns and prevent the emergence of new radical Islamic factions. Private banks should manage personal grants for new migrants, and a support network—including secular mental health professionals—should be established to assist in their integration.
Professional training and job placement programs should be developed for working-age migrants, and mixed schools should be established for hosts and newcomers. Private companies should handle infrastructure development under strict supervision.
Urban planning must allocate funds for purchasing land for the new population. Residents should be involved in planning and constructing permanent housing during resettlement in temporary structures.
These are just some critical elements to consider in designing this grand operation, which could radically reshape the Middle East—hopefully for the better.
