The question of the day after Hamas is becoming increasingly relevant as the campaign to dismantle Hamas as a military force and governing body in the Gaza Strip progresses. Once the intensive phase of the war is complete, with IDF forces established along the Philadelphi Route and the anticipated collapse of the four Hamas battalions in the Rafah area, Israel will move to the next phase of the campaign. This phase will involve establishing security and governance arrangements in Gaza for the ‘day after.’
The question of the day after in the Gaza Strip presents a complex and challenging issue for Israel’s senior political and security leadership. Nevertheless, Israel must now prepare for the scenario of implementing a military-civil administration in the area, both in terms of planning and organization. Establishing an Israeli military-civil administration in Gaza will undoubtedly impose a heavy burden on Israel, requiring the allocation of substantial material and human resources. However, it is essential to state as a basis for any future discussion that bearing that burden is indeed within the capabilities of the defense establishment.
The governance framework in Gaza after the war must include full security-military control by the IDF in the region, with close intelligence support from the General Security Service. The operational expression of such control is the ability of IDF forces to reach any point in the area at any given moment, based on precise and high-quality intelligence, to carry out arrests of terrorist operatives, thwart attacks, and prevent hostile activities.
IDF forces will need to continue systematic operations to eliminate remaining Hamas terror infrastructure across the Gaza Strip in the initial post-war phase. This effort aims to cleanse the area of any remaining terrorist cells that might operate independently without central leadership. A long-term and crucial task for the IDF will be to clear the underground tunnels, eliminate terrorist cells operating within them, and destroy the tunnels.
The complete dismantling of Hamas as a military force and governing entity is intended to pave the way for the establishment of an Israeli civil administration. This administration would work alongside and in full coordination with the military administration, delegating actual operational authority to local Palestinian entities for day-to-day civil management. Consequently, the Israeli civil administration will collaborate with local Palestinian figures to provide essential public services to the population, especially regarding water, electricity, medical services, and the operation of education and transportation systems.
The goal is to gradually build a local civil system capable of taking over daily operational management. Although this scenario is highly complex, the more Hamas’s control is eradicated, the greater the willingness of the local population to cooperate with the Israeli administration in this regard. In any case, Israel will be obligated to work with international organizations to facilitate the delivery of necessary humanitarian aid to the population. Additionally, Israel will need to implement its decision to prevent the continued operation of UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, which has historically played a negative role by actively perpetuating the Palestinian refugee problem. The PLO and Arab states have consistently used the refugee issue as leverage and as a diplomatic weapon against Israel in the international arena.
“To also eliminate the ‘Da’wah'”
At the conclusion of the intense phase of the war, Israel must advance fierce efforts to dismantle the ‘Da’wah’ apparatus – the support network of Hamas. This includes systematically addressing the indoctrination, incitement, and education that have instilled hatred and resistance towards Israel in the local population for decades. This indoctrination begins at a young age via daycares, kindergartens, schools, higher education institutions, Islamic charities, religious institutions, and social clubs. Mosques play a central role in embedding extreme Islamic ideas, particularly through incitement-filled sermons delivered during Friday prayers, which deliberately touch sensitive chords among the worshippers. Additionally, mosques serve as shelters for terrorists and their stockpiles of weapons and arms. Dismantling the Da’wah mechanism also requires arresting key Hamas activists and potentially expelling them from the area.
When implementing Israeli civil administration in the area, Israel must draw on its extensive experience controlling the Gaza Strip, from its capture in the Six-Day War in June 1967 until the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in May 1994, as part of the Oslo process following the Gaza-Jericho Agreement.
In practice, the Civil Administration functioned through military staff officers representing Israeli civil government ministries. They operated with a small team of Israeli employees from the parent ministries and a local Palestinian level of general managers responsible for the actual running of the offices. Under the Palestinian general managers, a local workforce of several thousand employees operated. The Civil Administration’s operations through the local Palestinian workforce were generally efficient, consistent, and smooth until the sudden outbreak of the First Intifada in December 1987. Following pressure from Palestinian resistance organizations promoting civil disobedience against Israeli rule, some local Palestinian employees resigned. However, after systematic efforts by the Civil Administration, most local workers returned to regular activity, and the attempt to promote widespread civil disobedience through mass resignations ultimately failed completely.
Alongside the Civil Administration’s routine management, normal life in the area was maintained through the IDF’s military administration and the dedicated efforts of the General Security Service, which focused on systematically thwarting terrorism and political subversion. Public order was maintained by the Israel Police, which operated through local Palestinian officers to ensure law enforcement and public order.
Required: Immediate Military-Civil Administration
Placing governance of the Gaza Strip in the hands of a Palestinian, Arab, or international entity will not ultimately provide security for Israel. It may even lead to the resurgence of Hamas and the restoration of its control in a relatively short time. Therefore, Israel will have no choice but to take responsibility for managing civilian life in Gaza for a limited period, although defining this timeframe is challenging at present. Under current circumstances, the Palestinian Authority is not qualified to take on this responsibility, as it is undergoing historic leadership changes with the impending end of Mahmoud Abbas’s presidency (he will turn 89 in November). Moreover, its security forces are only partially operational, and their activities, especially in refugee camps, are limited. Arab and international entities also condition the deployment of a management and control force on an Israeli commitment to establishing an independent Palestinian state, which Israel firmly opposes. Israel argues that rewarding terrorism, especially after the October 7, 2023 massacre, is unacceptable. Furthermore, any agreement must ultimately be subject to political negotiations between the parties.
Establishing a military-civil administration in Gaza is already essential, even before the intensive phase of fighting ends. Hamas activists are visibly attempting to recruit and train new members for its military wing, filling the void left by approximately 14,000 militants killed and thousands more injured in the war so far. Recently, Israeli security forces in Gaza have detected renewed training and preparations for new recruits.
In this context, Hamas’s fighting units are currently undergoing recovery and rebuilding efforts, particularly in areas where the IDF is not operating, mainly in northern Gaza and the Khan Yunis area. Here, Hamas is working to restore its control, evidenced by its operatives’ presence on the streets, local policing activities, and commandeering of humanitarian shipments meant for the population. There are also signs of efforts to revive Hamas’s governing wing in the area. Consequently, in recent weeks, IDF forces have focused on targeted efforts to eliminate Hamas’s internal security operatives, having already killed about 50 senior commanders since the war began.
