The bloodbath in As-Suwayda in the Druze Mountain in southern Syria immediately brought many back to the horrific scenes of the Islamic State (ISIS) between 2014 and 2017, and some Israelis to the horrors of October 7. The rivalry and hostility between the local Sunni Bedouin tribes and the Druze date back to the days of the Assad regime. The Druze, by the tenets of their faith, demonstrate absolute loyalty to the regime of the state in which they live and apply upon themselves a prohibition against establishing an independent state of their own, and thus were also loyal to the previous regime in Syria. Many served in senior positions in the military and security apparatuses of the Assad regime, which exhibited intense hostility towards the Sunni majority.
During the long civil war that began in 2011, the Syrian regime massacred religious and ethnic groups that were neither Alawite nor Shiite, and primarily targeted the Sunni majority. Its actions led to a massive wave of refugees—around six million Syrians fled their country, the overwhelming majority of whom were Sunnis. Many others became internally displaced, and countless people were brutally murdered by the Syrian army and its security forces. The Druze, even if they did not take an active part in these atrocities, are perceived by most Sunnis, who were oppressed by the regime, as part of the Assad regime and complicit in its atrocities against them.
With the fall of the previous Syrian regime and the takeover of Syria by HTS under the leadership of Ahmad al-Sharaa (al-Julani), old wounds were reopened, and acts of revenge began against anyone identified as part of or supportive of the Assad regime. This is essentially the background for the attacks by Sunni Bedouin tribes in southern Syria against the Druze in the Druze Mountain and As-Suwayda, as well as against other Druze villages near Damascus. Horrific massacres also occurred in the Latakia region, where most of the Alawite population resides, and in Damascus itself, targeting Christian populations, who were also perceived as having supported and cooperated with the Assad regime. The massacres were carried out by former ISIS members and other jihadists who gathered in Syria over the years, either through spontaneous formations or as part of the new Syrian army.
A Strategy for Reshaping the Regional System
Al-Sharaa, the new Syrian leader, was formerly a senior operative of al-Qaeda, broke away from the organization, and later established the Sunni jihadist coalition known as HTS (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham). He was arrested by the Americans for his murderous terrorist activities and was imprisoned for several years. His hands are certainly stained with much blood, and it remains unclear whether the fact that he meticulously trimmed his beard and swapped his robe for a suit truly symbolizes an abandonment of his jihadist beliefs and ways.
This reality—of murderous acts of revenge during the transfer of power from a minority regime—is neither new nor unique to Syria, where the Alawite minority ruled. We encountered it in Iraq following the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime, a ruler who relied on the Sunni minority and oppressed the Shiite majority. Israel discovered this reality after a traumatic event that is seared into the Jewish collective memory on October 7, and amidst a harsh, multi-front regional war in which it has been embroiled since then. Israel’s strategic compass, recalibrated after that Black Saturday, led to the formulation of a strategy aimed at reshaping the entire regional system by collapsing or significantly weakening its most critical and problematic center of gravity—Iran. The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria is a product of Israel’s strategy and came after heavy blows dealt to Hezbollah and Iran.
The fall of the Assad regime has opened the possibility for Israel to significantly alter the regional arena and remove a significant threat from Syria. Indeed, Israel seized this historic and strategic opportunity to destroy the Syrian army’s infrastructure to prevent these capabilities from falling into the hands of hostile jihadist forces and to ensure an open land and, more importantly, air corridor toward Iran.
In addition, Israel took control of the buffer zone established under the 1974 disengagement agreements to prevent the infiltration of jihadist forces into the area and to thwart efforts to organize terrorist attacks against Israel from the Golan Heights border. Israel has no territorial interests in Syria, and the takeover of the buffer zone is a temporary security necessity given Syria’s current reality of governmental instability. Israel is prepared to negotiate with Syria to reach updated and adequate security arrangements. Indeed, in recent times, there have been multiple reports of meetings between senior Israeli and Syrian officials to formulate agreements on these matters.
Within the buffer zone defined by Israel—larger than the area where IDF forces are currently present and active—lies the Druze Mountain, including the city of As-Suwayda, the largest Druze population center in Syria. The presence of this population in the area helps prevent the strengthening and activity of Sunni jihadist militias, thereby serving Israel’s security interests.
At the same time, the Druze population in the area maintains extensive familial ties with members of the Druze community who are Israeli citizens. The Druze minority in the Middle East numbers only around one million people, dispersed across four countries: Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. Druze communities are known for maintaining close inter-community ties, and their sense of persecution in the region enhances their sense of solidarity and mutual commitment. This is the primary reason why the Druze community in Israel is pressing the government to act and protect their brethren in As-Suwayda.
A Historic Commitment to the Protection of Minorities
The roots of the historical alliance between the Druze population in Israel and the Jewish residents of the land date back to before the establishment of the state. The Druze minority in Israel numbers only about 150,000 people, but is deeply involved and integrated into Israeli society. Its members serve in the IDF and security services, with many rising to senior positions and high ranks. The state, for its part, expresses profound gratitude to its Druze citizens for their commitment to the security effort and is highly sensitive to their emotions and concerns, especially regarding their family members across the border. Since many Druze have sacrificed their lives for the Jewish state and continue to be willing to do so, demonstrating absolute loyalty to Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people and considering themselves an inseparable part of it, the state cannot ignore their call to defend their brethren who are in distress and being slaughtered by Sunnis with the backing of the Syrian regime.
Beyond that, Israel has a historical, strategic, and moral obligation to protect minorities in the region, stemming from the fact that the Jewish people themselves have been a minority. In this sense, it is a shared destiny with religious and ethnic minorities, as was the case with the Kurds in Iraq, the Christians in Lebanon, and the Druze in Syria. This minority alliance, even if informal, is essential to Israel as a national and religious minority state in the region, and in Syria’s case, it also serves clear security interests. As the nation-state of the Jewish people, who were persecuted and massacred throughout history, Israel feels both a historical and moral duty to protect these minorities.
At the same time, Israel and the Syrian regime under Al-Sharaa share strategic interests. The Syrian regime is acting to push Iran out of Syria, is working against Hezbollah, and does not allow Palestinian terrorist activity from Syrian territory. The possibility of establishing security agreements with the current regime, which could in turn lead to cooperation in the fields of energy, water, and infrastructure, and ultimately to normalization and Syria’s participation in the Abraham Accords, is of great importance to Israel (and also to President Trump’s vision). This serves not only security interests but also the interests of regional integration through the creation of a new regional architecture, in which Israel is a significant and central component.
Therefore, the Israeli dilemma converges around the tension between the necessity of defending the Druze minority in Syria on the one hand, and the need to preserve and advance the mutual interests it shares with the Syrian regime on the other. Israel must find a way to maneuver and balance between the two and ensure that any blow it chooses to strike against the Syrian regime—due to its support for jihadist murderers slaughtering the Druze and its violation of Israel’s demand to avoid deploying military forces in the buffer zone—does not break the regime’s spine.
The blows must be proportionate—ones that send a clear message, preserve deterrence, while also maintaining channels of dialogue and current and future cooperation. Alongside Israeli resolve, there is a need for more creative thinking regarding the use of force to renew and preserve deterrence. It is essential to let go of the notion that simply because we have a large hammer in hand, every problem must be treated as a nail.
