In recent months, contacts have been taking place between the High Representative of the “Peace Council,” Nikolay Mladenov, and senior Hamas officials in an effort to advance the post-war stabilization process in the Gaza Strip. So far, however, little, if any, progress has been made. This issue could become an obstacle to advancing to the second stage of U.S. President Donald Trump’s three-phase plan.
The Memorandum of Understanding signed between the United States and Iran on June 17, 2026, also effectively serves as an interim agreement, formally establishing the end of the military campaign, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to maritime traffic, and the lifting of the naval blockade. However, it does not fundamentally alter the priorities of the U.S. administration in its Middle East policy, where the campaign against Iran remains at the center of attention, alongside the struggle against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Under these circumstances, the issue of Hamas’s rule over the Gaza Strip, despite its considerable importance from the American perspective, has effectively been pushed down the list of priorities. This is also reflected in the fact that the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the United States and Iran makes no reference whatsoever to Gaza. In this context, it should be noted that following the signing of the memorandum, detailed negotiations are expected to begin between the parties for a period of 60 days, with the option of a further 60-day extension, with the goal of ultimately reaching a final agreement.
The Plan Is Stalled, But Still in Effect
It is important to emphasize that, from the perspective of the Trump administration, the plan for stabilizing the Gaza Strip remains fully in place. The first of its three stages has already been completed, but further implementation has, for the time being, been blocked due to Hamas’s negative and reluctant position. In an effort to preserve the continuity of negotiations, maintain momentum in the talks, and prevent the emergence of a crisis or renewed escalation on the ground, the High Representative of the “Peace Council,” Bulgarian diplomat Nikolay Mladenov, presented a 15-point framework to the United Nations Security Council on May 21, 2026, aimed at advancing the implementation of President Trump’s “Comprehensive Peace Plan.” In his address to the Security Council, Mladenov warned that Israel and the Palestinians currently face only two possible paths forward: “the status quo or a new beginning, with no third option.” The new framework was intended to reinforce the message that despite the fact that most U.S. attention is focused on the ongoing confrontation with Iran, the issue of Gaza remains on the American president’s agenda and, from his perspective, requires progress toward a solution.
Mladenov stated in his speech at the United Nations that the new “roadmap” for stabilizing Gaza had been formulated in cooperation with the United States, Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar, based on positions presented by the Palestinian factions. He emphasized that the principles embodied in the framework were developed through dialogue with the Palestinian factions and are based on the principle of reciprocity, whereby every move by one side triggers a corresponding move by the other. An independent verification conference would approve each stage before implementation proceeds to the next.
In addition, Mladenov stressed that the guiding principle of his Gaza plan is encapsulated in the formula: “One Authority, One Law, One Weapon.” In an effort to accommodate Hamas and demonstrate a degree of consideration for the organization’s position, he clarified that “no armed Palestinian group will be required to hand over its weapons to Israel.” Instead, the weapons would be transferred to the “National Commission for the Administration of Gaza” (NCAG), chaired by Dr. Ali Shaat, who previously served in the Palestinian Authority, among other roles, as Deputy Minister of Planning. Under Mladenov’s framework, the “International Stabilization Force” (ISF) would serve as a buffer between IDF forces and the areas transferred to the control of the National Commission for the Administration of Gaza. It would assist in dismantling armed organizations and ensure the continuation of humanitarian operations. At the same time, Israel would commit to a gradual withdrawal of its forces to the Gaza border according to an agreed timetable linked to verified progress in disarming Hamas and the other armed factions.
Mladenov emphasized that the roadmap “does not ask Palestinians to surrender their weapons to Israel or eliminate political groups.” Rather, it proposes a model of gradual disarmament, conditional amnesty for those who lay down their arms and abide by the law, the reintegration of former operatives into civilian institutions, and economic support for those required to leave their positions. In addition, those who choose to leave the Gaza Strip would, according to Mladenov, be granted safe passage. He further warned that if the transition and disarmament process is delayed or fails, “the risk is that the deteriorating status quo will become permanent, leaving Gaza divided.” He concluded with a vision for Gaza’s reconstruction: “Gaza can be rebuilt by Palestinians, with goods moving through the crossings, a port handling trade, young people lining up for universities, electricity from the power grid, and tens of thousands of new jobs in the public sector.”
During the Security Council debate, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, Dr. Ramiz Alakbarov, sharply criticized Israel, claiming that “its strikes in Gaza continue every day,” while also condemning “the armed activities of Hamas and other Palestinian groups.” France’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Jérôme Bonnafont, stated that since the ceasefire took effect in October 2025, 850 Palestinians had been killed in Gaza. He noted that Israel now controls approximately 60 percent of the Strip, compared to 52 percent immediately after the ceasefire. According to him, humanitarian conditions in Gaza remain severe, and the Palestinian population continues to depend on daily aid deliveries. “To date, only $540 million has been provided out of the approximately $12.06 billion Humanitarian Response Plan for the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Gaza’s children deserve to live and enjoy their fundamental rights. They deserve a Gaza free from violence and deprivation, where they can build a better future together with their families.” He added that “ultimately, recovery, including in Gaza, must advance long-standing political objectives: the reunification of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank under a single legitimate and sovereign Palestinian government, and the resumption of a political process that will end the prolonged occupation and realize the two-state solution.” Alakbarov also criticized Israeli settlement construction and activity in eastern Jerusalem, as well as violence attributed to settlers in the West Bank, alongside Israel’s continuing military operations in the area.
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz stated in his address to the Security Council that “significant challenges remain in rebuilding and reconstructing Gaza.” He added that the United States would continue working with Israel, its regional neighbors, and its partners in the “Peace Council” to achieve this objective. Furthermore, he stressed that “Hamas must disarm, period. This is the next critical step toward achieving lasting peace, as outlined in President Trump’s peace plan, which this Council endorsed in Resolution 2803. This includes the irreversible destruction of all military, terrorist, and offensive infrastructure, including, of course, tunnels and weapons production facilities.” Waltz praised the increase in humanitarian assistance and argued that the diversion of aid to terrorist organizations had “almost completely disappeared.”
The French ambassador, however, argued that “restrictions on the delivery of aid and access through the crossings continue, and the target of 4,200 trucks entering each week has not yet been achieved. Many essential goods remain blocked.” He also criticized Hamas for refusing to disarm, but added that “the IDF continues to occupy a large part of Gaza.” He further argued that “the restoration of peace and living conditions cannot depend on the success of Hamas’s disarmament process, because that would effectively hand Hamas the keys to Palestine’s future and force the civilian population to bear the burden of continued paralysis. Reconstruction and rebuilding efforts throughout Gaza must begin without delay.”
One Authority, One Law, One Weapon
Hamas was quick to launch sharp criticism of the 15-point “Roadmap” proposed by Peace Council representative Nikolay Mladenov. Hamas spokesperson in the Gaza Strip Hazem Qassem stressed that Mladenov’s call to pressure Hamas “by every means” “constitutes a continuation of adopting the Israeli vision and an attempt to create justifications for Israeli escalation.” Another senior Hamas official, Basem Naim, a member of the organization’s Political Bureau, accused Mladenov of acting improperly by publishing the framework in a public post, arguing that serious negotiations are not conducted through the media. He emphasized that Hamas remains committed to negotiations and is interested in implementing the second phase, but not selectively or according to Netanyahu’s interpretation of the agreement. According to Naim, Mladenov focuses solely on the issue of weapons while ignoring both the Security Council resolution and Trump’s plan. He added that “Hamas and all the Palestinian factions adhere to a political doctrine under which the issue of weapons is linked to the existence of the occupation and to the Palestinian people’s right to resistance in all its forms, an inherent right of all peoples living under occupation.” He stated that Hamas agrees in principle with the formula “One Authority, One Law, One Weapon,” provided that “the authority is legitimate and elected, and that the one weapon is under a fully sovereign state.”
Throughout June 2026, negotiations continued in Cairo between a Hamas delegation and the High Representative of the Peace Council, Nikolay Mladenov, together with representatives of the U.S. administration and the mediating states, without the participation of Israeli representatives. The objective was to formulate understandings that would enable progress toward the second phase of implementing the ceasefire agreement in accordance with the “Roadmap,” with particular emphasis on the issue of Hamas’s disarmament. According to an Al Jazeera Net report of June 18, 2026, a Palestinian source who participated in the Cairo meetings stated that Mladenov rejected the proposal submitted by Hamas and the Palestinian factions regarding Article 8 of the “Roadmap,” which deals with disarmament. At the same time, however, he agreed to remove the term “resistance infrastructure” and instead presented more detailed language describing the resources and assets used by the “resistance,” including tunnels, off-road vehicles, warehouses, open areas where resistance operatives may gather or establish training camps, in addition to personal weapons, military uniforms and military-style clothing, as well as medical units and field hospitals. The source noted that the Palestinian factions were surprised by Mladenov’s revised wording, as it reflected a much stricter position regarding the capabilities and assets of the “resistance.” The report further stated that under the revised provisions, the “National Commission for the Administration of Gaza” would assume actual responsibility only from the moment it formally took office and would not be responsible for fulfilling previous commitments made by the Hamas administration in Gaza, including obligations to employees, suppliers, and outstanding loans.
According to Al-Quds Al-Arabi on June 19, 2026, a Hamas source stated that Mladenov’s new proposal reflects a certain shift in its approach to the issue of the “resistance’s” weapons. Instead of explicitly demanding “disarmament,” the new proposal offers a framework for the gradual collection and storage of weapons under the supervision of the mediating states, the Peace Council, the National Commission for the Administration of Gaza, and the International Stabilization Force (ISF). According to the report, the process would take place in parallel with an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and would apply to weapons depots designated under the agreement. It further stated that the proposal distinguishes between heavy weapons, which would be collected and stored under supervision, and light personal weapons, which would be transferred to the security force of the National Commission for the Administration of Gaza and regulated through a licensing system. The report also noted that several comments submitted by the Palestinian factions had been accepted, particularly their demand to complete the first phase of the agreement and receive tangible guarantees before moving on to the second phase.
In a report published by the Hamas-affiliated newspaper Al-Resalah on June 22, 2026, reflecting Hamas’s position regarding the continued implementation of Trump’s framework for Gaza, Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem stated that the meetings with the mediators had produced important understandings concerning the completion of the first phase of the agreement and the establishment of mechanisms for implementing the second phase. These included complex and sensitive issues such as the entry of the “National Commission for the Administration of Gaza” into the Strip, the transfer of governmental responsibilities in various sectors, including security, as well as mechanisms for dealing with Palestinian weapons. Nevertheless, he argued that during his meetings with Hamas and the Palestinian factions, Mladenov had presented positions “that do not align” with the understandings reached with the mediators. According to Qassem, this complicated the situation and prevented a final agreement from being reached at that time. He asserted that Hamas believes Mladenov continues to approach the issue from a perspective close to the Israeli one, as reflected in the proposals he presented during the latest round of meetings. He added that “the Palestinian factions continue to hold consultations in order to examine Mladenov’s proposal and formulate a unified and responsible response that places the interests of the Palestinian people above all else.”
Taher al-Nono, media adviser to the head of Hamas’s Political Bureau, stated that the organization had reached “the peak of optimism” following its talks with the mediators. At the same time, however, he claimed that on June 12, 2026, Mladenov had retreated from the original “Roadmap” document and introduced “new, surprising, and different” formulations. He reiterated Hamas’s position that it would not agree to move to a new phase of the agreement before the previous phase had been fully implemented. He further argued that “the occupation wants the Gaza Strip to be without resistance weapons and with the resistance factions dismantled,” while accusing the Peace Council of lacking seriousness regarding the reconstruction of the Strip.
According to Asharq Al-Awsat on June 22, 2026, Palestinian sources clarified that despite the criticism of Mladenov’s revised proposal, the general trend within Hamas and the Palestinian factions was to discuss it positively following the amendments, while continuing efforts to introduce additional revisions and improvements to several of its other provisions. Hamas sources added that the organization’s overarching objective is to capitalize on the understandings reached during the Cairo talks in order to advance the complete cessation of the war.
Hamas Remains in Full Control
Based on conversations conducted by the author with members of Palestinian organizations, as well as with ordinary residents of the Gaza Strip, the clear impression is that Hamas continues to hold the reins of power in the territory without meaningful constraints. The opposition confronting it on the ground does not pose a significant threat to its status as the governing authority and, at present, carries only marginal influence. Under these circumstances, resistance to Hamas’s continued rule in Gaza is essentially limited to armed Palestinian militias operating in the area, particularly beyond the “Yellow Line,” under the protection of the IDF and the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), which provide them with ongoing operational and intelligence support. Hamas acts consistently and systematically against these militias through arrests, ambushes, pursuits, and vehicle searches. For example, on March 19, 2026, Hamas’s plainclothes police unit “Sahm” reported on its Telegram channel that it had foiled an attempt to assassinate a senior “resistance” figure in central Gaza thanks to “high-quality intelligence operations.” According to the statement, two suspects described as “collaborators” with Israel were arrested during the operation. They were allegedly found in possession of silenced weapons, surveillance equipment, and camouflage clothing.
Specifically, it was claimed that the two detainees admitted during interrogation that they had collaborated with the militia of Shuki Abu Nusira, which operates against Hamas in Gaza, and that they had undergone training by Israeli intelligence officers, including one known as “Captain Abu Omar.”
In another report published by a Hamas media outlet, it was stated that on June 21, Hamas’s “Radaa” forces, the organization’s internal security unit, attacked a group of operatives belonging to militias cooperating with Israel after they crossed the Yellow Line in northern Gaza. It was also reported that Hamas continues to operate against Palestinians suspected of “collaborating” with Israel, while Hamas media channels periodically publish reports on the arrests of Palestinians described as “collaborators” and “agents” of the “Zionist enemy.”
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that Hamas has been using the period since the October 2025 ceasefire to rebuild its military capabilities and advance its force buildup on the ground as much as possible. These efforts are part of the organization’s preparations for the renewal of armed conflict with Israel. They include expanding stockpiles of locally produced weapons, including explosive devices and anti-tank weapons, as well as equipment smuggled in from Egypt, particularly drones and communications equipment. Hamas has also intensified the recruitment of young men between the ages of 18 and 23, expanded its operational force structure, improved the combat readiness of its elite Nukhba fighters through dedicated training exercises, and restored and expanded existing underground infrastructure throughout the Gaza Strip. As part of this effort, Hamas is also working to smuggle equipment and raw materials used in the production of rockets and explosive devices in workshops operating within areas under its exclusive control. This assessment is reinforced, among other things, by remarks attributed to what was described as a “senior Southern Command official,” as reported on journalist Almog Boker’s Telegram channel on March 18, 2026, stating that attempts to smuggle weapons from Egypt into the Gaza Strip using drones are detected on a daily basis. It should also be noted that Hamas continues to manufacture improvised weapons, prompting the IDF to intensify strikes in recent months against military targets, particularly warehouses and terrorist infrastructure. This is despite information obtained by the author from reliable sources in Gaza indicating that after more than two years of military conflict, Hamas is experiencing increasing difficulties due to a severe shortage of ammunition.
In an effort to strengthen its civilian governance, Hamas police continue to perform routine policing duties, including traffic control and patrols in markets and displaced persons’ camps. Police forces and relevant government ministries are working with merchants in an attempt to regulate prices, particularly in light of the sharp rise in the cost of basic goods. Hamas’s Ministry of Economy recently called on merchants to adhere to official prices and warned that any violations or price gouging would result in legal action. It also urged merchants and residents to report such violations. In response to these measures, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), according to a statement published on its Facebook page on March 18, 2026, rejected Hamas’s claims that its actions were intended to lower market prices. In a direct appeal to Gaza’s residents, COGAT accused Hamas of seizing humanitarian goods, stating that hundreds of aid trucks enter the Strip every day carrying large quantities of food to meet the daily needs of the Palestinian population ahead of Eid al-Fitr. At the same time, it alleged that Hamas confiscates aid supplies and imposes taxes on merchants, driving prices to “unbearable levels.”
Another means by which Hamas reinforces the population’s dependence on its rule is through financial assistance to needy families in Gaza. Specifically, it was reported that one such assistance campaign was funded using money confiscated from several merchants who had failed to act responsibly and ignored the population’s needs since the ceasefire agreement with Israel came into effect in October 2025. Following the establishment of the technocratic government to administer the Gaza Strip, Reuters reported on February 19, 2026, that Hamas had appointed five police commanders affiliated with its military wing, along with new senior officials in the Ministries of Interior and National Security and the Ministry of Economy. A Hamas spokesperson claimed that these were temporary appointments intended to prevent an “administrative vacuum” and ensure the continued provision of essential public services.
The Protest Attempt Failed
Hamas’s near-total control on the ground was recently demonstrated by the failure of a campaign that had circulated on social media in recent weeks, particularly on pages affiliated with Fatah, calling for demonstrations against Hamas on June 26, 2026. The planned protests were intended to focus on the severe living conditions in the Gaza Strip and the delays in advancing the second phase of President Trump’s plan, while placing the blame squarely on the Hamas leadership. In practice, however, Hamas itself orchestrated a counter-campaign calling for demonstrations against Israel and against envoy Nikolay Mladenov over his failure to advance negotiations on post-war arrangements in Gaza. As part of its effort to prevent the planned protests on June 26, Hamas sought to strengthen its deterrence by deliberately publicizing the executions of Palestinians accused of collaborating with Israel.
The MOU Ignores Fatah, While Hamas Consolidates Its Control
Conversations conducted by the author with Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, most of them affiliated with Fatah, revealed a strong sense of disappointment that the Memorandum of Understanding recently signed between the United States and Iran contains no reference whatsoever to the need to remove Hamas from power in Gaza. In this context, the author was told that while the opposition to Hamas has been gaining strength on the ground, it is still not sufficiently powerful to challenge Hamas’s status as the sole governing authority or bring about its collapse at the present time. At the same time, it was emphasized that opposition to Hamas is expected to grow as the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip continues to deteriorate, gradually eroding the public’s fear of the organization.
In practice, Hamas is using the current period, until conditions emerge that will allow for the development of a new reality in the Gaza Strip in accordance with President Trump’s vision, to further consolidate its control over the territory. Hamas consistently demonstrates that it is the “master of the house” in Gaza through military parades, public displays of force, and the visible presence of armed operatives from its military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, along major roads, as a deliberate act of defiance, particularly in light of demands for the organization’s disarmament. Several months ago, during the Eid al-Fitr holiday marking the end of Ramadan, uniformed Hamas operatives were filmed distributing sweets to children in the Nuseirat refugee camp in central Gaza. Armed members of the military wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Jerusalem Brigades (Saraya al-Quds), were likewise documented carrying weapons while handing out sweets to children during the holiday.
Hamas’s control on the ground is also reflected in measures intended to strengthen its deterrence and suppress expressions of opposition among the public. These include kidnappings, arrests, torture, and even executions of rivals and opponents. In this context, it is worth noting the public remarks made by Hamza Abu Hweidy, a Palestinian activist born in Gaza who now resides in Germany. He stated that Hamas had intensified its repression of Gaza’s residents through executions, shootings, kidnappings, and torture. In a post he published, he wrote: “The list of atrocities grows by the day, and their pure sadism exceeds anything that can be understood, even for those of us who were born and raised in Gaza and lived under Hamas’s brutality for years.” Abu Hweidy continued: “We thought we had seen the bottom of their moral corruption. There is no bottom for these people.” (Hamza Abu Hweidy’s X account, March 14, 2026).
France Assists Hamas
The Arab media recently reported on a “highly secret” meeting between senior members of Hamas’s Political Bureau and a French delegation that included current and former diplomats as well as members of parliament from both coalition and opposition parties. Palestinian sources reported that the meeting took place in “a country in the region,” without identifying it by name. They stated that officials from several countries, as well as Palestinian factions and the mediating states, became aware of the meeting only shortly before or after it took place. According to the reports, discussions focused on the overall Palestinian arena with the aim of restoring internal Palestinian relations and reviving political negotiations with Israel in an effort to end the conflict and establish a Palestinian state within the borders of June 4, 1967, prior to the Six-Day War. According to Asharq Al-Awsat on June 21, 2026, Hamas sources confirmed that the meeting had taken place but declined to provide additional details.
According to Asharq Al-Awsat on June 16, 2026, Hamas recently resumed elections for the leadership of its Political Bureau after the first round, held in May 2026, failed to produce a decisive outcome. According to the report, voting in the Gaza Strip had already begun and was expected to continue later in Judea and Samaria and among Hamas members abroad. It was noted that the second round of elections had originally been scheduled to take place earlier but was postponed due to prevailing circumstances. It was further reported that the second round would be conducted under even greater secrecy than the first in order to preserve the confidentiality of the process and prevent leaks to the media.
Bottom Line: The Peace Council Is Leading Toward Continued Fighting
The period since the ceasefire in the war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip was agreed upon on October 10, 2025, has been used by the organization to further strengthen its dominant position on the ground, both as a military force and as a governing civilian authority. This has occurred despite the continued operations of the IDF, supported by the operational and intelligence capabilities of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), aimed at carrying out targeted strikes against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad cells that repeatedly attempt to infiltrate areas under Israeli military control in order to carry out terrorist attacks.
Taken together, the available information regarding the recent contacts between the senior representative of the Peace Council, Nikolay Mladenov, and senior Hamas officials makes it clear that no breakthrough has yet been achieved in the negotiations. As a result, there has been no meaningful progress toward implementing the second phase of President Trump’s plan for stabilizing the Gaza Strip. The principal obstacle preventing the parties from reaching operational understandings remains Hamas’s position, which, at the time of writing, still does not clearly, fully, and unconditionally accept Mladenov’s proposal for the practical implementation of the Gaza stabilization plan.
It is important to note that the key issue complicating the negotiations and casting doubt on the prospects for reaching the understandings necessary to implement the second phase concerns the clear and unequivocal demand that Hamas disarm and that the Gaza Strip undergo complete demilitarization according to a detailed implementation framework and a defined timetable. This undoubtedly represents a particularly difficult challenge for Hamas. At present, the question marks surrounding the organization’s position on this issue far outweigh any certainty.
Based on continuous monitoring of Hamas’s conduct throughout the negotiations to date, it is highly likely that the organization will continue to create obstacles, disrupt progress, delay implementation, and stall for as long as possible. In doing so, it is taking advantage of what can only be described as the U.S. administration’s current lack of enthusiasm for renewing an Israeli military campaign against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. In this context, it is important to note reports published in recent days suggesting an emerging shift in the U.S. position. These reports indicate growing American opposition to an Israeli military operation aimed at disarming Hamas and dismantling its military and governing capabilities, while favoring instead an opportunity to achieve binding agreements through diplomatic negotiations.
In assessing future developments, it is essential to recognize that the situation in the Gaza Strip remains dynamic and continuously evolving, particularly with regard to the positions of the key actors shaping events. At present, this assessment appears especially relevant to the U.S. administration, as preliminary reports in the media point to emerging changes in its position regarding the continued implementation of President Trump’s framework. In any event, the apparent shift in the U.S. position concerning Hamas’s disarmament and its continued rule in the Gaza Strip requires Israel to remain prepared for the possibility of launching a military operation to achieve the war objectives established by the political-security cabinet: the collapse of Hamas as both a military force and a civilian governing authority. This is especially true if Hamas ultimately succeeds in avoiding the practical implementation of the obligations required of it.
