After the abduction and murder of innocent Israeli civilians on October 7th, Israel had no choice but to declare a comprehensive war against the terrorist organization Hamas. The aerial bombardments and ground incursions in Gaza have had significant repercussions on Israel’s foreign policy, particularly towards regional states. The destruction wrought by Hamas on Gaza has also impacted diplomatic processes that Israel had initiated even before the war.
The positive momentum created by the Abraham Accords did not resonate with Turkey. This non-Arab state had already recognized the State of Israel in 1949 and has maintained full diplomatic relations with the Jewish State ever since. However, it is important to emphasize that this relationship has always been complex, characterized by unpredictable and drastic ups and downs, a trend that persisted and reached its peak under the current Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. While relations between the two countries cooled in March 2022, the aftermath of October 7th witnessed their complete collapse.
It is becoming clear that the restoration of warm relations declared publicly with the visit of President Isaac Herzog to Ankara did not withstand the test of reality. The extensive scope of the war in Gaza pushed Turkey to change its strategy towards Israel. While normalization managed to withstand tests such as Operation Dawn’s Light (an Israeli military operation in Gaza in August 2022) and tensions surrounding the Temple Mount during Ramadan, Erdogan was willing to tolerate limited, simmering violence in the Israeli-Palestinian arena.
In hindsight, it can be determined that the main condition for normalizing relations with Turkey depended on the survival of Hamas. Thus, when Israel declared a comprehensive war against this murderous terrorist organization, Erdogan, deeply influenced by the ideals of the “Muslim Brotherhood,” could not allow himself to maintain normal relations with Israel, pretending that nothing had happened.
In his speech to the Turkish Parliament on October 25th, a turning point in relations emerged. Erdogan refrained from condemning Hamas as a terrorist organization and even referred to this group of murderers as “a freedom-fighting organization.” In doing so, he destroyed relations with Jerusalem. Since then, he has seized any opportunity to continue harsh criticism of Israel and declared full solidarity with Hamas. Furthermore, following his directives, the Turkish Foreign Ministry actively engages in Islamic cooperation and supports the delegitimization campaign against Israel led by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and also contributes to the Palestinian Authority’s politicization by falsely accusing Israel of “committing genocide,” thus effectively contributing to the trivialization of the Holocaust. In his recent statements, Erdogan equated Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler, further exacerbating anti-Israel rhetoric, reaching a new low.
Erdogan’s extreme statements are exceptional in the context of other Arab states, indicating that they are his personal initiative and his particular views, which do not represent any decision or position in pan-Arab diplomacy.
The Neo-Ottoman Math
It should be noted that Erdogan received a traditional Islamic education since his childhood. Due to the influence of his religious studies teacher in elementary school, who was impressed by his skills, his father decided to further strengthen his religious education. Thus, during middle school and high school, he integrated into an Imam Hatip, a religious-state school. Additionally, during summer vacations, he was sent to Quran and prayer groups. Later on, Erdogan joined the Nationalist Turkish Student Organization (MTTB), which was religiously conservative. This affiliation connected him to the Islamist party of Necmettin Erbakan, known for his anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist views. As a result, Erdogan also became a member of the radical Naksibendi-Khalidi religious order at the Iskender Pasha Mosque in Istanbul, which advocated for the religious orthodoxy to take over the secular state through political organization based on Islam.
Against this background, it can be understood why the product of this education is not only anti-Zionism but more practically, an innate desire to achieve a more important Islamic goal. The religion of Islam and political Islam flow in the veins of the Turkish president. On the surface, Erdogan even “surpassed” his teacher, Erbakan, in that the latter did not know how to tailor his rhetoric to political needs, which Erdogan seemed to have succeeded in primarily in Turkish domestic politics. However, in practice, the seemingly uncontrollable outbursts receive support from the Turkish center-right and even from Turkish liberals, who sought to reduce the influence of the Turkish army on the mechanisms of the state.
Erdogan’s alliance with the liberals collapsed in 2013, following the riots in Gezi Park. As is known, what began as protests for environmental quality turned into a protest against Erdogan’s excessive concentration of power. Thus, Erdogan was forced to forge a new alliance with the Turkish nationalists in 2015 and was forced to integrate political Islam into Turkish nationalism.
This alliance combines the Islamist-political perspective with Turkish nationalism and embraces the old-new Neo-Ottoman ideology intimately. This ideology aspired to restore the former glory days of the Ottoman past to return the crown to its old place. That is, if not to reconquer all the former Ottoman territories at least to restore and revive Turkish influence in those regions where the Ottoman Empire once ruled. From this perspective, Erdogan began to see himself as the “grandson of the Ottomans” and began to project his presence in the Middle East, North Africa, the Caucasus, and the Balkans.
From Soft Power to Hard Power
From the beginning of Erdogan’s tenure, the Turkish connection to all the regions where the Ottoman Empire once ruled could be seen; initially, this was done through “soft power” – attempts at cultural influence through television series, for example. After 2019, with Turkey’s intervention in the civil war in Libya, Ankara began to also use its hard power, namely its military. As part of this new policy, one can see the deepening and extensive presence of the Turkish army in various areas such as the Eastern Mediterranean, Syria, Iraq, and even Nagorno-Karabakh in the Caucasus. Moreover, Ankara plays a very important role in the Balkans and the Black Sea. Through its military industry, Ankara empowers Kosovo and Ukraine in their struggle against Serbia and Russia.
When analyzing the implications of this Neo-Ottoman foreign policy, it is also important to understand the moral principles and motives behind this worldview. In literal translation from Turkish, it is called “the vision of achieving a world order” (Nizam-ı Alem Ülküsü). According to this worldview, led by those who are committed to the idea of combining Turkish nationalism and political Islam to form the spearhead of Muslim countries, Turkey must act fairly and aggressively to bring peace and order to the world, while ensuring full Turkish and Islamic control over the chaotic areas of conflict and disorder. In other words, this vision can be interpreted as a posture of “world correction” through the use of military force.
As a leader sitting at the center of power for more than two decades, Erdogan undoubtedly sees himself as more than just a president. He is building a legacy for future generations. Therefore, he not only operates in the lands of the former Ottoman Empire but also aims to make more fundamental changes. His book, “A More Just World is Achievable,” which among other things calls for a fundamental reform of the UN Security Council for the benefit of Muslim countries, namely to bring Turkey as a permanent member into the Council, is one of the ideas that shed light on the depth of the Turkish president’s ambitions. Alongside these statements in his book, and in order to make his views the common heritage, he introduces the slogan “The world is bigger than five” – which implies the right to veto the votes of the five permanent members of the Security Council.
Therefore, one can also see the relationship of the American veto against the imposition of a ceasefire in Gaza to Erdogan’s rhetorical call for his view of a new and fairer world order.
The Turkish solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
What is a fair arrangement for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict according to Erdogan’s perception? Last December, the Turkish Foreign Ministry proposed a diplomatic solution whereby Turkey would provide “guarantees” for the benefit of the Palestinians, while the US would serve as a “guarantor” for Israel.
This concept, whereby one country “guarantees” another, is a concept of the “Eastern Mediterranean” that is not well-known in the Western world. The best example of illustrating this concept is the Cyprus issue. In 1960, when the Republic of Cyprus was founded as a result of the Zurich Agreements, Turkey, Greece, and Britain signed “guarantees” to preserve the status quo and ensure the security of the new republic, which only had a regular army of a few thousand soldiers. It is clear that Turkey’s main goal at the time was to preserve the rights of the Turkish community in Cyprus, which constituted 18.4% of the island’s population.
In Turkish eyes, the military coup that occurred in 1974, planned against the Cypriot president by Greek nationalists who acted on the island to unite Cyprus with Greece, provided sufficient grounds to exercise the “guarantee” right. Turkey activated the “guarantee” right against the violation of the status quo and invaded the northern part of the island. In the initial stage of the conflict, the Turks could only hold a very small pocket on the northern coast of the island. But then, following pressure from the US and the West, Turkey was forced to cease hostilities and participate in peace talks held in Geneva.
A deadlock in the talks led Turkey to break off negotiations. Thus, the Turkish army moved to the second stage of the conflict and completed the invasion. At the end of the war, which Turkey called “Operation Peace of Cyprus,” Turkey completed its plan by dividing the island into two parts. 37% of the island came under the full control of the Turkish army, which began with the transfer of all Greek Cypriot population from the north to the south, and all Turks who were in the south were transferred to the north. Since then, the two sides have still not reached an agreement, and the island remains divided between the Republic of Cyprus, ruled by Greek Cypriots, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which Turkey established. According to international law, Turkey is considered an occupying power in the northern part of the island, and therefore, the TRNC has not received any international recognition.
Beyond the benefit that Turkey seeks to gain from providing similar “guarantees” to the Palestinians, it is already presenting its position that it and the United States are responsible powers, while Israel is a failed state in need of guarantors, similar to the Republic of Cyprus.
From this, one can understand Turkey’s perception of Israel, especially after October 7th, specifically that it is far from being intimidated by a state it perceives in this way. By providing such “guarantees” for “preserving the status quo,” Turkey intends to benefit without risking anything. In the case of Cyprus, for example, neither side dared to impose sanctions against Turkey’s takeover of Cyprus. Britain and even Greece, which saw the Greek Cypriots losing their status on the island, did not dare to challenge Turkey.
The Cyprus file should be enough to teach Israel why it should not regard the United States as its “guarantor.” In other words, Jerusalem should reject any proposal for guarantees that could introduce additional elements into the Israeli-Palestinian equation. We have seen that if Turkey accepts the right to provide guarantees, it will use it. Such agreements pave the way for future conflicts and even widespread military confrontations.
Although the Turkish proposal for guarantees was first heard last December, the Turkish Foreign Ministry is still trying to promote the matter on every possible platform. Recently, on March 3rd, within the framework of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, Turkish Foreign Minister Akkan Pidjan reiterated Turkey’s willingness to provide guarantees for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to his method, the provision of guarantees should be made with Israel’s consent. In the same speech, Pidjan revealed Turkey’s unspoken position by proposing to act unilaterally without Israel’s consent and to provide humanitarian assistance to Palestinians in Gaza. In other words, on some day, if and when Turkey signs the guarantee, it may interpret an event in any way it sees fit and may exercise its right derived from the signed agreement. Without a doubt, signing such an agreement that would give Turkey the right to activate the guarantee for the benefit of the Palestinians would be a severe mistake for Israel’s security.
The Bottom Line
In conclusion, October 7th also shook Israel-Turkey relations. The expanding scope of the conflict did not allow Erdogan room for maneuver, so he chose to abandon normalization of relations with Israel. In other words, Erdogan’s declared pragmatism towards Israel disappeared in favor of the neo-Ottoman ideology deeply influenced by political Islam and Turkish nationalism. Against this background and while completely ignoring what happened on October 7th, Erdogan chose to focus solely on his legacy and therefore publicly declared his support for Hamas. As a leader in power for over twenty years, he wants to justify the new image he is trying to create: “the heir of the Ottomans” – one who can bring order, peace, and tranquility to the Middle East.
Therefore, as he seeks to make a revolution in the existing world order through promoting reform in the Security Council. In the same spirit, Erdogan aims to bring the Palestinians under his patronage by providing guarantees that he will sign on their behalf. Without a doubt, such a move would make Turkey a key player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and would limit Israel’s military freedom of action.
Against this backdrop, Israel must be vigilant and not fall into the honey trap wrapped in words of peace. When it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in terms of national security interests, Israel must minimize any possible contact with Turkey and should not allow Turkey to enter the Middle Eastern equation, which is already complex enough with the vested interests of Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, and Qatar.