The successful elimination of the arch-terrorist Ismail Haniyeh in the capital of the Axis of Evil, Tehran, sent shockwaves through Ankara. As a reminder, last December, following the statement by Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar that Israel would settle accounts with all perpetrators of the October 7 massacre—even if they were in Turkey, Qatar, or Lebanon—Turkish President Erdoğan warned Israel that such actions would have severe consequences for bilateral relations.
Although Haniyeh was not assassinated on Turkish soil, the assassination nevertheless deepened the rift between the two countries beyond what would be expected from such an operation. This was due to the intimate relationship between Erdoğan and Haniyeh. In his later years, Haniyeh frequently visited Turkey and met with Erdoğan at his palace on multiple occasions. It is reasonable to assume that a personal connection formed between the two, making the assassination a personal blow to the palace in Ankara.
The mourning atmosphere in Erdoğan’s palace was reflected in his decisions. The day after the assassination, Erdoğan declared a national day of mourning. On August 1, Turkish flags were lowered to half-mast across the country and in all diplomatic missions abroad, including the Turkish Embassy in Tel Aviv. This was yet another illustration of the absurd reality in the Middle East—a flag lowered to half-mast in the heart of Tel Aviv in mourning for the killer of Israelis.
The Turkish move sparked outrage in Jerusalem. Foreign Minister Israel Katz summoned the Turkish chargé d’affaires for a reprimand. Additionally, in a post on his official account on X, Katz suggested that the Turkish diplomat return to Turkey if he wished to mourn Haniyeh. However, the post remained a mere publicity stunt and did not translate into concrete action.
The Israeli Foreign Ministry’s move did not faze Ankara. On the contrary, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan chose to escalate the situation further by calling for the establishment of a regional defense alliance against Israel. However, in contrast, his ministry’s spokesperson did not ignore Katz’s reprimand and took a jab at him, stating, “Peace cannot be achieved when a minister threatens diplomats and assassinates leaders engaged in negotiations.”
This reflects the delusional mindset in Turkey, where Haniyeh is perceived as a “man of peace” who was allegedly trying to negotiate a ceasefire when he was assassinated. The Turkish public discourse and media completely ignore specific episodes in Haniyeh’s life, such as his “prayer of thanks” after witnessing the massacre of Israelis on October 7 from his hiding place.
“The Zionist Entity”
The eulogies delivered by Erdoğan and the pro-government Turkish media played a significant role in shaping Haniyeh’s image as the “great leader” of the entire Muslim nation. Alongside these praises for the arch-terrorist, Erdoğan also took the opportunity to criticize Israel, describing the assassination as “Zionist barbarism.” The very use of the term “Zionism” as a derogatory term by the Turkish president in an official statement indicates a further deterioration in relations.
In the past, despite his criticism of Jerusalem, Erdoğan refrained from using the term “Zionism” when referring to Israel, always opting for more formal terminology such as “the Israeli government.” While the Turkish media frequently used this term, no Turkish politician had ever been so blunt—approaching Iranian-style rhetoric.
The similarities between Ankara and Tehran were not limited to Erdoğan’s speech, in which he effectively joined those who deny Israel’s right to exist. On August 2, Turkey blocked access to Instagram, a move characteristic of countries like Iran and North Korea. According to reports in the Turkish media, this decision was made in protest against Instagram’s refusal to publish Turkish officials’ eulogies for Haniyeh. Instagram executives negotiated with the Turkish government for a week before Turkey agreed to lift the ban.
As with other actions taken by the government, it did not hesitate to harm the 57 million Instagram users in the country, many of whom rely on the platform for their livelihood. Instagram is a crucial marketing tool for various industries, such as hospitality and tourism. According to estimates by the Istanbul Planning Agency (IPA), the financial loss caused by the week-long ban amounted to $396 million. However, these figures did not seem to concern Ankara—just as the severance of trade relations with Israel, which caused Turkey an annual economic loss of $437 million, did not.
Immediately after lifting the ban, Fahrettin Altun, the head of Turkey’s Communications Directorate and Erdoğan’s chief propagandist, quickly shared a eulogy for Haniyeh on Instagram. Government supporters perceived this move as a “victory” over Instagram. Of course, in the overall balance of this affair, Turkey lost nearly $400 million, but in its view, it “taught Instagram a lesson.”
Turkey’s Middle Eastern Wagner-Style Force
Despite the turmoil that swept through Turkey following the assassination of Haniyeh, it was not this event that deteriorated relations between the two countries. Three days before the assassination, during a gathering of the ruling party in the Rize province on the Black Sea coast in northern Turkey, Erdoğan spoke about the importance of strengthening and ensuring the independence of Turkey’s military industries. His reasoning was so that Turkey could defend itself from Israel and help the Palestinians, “so that [Israel] cannot do what it is doing in Palestine.” From these extreme statements, he escalated to a direct threat, declaring that Turkey would be willing to “enter” Israel, just as it did in Nagorno-Karabakh and Libya. This referred to Turkey’s active involvement in two wars in 2020.
Turkey decided to intervene in Libya to bolster its position in the maritime border dispute in the eastern Mediterranean against Greece and Cyprus. It exploited the situation to establish legal ties with these countries by signing a maritime boundary agreement with the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA). The GNA was placed under Turkey’s protective umbrella in exchange, effectively handing over its survival to Ankara. The Turkish parliament approved this decision on January 2, 2020, paving the way for Erdoğan’s government to intervene in Libya’s civil war in favor of the GNA, which was besieged in Tripoli. Following this decision, Turkey began shipping arms via naval vessels, including heavy ammunition, armored vehicles, air defense systems, anti-tank weapons, and drones.
Turkey’s intervention against General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) achieved its objectives primarily through the recruitment of Syrian mercenaries who were flown to Libya to fight alongside the GNA. The role of the Turkish company SADAT, which operates like the Russian Wagner Group, is worth noting. According to numerous reports, SADAT personnel not only trained the mercenaries brought from Syria but also the local Libyan GNA fighters.
The Turkish Threat: “We Will Enter Israel”
A similar scenario unfolded in the Azerbaijan-Armenia war in Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey’s ethnic ties with Azerbaijan led Ankara to supply drones to Baku, significantly contributing to Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia. In this case, Israeli technology also contributed to Azerbaijan’s victory—this time alongside Turkey.
From these two cases, Erdoğan’s statement about “entering Israel” could be interpreted as Turkey’s intent to support forces opposed to Israel, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, through the supply of weapons and ammunition. Given that Hamas is besieged in Gaza, it is reasonable to assume that Turkey may focus its efforts on Lebanon instead.
Despite all the adverse developments between Turkey and Israel—the unprecedented actions and statements, including veiled threats of military confrontation, as well as measures such as halting flights, tourism, and trade relations—on paper, Israel and Turkey are still not officially hostile nations.
In other words, following Erdoğan’s declarations, Turkey can no longer be considered a “friendly” country, but it is also not an “enemy state.” But, the phrase “it’s complicated” accurately describes the current state of relations. Regardless, while Israel’s Foreign Ministry categorizes Turkey as part of “Europe,” the behavior of its government does not align with this definition. Instead, it undeniably reflects that of a Middle Eastern country. In Europe, countries do not sever trade relations on a whim, block social media platforms, or make belligerent declarations against friendly nations. Europe has other ways to express dissatisfaction and protest.
In light of this, Israel must acknowledge that Turkey is part of the Middle East, not Europe. The immediate implication is that Turkey’s file in the Foreign Ministry should be transferred from the Southern Europe division to the Middle East division. This shift is crucial for making better-informed decisions regarding Ankara. Such a move would lead to treating Turkey similarly to Egypt and Jordan—countries with which Israel has peace agreements but under limited trust. Just as Israel closely monitors Arabic and Persian discourse, it should also carefully track Turkish rhetoric and, most importantly, communicate its stance in Turkish.
Correctly categorizing Turkey will lead to a different diplomatic approach—one that could curb Turkey’s further hostile actions against Israel.
This step would pave the way for effective diplomacy, utilizing Israel’s influence in Washington and Baku to restrain Ankara. Correct diplomatic engagement could eventually lead to a gradual rebuilding of stable relations with Turkey after the war.
