Flydubai Flight FZ1073, which ended safely thanks to the bravery of the captain and the resourcefulness of the Israelis on board, should be a source of concern for every government, intelligence service, and defender of the free world. This terrorist incident, like the violent riots that spread throughout France, is yet another warning sign of the most significant threat facing the free world. Islamist radicalism, spreading throughout the Western world and prominently manifested in terrorism against Israel, threatens the very existence of the free world as such, and not only Israel. Islamist radicalism has multiple faces and layers, and it transcends borders and states. It is therefore essential to recognize and understand the phenomenon and the risks it poses to the free world as a whole, and to pool resources and coordinate efforts to suppress this threat in a way that prevents its resurgence. “Do not wait for extremism to become terrorism, and do not wait for terrorism to become a catastrophe,” urges Ahmed Charai (Charai, 2026) in a recently published article (The Terrorist Threat Has Changed. Our Strategy Must Change With It).
This article examines Islamist radicalization and its distinctive characteristics as they developed between 2010 and 2025 among Muslim communities in six Western European countries: Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands. The analysis is based on a three-level model that connects personal grievances (micro), social networks (meso), and broader political conditions (macro). The findings indicate that while radicalization pathways are similar in nature to those of other extremist movements, Islamist radicalization in Europe develops within a unique context shaped by social exclusion, identity tensions, transnational religious narratives, and difficulties with integration. Government responses reveal that fragmented governance, delayed political responses, and competing public narratives have intensified the pressures driving radicalization. The Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, exacerbated the sense of threat, accelerated the securitization of radical Islamism, and linked domestic security concerns with the Palestinian issue and global conflicts. Securitization operates in two directions: it serves as a response to radicalization, but can also deepen identity-based tensions and undermine social cohesion.
The Surprising Connection Between Religion and Progressivism
In recent decades, Europe has absorbed significant immigration from countries with Muslim-majority populations, leading to the formation of large Muslim communities concentrated primarily in major metropolitan areas. These communities encounter structural barriers, social exclusion, economic marginalization, and residential segregation. Parallel religious and cultural infrastructures established within these communities provide social support, but also disconnect them from broader social institutions. Although most Muslims in Europe reject political violence, such segregated environments can facilitate ideological radicalization when people are exposed to discrimination and narratives about the moral decline of the West (Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015). In some cities, the disconnect has deepened to the point of the state’s institutional and territorial retreat (No-go zones), undermining law enforcement and intelligence capabilities.
The demographic context is also shaped by a profound change in religious identity in Europe: Pew studies show that between 2010 and 2020, the share of people identifying as Christian in Europe declined from 74.6% to 67.1%, while the share of the religiously unaffiliated rose from 18.7% to 25.3%, and the share of Muslims increased from 5.3% to 6.0% (Pew Research Center, 2025). The combination of majority secularization and Muslim population growth creates a sense that the national “core” identity has been abandoned and fuels the framing of Islam as a threat.
Cross-border ideological currents circulating through religious dissemination networks and digital platforms strengthen political Islam. One notable development is the “red-green alliance” – a tactical rapprochement between radical Islamist movements (“green”) and the progressive left (“red”) around anti-capitalist, anti-Western, and anti-Zionist messages (Karagiannis & McCauley, 2013; Ben David, 2023). The study focuses on the years 2010–2025, a period that included the Arab Spring, the rise of ISIS, the refugee crisis (2015–2016), waves of “lone wolf” attacks (such as the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack), and the October 7, 2023, attack and its aftermath.
The foundations and sources of radical Islamist ideology lie in the Arab and Muslim world, and in this sense, “there is also a responsibility that belongs particularly to the Arab and Muslim world” (Charai, 2026). The international community, led by the powers of the free world, must compel governments in Arab and Muslim countries to wage the struggle against radical ideology. “Arab governments, religious institutions, universities, intellectuals, and civil society must confront ideologies that legitimize political violence, normalize hatred, or turn religious identity into perpetual conflict.” (Charai, 2026).
Three central research questions guide the discussion:
1. What are the main characteristics of Islamist radicalization in Europe and the mechanisms driving it in the six countries under examination?
2. How does Islamist radicalization differ from radicalization in general?
3. How did the October 7 attack reignite “red-green” alliances, lead to increased use of Palestinian symbols, and contribute to the rise of securitization?
The Central Argument
Islamist radicalization in Europe threatens the very identity, culture, and existence of European states as Western, democratic, and free societies. It must therefore be understood and addressed as an existential security issue, rather than as a routine problem of integration or social marginalization.
Although the pathways of Islamist radicalization resemble those of other extremist ideologies in their mechanisms, it operates within a unique context shaped by large-scale immigration, transnational networks, and political Islam. Under these conditions, radical actors exploit liberal legal frameworks and protected religious spaces to build long-term influence below the threshold of overt violence. The October 7, 2023 attack served as a critical catalyst, exposing how quickly external Islamist violence can accelerate internal mobilization, polarization, and antisemitic escalation in Europe.
Although both right-wing extremism and the progressive left pose threats to the liberal order, security agencies such as Europol and Germany’s BfV rank Islamist radicalization as the fastest-growing terrorist threat (Europol, 2024). The far right and Islamism feed each other’s radicalization through mutual reinforcement (Busher & Macklin, 2015). Treating Islamist radicalization as a first-order security challenge (securitization) is regarded by the security establishment as essential to preserving the liberal and national foundations of European democracy.
Methodology and Sources
The study examines the years 2010–2025 and focuses on six countries: Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands. These countries were selected because of their large Muslim populations and their differing models of immigration, integration, and security policy.
The operational definition draws on Balzacq and Settoul’s distinction between nonviolent cognitive radicalization (rejection of democratic norms, promotion of Sharia governance, and framing grievances through the concept of the ‘umma’) and violent extremism (the transition to political violence) (Balzacq & Settoul, 2022a). The analysis draws on four types of sources:
Demographic data: Pew Research Center data (2010–2020) and data from national interior ministries.
Security and terrorism data: reports by Europol (TE-SAT), Germany’s BfV, the Dutch AIVD and NCTV, the Swedish Säkerhetspolisen, Britain’s Prevent program, and the FRA.
Legislation and policy: national laws, parliamentary reports, and judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.
Elite discourse database: an analysis of political discourse (‘actor-message-audience’) based on an original database for 2010–2026 (Kerem, 2010–2026), alongside policy reports (such as the 2026 New Direction Foundation report).
Theoretical Framework and Literature Review
Radicalization and Securitization Processes
Radicalization is not a linear pathway but rather a “family of processes” (Balzacq & Settoul, 2022a). The three-level model includes:
Motivations (micro): personal grievances, identity crises, a sense of injustice, and marginalization.
Enabling conditions (macro): political opportunities, conflicts abroad, and digital environments.
Mechanisms (meso): peer influence, social networks, and charismatic leadership (Crenshaw, 1981; Balzacq & Settoul, 2022a).
Studies reject the “conveyor belt” theory, according to which radical beliefs inevitably lead to violence, and point to an empirical disconnect between threat narratives and their actual measurement. In addition, the research is divided between structural approaches focusing on socioeconomic exclusion (Khorchide et al., 2021) and approaches emphasizing transnational ideological networks, such as the Muslim Brotherhood (ECR Group, 2021; Schmidinger, n.d.).
The concept of securitization, which originated with the Copenhagen School (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998), explains how a civilian issue is transformed into an existential security threat, thereby justifying the use of extraordinary or extreme measures through speech acts and institutional practice (Balzacq, 2011). The process consists of three components:
Securitizing actor: an actor with epistemic/political authority (Michael, 2007, 2009).
Message content: defining the issue as an existential danger to identity, the constitution, or the state.
Audience: the public or parliament, which grants legitimacy to extraordinary measures.
Researchers such as (Cesari, 2013) and (Mandaville & El-Mohammad, 2022) warn that excessive securitization of Islam in Europe generates severe restrictions and increases distrust among citizens.
The Spectrum of Radical Behavior and Distinctive Characteristics
Radical behavior exists along a continuum: ideological (adoption of absolutist views), discursive (hate speech), symbolic (Sharia patrols/da’wa), behavioral (enforcement of gender segregation), criminal, violent (the murder of Theo van Gogh), and terrorist (the attacks in Paris and Brussels).
The characteristics that distinguish Islamist radicalization in Europe:
Transnational framework: linking local grievances to a global narrative of the ‘umma’ and connections to conflicts in the Middle East (LeVine, 2006).
Religious doctrine: the use of concepts such as ’fard ‘ayn’ (individual obligation) to justify violence (Hegghammer, 2010).
Protected micro-environments: exploiting mosques and religious study groups protected under freedom of religion (Wiktorowicz, 2004).
Community separation and normative differentiation: creating enclaves facilitated by Sharia councils and parallel personal-status laws (Koopmans, 2014; Siddiqui et al., 2018).
The ‘Red-Green’ Alliance: tactical coalitions with progressive actors around anti-imperialist and pro-Palestinian narratives (Vidino, 2011).
Demographic visibility and external ties: the context of large-scale refugee migration (Rostan & Rostan, 2020) and financial and organizational ties with actors in the Gulf and the Middle East (Vidino, 2010).
Empirical Findings: Analysis of the Case Studies
The demographic data are based on research estimates (Pew Research Center, 2025), as most European countries do not record religious affiliation in official censuses (Mohiuddin, 2017). The growth of the Muslim population (from 5.3% in 2010 to 6.0% in 2020 across Europe) occurred alongside a sharp erosion of Christian identity among the majority population.
1. Germany
Demographics: The Muslim population grew from 4% at the beginning of the decade to approximately 6.5%–6.9% in 2020 (around 5.8 million people), primarily as a result of the 2015–2016 refugee crisis (Duman, 2018; BAMF, 2021; Pew, 2025).
Islam in the public sphere: Approximately 2,750 mosques and prayer rooms, with the largest network being DITIB, operated by Turkey (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2021). A developed halal economy (Muslim dietary laws) is concentrated in neighborhoods such as Neukölln in Berlin and Marxloh in Duisburg. The New Direction report (2026) defines these areas as “parallel societies” (Hemery-Aymar, 2026).
Radicalization and securitization: Securitizing actors operate at two levels: the AfD party (Alice Weidel) has portrayed immigration as “population replacement” and an existential threat (Weidel, 2016, 2018); at the institutional level, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) classifies legalistic Islamism (such as the Muslim Brotherhood) as a serious threat to the democratic order (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 2024). Terrorist attacks (such as those at Breitscheidplatz in 2016 and Solingen in 2024) accelerated deportation measures and extensive intelligence monitoring (Le Monde, 2024; ISGAP, 2025).
2. France
Demographics: The highest rate in Europe, rising from 6.6% in 2010 to 9.1% in 2020 (approximately 6 million people) (Pew Research Center, 2025).
Islam in the public sphere: Approximately 2,500 mosques and a halal economy worth €5–7 billion (Ministère de l’Intérieur, 2024). The visibility of Islam comes into direct conflict with the principle of republican secularism (laïcité) (Bowen, 2007). The New Direction report (2026) identifies a high correlation between the growth in the number of mosques and the emergence of critical No-go areas, such as Franc-Moisin in Saint-Denis (Hemery-Aymar, 2026).
Radicalization and securitization: France suffered the most severe terrorist attacks (November 2015, 130 people killed), resulting from a combination of foreign fighters returning from Syria and local networks (Micheron, 2022; Settoul, 2022). Securitization was institutionalized through the “anti-separatism” law (2021) and a policy of disruption (politique d’entrave), under which hundreds of institutions and associations were shut down (Darmanin, 2020; U.S. State Dept, 2022). In 2026, a parliamentary committee defined Islamism as an “existential threat.”
3. Belgium
Demographics: An increase from 5.1% in 2010 to 6.8% in 2020 (Pew Research Center, 2025).
Islam in the public sphere: Approximately 330 mosques, concentrated mainly in Brussels (Molenbeek, Schaerbeek) (Exécutif des Musulmans, 2023). Laws banning full-face coverings (2011) were upheld by the European Court of Human Rights on the grounds of vivre ensemble (“living together”) (S.A.S. v. France, 2014; Belcacemi v. Belgium, 2017).
Radicalization and securitization: Belgium recorded the highest per-capita rate of foreign fighters who traveled to Syria, mainly through organizations such as Sharia4Belgium and networks in the Molenbeek neighborhood (Coolsaet, 2016). This network carried out the terrorist attack in Brussels in March 2016 (32 people killed) (Van Ostaeyen, 2016). Leading politicians (Didier Reynders, Theo Francken, Jan Jambon) spearheaded emergency legislation and stricter surveillance (Reynders, 2016; Europol, 2023).
4. Britain
Demographics: An increase from 5.3% to 6.4% (approximately 4.3 million people in 2020), alongside the decline of the Christian majority to below 50% (Pew Research Center, 2025).
Islam in the public sphere: An extensive infrastructure of approximately 1,800 mosques, Sharia councils, and a huge halal sector (Naqshbandi, 2024; Fischer, 2015).
Radicalization and securitization: The 7/7 London bombings (2005) laid the foundations for the Prevent strategy to counter extremism (House of Commons, 2006; Abbas, 2022). Politicians across the political spectrum (Nigel Farage, Theresa May, Boris Johnson, Suella Braverman, as well as Rishi Sunak and Keir Starmer) framed immigration and radicalization as threats to British sovereignty and values (May, 2016; Sunak, 2023; Starmer, 2025). The 2024 elections marked a precedent, with independent candidates elected to Parliament on explicitly pro-Gaza platforms (Al Jazeera, 2024).
5. Sweden
Demographics: A near doubling from 4.5% in 2010 to 8.1% in 2020 (approximately 840,000 people) due to the large-scale intake of refugees (Pew Research Center, 2025).
Islam in the public sphere: Approximately 250 mosques concentrated on the outskirts of cities (Rinkeby in Stockholm, Rosengård in Malmö) (Borell & Gerdner, 2011; Myndigheten för stöd till trossamfund, 2023). Police have identified 59 “vulnerable areas” (utsatta områden).
Radicalization and securitization: A high rate of foreign fighters and growing criminal-religious extremism (Säkerhetspolisen, 2024). Political discourse has undergone a sharp shift: leaders (Ebba Busch, Tobias Billström) have warned against political Islam, while the Sweden Democrats have become an influential force under the Tidö Agreement. In 2026, an official state inquiry was established to examine the penetration of political Islam (Government Offices of Sweden, 2026).
6. The Netherlands
Demographics: An increase from 5.0% to 5.5% in 2020, within a society in which 54.1% of the population has no religious affiliation (Pew Research Center, 2025).
Islam in the public sphere: Approximately 475 mosques concentrated in major cities (CBS, 2024).
Radicalization and securitization: Following the murder of Theo van Gogh (2004), the Netherlands abandoned its multicultural “pillarization” model (verzuiling) in favor of close monitoring by the AIVD and NCTV of Salafism and legalistic Islamism (AIVD, 2024; NCTV, 2023). Politicians such as Geert Wilders (PVV) and Dilan Yeşilgöz (VVD) framed political Islam as a direct threat to freedom and the constitution.
Comparative Analysis and Broader Implications
The Role of the Palestinian Narrative and the ‘Red-Green Alliance’
The Palestinian issue is not perceived within Islamist radicalization merely as a territorial national conflict, but as a central metaphorical symbol of historical injustice perpetrated against the entire Muslim ‘umma’ (LeVine, 2006). This narrative serves as a unifying force connecting the personal grievances of young people in Europe with a global struggle against the West.
The Palestinian issue constitutes the primary glue of the ‘Red-Green Alliance’ (Vidino, 2011; Karagiannis & McCauley, 2013). Islamist organizations exploit the liberal and progressive language of “human rights,” “anti-colonialism,” and the “fight against racism” to gain legitimacy in mainstream public opinion, while radical left-wing groups provide them with an organizational and political platform. However, this is inherently a fragile alliance, marked by deep value gaps on issues of gender and LGBTQ rights (Ben David, 2023).
The Impact of October 7, 2023 as a Catalyst for Radicalization and Securitization
The Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, and the war that followed served as a turning point and critical catalyst for existing trends across Europe:
Escalation of polarization and mass protests: The events of October 7 sparked an unprecedented wave of protests in European cities. These demonstrations were largely coordinated by networks affiliated with the Red-Green Alliance, some of which had received support and funding from external actors (such as Qatar) for years (Maariv, 2026a).
Sharp rise in antisemitism: Reports by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and national monitoring organizations (such as CST in Britain) point to a dramatic increase in antisemitic incidents, attacks, synagogue desecrations, and targeted terrorism alerts against Jewish institutions (CST, 2022; FRA, 2024; Europol, 2024).
Acceleration of securitization processes: European governments responded with an unprecedented expansion of emergency and policing powers. In Germany and France, radical pro-Palestinian organizations (such as Samidoun) were banned, certain demonstrations were prohibited, and surveillance of mosques and social media networks was intensified.
Distortion and paradox of supranational policy: While European nation-states are tightening securitization measures against legalistic Islamism, European Union institutions continue to fund and cooperate with umbrella organizations associated with these networks (such as ENAR and FEMYSO), undermining the effectiveness of national counterterrorism efforts (Williams, 2026; Gudmundson, 2026).
Discussion, Summary and Conclusions
Analysis of Recent Extreme Events in Light of the Research Findings
The recent dramatic events, the thwarting of an attempted hijacking of a “Flydubai” aircraft alongside the wave of violent unrest sweeping across France, led by radical Islamist elements in cooperation with progressive organizations, do not occur in a vacuum. They represent a practical and tangible manifestation of the theoretical and empirical trends and patterns discussed in this article:
Realization of the Potential of the ‘Red-Green Alliance’ on the Ground:
The findings of the article indicate that Islamist organizations use the language, mechanisms, and political platforms of progressive movements in the West as a source of legitimacy for their struggle and for mobilizing public support. The recent unrest in France demonstrates in practice how radical ideology operates as a synergistic network: progressive discourse provides moral cover and civic justification for protest, while Islamist elements exploit the platform to perpetrate violence, damage infrastructure, and undermine the stability of the state.
From a Focused Struggle to Global Escalation and International Instability:
The attempted hijacking of the “Flydubai” aircraft is directly connected to the article’s conclusion regarding the willingness of radical elements to break beyond the boundaries of regional conflict and revive the use of aviation and international terrorism tactics. As examined in this article, when radicalism experiences a sense of erosion or pressure in the local arena, it seeks to create a global psychological shock (“projection of power”) while targeting both civilian and strategic targets.
Erosion of Governance and the Sovereignty of the Western State:
The violent wave in France illustrates the profound challenge posed by the combination of religious radicalization and socio-political protest in democratic nation-states. As the research found, the loss of governance in certain areas (No-Go Zones) and the ability of extremist coalitions to challenge law enforcement and legal institutions are a direct consequence of the normalization of radical ideas within mainstream public discourse.
Key Conclusions
The comparative analysis of radicalization processes in six Western European countries between 2010 and 2025, alongside an examination of recent current events, demonstrates that Islamist radicalization is not merely an isolated law-enforcement problem or a failure of welfare policy, but an existential security and identity challenge to the liberal-democratic order.
The research findings lead to three key conclusions:
The Uniqueness of the Threat: Radical Islamism succeeds in combining local grievances stemming from exclusion with a transnational religious ideology and connections to global conflicts, while exploiting the liberal legal space for long-term legalistic activity below the threshold of violence.
The Securitization Paradox: While securitization is a necessary state response to protect constitutional foundations, its expanding application may deepen alienation among Muslim communities, fuel narratives of grievance, and thereby create a vicious cycle that further fuels radicalization.
October 7 and Extreme Events as a Turning Point: The attack in southern Israel, the international hijacking attempt, and the unrest in France exposed the vulnerability of European societies to the penetration of violence and ideology, accelerated political polarization, and transformed the Palestinian issue and the anti-Western struggle into central instruments of political mobilization and antisemitism.
What Can Be Done?
To address this challenge, European states must formulate a consistent and sophisticated policy:
Separating Conceptual Discourse and Ending Normalization: Western policy and security decision-makers must recognize that the connection between progressive actors and radical Islam is not a platform for civil rights, but a mechanism serving radical objectives that seek to dismantle the rule of law and legal order.
Integrated Enforcement and Counterterrorism: The successful thwarting of the attempted hijacking demonstrates the importance of deep, institutionalized cooperation in intelligence and aviation security. However, without addressing the roots of ideological and operational radicalization within European countries themselves, these threats will continue to erupt in different arenas. Addressing the roots of ideological radicalization requires deep familiarity and understanding through systematic monitoring of educational curricula, statements by religious and political leaders, and social networks. When findings demonstrate incitement and ideological indoctrination to violence, terrorist financing, and material or other forms of support, governments must act. Addressing the ideological infrastructure of Islamist radicalism requires cross-border and international cooperation.
Interagency Coordination: A clear distinction must be made between the law-abiding Muslim majority and Islamist entrepreneurs, foreign sources of oversight and funding must be monitored, and the structural gap between stringent national policies and European Union mechanisms that undermine them must be bridged. The international community, led by the United States, should build an organizational and structural infrastructure that enables the integration of intelligence cooperation, including financial intelligence, aviation security, rigorous law enforcement, and the prevention of radicalization (Charai, 2026).
