In recent years, and especially since the outbreak of the Iron Swords war, the name of Mohammed Dahlan, a former senior Fatah figure, has repeatedly surfaced in discussions about the future of the Gaza Strip and the identity of the Palestinian leadership on the day after the war. Dahlan, who was pushed out of the Palestinian centers of power more than a decade ago and has lived in the United Arab Emirates ever since, continues to maintain an extensive network of contacts within the Palestinian arena, the Arab world, and the international system.
The possibility that he could once again play a central role in the Gaza Strip has attracted particular interest, given his past as head of the Palestinian Preventive Security Service in the Strip, his ties with Israel and the United States, his longstanding rivalry with Hamas, and the confrontation that led to his expulsion from Fatah.
I first came to know Dahlan in the 1980s, when I served as head of the Arab Affairs Department in the Israeli administration in the Gaza Strip. Later, I met with him in the course of my work as an adviser to defense ministers and maintained contacts with senior officials in the Palestinian Authority and Fatah.
This familiarity, together with conversations with Palestinian figures and close observation of developments in the regional arena, allows me to examine Dahlan’s career not only through the positions he held, but also through the complex relationships he cultivated with rivals, allies, and various centers of power.
From the Khan Yunis Refugee Camp to the Fatah Leadership
Mohammed Dahlan, known as “Abu Fadi,” was born on September 29, 1961, in the Khan Yunis refugee camp in the Gaza Strip. His family arrived in the camp after the 1948 War of Independence, from the town of Hamama, which was located near al-Majdal, today Ashkelon.
As a young man, he studied at the Islamic University of Gaza, which was a major center of activity for the Islamic movement in the Strip. During this period, the movement led by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin was taking root in the area. Yassin would later establish Hamas.
Although Dahlan belonged to Fatah’s Palestinian nationalist camp, he was closely acquainted with activists from the Islamic movement, including figures who would later become senior Hamas leaders. Some of them, including Yahya and Marwan Sinwar and Mohammed Deif, also grew up in the Khan Yunis refugee camp.
This familiarity gave rise to a complex relationship. On the one hand, Dahlan was a political and security rival of Hamas and fought its members for years. On the other hand, his personal ties with key figures in the movement enabled him to maintain channels of communication even during periods of intense confrontation.
During the 1980s, Dahlan headed Fatah’s youth movement, “al-Shabiba al-Fatahawiyeh,” and became one of the movement’s leading activists in the Gaza Strip. His activities against Israeli rule led to his arrest on numerous occasions. In January 1987, several months before the outbreak of the First Intifada, Israel deported him to Jordan. After a brief stay in Amman, he moved to Tunis, where he joined the PLO leadership under Yasser Arafat.
His relationship with Arafat would eventually open the way for him to the upper echelons of the Palestinian system.
The Strongman of Gaza’s Security Services
In May 1994, following the Cairo Agreement signed as part of the Oslo process, Dahlan returned to the Gaza Strip and was appointed by Arafat to head the Palestinian Preventive Security Service. In his new position, he built a security force numbering thousands of armed men, developed close ties with Israeli and American security officials, and became one of the most influential figures in the Strip. One of his central responsibilities was the fight against armed Islamist organizations, foremost among them Hamas. The service he headed acted forcefully against members of the movement, at times employing methods that drew criticism over human rights violations.
At the same time, Dahlan established himself as a central figure in security relations between the Palestinian Authority, Israel, and the United States. However, his relationship with Israel was not without disputes and serious incidents. His name was linked to the attack on a school bus in Kfar Darom in 2000. In 2019, an Israeli court ruled, in a civil proceeding, that Dahlan was responsible for the attack and ordered him to pay 44 million shekels in compensation to the victims’ families.
Following the outbreak of the Second Intifada, Dahlan became prominent for his criticism of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad over the escalation of the confrontation with Israel. At the same time, he also began criticizing Arafat, arguing that the Palestinian Authority was plagued by corruption and the improper appointment of individuals close to the leadership.
In 2002, he resigned as head of the Preventive Security Service. A year later, following Mahmoud Abbas’s appointment as prime minister of the Palestinian Authority, Dahlan was appointed minister of security affairs in his government and continued to maintain ties with Israel and the United States. When Abbas resigned in September 2003, Dahlan’s tenure in the government also came to an end, but he continued to preserve his influence in the Strip through his supporters in Fatah and the security services.
The Fight Against Hamas and the Rift with Abbas
In March 2007, Abbas appointed Dahlan as head of the Palestinian National Security Council. The appointment came against the backdrop of an escalating confrontation between Fatah and Hamas, following Hamas’s victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections the previous year.
In June 2007, Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip by force, following fierce clashes with security forces affiliated with Fatah. Dahlan, who was closely identified with the campaign against Hamas, left the Strip and eventually settled in Ramallah. These events marked the end of the Palestinian Authority’s rule in Gaza and the deepening of the political and geographic divide between the Strip and the West Bank. At the same time, Dahlan’s relations with the Fatah leadership also continued to deteriorate.
In 2011, following a bitter confrontation with Abbas and allegations that he had attempted to oust him, Dahlan was expelled from the movement. He moved to the United Arab Emirates, where over the years he established ties with senior figures in the political and business establishment.
On the face of it, his expulsion from Fatah and his removal from the Gaza Strip should have marked the end of his political career. In practice, Dahlan succeeded in maintaining a network of loyalists and contacts that enabled him to continue influencing developments in the Palestinian arena even from his base outside the territories.
“This Is David Hacham, a Representative of the Zionist Occupation”
My personal acquaintance with Dahlan began in the years before the First Intifada, when I headed the Arab Affairs Department in the Israeli administration in the Gaza Strip. At the time, Dahlan was in his twenties, an energetic and committed activist in Fatah’s youth movement. In the meetings I held with him, I was impressed by his familiarity with political developments in Israel and his understanding of Israel’s positions on the Palestinian issue.
In January 1987, after the decision was made to deport him to Jordan, I assigned one of the department’s officers to accompany him by helicopter to the Allenby Bridge, on his way out of Israeli territory. Several years later, during the Oslo process, we met again, this time under entirely different circumstances.
In the summer of 1998, when I was serving as an adviser to Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, I was asked to meet with Dahlan, who was then head of the Preventive Security Service in the Gaza Strip. The purpose of the meeting was to convey security and political messages of importance to the contacts taking place between Israel and the PLO. The visit had been coordinated in advance with his office. When I arrived at the Erez checkpoint, Dahlan’s representatives were waiting for me in a luxurious black Mercedes. From there, we continued to the Preventive Security headquarters in the Tel al-Hawa neighborhood of Gaza City, escorted by two security jeeps.
When I entered Dahlan’s office, he was sitting at the head of a large mahogany table, surrounded by about ten Palestinians who were taking part in the meeting. Dahlan greeted me with a smile and announced to those present: “This is David Hacham, a representative of the Zionist occupation.”
I was surprised by the provocative description. After a brief moment, I decided not to be drawn into a response, greeted those present, and left with Dahlan for a side room, where we held the scheduled meeting. The conversation itself took place in a matter-of-fact, open, and cordial atmosphere. I conveyed to Dahlan the messages I had been asked to deliver, and he asked me to convey messages from him to the defense minister.
At the end of the meeting, members of his staff escorted me to another meeting with Abbas, who at the time was living in the Rimal neighborhood of Gaza. That meeting, too, took place in an informal atmosphere, and Abbas asked me to convey messages concerning the political contacts between Israel and the PLO.
The encounter with Dahlan illustrated to me a central feature of his political character: his ability to combine provocative statements toward Israel with direct and practical dealings with representatives of the Israeli security establishment. This ability, together with his interpersonal skills and the network of contacts he cultivated, helped him maintain his standing even after he was removed from the formal centers of power.
The United Arab Emirates: A Power Base Outside the Territories
Since leaving the Palestinian arena, Dahlan has established his position in the United Arab Emirates, which has become a hub for his political, economic, and personal activities. His ties with senior figures in the Emirates enable him to continue operating in the Palestinian arena, despite holding no official position in the Palestinian Authority or Fatah. Through his network of loyalists, he maintains contacts with figures in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and is involved in aid initiatives and social activities.
The Gaza Strip remains a major focus of his activities. His family roots in Khan Yunis, his past as head of the Preventive Security Service, and his ties with Fatah activists in the Strip enable him to maintain a political and organizational presence there. As part of his activities, Dahlan promotes the delivery of humanitarian and economic assistance to residents of the Strip, among other means through his connections in the United Arab Emirates. This activity also serves as a means of maintaining his ties with the local population and with figures aligned with him.
The Iron Swords war and the severe humanitarian crisis that followed gave additional importance to aid networks serving the Strip. In this context, the activities of figures associated with Dahlan have also continued. However, a distinction must be made between organizational and economic influence and broad public support. The extent of support for Dahlan among the Palestinian public is not sufficiently clear, and varies between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and among different political and social groups.
His ties with senior Hamas figures, which developed against the backdrop of many years of acquaintance, do not erase the historical rivalry between the sides or their disagreements over the future of the Strip.
Could Dahlan Return to Gaza?
Discussions over the future of the Gaza Strip following the war have brought Dahlan’s name back onto the political agenda. As early as 2024, The Wall Street Journal reported that his name had been raised in talks concerning arrangements for the Strip, as someone who could potentially play a role in administering it, at least during a transitional period. According to the report, Israeli, American, and Arab officials had explored the possibility, and signals had even emerged from Hamas indicating a willingness to discuss it. Yet significant obstacles stand between raising Dahlan’s name in political discussions and his actually returning to a position of authority in Gaza.
First, Dahlan has been absent from the Strip since Hamas seized control of it in 2007. Although he has maintained ties with his loyalists, he currently has no local governing or security apparatus that would enable him to assume responsibility for administering the Strip.
Second, the question of dismantling Hamas’s military force and establishing security control over the Strip remains a central component of any framework for alternative governance. Without an agreed security and political arrangement, any actor asked to assume governing responsibility would face considerable challenges.
Third, Dahlan would have to contend with possible opposition from figures within Fatah and the Palestinian Authority, who view him as a political rival and continue to oppose his return to a leadership position.
In May 2026, media reports said that Shin Bet chief David Zini met with Dahlan during a visit to the United Arab Emirates. According to the reports, the two discussed the future of the Gaza Strip after the war. The full contents of the meeting were not made public, and the meeting itself does not indicate that an agreement exists regarding a future role for Dahlan. The developments as a whole show that Dahlan’s name continues to feature in discussions about future arrangements in the Strip. However, there is currently no certainty as to whether he will return to Gaza or assume an official role in its administration.
The Struggle for Leadership of the Palestinian Authority
Alongside the question of the future of the Gaza Strip, another question is emerging: Dahlan’s place in the Palestinian political system in the post-Abbas era. Dahlan has made no secret of his historical affiliation with Fatah, and although he was expelled from its ranks in 2011, he did not establish a new and separate political party. Instead, he continued to cultivate ties with activists and figures associated with the movement.
His decision to preserve his political identity as a Fatah figure gives his conflict with the movement’s leadership the character of an internal struggle over influence, the identity of the leadership, and its future direction. Yet his possible return to the centers of leadership depends on a range of factors that are not solely within his control. Senior Fatah figures in Ramallah continue to regard him as a political rival. At the same time, the question of succession to Abbas is attracting interest among other figures and currents in the Palestinian arena, including supporters of Marwan Barghouti, who is serving prison sentences in Israel.
Dahlan’s standing is also influenced by his network of relations with Arab states, foremost among them the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, as well as by the positions of the United States and Israel regarding future political and security arrangements.
It is important, however, to distinguish between his influence through political, economic, and organizational ties and the extent of public support for him. His ability to assume a leadership role will also depend on the legitimacy he receives from the movement’s institutions and from the Palestinian public, and on whether elections are held for the presidency of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Legislative Council.
Another possibility is his integration into a collective leadership framework established on the basis of agreements among various actors in the Palestinian system. This scenario, too, would require broad political agreements, and there is currently no basis for determining whether it will materialize.
The Man Who Continues to Operate Behind the Scenes
Over the years that I have known Mohammed Dahlan, I have been particularly struck by his ability to establish personal relationships with people from different camps, and at times even with rivals. His rhetorical skills, familiarity with the political arena, and ability to engage directly with Israeli, Arab, and international figures were prominent features of my meetings with him.
Yet personal familiarity and political skills do not guarantee a return to a leadership position.
Dahlan carries a complex legacy: his activity within Fatah, his leadership of a security service that waged an intense struggle against Hamas, his ties with Israel and the United States, his confrontation with Abbas and expulsion from the movement, alongside the network of relationships he cultivated in the United Arab Emirates. All of these continue to shape his standing in the Palestinian arena and the way he is regarded by allies and rivals alike.
Developments in the Gaza Strip and discussions over the future of the Palestinian Authority have once again raised the question of Dahlan’s place in the political system. Yet whether he will return to play a central role depends on the political and security arrangements that take shape, the balance of power within Fatah, and the willingness of Palestinian and regional actors to work with him.
In this sense, the story of Mohammed Dahlan is also the story of the Palestinian political system: a system in which personal rivalries, organizational loyalties, regional ties, and struggles over centers of power continue to shape reality.
Dahlan may have left the Gaza Strip nearly two decades ago, but the relationships he cultivated and the activities he has pursued since then have enabled him to remain part of the discussion over its future.
The question of whether he will return to the centers of leadership remains open.
