Before the deadly terrorist attack in the Gaza Envelope, the Palestinian scene was marked by a political-administrative split between the West Bank, under the control of the Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas, and the Gaza Strip, under Hamas control. This split in Palestinian leadership occurred in June 2007. Until then, Gaza was governed by a Palestinian unity government led by senior Hamas figure Ismail Haniyeh. The split occurred when Hamas militants unexpectedly seized control of Gaza by force, violently ousting Palestinian Authority officials, many of whom were thrown off the roofs of tall buildings in Gaza City to their deaths. Following Hamas’ takeover, the Palestinian landscape effectively evolved into a bifurcated and separate dual-authority system, represented by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank as a secular-nationalist authority, and Hamas in the Gaza Strip as a religious-Islamic authority.

It’s important to emphasize that ideologically, Hamas is not content with just controlling the Gaza Strip. Since its establishment, it has challenged the Palestinian Authority’s rule in the West Bank and aspires – ultimately and inevitably according to its beliefs – to take the lead in guiding the Palestinian people.

On a personal note, I vividly remember the events of June 2007. At that time, I served as an advisor to the Minister of Defense on Arab affairs. One day during that month, I received a frantic phone call from the Egyptian General Intelligence Officer, General Brahan Hamad, who headed the Egyptian security delegation operating in the Gaza Strip, assisting the security mechanisms of the Palestinian Authority with advice and guidance. He described with great excitement the situation as it unexpectedly unfolded in the region and urgently requested that I immediately convey his strong impression of what was happening to the Minister of Defense. Tension was palpable in his voice. I tried, as best as I could, to reassure him and recommended that he stay at home until the anger subsides. Eventually, I learned that he had managed to reach safety after crossing the border into Egyptian territory through the Rafah crossing.

Hamas's rally from 2012, 'seizing armed control over Gaza’
Photo: Fars Media Corporation

Consolidation of Hamas Rule in Gaza

Since seizing control of the Gaza Strip, Hamas has worked to consolidate its power and expand its military-operational capabilities. This has been achieved through systematic smuggling of weapons, combat gear, and specialized military equipment, primarily through the tunnels along the “Philadelphia Corridor” – the 14-kilometer border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, as well as through maritime routes. Some of the combat means were supplied to Hamas fighters through local production in laboratories and specialized workshops, which have been increasingly exposed during the recent Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip. Notable among these are the Yasir 105 anti-tank rocket launcher, the Al-Ghoul sniper rifle, frequently used by Hamas operatives to target IDF soldiers, the bouncing fragmentation charge with a radius of 15 meters, the “Shoat'” explosive charge, and the high-explosive barrel bomb known as the “Thaqib.”

This variety of combat means characterizes Hamas as an organization operating guerrilla warfare methods, taking advantage of its intimate knowledge of the terrain to enhance its effectiveness against IDF soldiers. Additionally, Hamas terrorists exploit the destruction caused by IDF airstrikes on buildings, utilizing breaches in walls to seize firing positions, providing them with a significant tactical advantage. Hamas has also extensively networked the area with underground tunnels spanning hundreds of kilometers. These tunnels are intended to assist Hamas militants and provide them with an advantage in confrontations with IDF forces. This is manifested in their ability to ambush soldiers without detection, inflict casualties, lay ambushes, and then quickly find hiding places and shelters underground.

IDF operations against terrorist organizations

In recent years, there have been changes in Hamas leadership within and outside the Gaza Strip. Khaled Mashal, who served for a long time as the head of the organization’s political bureau, was replaced by Ismail Haniyeh, who served as the head of the Palestinian Unity Government. This government was formed following Hamas’ victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections held in January 2006. After Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, Haniyeh continued to serve as the head of the Hamas government in Gaza and as head of the political bureau until his replacement in 2017 by Hamas activist Yahya Sinwar, through internal elections within the organization.

Since his early release from prison as part of a prisoner exchange deal in 2011, Sinwar has solidified his position as a prominent and central figure in Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip. Alongside him, prominent members of the organization’s military wing have stood out, including Mohammed Deif, Marwan Issa, and Mohammed Sinwar (Yahya’s brother).

The IDF’s “Guardian of the Walls” operation in the Gaza Strip in May 2021 significantly increased popular support for Sinwar’s leadership, who was perceived on the Palestinian street as someone unafraid to challenge the IDF and stand at the forefront of the armed struggle against Israel. During Operation “Iron Sword,” Sinwar’s standing among Palestinians as a revered figure and symbol of courage and steadfastness only continued to grow.

Where is Sinwar heading?

As IDF forces intensify their activities in the Gaza Strip, Sinwar is striving not only to safeguard his personal security but also to advance Hamas’ strategy. Its main components include achieving a comprehensive ceasefire, complete Israeli withdrawal from the territory, maintaining Hamas’ status as a political entity and military force, rebuilding infrastructure and civilian structures, executing a “dignified” prisoner exchange deal, and lifting the Israeli blockade imposed since 2007. Given Israel’s steadfast position, Sinwar is expected, especially as IDF forces close in on his whereabouts, to utilize the “winning card” he holds – the Israeli captives. This is an effort to leverage his bargaining power and secure his terms, alongside the release of a significant number of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails.

Hamas’s Goal: Israel’s Destruction

The murderous terrorist attack on October 7, 2023, vividly expressed Hamas’s ideological vision – the aspiration for Israel’s destruction, rooted in its deep-seated hatred towards Jews, as per its charter, first published in May 1988. These views of Hamas were reflected in official publications, slogans, and incitement materials, uncovered during raids conducted at various Hamas-affiliated sites during the First Intifada. Especially notable was the campus of the Islamic University in Gaza, which had been one of Hamas’s main power centers in the strip for years. Among other things, anti-Semitic propaganda such as Adolf Hitler’s infamous “Mein Kampf,” in its Arabic version, and the forged anti-Semitic document, “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion,” circulated during the early 20th century Russian Empire, were found there. In this context, it is important for me to emphasize that in all my meetings with senior Hamas figures throughout my tenure, without exception, I felt as though they were launching arrows of focused hatred towards me as an IDF officer, a Jew, and an Israeli.

Hamas’s Demise – an Elusive Goal

One of the objectives of Israel’s recent military campaigns against Hamas in the Gaza Strip is to undermine its status as both a military force and a political authority. In my estimation, this is undoubtedly a lofty goal for Israel to achieve. However, the elimination of Hamas as an ideological movement representing an idea is a task that is likely beyond feasible realization in practice.

Ismail Haniyeh with Ali Khamenei in 2012, 'Iran blessed the October 7 attack'
photo: Khamenei.ir

Iran-Hezbollah-Hamas Against Israel

Iran, leading the “Resistance Axis,” sees its proxies in the region as part of its military strength and deterrent capability. Its support for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad is aimed at creating a “ring of fire” around Israel. Despite Hamas being a Sunni organization, the support it receives from Shiite Iran is based on a common denominator, which is the concept of “resistance” and the aspiration for Israel’s destruction.

Iran views both the Islamic Palestinian organizations, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as central power hubs through which it can advance its regional objectives, especially against Israel. It provides assistance to these organizations by supplying weapons and military equipment, generous funding, transferring technological knowledge for development and production of warfare means, and providing military training and guidance to operatives. Following the terrorist attack on October 7, 2023, senior Iranian officials praised Hamas for the massacre, emphasizing their continued support for the organization.

Hezbollah in Lebanon is one of the main military and financial supporters of Hamas in Gaza. Since the start of the conflict, Hezbollah has stood alongside Hamas, evidenced by daily shootings aimed at both military and civilian targets in Israel. However, it is noticeable that the Lebanese organization is not interested in uncontrolled escalation of the military confrontation until the outbreak of a full-scale war, thus limiting its activities to the geographical area near the border.

Hezbollah’s operational support for Hamas is also evident in the establishment of a military outpost of the Palestinian organization operating in southern Lebanon in recent years. Hamas militants involved in various activities, including during the recent year’s conflict in Gaza, have coordinated closely with Hezbollah and aligned their actions with his military operational policy in the confrontation with Israel.

After the attack on the Iranian consulate building in Damascus, attributed to Israel on April 1, 2024, in which General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, who commanded the Quds Force in Lebanon and Syria, was killed, Iran attacked Israel on April 13 by launching 30 ballistic missiles and 170 surface-to-surface missiles towards Israel. Iran’s attack reflects an escalation and intensification in the confrontation with Israel, creating a new equation whereby any harm to its interests in the region, Iran will respond with direct strikes on targets within Israel. It’s worth noting that Iran’s attack was met with a military response attributed to Israel against Iranian military targets in its territory. Iran attacked Israel due to the deterioration in its deterrent power, as a result of the multi-faceted conflict in which it is engaged, particularly in the war against Hamas in Gaza and against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Israel Strengthened Hamas – A False Claim

In publications and research addressing the history of Hamas, it is often alleged that Israel played a significant role in its establishment and provided ongoing support with deliberate intentions. This was purportedly aimed at neutralizing the power of nationalist elements operating within the framework of the PLO, especially Fatah, by bolstering a rival and competitor within the Palestinian political-public sphere.

As someone who was responsible for presenting an integrated intelligence-civilian situation before the authorized ranks, I can testify that I never received any direct and explicit directive from any superior rank, military or governmental, to favor the Islamic movement as it operated pre-Intifada through the Islamic Association, Al-Mujamma Al-Islami, at the expense of P.L.O. activists. Moreover, as someone who served in the military-governmental system, we were well aware of the implications of the strengthening of radical Islamic influence in the territory. As evidence of this, one can see the regular convening, every month before the outbreak of the Intifada, of the “Forum for Religious Zealotry” led by the Civil Administrator, in order to systematically monitor the development and actions of the radical Islamic stream in the area and to take the necessary actions to prevent its strengthening and expansion of its influence in the region.

IDF soldier uncovers terror tunnel in 2014
Photo: IDF Spokesperson

Hamas’s Explanation Document on the October 7 Massacre

In late January 2024, Hamas published an explanatory booklet in Arabic and English titled “Our Position – Operation ‘Al Aqsa Flood'”, referring to the massacre carried out by the organization’s operatives against Israeli residents in the Gaza periphery on October 7, 2023. The central argument emphasized by Hamas in the document is that the terror attack was part of the Palestinian struggle for freedom and that the organization’s activists did not target civilians but rather “soldiers and those carrying weapons,” and if such casualties occurred, “it was not intentional.”

The 18-page document by Hamas was part of its explanatory efforts as part of attempts to garner Arab and international public opinion pressure on Israel to end the war. Hamas sought to advance in the document a psychological warfare campaign against Israel and accused it of killing many hostages, both on October 7, 2023, and in airstrikes on Gaza, as part of its defensive campaign. The release of the document over a hundred days after the start of the war indicated that Hamas was digging in for its conclusion, still an active organization that had not surrendered, showing political and military resilience, and aspiring to emerge as part of the Palestinian leadership within the framework of the PLO.

The Day After – What Can Be Done?

In recent months, reports have circulated in the media regarding closed-door discussions within the Israeli Cabinet about the future governance of the Gaza Strip following the war. The ongoing discussions are deemed crucial, as they allow the security apparatus and the IDF to prepare and plan for post-war military activities in the region.

It’s important to note that as part of Israel’s preparation for the aftermath of the war, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu circulated an official document on February 23, 2024, titled “The Day After Hamas – Principles.” The document outlines Israel’s core principles and interests concerning its military-security policy, including civil aspects, vis-à-vis Gaza in the post-war era. It addresses the promotion of a plan for radicalization reduction across religious, educational, and welfare institutions in Gaza. A specific clause in the plan refers to the closure of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) agency, whose operatives were involved in the terror attack on October 7, 2023. Regarding future arrangements, the plan expresses opposition to international agreements on the matter and advocates against unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state, stating that “following the massacre on October 7, a huge reward will be given to terror…”

From my perspective, Israel is required to maintain military-security control over the entire Gaza Strip after achieving the war’s objectives. This control should be exercised for at least a defined period, which cannot be specified at this time. Only IDF control, with close intelligence support from the General Security Service, can adequately address Israel’s vital security needs and prevent any attempts to revert Gaza back into a terrorist enclave under Hamas or other extremist Islamic entities.

It should be emphasized that an Israeli military-civilian government operating in Gaza after the war will have a paramount task of dismantling Hamas’s “da’wa” mechanism—the intertwined religious-Islamic and civil infrastructure established by Hamas in recent decades (charity organizations, schools, kindergartens, Islamic study groups, Quranic teachings, incitement against Israel and Jews, etc.), which indoctrinates hatred against Israel from an early age and provides the ideological basis for anti-Israel activities, particularly terrorist attacks.

I believe recent ideas suggested in the media regarding transferring governance authority in Gaza after the war to the Palestinian Authority, an Arab entity, or an international force are largely misguided and problematic. They could potentially, as a scenario Israel must consider, lead to a renewed strengthening of Hamas’s territorial grip. Against this backdrop, Israel must already undertake the necessary measures and prepare for the establishment of a unified military-civilian government in Gaza. Such a government would be responsible for distributing authority for the daily lives of the Palestinian population to local actors (mukhtars, dignitaries, local council heads, municipal officials, etc.), who are entirely disconnected from Hamas’s governing structure that operated in Gaza prior to the current conflict and were not part of its service.

IDF forces seize control of Rafah crossing, May 24 - 'Necessary to control the Philadelphi Corridor'
Photo: IDF Spokesperson

Seizing Control of the Philadelphi Corridor – a Necessary Move

Israel must swiftly take control of the Philadelphi Corridor to the best of its ability. Recently, IDF forces have begun implementing this objective by seizing a small portion along the corridor and the Rafah crossing. This clear objective is to continue neutralizing Hamas’s active battalions in the area, locate and destroy the active tunnels along the corridor, and block Hamas’s weapon smuggling routes. Another crucial objective is to prevent any potential attempts by Hamas and jihadist elements operating in Sinai to smuggle Israeli captives outside the Strip. These actions will necessitate Israel to evacuate hundreds of thousands of Palestinian residents from the Rafah area to designated areas, with an emphasis on the al-Mawasi region along the Gaza coast and west of Khan Yunis.

The IDF’s seizure of part of the Philadelphi Corridor and its operations against Hamas battalions in the Rafah area have faced strong opposition from Egypt, leading to growing tensions between the two countries. This is manifested in Egypt’s declared intention to join a lawsuit filed by South Africa against Israel in the International Court of Justice, accusing Israel of crimes related to apartheid. In this context, it should be noted that Egypt’s Foreign Minister, Sameh Shoukry, publicly addressed this issue on May 15, 2024, clarifying that Egypt has not yet joined the lawsuit in practice due to “stringent legal demands.” Another indication of Egypt’s discontent with Israel’s conduct in Gaza is its decision to close the Rafah crossing to the entry of humanitarian aid convoys to the Strip. Importantly, recent leaks in the international media suggest that Egypt is considering downgrading its diplomatic relations with Israel and recalling its ambassador from Tel Aviv. Against this backdrop, it is emphasized that Israel is committed to making every effort to ease tensions with Egypt and to continue maintaining the peace agreement as a strategic asset.

Yahya Sinwar, "Since the Shalit deal, he has established his position as the strongest man in Hamas"
Photo: Anas-Mohammed / shutterstock.com