The fall of Bashar al-Assad, an Alawite, through a Sunni rebel uprising, heralded the beginning of a new era in the Middle East. The swift actions of the rebels, supported by Turkey, not only ended the 61-year-old authoritarian rule of the Assad family but also marked a shift in the power dynamics behind the scenes of the failing Syrian state.
Contrary to all expectations, the ostensibly weaker side of the equation—Turkey and the rebels—managed to defeat the coalition comprised of Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, and the Syrian regime.

Undoubtedly, this remarkable success could not have been achieved without the significant weakening of two key pillars of that coalition: Russia and Iran.
At this point, one can observe the direct impact of conflicts in other arenas on the developments in Syria: the war in Ukraine, Israel’s recent campaign against the Hezbollah terror organization, and Israeli strikes in Iran—all of which drastically altered the strategic picture. In these three theaters, the Syrian dictator Assad’s most important allies faced serious difficulties, rendering them unable to meet the regime’s demands as they had previously.
As the smoke of war began to clear, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was already being crowned at home as the “Neo-Ottoman Sultan who reconquered Syria.” Until their expulsion in World War I in 1918, the Turks ruled the region for 402 years. Against this backdrop, unlike Russia, which regarded Syria as a distant and temporary satellite state, Erdoğan and much of the Turkish public view the region as an integral part of their heritage. This perspective aligns well with the Neo-Ottoman ideology, which aspires to revive Turkish influence in the territories once controlled by the Ottoman Empire.

Thanks to this success in Syria, Erdoğan gained significant public support, and his popularity surged once more. However, it is also essential to note that until Assad’s fall, Erdoğan faced severe domestic criticism—again due to his foreign policy regarding Syria. At the height of the 2023 election campaign, the secular and nationalist opposition accused him of dragging Turkey into a dangerous adventure in the Syrian quagmire, with the criticism escalating particularly over the issue of Syrian refugees. Since the outbreak of the civil war, official figures indicate that Turkey has hosted over three million Syrians, though many believe the actual number is much higher. Unsurprisingly, a refugee influx of such magnitude caused social tensions in Turkey, leading to unemployment, xenophobia, and violence.

Yet, despite all the criticism, President Erdoğan remained steadfast and refused to abandon his Neo-Ottoman stance, heavily influenced by Pan-Islamism. In this context, Erdoğan sought to convince the Turkish people of the righteousness of his path, emphasizing the importance of the religious commandment of “hospitality” modeled after the residents of Medina, who welcomed the Prophet Muhammad during his famous migration from Mecca.

"On December 13, Erdoğan again addressed the cameras, revealing his Neo-Ottoman vision without filters. He claimed that if World War I had ended differently, all Syrian provinces, such as Aleppo, Idlib, and Damascus, would today be part of Turkey"

The Message Behind the Suit and Tie

Ultimately, Erdoğan’s persistence played into his hands. After Assad’s fall, what many perceived as futile investments bore fruit, and thanks to his continued support for the rebels, Syria has now come under Ankara’s absolute influence. Following Assad’s downfall, in light of the destruction of the Syrian conventional army by the IDF and years of international political and economic isolation imposed on Syria, the new Syrian administration under Ahmad al-Sharaa (al-Julani) now needs Turkey more than ever.

At this juncture, in a speech on December 11, President Erdoğan announced what was already evident to all: Turkey is the new ruler of Syria. In his address, Erdoğan challenged “all elements” daring to attack Syria and explicitly stated that his country would stand firm by Syria’s side to counter such threats. Given the IDF’s operations in the Syrian Golan and Israeli airstrikes throughout Syria, it can be inferred that this message was primarily directed at Israel.

The day after this firm speech, Erdoğan sent Turkey’s intelligence chief, İbrahim Kalın, to Damascus. Upon his arrival, Kalın was met with a grand reception, and al-Julani himself chauffeured him to the historic Umayyad Mosque in central Damascus. A reminder: at the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Erdoğan had promised his supporters that he would topple Assad and pray at the historic mosque as a symbol of victory. Hence, this specific visit holds significant Neo-Ottoman symbolism for the president. On the same day, Turkey also reopened its embassy in Damascus, becoming the first country to break the isolation of the new Syrian regime.

The relationship deepened rapidly. On December 13, Erdoğan again addressed the cameras, revealing his Neo-Ottoman vision without filters. In his speech, he claimed that if World War I had ended differently, with an Ottoman victory, all Syrian provinces, such as Aleppo, Idlib, and Damascus, would today be part of Turkey.

As if that weren’t enough, on December 18, in another historic speech, Erdoğan declared that he could not limit his country to its current 782,000 square kilometers and added that Turkey is “bigger than its borders”—a statement destined to become a slogan for the Neo-Ottoman ideology for generations to come.

Four days later, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Damascus—a day after the U.S. lifted the $10 million bounty on al-Julani’s head. This suggests that the Turks had coordinated with the Americans and received their approval beforehand. By giving this green light, Washington also opened a new chapter in its relations with Syria by assisting Turkey in legitimizing al-Julani.

The foreign minister’s visit was highly publicized, with Turkish and Syrian flags prominently displayed. The message was clear: the international community should normalize relations with the newly established Syrian state. The images from the summit between Fidan and al-Julani were striking, particularly al-Julani’s suit and tie, which Turkey likely provided. This visual detail is an integral part of Turkey’s strategy in Syria. A day after the bounty on his head was removed, the suit and tie transformed al-Julani from a wanted jihadist to a polished and seemingly acceptable statesman in the eyes of the Western world.

Beyond its impact on the rebel leader’s personal image, this image underscores the sophistication of Turkey’s strategy. Unlike Iran, whose methods are largely unacceptable globally, Turkey excels at rebranding “old, undesirable products” in a new, appealing package. Time will tell whether al-Julani becomes a “best seller.” Still, the new Syrian leader has already hosted German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock in Damascus, signaling a positive trend for him.

Al-Julani and the Ukrainian Foreign Minister: "Through the suit and tie, Ankara has significantly improved Al-Julani's image."
photo: Mfa.gov.ua

The Kurdish Organizations’ Dilemma

As Turkey establishes a stronger foothold in Syria, both Ankara and the new regime in Damascus are focusing considerable attention on the Kurdish presence in the northeast of the country. Ankara regards the Kurdish YPG-PYD as a terrorist organization, equating it with the PKK, which is also recognized as such—not only by Turkey but by the international community.

Initially, before taking more significant and impactful steps concerning Syria’s future, Turkey aims to “cleanse” the entire border area of armed Kurdish presence to a depth of 30 kilometers. In this context, Turkey seems inclined to support Syrian rebels to handle the “dirty work” on its behalf. However, due to U.S. pressure and presence on the ground, Erdoğan has not yet fully achieved this lofty goal. Considering that the key to the new Syria lies in Turkish hands and that Europeans are eager to support its reconstruction to alleviate the Syrian refugee crisis in their continent, a solution may eventually be found—if not in the short term, then in the future—that satisfies both Ankara and Washington.

Currently, Kurdish organizations in Syria are being pressured by Turkey to withdraw southward and integrate into the “mechanisms of the new Syrian state.” However, they are reluctant to relinquish what they currently hold. They are now seeking recognition and autonomous rights, but Turkish pressure on al-Julani is unlikely to allow this for now.

The Americans are considered the Kurds’ protectors, so their fate may well depend on incoming U.S. President Donald Trump. In this context, Turkey is optimistic. In 2019, Trump abandoned the Kurds by giving Turkey the green light to invade the Tel Abyad and Ras al-Ayn areas. At the time, only U.S. Department of Defense pressure forced Trump to backtrack. Today, the conditions in Syria are different. Considering the numerous business opportunities in the emerging state, Trump’s America might find a middle ground to appease Erdoğan, advancing U.S. interests in Syria. In other words, the Kurds may pay a heavy price for this.

YPG fighters: "Ankara considers the Kurdish organization a terrorist group."
photo: Nûçe Ciwan

Striving for Dialogue – and Calming Tensions

Given Turkey’s profound influence in Syria, it seems that sooner or later, Erdoğan will achieve his goals in northern Syria. Once he gains complete control over Syria according to his vision and neutralizes the Kurdish threat along the border, he is likely to turn his attention to other issues within the failing state. According to Turkish media, there are already initial signs of this shift. Unofficial reports suggest that Turkey is planning to establish military bases in Syria. Moreover, Turkey’s Defense Minister, Yaşar Güler, has already declared Turkey’s intentions to equip and rebuild the new Syrian army.

In this context, recalling another statement by the same minister is essential. On November 12, Güler labeled Israel a direct threat to Turkey, asserting that future aggression against Turkey is highly likely. About a month prior, on October 8, the Turkish parliament held a secret session with the agenda titled “Israel—a Threat to Turkey’s National Security.” These developments indicate that the minister’s statements are not isolated events.

Turkey, therefore, has already designated Israel as a threat even before Assad’s potential fall, and Jerusalem is taking this into account. On January 6, the Nagel Committee recently published its recommendations concerning Israel’s national security strategy. For the first time, this report defined Turkey as a potential adversary with which Israel might face direct military conflict.

Currently, particularly in the aftermath of the war in Gaza, the anti-Israel rhetoric from President Erdoğan and senior Turkish officials is intensifying. Some public figures in Turkey had even gone so far as to threaten Israel directly, calling for the “liberation of Al-Aqsa Mosque,” akin to the “liberation of Hagia Sophia” when it was converted back into a mosque and the “liberation of the Umayyad Mosque” from Assad’s control.

In light of these inflammatory statements, there is little room for optimism regarding the future. It is essential to acknowledge the challenge at hand: Israel and Turkey have become neighbors in Syria. Against this backdrop, tensions between Jerusalem and Ankara could escalate. At this stage, Israel must do everything in its power to avoid turning Turkey into a declared adversary. Israel already faces enough enemies, and achieving this goal requires entering into dialogue with Turkey.

Conversely, Ankara must understand that Israel’s efforts to initiate dialogue for the sake of preserving peace do not stem from weakness. In light of the tragic events of October 7, Israel cannot afford to dismiss any future scenario. If it wishes to prevent a deterioration into open hostility with Turkey, Israel must prepare for every eventuality.

Turkish President Erdoğan was already being crowned at home as the "Neo-Ottoman Sultan who reconquered Syria."
photo: Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock.com