Turkey and Iran have long-standing rivalries, stemming from the legacies of their respective historical empires—the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Empire. Established by a Shiite Iranian dynasty, the Safavid Empire governed much of present-day Iran from the early 16th century until 1722, restoring Muslim Iran’s independence under native rulers.

Their military conflicts trace back to 1514’s Battle of Chaldiran, where the Ottomans achieved a decisive victory, preventing Iranian expansion of Shiism into Anatolia and limiting their influence in the Middle East.

Despite periodic wars, the Zuhab Treaty of 1639 marked a significant turning point. It not only ended hostilities but also established the border between Turkey and modern-day Iran. Unlike other Middle Eastern borders drawn by colonial powers, this boundary was mutually agreed upon by both nations, making it a rare example of undisputed territorial demarcation.

Until the conclusion of World War I, the Turks upheld Ottoman dominance while safeguarding Sunni Islam against Shiism. However, even after the Zuhab Treaty, their shared history was not devoid of challenges. Following the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, Turkey perceived Iran as a menace to its secular government—a perception that proved valid. This was evident in Iran’s efforts to export the revolution to Turkey and in the targeted killings of secular intellectuals, actions that underscored Iran’s strategic threat to Turkey.

The shift in their relationship didn’t occur until 2010. Under the leadership of then-Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “Zero Problems with Neighbors” doctrine, Turkey announced a departure from its previous foreign policy stance, officially designating Iran as a friendly nation posing no danger. This shift enabled both countries to redirect their attention to a shared adversary: the Kurdish movement. Both nations embarked on campaigns against armed Kurdish factions. While Iran targeted the Kurdish PJAK organization, Turkey focused on combating the PKK, recognized as a terrorist entity by the West as well. Consequently, their shared struggle against a common enemy facilitated their reconciliation.

Another instance of this policy shift is evident in Turkey’s alignment with efforts to isolate Iran during a period when numerous countries worldwide, spearheaded by the United States, enforced sanctions against it. Turkey and Brazil, both temporary members of the UN Security Council at the time, under the leadership of Brazil’s Lula da Silva, likewise embraced an anti-Western stance and aligned themselves with Ahmadinejad’s Iran. Consequently, Turkey, Brazil, and Iran entered into an agreement stipulating that Turkey would undertake the enrichment of Iranian uranium.

However, Turkey’s actions weren’t merely driven by goodwill towards Iran; rather, they stemmed from a strategic interest in preventing its neighbor from collapsing, thereby safeguarding Turkish economic interests as well. Throughout this process, Turkey remained committed to aiding Tehran in mitigating the impact of the imposed sanctions. As a result, the Turkish state-owned bank Halkbank faced direct allegations of violating these sanctions, leading to an ongoing lawsuit in the United States.

״The burgeoning rapport between Ankara and Israel, coupled with Turkey's emerging partnerships, contributed to the regional isolation of Iran״

The swift transition – from lover to enemy

October 7 marked a pivotal moment not only in Israel’s security outlook and foreign policy but also in the perceptions of countries across the region. Prior to the Gaza conflict, Israel was riding a wave of peace agreements and normalization of relations spanning from Gulf states to Anatolia. This trajectory held promise for moderate nations in the region, including Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Egypt, and even Turkey, all of which prioritized prosperity, stability, and regional cooperation.

Turkey not only restored diplomatic ties with Israel but also embarked on a new chapter in its relations with Arab nations willing to pursue peace with Israel. This included countries that had previously strained relations with Ankara due to various diplomatic incidents, such as the assassination of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi on Turkish soil, the attempted coup in Turkey, and the successful military coup in Egypt. However, through the adoption of a pragmatic foreign policy approach, disputes among moderate Sunni countries were set aside.

The burgeoning rapport between Ankara and Israel, coupled with Turkey’s emerging partnerships, contributed to the regional isolation of Iran. This vision of a reinvigorated Middle East, characterized by cooperation and stability, posed a significant threat to the Iranian axis. The Tehran regime, reliant on perpetuating conflicts to maintain control, thrives on the presence of external enemies, whether real or perceived, to galvanize support among its populace.

Indeed, signs of the regime’s instability were evident long before the tragic events of Simchat Torah, as evidenced by the case of Mahsa Amini’s killing a year prior. The brutal murder of this young woman by the “morality police” for allegedly improper hijab attire sparked violent protests in Tehran and her hometown of Karaj. Women took to the streets chanting, “Women, life, freedom,” signaling a potential challenge to the regime’s authority. However, the events of October 7 abruptly halted the burgeoning peace efforts between Saudi Arabia and Israel and marked the deterioration of Israel-Turkey relations, effectively returning Iran to its accustomed sphere of influence.

Aware of Iran’s strategic maneuvers, moderate Arab nations endeavor to mitigate the repercussions, particularly in their interactions with Israel. Despite shared interests, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean, Erdogan chose to prioritize Turkey’s alignment with the pan-Islamist ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood over maintaining pragmatic relations with Israel, even at the expense of Turkish interests. Ultimately, Tehran emerges as the primary beneficiary of Erdogan’s ideological shift.

The Armenian Foreign Minister and the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abdollahian, in Tehran, 2021
photo: Tasnim News Agency

Israel – the Common Denominator

The schism between Israel and Turkey presented a unique opportunity for the Ayatollahs to solidify their ties with Ankara, especially after relations between the two had soured following the collaborative efforts between Israeli Mossad and the Turkish intelligence service, MIT, in June 2022. This collaboration successfully thwarted numerous attacks targeting Israeli tourists on Turkish soil, exacerbating tensions between the two nations. Concurrently, friction escalated due to MIT’s surveillance activities aimed at Iranian Revolutionary Guard cells plotting on Turkish territory.

However, it’s worth noting that both countries endeavored to prevent relations from deteriorating to a point of irreconcilable enmity. Despite these underlying tensions, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian’s visit to Ankara on June 27, 2022, underscored a commitment to dialogue. Turkish media outlets harshly criticized Iran for endangering Israeli tourists on Turkish soil during this visit. Nevertheless, Turkish journalists and analysts made a point to clarify that their concerns were rooted in sovereignty rather than the well-being of Israelis, thereby distancing themselves from accusations of defending “Zionists” while maintaining diplomatic channels with Israel.

Against this backdrop, anticipation was high as Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu hosted his Iranian counterpart in Ankara. Many expected tensions to be palpable between the two nations. However, the contrary unfolded. Amir-Abdollahian received a warm welcome and was even referred to as “brother” by Çavuşoğlu. Moreover, in a conciliatory gesture captured by the media, Çavuşoğlu emphasized the need for cooperation between both countries in combating terrorism. Despite the evident strains in their relationship, the Turkish Foreign Minister refrained from publicly denouncing Tehran, while Iran opted to convey its messages discreetly.

A month later, on July 19 of the same year, President Erdoğan embarked on a visit to Tehran, marking the commencement of a new chapter in bilateral relations. During his visit, the Turkish president participated in the seventh session of the “Supreme Council for Cooperation,” established in 2014 to foster deeper dialogue between the two nations. This intimate exchange persisted into 2023, evidenced by the visit of the new Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to Iran in September of that year. Subsequently, a month after the outbreak of the Gaza conflict in November, Amir-Abdollahian paid another visit to Ankara, further underscoring the ongoing diplomatic engagement between Turkey and Iran.

The next step in the process of improving relations between the countries was influenced by Hamas, resulting in the breakdown of the normalization of relations between Turkey and Israel. Following the visit of the Iranian foreign minister on November 27, Turkish President Erdoğan reached out to his Iranian counterpart, Ibrahim Raisi. According to the official statement from the Turkish presidency, the two leaders discussed Israel’s actions in Gaza, the importance of providing humanitarian aid to Palestinians, and efforts to secure a ceasefire. Essentially, this dialogue resolved the disputes between the two countries. Consequently, Erdoğan called on all Muslim nations to unite against what he termed as ‘the massacre in Palestinian lands’ perpetrated by Israel.

Following a significant defeat in local elections, the Turkish president, as is customary, attempted to shift public attention from domestic issues to Gaza. Instead of addressing the unfavorable election results directly, Erdoğan, in a somewhat limited manner, highlighted the situation in Gaza. In a telephone statement to the media, the two leaders reiterated their commitment to working towards a ceasefire and expressed their desire to see reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah.

Al-Hashd al-Shaabi forces in Iraq, 'part of Iran's proxy war against Turkey'
photo: Tasnim News Agency

Clashing and Smiling

Despite the significance of their cooperation, it’s crucial to acknowledge the persistent ambivalence in their relationship. While the border between the two nations remains tranquil, tensions simmer in various theaters, including Syria, Iraq, and the Caucasus. Turkey’s divergent foreign policy towards the Assad regime and its direct involvement in the Syrian civil war clash with Iranian interests. Moreover, Iran is uneasy about Turkey’s expanding economic footprint in Kurdistan.

In addition to Turkey’s soft power influence, its military presence in the region raises concerns. Since 2019, Turkey has established 38 “temporary” military bases along Iraq’s northern border, raising doubts about the permanence of its presence. In response, Iran employs Shiite militias to engage in a proxy war against Turkey, occasionally launching missiles from Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi militants at Turkish bases in the region.

Their interests significantly intersect in the Caucasus. In 2020, during the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia reshaped the dynamics. Turkey, a Sunni nation, supported Shiite Azerbaijan, while Shiite Iran paradoxically backed Christian Armenia. Iran viewed Azerbaijan’s triumph as a threat to its territorial integrity due to the sizable Azerbaijani population within its borders and as an expansion of Turkey’s influence in the Caucasus.

Even post-war, Iran remains steadfast in its support of Armenia to prevent the establishment of a land corridor between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Notably, the creation of this corridor was one of the ceasefire conditions between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Apart from military and regional influence concerns, the water issue significantly shapes their relationship. Over the past decade, both nations have grappled with severe droughts, leading to the depletion of reservoirs and rivers. In a bid to harness its water resources, Ankara constructed four dams along the Aras River, which traverses borders with Iran, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

Iran contends that Turkey’s dam construction has purposefully diminished the flow of water into its territory. While Turkey denies culpability, it maintains open communication channels while attributing Iran’s water woes to its own mismanagement of infrastructure.

Erdogan’s “Sanctions”

While this article was nearing completion, Erdogan imposed “sanctions” against Israel, restricting Turkish exports to the country. These sanctions specifically target the export of cement and construction materials, and Erdogan stated they will remain in effect until Israel ceases its military actions in Gaza. This represents an annual export value of $3.5 billion. Notably, Erdogan’s measures do not exempt food exports and other consumer goods, potentially posing a long-term threat to Turkey’s economy. This move is yet another attempt to demonstrate solidarity with Arab interests in the Middle East.

Contrary to Western perceptions, Turkey and Iran exhibit deliberate decision-making rather than impulsive actions. Both nations prioritize maintaining good neighborly relations despite significant disagreements. While they collaborate, they also engage in confrontations, demonstrating adaptability to changing situations while striving to advance their interests without resorting to public clashes.

Following October 7, the prevailing anti-Israel sentiment in the region continues to serve their interests by portraying a facade of unity and partnership, even if it lacks substance. However, despite their apparent rapprochement, the deep-seated religious and historical divisions between Turkey and Iran remain evident. Turkey’s NATO membership and its historical rivalry with Tehran significantly influence their relationship dynamics. Although a strategic alliance between the two countries seems improbable, Israel must not dismiss the implications of the relationship between Turkey and hostile entities. Israel should remain vigilant to any potential reconciliation between Turkey and such entities and take proactive measures, particularly by bolstering Israeli influence in key areas of contention, such as Azerbaijan and the regional Kurdish government.

Erdogan visited Khamenei in Tehran in 2018, 'love-hate relationship'
photo: Khamenei.ir