On October 1, 1985, Israeli Air Force (IAF) jets struck the PLO headquarters in Tunisia, a staggering 2,300 kilometers from Israel, in an operation dubbed “Wooden Leg.” This was the most extended-range bombing mission ever conducted by the IAF at the time. Are there similarities and connections between this groundbreaking mission and recent strikes in Dahiya, Iran, and Yemen’s Hodeidah port?
Over the past four decades, our region and the world have undergone significant changes. The nature of the enemies operating against Israel has also evolved, especially in their capabilities, which have seen numerous “quantum leaps.” The following sections will examine the differences and similarities between the IDF’s past operation in Tunisia and its recent strikes, focusing on the targets and the intelligence and aerial capabilities involved.
Looking Back: Operation “Wooden Leg”
Nearly 40 years ago, the decision to execute Operation “Wooden Leg” was made following a series of terrorist attacks against Israel. Notably, on Yom Kippur, September 24, a faction seized a yacht in Cyprus and murdered the three Israelis on board. Israel’s primary objective in this operation was to deter the PLO and demonstrate that there was no safe haven for those attacking Israel – showcasing the “long arm of the IDF.”
While the aircraft strikes inflicted significant damage on the PLO’s organizational structure and caused the deaths of dozens of members at various ranks, they were not intended to eliminate the “kingpin” Yasser Arafat. Indeed, under his leadership, the PLO continued to be a significant force that exacted a heavy price from Israel for many years.
In contrast, during the bombings in the Dahiya district, Israel aimed—and succeeded—in directly targeting Hassan Nasrallah and other senior officials at the top of Hezbollah. This followed a series of targeted eliminations in Lebanon of mid-level and field operatives, resulting in hundreds of Hezbollah casualties since the beginning of the “Iron Swords” war. The elimination of Nasrallah created a dramatic shift in dealing with the Lebanese arena and may also affect Hezbollah’s relationship with Iran. The strikes deep within Iran and Yemen were intended to impair the military and strategic capabilities of Iran and its regional proxies, both as a response to actions against Israel and as a deterrent for future threats.
Intelligence Beyond Imagination
From an intelligence perspective, comparing Operation “Wooden Leg” to Israel’s current actions reveals two entirely different worlds. There was no specific plan in Tunisia to target Arafat or his top leadership. However, the operation still required precise intelligence and operational and technical capabilities, primarily because it involved an attack over a great distance. At the time, the use of intelligence technologies was relatively limited, consistent with the operation’s period. Preparation for the mission included gathering human intelligence (HUMINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT), and, according to various foreign and other reports, even satellite imagery (despite Israel lacking any homegrown satellite capabilities at the time). This information arrived through unusual means to ensure maximum target accuracy without harming civilian targets, necessitating overcoming the vast distance from Israel. To the best of public knowledge, there was no cooperation with foreign entities due to the secretive nature of the operation.
Following the attack in Tunisia, various claims emerged, including allegations that Jonathan Pollard provided Israel with intelligence based on satellite sources. However, there is no definitive evidence directly linking the information provided by the Israeli spy, according to foreign publications, regarding Middle Eastern terrorist organizations to the operation itself or its preparations.
In the 2024 battlefield, intelligence is vastly more extensive, with systems including “homegrown” satellites and advanced sensors that allow high-resolution imaging and precise visual intelligence collection even in darkness or adverse weather conditions. Cyber capabilities, now an integral part of intelligence work, enable the penetration of communication and computer systems to gather internal information. Additionally, diverse and advanced collection methods characterized by significant technological developments, receiving intelligence from SIGINT and UAVs, artificial intelligence (AI) tools for scanning large data volumes, identifying unusual patterns, and real-time tracking—result in intelligence-gathering capabilities beyond imagination. It is also likely that some of the strikes conducted over the past year received intelligence from foreign partners.
“Price Tag” for Attacks on Israel
Operation “Wooden Leg” was characterized by a complex attack range of 2,300 kilometers from Israeli territory, including groundbreaking aerial refueling for F-15 jets. In contrast, the strikes in the current war were carried out using more advanced aircraft, including UAVs, with stealth capabilities and advanced weapon systems that enabled remote attacks while reducing risks to pilots.
There is a fundamental difference between the 1985 operation and recent international actions. “Wooden Leg triggered a wave of international condemnation of Israel, leading to a condemnation resolution in the UN Security Council due to the attack on Tunisia, which was not ostensibly a party to the conflict. Although the United States did not join the international chorus of criticism, it did not use its UN veto power against the condemnation resolution.
In contrast, the 2024 strikes proceeded with relative quiet from Israel because they occurred against the backdrop of escalating regional tensions that had been intensifying since October 7, 2023—the war declared by Hezbollah against Israel and the attacks by Iran and the Houthis. Many global reactions were characterized by public support or tacit silence, primarily from many Western countries. Nonetheless, there were also criticisms and condemnations (for example, from France regarding Lebanon) based on the interests of the involved countries and the political context. In various countries, protests in support of Israel’s adversaries were also held.
Regarding the achievement of objectives, “Wooden Leg” is considered a significant success due to the severe damage inflicted on the PLO headquarters, the elimination of senior members, and the strengthening of Israeli deterrence—albeit in a limited way, primarily because Arafat himself was not harmed. The goals and targets of the strikes in the “Iron Swords” war—in Dahiya, Iran, and Hodeidah port—were fully achieved: the elimination of the “kingpin” Nasrallah, significant impairment of capabilities, and reduction of threats, especially concerning Iran and Hezbollah, the destruction of rocket production sites and advanced ammunition warehouses, severe damage to Israel’s strategic capabilities, as well as command and control facilities and air defense systems.
The strikes over the past year also represented an impact on strategic capabilities and established a “price tag” for anyone attempting to harm Israel (primarily concerning Iran and the Houthis). Israeli deterrence, which had been severely weakened over the past two years, strengthened against its adversaries following the strikes. However, alongside this, especially after the strikes in Iran, tensions increased, enhancing the potential for escalation and future confrontations.
The Impact of Leadership Eliminations
From the perspective of the internal response among the targeted parties, a clear difference is evident between then and now: while the PLO managed to maintain its leadership and reorganize its ranks after the attack in Tunisia, the elimination of Nasrallah created a leadership vacuum within Hezbollah, accompanied by internal crises and operational challenges. Eliminating a leader like Nasrallah sends a clear deterrent message to all of Israel’s adversaries, particularly Iran, and demonstrates Israel’s determination to remove security threats and protect its citizens.
In contrast, Operation “Wooden Leg” achieved limited deterrence, as the central figure, Arafat, survived. The difference in the outcomes of these operations and the fact that the first did not eliminate the “kingpin” illustrates how achieving objectives—especially when it involves eliminating key leaders—affects regional dynamics and the long-term implications of military actions.
The operation in Tunisia and the current operations highlight the importance of inter-branch and community cooperation, the synchronization between all intelligence agencies, the Air Force, and other operational units, and the significance of ongoing efforts to enhance collection capabilities, develop advanced systems, and operate a “winning intelligence-operational fist.”
Comparing then and now, especially in light of the heavy shadow of intelligence and the IDF’s failure to provide warning and respond to the surprise attack on October 7, we can learn about the significant and impressive capabilities of the Israeli intelligence community and the importance of adaptation, learning from the past, and applying lessons to improve effectiveness. This includes upgrading capabilities and continuously assessing the implications of regional developments and international influences.
